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USCONARC PARTICIPATION IN THE CUBAN CRISIS 1962 (U)

BY
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USOONAR PARTICIPATION IN THE CUBAN CRISIS 1962 (1)

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Ours Training and Readiness
U. S. Continental Army Command
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FOREWORD

(U) In the evening of 12 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy started the American action to an unknown build-up of Russian missiles on the island of Cuba. The President announced the establishment of a naval quarantine of Cuba to be effective on 14 October and added that we would take whatever steps necessary to neutralize this Russian threat as close to our shores. To the people of the United States the Cuban Crisis was the most serious to occur on the international scene since the end of World War II; Korea was thousands of miles away, Cuba lay a mere 90 miles from Florida. The U. S. military forces began girding for possible conflict and, while the military venture was under the control of a joint command, the U. S. Army forces were expected to bear the brunt of the invasion of the island and of the subsequent ground combat operations there.

(S) The purpose of this study is to record the principal actions taken by the U. S. Continental Army Command (USCOMAR) -- which became the Army component of the joint command as U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command -- in preparation for the possible conflict. As General Herbert B. Powell, Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command, later pointed out, the crisis gave him an excellent opportunity to rehearse his forces for armed combat without suffering a single casualty. This study is important because it affords a continuity in the field of contingency planning not found elsewhere in Headquarters, USCOMAR, or Department of the Army. It covers the background planning along with subsequent developments, changes, and preparations for actual implementation. The problems which arose were numerous, but their solutions were lessons to be learned by future planners in the event that such an emergency arose again.

(S) By the time that the Cuban Crisis occurred in late 1962, the contingency plans of the U. S. military forces designed to cope with just such a situation had undergone numerous changes. The U. S. Continental Army Command had observed the constant evolution of a number of such plans over a period of approximately two years. Contingency planning support of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), for the Cuban area had been under constant revision since late 1960. Despite the fact that the basic concept of operations remained relatively unchanged, the pertinent contingency plans were subjected to a continual evolutionary process consisting of an extensive reevaluation of force requirements which, in turn, resulted from a day-to-day reevaluation of the Army's capabilities. In the period of one year alone -- October 1961 to October 1962 -- some twenty revisions and four changes radically altered the force structures committed to these plans.

(TS) The major changes in the task organization can actually be grouped into five time frame periods. Between the time the original plan was developed in 1959 until the end of 1960, the Army forces comprised a task force made up of two Airborne Battle Groups with a strength of approximately 14,000 (STRAD Operation Plan 31-59). The first major re-appraisal was made

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In December 1948 when the Army divisions were increased to a full Airborne division (STRAC Operation Plan 33-811). Again, in May 1949, the force structure was increased to two Airborne divisions plus additional surface forces (Proposed STRAC Operation Plan 33-811). This latter plan called for the air drop of a six battle group force on D-day. This concept was again changed in October 1949 to provide for the air drop of a two battle group force on D-day (Revised STRAC Operation Plan 33-811). The published plan provided for two Airborne Divisions, an Infantry division, and an Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Air and Surface Echelons and an Infantry division in the On-call Echelon. Revolutionary changes were made to the operation plans during the period from October 1949 to January 1952 as a result of the Berlin situation, the reinforcement of U. S. Army Europe, the activation of two new divisions, and a call-up of reserve forces.

(S) The first indication that the military intentions of the United States against Cuba were actually serious occurred in February 1962 when the Secretary of Defense directed that planning be expedited with a view to reducing troop reaction times. Another major change to the operation plans occurred in August 1962 when the indications of an intensive Soviet build-up resulted in creation of a Floating Reserve and the assignment of additional forces. This latter change increased the force requirements to approximately 5 divisions with supporting forces, a manpower total of approximately 108,000. (The President of the United States questioned the adequacy of even this force when, at the height of the Cuban Crisis, he directed the Secretary of Defense to consider the use of additional troops.) MACVJAG's participation in any emergency operations in the Cuban area was greatly complicated by the fact that the Command had to be prepared to respond to the requirements of some ten different plans and related actions pertaining to just this one area of operations. The priorities for the various contingency plans, moreover, had changed four times during the short period from July to November 1962. The final priority change was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the very time when MACVJAG assault forces were being partially pre-positioned. At this late date, a top priority was directed for Operation Plans 312 and 318 over and above all other planning requirements.¹

(S) Actual preparations at the Department of Defense and Department of the Army levels did not always keep pace with the requirements of world-wide contingency planning. For example, in the field of ocean transport, Congress in 1954 authorized the Department of Defense to acquire a total of six billion, roll-off (ROBO) vessels for use in such operations. Four years later, during the United States intervention in Lebanon in 1958, U. S. Army, Europe (HARRBURG), highly praised the performance of the USS COMET, the only vessel of this type then in actual service. On the basis of the HARRBURG reports,

¹ See Brady, Incl to SF, MACVJAG to DODJF and CofS, 8 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 10 Nov 62, pp 2 - 3. (S) SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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the Department of the Army pressed for the acquisition of the remaining five vessels. In addition, the Department recommended a long-range program for the acquisition of sixteen such vessels, making a total of twenty-five which would be available for amphibious operations.¹¹ But by November 1962, only two such vessels were under the control of the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) and thus available for use by USCOMSAC. The use of such vessels for assault operations, moreover, was precluded upon their making off-shore with appropriate lightages. As of November 1962, only one Beach Barge Lighter (BBL), the JOHN E. B. PAGE, had been constructed for the U. S. Army and this was under the control of the U. S. Army Transportation Center at Fort Rucker, Virginia. Even though the second roll-on, roll-off ship, the USSC TARKENT, was a later acquisition, it had no ramps between decks and could not discharge into the BBL.

Not even at the USCOMSAC level were the lessons of previous operations taken into consideration. Again using the example of amphibious shipping, the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army -- in developing the history of the Lebanon Crisis of 1958 -- pointed out that the major criticism of the USSC COMET was that its limited headroom sharply curtailed the full use of its roll-on, roll-off capabilities. In the 1958 operations, the COMET was used to transport the 3d Battalion (Medium Tank), 15th Armor, from Bremerhaven, Germany, to Beirut, Lebanon. USCOMSAC contingency plans called for the COMET to transport an identical troop unit -- the 2d Battalion (Medium Tank), 89th Armor -- to Cuba. Yet USCOMSAC logistical planners did not discover the COMET's limitations for storing tanks and trucks on decks No. 3 and 4 until after loading operations were already underway. Tanks had to be de-loaded which caused the COMET to become so top heavy as to elicit complaints from the master concerning the seaworthiness of his vessel.¹² In fact, these limitations in the headroom, encountered first in Lebanon and now at the time of the Cuban Crisis, led the USCOMSAC logistical planners to conclude that vessels of this type were not suitable to lift the Operation Plan 314 assault elements to the objective area and that their use in future operations should be reconsidered.¹³

11.

GOCT, BA, First Beach Off, Lebanon, A Test of Contingency Planning, 15 Nov 58, pp. 12 - 22 and 38 - 39. (SECRET).

12.

(1) Ibid. (2) Mag. (USCOMSAC In R-51849), CO 2d Bn 89th Armor to COMUSMACV, PNO Saigon 1 Nov 61. (CONFIDENTIAL). In SCUTE P&O Div files.

13.

13. USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee to SCUTE, 15 May 63, subj: Summary Report of Ad Hoc Committee, Lessons Learned (OPAS 146) (I), ATUS-PAO (I), pp. 15 - 16. (SECRET). In SCUTE P&O Div files.

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(P) All in all, General Powell felt that Operation Plan 318 was basically sound and that the partial implementation during the Cuban Crisis presented his command with an excellent opportunity to rehearse the plan and to develop improvements. General Powell also felt that this partial implementation definitely served to improve the day-to-day administrative, operational, and logistical procedures of MDCMAB.²

(P) The following account records MDCMAB's accomplishments during the Cuban Crisis, particularly with regard to the problems which had to be overcome in order to respond to the demands imposed by such an emergency situation. Shortcomings were inevitable in preparing for possible conflict and these are included for the edification of future planning staffs. It is hoped that this experience will prove beneficial both to those responsible for plans development and to those who must implement the plans should a similar emergency again arise.

2.

Tab 4, "Comments on General Powell's Letter, subject: Review of Cuban Plans," Ltr, COMSAB to Ch/JCR, 20 Jan 43. (TOP SECRET). In AG-76 Com.

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GENERAL HERBERT S. POWELL

Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command
Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command

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ABSTRIDE

Frontispiece

Lt. Gen. John E. Waters, Actg. Deputy CG USCOMARG/
USARLANT

"

Maj. Gen. G. T. Sweeney, Chief of Staff, USARLANT Forward

"

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Chapter I

PRELUDE TO OPERATIONS¹

(S) Since the Island of Cuba lay within the area of responsibility allocated to the Atlantic Command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the task of developing plans for any eventual military operations in that area was undertaken by Admiral Robert L. Benson, Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT). Planning on a joint basis began in November 1959 when the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, in his role as planning agent for the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC), commenced army component planning for contingency operations in Cuba. CINCLANT's preliminary planning envisioned the use of a joint task force as a normal factor in his operations as a unified/specified commander. From the outset, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, was designated as Commander, Task Force 125 (Army Task Force), to operate under the Commander, U. S. Navy Second Fleet (COMUSMACVFLT), whom CINCLANT had designated as the Commander, Joint Task Force 122. Supporting plans were prepared by CINCLANT's service component commanders; Commander, Joint Task Force 122; and the designated Army, Navy, and Air Force Task Force Commanders.² Chart 1 shows CINCLANT's organizational structure for planning purposes in the Cuban contingency operations planning.

Selection of the Interim Army Component Commander

(S) The Secretary of Defense met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the month of July 1961 to resolve certain problems which had arisen in conjunction with CINCLANT's responsibilities for contingency planning in certain specified areas. As a result of the conference, the Secretary issued a directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which required both the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC), and the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command (COMTAC), to designate Interim Army

1.

Some confusion may arise from the fact that both ZULU (Z) time and REGULAR (R), or standard, time are used in connection with Cuban Contingency Planning and Operations. ZULU time is Greenwich time, which is five hours in advance of Eastern Standard Time (EST). To avoid such confusion, all time factors contained in the body of the study itself will be given in EST. In the footnotes, the date time group (DTG) of all messages will be given in ZULU time just as it appears on the message.

2.

(1) Hq. CINCLANT, CINCLANT Historical Account of the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U), p. 17. Op 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Hq. XVIII Airborne Corps, The Role of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U), pp. II-1 - II-5. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (3) Appendix I, subj: Task Orgn, JTF 122; to ANNEX E, subject: Task Orgn; to STRAC OPLAN 316-62 (U), 1 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). All in WDCR 75 Com.

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and Air Force Component Commanders to assist CINCLANT in his contingency planning for Cuba. The mission delineated for the Army Component Commander included responsibility for planning and executing, when directed, the required logistical and administrative support for the Joint Task Force (JTF) of CINCLANT's Operation Plans 312-61, 314-61, and 316-61.³

(P) In compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Defense, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, on 9 August 1961, designated Lt. Gen. J. B. Trapnell, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Interim Army Component Commander. This designation was in addition to General Trapnell's other duties and did not, in any way, affect his prior designation as Army Task Force Commander in support of CINCLANT Operation Plans 312, 314, and 316. The directive was not, however, to be construed as authority to activate an Army Component Command. Within a matter of one week following General Trapnell's appointment, the scope of the area of interest for planning purposes was enlarged to include Haiti and the Dominican Republic in addition to Cuba.⁴ Thus all planning and participation in support of CINCLANT's contingency planning regarding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic was the responsibility of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps; Headquarters, USCOMARAC, itself, was not actually involved in any of the early planning phases.

(P) At the beginning of October 1961, Lt. Gen. E. H. Howe succeeded Lt. Gen. Trapnell as Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and was designated by name as the Interim Army Component Commander for specified planning assistance. In this regard, General Howe was directed to use elements of his XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters staff whenever required to carry out his missions as Interim Army Component Commander. At this time, limited USCOMARAC participation in the planning phases was proposed. General Howe was informed that, in addition to those representatives of his own headquarters whom he directed to attend, representatives of Headquarters, USCOMARAC, would attend all future planning conferences with CINCLANT. The authority of the Army Component Commander was broadened to include responsibility for advising CINCLANT on all Army matters pertaining to his appropriate operational plans, although information copies of such advice were to be sent to Headquarters, USCOMARAC. As Interim Army Component Commander, General Howe

3.

(1) Memo, Ch/JCS to CofS A and CofS AF, 21 Jul 61, sub: Designation of Interim Army and AF Component Commanders to the Atlantic Command. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg 94687, (USCOMARAC M-324005), DA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 282051Z Jul 61. (SECRET). Both in DCSTH P60 Div files.

4.

(1) Msg 305877, CG USCOMARAC to CG XVIII Abn Corps and COMJAC, DTG 091710Z Aug 61. Op. 3. (SECRET). (2) Msg 94698 (USCOMARAC M-324483), DA DCSOPS to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 161913Z Aug 61. Op. 3. (SECRET). Both in DCSTH P60 Div files.

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was responsible for preparing all Army Component Command and Army Task Force operation plans (OPLANS) in support of the pertinent CINCLANT operation plans. Upon completion, all such plans were to be submitted to CINCLANT for his approval. In developing these plans, steps were to be taken to include logistical and administrative support policies for all Army forces supporting the various commands of CINCLANT Joint Task Force (JTF) 122. These forces included the Army Task Force (ATF), the Army Special Forces in support of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command, (JUNTYA), and the Civil Affairs support forces of Task Force 122.3. At the same time that the completed plans were submitted to CINCLANT for his approval, they were to be submitted to the Department of the Army through Headquarters, USCOMARMC, in order to secure departmental approval of its capability to support the plans. Information copies of the completed plans were also to be furnished to the six Armies located in the Continental United States so that necessary planning at that level could be initiated pending approval of the Department of the Army.³

The Establishment and Interrelation of CINCSTRIKE into the Planning Picture

(P) Toward the end of 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created a new unified command in the Continental United States, the U. S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM), with General Paul B. Adams as Commander in Chief (CINCSTRIKE). In delineating CINCSTRIKE's command relationships, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that the combat ready forces of TAC and USCOMARMC would be placed under his operational control to enable him to carry out his assigned missions. The Commanding General, USCOMARMC, and the Commanding General, TAC, were thereupon designated as the Army and Air Force Component Commanders of CINCSTRIKE.⁴ The latter designations, in particular, would seem to create complications with regard to previous commitments to unified command planning and operations.

(P) In order to eliminate any misunderstandings, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued clarifying instructions in March 1962. They pointed out that CINCSTRIKE's Component commanders were the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command (CINCARSTRIKE), and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Strike Command (CINCPASTRIKE), and that the component commands were respectively ASTRIKE and PASTRIKE. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully intended CINCSTRIKE to have continuous operational control over both CINCARSTRIKE and CINCPASTRIKE and their combat ready forces as required for the accomplishment

3.

(1) Msg 306433, CG USCOMARMC to CINCLANT, DTG 111344Z Oct 61.
(SECRET). (2) Msg 306675, CG USCOMARMC to CG XVII Air Corps, DTG 022143Z Nov 61. Co: 3. (SECRET). Both in DCSTTR P&D Div files.

6.

Ltr, Gen Paul B. Adams, CINCSTRIKE, to Gen H. H. Powell, CG USCOMARMC, 31 Dec 61, w/incl, subj: Command Relationships. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSTTR P&D Div files.

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of his missions. CINCSITRIK's delineated missions included, among others, the maintenance of a readiness posture which would permit him to augment other unified/specified commands and to implement JCS approved plans. CINCSITRIK's terms of reference, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insured that the combat-ready forces of both USCOMARAC and TAC would continue to be available to commanders of other unified/specified commands for the same purposes as in the past. One significant change was that USSTRICOM was now the point of contact for augmentation force planning by other unified/specified commands with regard to those Army and Air Force units assigned to USSTRICOM in the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) force tables. The point of contact had previously been Department of the Army and USCOMARAC for Army forces, and Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, and TAC for Air Force units. The JCS further instructed the commanders of all unified/specified commands to revise their plans accordingly in order to reflect these altered interrelationships. CINCSITRIK was now directed to develop all required supporting plans in conjunction with the commanders of the unified/specified commands so concerned. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT to designate (or require his component commanders to do so) Army and Air Force commanders as Interim Component Task Force Commanders to assist CINCLANT in his contingency planning for Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Upon receiving notice from CINCSITRIK that this measure had been accomplished, the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended to rescind their previous instructions by which the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force had required the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, and the Commanding General, TAC, to respectively designate Interim Army and Air Force Component Commanders.⁷ It is interesting to note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to CINCSITRIK and CINCPACSTRICK as the respective Army and Air Force Component Commanders and that they directed CINCSITRIK to designate Interim Army and Air Force Component Task Force Commanders. But they did not rescind their previous instructions as they had indicated, with the result that a misunderstanding was to arise on the part of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps.

(S) CINCSITRIK, in accordance with the instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed CINCPACSTRICK in the latter part of March 1962 that he intended to reaffirm the designation of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Interim Army Task Force Commander. Since CINCPACSTRICK offered no objections, the designation was reaffirmed on 4 April with instructions that the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, acknowledge the designation directly to CINCLANT. The resulting message, however, stated that the XVIII Airborne Corps commander was acknowledging his designation as Interim Army Component Commander. CINCSITRIK thereupon directed him to withdraw this acknowledgment and forward a corrected message to CINCLANT acknowledging

7.

(1) Msg 3743, (USCOMARAC to M-303314) JCS to CINCLANT and other Unified/Specified Commands, DTG 221937Z Mar 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg 3743, (USCOMARAC to M-303313) JCS to CINCLANT and CINCSITRIK, DTG 231936Z Mar 62. (SECRET). Both in AG Msg Com.

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designation as the Interia Army Task Force Commander. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, immediately questioned the Commanding General, USMACV, as to whether this change in designation constituted any change in thinking with regard to either the responsibilities of the XVIII Airborne Corps commander or the operational control of Army forces for operations under CINCLANT operation plans. The contested acknowledgment was, nevertheless, issued but the misunderstanding was not corrected as the former designations were continued until events indicated that the execution of CINCLANT operation plans was imminent in the Cuban area.⁸

Completion of CINCLANT Operation Plans

(CJF) In the meantime, CINCLANT completed his original concept of Operation Plan 118-61 -- the plan which was to eventually be partially implemented during the Cuban Crisis -- and distributed it during October 1961 to all subordinate levels with the instructions that it was effective for planning purposes upon receipt. This plan was to become effective for operations after it had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and after the necessary supporting plans had been developed. The plan was shortly approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to permit the subordinate headquarters to proceed with their required planning.⁹

(CJF) This plan was only one of a series of plans which were developed by CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH, and subordinate commands and headquarters prior to the occurrence of the Cuban Crisis in September, October, and November 1962. The primary plan in this series was CINCLANT Operation Plan 112, a fast reaction air strike plan, which was intended as a preliminary action to precede either of the two operation plans which provided for an actual invasion of the Cuban Island. CINCLANT's plan was, in turn, supported by CINCSOUTH Operation Plan 312, a deployment plan providing Air Force units to CINCLANT and Army units for the security protection of fighter airfields in Florida. The final plan in this 312 category was CINCSOUTH Operation Plan 313. Following the air strike plan in sequence were two similar plans -- CINCLANT Operation Plans 114 and 116 -- which provided for the actual invasion of Cuba. CINCLANT

8.

(1) Msg (USMACV to M-203633), CINCSOUTH to CINCSOUTH and CINCSOUTH, DTG 201000Z Mar 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg STRAC-272, (USMACV to M-203633), STRAC to JOB, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH and CINCSOUTH, DTG 041130Z Apr 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (3) Msg (USMACV to M-204336), CINCSOUTH to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 202030Z Apr 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (4) Msg AJBCO-CP-2971, (USMACV to M-204677), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG USMACV, DTG 202000Z Apr 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). All in AG Msg Sec.

9.

Ltr. CINCLANT to Distrib Ltr., 21 Oct 61, subj: CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan No. 116-61. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET - NOFORN). In NSRHS RSC files.

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Operation Plan 314 was an eighteen-day reaction plan for a coordinated air-berne and amphibious assault on Cuba with no pre-positioning of required forces. The CINCLANT Operation Plan was, in turn, supported by STRAC Operation Plan 314 as, as it was originally designated, Operation Plan 33-41. CINCPACIFIC Deployment Operation Plan 314 provided the Air Force and Army units and troops to CINCLANT which were listed in the AFLANT and STRAC operation plans. At the USCOMSAC level the CINCPACIFIC plan was supported by CING-ARSTRIFE Operation Plan 314. CINCLANT Operation Plan 316 was a five-day reaction plan for an airberne assault on Cuba to be followed as soon as possible by an amphibious attack. This plan was supported by STRAC Operation Plan 314, formerly designated Operation Plan 37-42. Both Operation Plans 314 and 316 had two alternate versions, the first of which reduced the reaction time to four and two days, respectively. The second alternate version eliminated Reserve Forces from the troop lists. Other related plans prepared concurrently included the Third Army Support Plan which was intended as a back-up plan for both Operation Plans 314 and 316.¹⁰

Preparations for Implementing Operation Plan 312

(36) The seriousness of the enemy build-up on Cuba by the end of September 1962 indicated to the U. S. Air Force a need for continuous planning and logistical actions to adequately cope with the expanding problems of the situation. Consequently, on 24 September 1962, General W. C. Sweeney, Jr., Commander, U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC), personally assumed the responsibilities of Interim Air Force Component Commander to assist CINCLANT in planning for the Cuban area. This step was taken to insure that the full capabilities of TAC were directed toward completing plans for Air Force participation in CINCLANT's operation plans. General Sweeney's action did not affect the responsibility of the Commanding General, Eleventh Air Force, as the Interim Air Force Task Force Commander.¹¹

(36) On 1 October, CINCLANT directed the Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic Command, (CINCPACFLT) and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy Forces, Atlantic Command, (CINCPACFLT) to take all feasible measures required to assure a maximum readiness to execute Operation Plan 312 by 20 October. CINCPACFLT was directed to commence pre-positioning, to the extent possible in advance of approval of the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that aviation ordnance material required to execute Operation Plan 312. CINCPACFLT was directed to pre-position Aviation Ordnance material on

¹⁰.

818 Study, Incl 64 BF, DCSUTR to DCSURF and CofS, 8 Dec 62, (obj: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 20 Nov 62, pp. 1-2. (TOP SECRET). In DCSUTR P&O Div files.

¹¹.

Msg C-42-1978, (USCOMSAC In 2-213487), COMTAC personal from Gen Sweeney to CINCLANT for Adm. Division, DTG 261450Z Sep 62. (TOP SECRET). In AS TS Com.

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a priority basis, as well as all support material required to achieve a desired readiness posture.¹²

(C) The instructions issued to CINCPACFLT and CINCSARPAC were not quite clear to CINCSTRIKE since the execution of Operation Plan 313 was but a prelude to execution of either Operation Plans 314 or 315. Because of the impact which CINCPACFLT's instructions would have on USSTRICOM forces, CINCSTRIKE desired a further explanation. He pointed out to CINCPACFLT that he assumed that the date of 30 October was not an operational date on which all forces concerned would assume a DEFCON 1 posture, but rather a date by which CINCPACFLT desired a maximum readiness of plans, personnel, and logistical support which included the pre-positioning of all classes of supplies as required. CINCSTRIKE also assumed the pre-positioning of combat forces as intended. CINCPACFLT immediately confirmed CINCSTRIKE's assumptions.¹³

Increased Army Readiness Posture

(C) By the beginning of October 1963, CINCPACFLT was convinced that, in order to develop the highest possible state of readiness to execute his operational plans, consideration would have to be given to relocating and pre-positioning troops, aircraft, ships, equipment, and supplies. He believed that much of the required pre-positioning could be accomplished with a minimum disturbance of current operational and training commitments and within budgetary limitations. As a planning factor, however, CINCPACFLT desired information from his Army Component Commander as to the extent and nature of pre-positioning which could be accomplished if the budgetary limitations were lifted. While CINCPACFLT's queries were directed to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, who was his designated Army assistant for contingency planning, USCOMARMC decided to take the necessary action and compile the required data. Not only did the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, direct the XVIII Airborne Corps commander to make recommendations concerning those measures desired to increase the readiness posture of TF 123 (the Army Task Force), but he also directed the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, to make recommendations as to measures desired to increase the capabilities of that command to support the staging and emergency resupply operations for TF 123.¹⁴

12.

Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-213457), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT and CINCSARPAC, DTG 041812Z Oct 63. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

13.

(1) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-213457), CINCSTRIKE to CINCPACFLT and CINCSARPAC, DTG 041842Z Oct 63. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-213578), CINCPACFLT to CINCSTRIKE, DTG 022348Z Oct 63. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

14.

(1) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-213745), CINCPACFLT to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 041910Z Oct 63. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (3) Msg. AFUTE-WF-302119, CG, USCOMARMC, to CG, XVIII Abn Corps and CG Third Army, DTG 041812Z Oct 63. (SECRET). In DCSTAF P&G Div files.

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(TOP) By the time that the USCOMARC commander had forwarded the request for recommendations to his subordinate commanders, events were already overtaking the planning actions and preparations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff called a planning conference for 12 October to develop appropriate answers for the Secretary of Defense on the status of preparations for military operations in Cuba. In particular, the conference was to develop specific actions which could be taken to increase the readiness posture of the U. S. Armed Forces and to reduce the reaction lead time for CINCLANT Operation Plan 314. The conference was also to determine requirements for, and the methods and costs involved in, pre-positioning of forces, shipping, Army heavy equipment, and certain supplies. The planners also were to consider the question of providing additional facilities which would be required to accomplish these factors, such as ports, airfields, staging areas, storage and handling facilities, and troop accommodations.¹⁵

(TOP) One direct result of the JCS conference was an increase in the supply priorities for all Active Army units which were assigned to STRAC Operation Plans 314 and 315. A. of 19 October 1961 the designated units were assigned a supply priority of 2.09 as defined in AG 11-12.18 As a result, USCOMARC troop units assigned to STRAC Operation Plans 314 and 315 were given a supply priority above the major overseas commands, particularly the European area, but certain other strategic areas and activities had been designated for yet higher priorities by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While this action did appreciably ease the material problems of the Operation Plans 314 and 315 troop units, it still did not guarantee that they would be provided with all the material which they required for combat action, especially if it was in world-wide short supply.

Changes in Command Relationships

(TOP) One significant change in command relationships for the execution of the operation plans occurred shortly after the Joint Chiefs of Staff conference in Washington. The Department of the Army designated General Herbert B. Powell, Commanding General, USCOMARC, as the Interim Army Component Commander to assist CINCLANT in his contingency planning in lieu of Lt. Gen. Hamilton B. Howe. This change in command relationships did not alter the designation of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Interim

15.

(1) Msg 6590, (USCOMARC In M-213904), JCS to CINCLANT, DTG 101722Z Oct 61. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 6629, (USCOMARC In M-213908), JCS to CINCLANT and CINCLANT, DTG 101819Z Oct 61. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG 15 Com.

16.

Msg, ATLOG-6-302189, CG USCOMARC to XI Armies, NEN and ANG, DTG 191944Z Oct 61. (SECRET). In DCSEUR P&O Div files.

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Army Task Force Commander for the same purpose.¹⁷ CINCLANT was also in the process of realigning his command structure and assessed that during operations he would exercise operational command of the individual service Task Forces through each component commander. Consequently, subsequent to the initial assault phase and when directed by CINCLANT, CINCARLANT would become the Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF), Cuba, rather than the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps. Thus the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, as CINCARLANT, would become the actual field commander of tactical operations in Cuba proper.¹⁸ Department of the Army, on the other hand, did not intend that the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, as CINCARLANT, should move outside the continental limits of the United States. His appointment as CINCARLANT was primarily for planning purposes. CINCLANT, therefore, amended his original instructions on command relationships for the implementation of Operation Plans 314 and 318 and designated the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba, to operate directly under his control at such time as he directed the establishment of that joint task force.¹⁹

Designation of the CG USCOMARMC as Department of the Army Coordinating Authority

(REF) In addition to his appointment as CINCLANT, the Department of the Army designated the Commanding General, USCOMARMC as the Departmental Coordinating Authority for the administrative support of USCOMARMC Army forces employed in CINCLANT's contingency plans and operations conducted in the Western Hemisphere. The departmental instructions indicated that particular emphasis in this regard should be placed on logistical and personnel support in order to insure the provision of adequate, timely, and continuous support for Army forces. In addition, the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, was designated CINCLANT's single point of contact with appropriate Department of the Army elements and commands. In carrying out these responsibilities, the USCOMARMC Commander was authorized to deal directly with other Army staff agencies and commands, other military services, and Department of Defense agencies. The

17.

(1) Msg 820294, (USCOMARMC In M-214151), SA DCSTPS to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 162112Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg 100137, CG USCOMARMC to CINCLANT, DTG 173104Z Oct 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSTPS P&O Div files.

18.

(1) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-214448), CINCLANT to JCS, CINCARLANT, et al, DTG 201714Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCSTPS P&O Div files. (2) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-1100), CG XVIII Air Corps to SA DCSTPS, DTG 222412Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Cos.

19.

(1) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-214934), CINCLANT to JCS, DTG 230402Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg. (USCOMARMC In M-217217), SA DCSTPS to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 041411Z Oct 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSTPS P&O Div files.

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only provision imposed upon the Commanding General, USCOMARC, in this regard was that the coordination would be effected at the lowest level of command consistent with the function.²⁰

Assumption of Operational Control by CINCLANT

(P) CINCLANT realigned his command structure effective 20 October 1962 to better prepare for the implementation of his operations plans. As a first step, he disestablished the Headquarters of Task Force 112 and transferred its functions to his own headquarters. By this time, the Commanding General, USCOMARC, had been designated CINCOMANT; the Commanding General, IAC, had been designated CINCAPLANT; and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, U. S. Navy (CINCLANTFLT) had been designated CINCLANT. During actual operations, CINCLANT intended to exercise operational command of his individual service task forces through these respective component commanders. All plans and orders which had previously been issued by Task Force 112 were to remain in effect until revoked by CINCLANT. In the conduct of operations incident to the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plans 314 and 318, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, was to be Commander of the Army Task Force; the Commanding General, Eleventh Air Force, was to be commander of the Air Force Task Force; and the Commander, Atlantic Amphibious Forces, U. S. Navy, was to be commander of the Navy Task Force. After some misunderstanding concerning the responsibilities of CINCLANT, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, was again designated to be Commander, Joint Task Force, Cuba, upon its establishment. (SECRET 2)24

(P) The Joint Chiefs of Staff took definite preparatory steps in mid-October when it became evident that the implementation of CINCLANT's operation plans was an imminent possibility. They announced on 19 October that they were readying plans to alert CINCSOUTH for temporary loss of operational control of the Army and Air Force units assigned to the troop lists and support lists of CINCLANT's Operation Plans 312, 314, and 318. The Joint Chiefs of Staff actually notified CINCSOUTH late in the evening of 21 October that they were temporarily transferring operational control of all Army and Air Force units which were then under his operational control but included in CINCLANT operation plans for Cuba. A few hours later, CINCSOUTH notified both CINCAPLANT and CINCOMANT that temporary operational control of all forces as designated above passed to CINCLANT effective at once. CINCLANT,

20.

Msg. (USCOMARC in M-478487), Re DCROPS to CG USCOMARC, PFC 181756Z Oct 62. (FOUO). In DCSTATE P&O Div files.

21.

(1) Msg. (USCOMARC in M-214308), CINCLANT to JCS, PFC 190712Z Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg. (USCOMARC in M-214448), CINCLANT to JCS, CINCOMANT, et al, PFC 284748Z Oct 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSTATE P&O Div files.

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on the other hand, did not notify his component commanders of his assumption of operational control of the transferred forces until approximately noon of the following day. At that time he directed his component commanders to keep him advised of the status of their forces.²²

(C) Prior to the actual transfer of operational control of these units included in the pertinent CINCLANT operational plans, CINCLANT requested a summary of the Army Units assigned to Operation Plan 316 in terms of the numbers of divisions, brigades, combat commands, and the like. The list of troop units was to be submitted in three categories: the air echelon, the surface echelon, and the reserve forces. On 13 October, CINCLANT forwarded a revised list of the Army units which had been placed under CINCLANT's operational control on the previous day. (CHART 1)²³

Selection of Code Word for Cuban Operations and Planning

(C) With the alerting of troop units for pre-positioning actions and the refinement of plans for actual execution of the operations plans, a code word of lower security classification was required for ease of communication and action. Consequently, on 24 October 1962 the code word "SCARBARDS" was assigned for use in identifying all communications relating to Cuban planning and operations. All messages concerning such planning and operations for the Cuban contingency were to be prefaced by the words "OPERATION SCARBARDS." While the classification of the code word itself was Confidential, its meaning was TOP SECRET. Consequently, the originators of all messages were cautioned to take proper care so that the meaning of the code word was not revealed when used in Secret or Confidential messages.²⁴

Concept of Operations in the Objective Area

(C) The planned concept of operations for Task Force 125 (Army Task Force) within the objective area did not provide for any alert notification

22.

(1) Msg 6842, (USCOMARC In M-214619), JCS to CINCPAC, DTG 220222Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 3789-G 534/62 (USCOMARC In M-214563), CINCPAC to CINCLANT, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, DTG 220410Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg. (USCOMARC In M-214709), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, DTG 221448Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Com.

23.

(1) Msg. (USCOMARC In M-214300), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 191346Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg. (USCOMARC In M-214447), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 202148Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) Msg 102263, CG USCOMARC to CINCLANT, DTG 230216Z Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In POSUTR P&O Rev Files.

24.

Msg 102263, CG USCOMARC to II Armored, III Corps and XVIII Air Corps, DTG 240218Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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on pre-positioning of forces prior to the day on which the plan was ordered into execution. On the designated D-day, selected Army forces were to conduct an airborne assault in the vicinity of Havana, Cuba, and to participate in a simultaneous amphibious assault by Task Force 123 (Navy Task Force) in the vicinity of Tarara. The major operational objectives of the airborne assault were the seizure, occupation and defense of four strategic airfields in the vicinity of Havana to include San Antonio de los Baños Airport, Jose Marti International Airport, the Mariel Naval Air Station, and the airfield at Baracoa. In addition to the airfields, the Commander, Task Force 123 was to seize the port of Mariel, Cuba, and to land designated surface elements of his task force through that harbor complex. As a final measure, he was to provide any required assistance to the Commander, Task Force 128 (Amphibious Task Force) in landing designated surface elements of Task Force 123 over-the-beaches in the vicinity of Tarara after that area had been secured by Landing Group West. The link-up between the Commander, Task Force 123 and Landing Group West would most probably set the stage for the designation of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps (Commander, Task Force 125) as Commander, Joint Task Force, Cuba, who would then be responsible for the conduct of all subsequent operations in the objective area.²⁵

25.

Annex A, subj: Concept of Operations; to STRAC OPLAN 316-63 (U), 1 Oct 63, pp. A-1 thru A-6. (TOP SECRET). In DCSPTR 79 con.

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Chapter 11

DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING FACTORS²⁶

Recapitulation of Plans Development

(S) The Commander in Chief, Atlantic, had developed three primary contingency plans to cope with emergency situations in the Cuban area: CINCLANT Operation Plans 312, 314, and 316. CINCLANT Operation Plan 312 was a fast reaction air strike plan designed to precede either Operation Plan 314 or 316, depending upon which was selected for actual ground-troop assault operations on Cuba. Operation Plan 314 was an eighteen-day reaction time plan for a coordinated airborne and amphibious assault on the island of Cuba. No pre-positioning of forces was either intended or required to execute Operation Plan 314. CINCLANT Operation Plan 316, on the other hand, was originally developed as a five-day reaction time plan for an initial airborne assault on Cuba, to be followed as soon as possible and practicable by an amphibious attack. This concept was later modified to provide for a seven-day reaction time and a simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault.²⁷ In order to provide a clearer understanding for those of his subordinate commanders who were responsible for planning actions and for actual operations when and if the plans were implemented, CINCLANT defined certain terms which specifically applied to operations in the Cuban area. E-day for any of the subject plans was the day on which any particular plan was ordered into execution by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCLANT was responsible for designating E-hour, i.e., the precise time at which the particular plan would be executed. D-day was to be designated separately for each operations plan to be executed, and was defined as the day on which an operation commenced, e.g., an air strike, bombardment, assault landing, or the like. E-hour applied only to Operation Plan 312 since it was defined as the time at which the first aerial ordnance would be dropped on Cuba. E-hour was scheduled to occur on D-day of Operation Plan 312. E-hour was defined as the time that the airborne assault commenced on E-day of Operation Plan 314. E-hour was likewise defined as the time at which the first wave of the amphibious assault forces would land on Cuban soil on E-day of the 316 Plan. It should be noted that these definitions

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In the interest of continuity and organization, the development of planning factors is considered separate from, and prior to, treatment of the pre-positioning and pre-operational phases of Cuban contingency actions.

²⁷

See Study, Incl to SF, DCSUTR to DCSURF and CofS, 8 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 20 Nov 62. p. 1-2 (TOP SECRET).
1a AG TS Com.

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indicated that both F-hour and H-hour for Operation Plan 316 would occur on D-day for that particular plan.²⁸

Development of Priorities for the Contingency Plans

(S) As has been indicated earlier, priorities for the development of the previous contingency plans changed a number of times during the period from late 1960 up to the time of the Cuban Crisis. The seriousness of planning for such contingency actions in the Cuban area was emphasized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1962 when they established a first priority basis for the completion of all Cuban contingency plans. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the preparation of alternate plans for both Operation Plans 314 and 316 with a reduction of the reaction time for the subject plans from 18 to 4 days and from 5 to 3 days, respectively. CINCLANT, feeling that any further development of plans to support CINCLANT Operation Plan 316 might be unnecessary, directed that a higher priority be given to Operation Plan 314. He based this decision on an opinion of his Headquarters staff that the continued growth and estimated current strength of the Cuban Armed Forces had already rendered inadequate the concept of operations developed for Operation Plan 316. All major contemplated operations, therefore, were to be based on Operation Plan 314.²⁹ This decision notwithstanding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT in mid-October to bring all units contained in the Task Organization for his Operation Plan 316 to the highest state of readiness for a possible execution of that plan. It was on the following day that the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the modification of Operation Plan 316 on a priority basis so as to provide for a simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault on the seventh day rather than the fifth after the commencement of hostilities.³⁰ Unit transportation requirements for the seven-day version of this operation plan were identical to those for the five-day version. These latter plans had already been developed and were in the hands of those agencies responsible for the development of movement schedules. Current surface movement schedules were already programmed

28.

Msg, (USCOMARC In M-215238), CINCLANT to CINCSANT, 21 21, DTG 142018Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

29.

(1) Msg 3385 (USCOMARC In M-109123), JCS to CINCLANT, CG, USCOMARC, 21 21, DTG 180601Z Feb 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARC In M-202197), CINCLANT to CG, USCOMARC, DTG 241354Z Feb 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

30.

(1) Msg 300180, CG USCOMARC to 21 Army, DTG 170610Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARC In M-214284), CINCLANT to CINCSANT, DTG 190638Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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for publication by 12 October 1962. Daily air movement schedules required attention on a priority basis.³¹

(TOP SECRET) Just a few days later, CINCLANT confused the picture by announcing to his component commanders that, in order to achieve the most advanced state of readiness which could be achieved short of actual hostilities, the time had arrived when Phase II of either Operation Plan 314 or 316 should be executed or, as an alternative, Plan 314G (another variation of Operation Plan 314) should be executed. This decision meant that once again priorities would be changed at a time when unit pre-positioning plans were progressing in an orderly manner. Realizing this disadvantage, CINCLANT requested recommendations from each of his component commanders as to which of the variations of either of the two plans should be executed. He pointed out that the execution of Operation Plan 314G would not lessen the capability of his commanders to execute either version of Operation Plan 316 nor, on the other hand, would it serve to significantly improve the reaction time under Operation Plan 316. Its only result would be an earlier introduction of follow-on forces in the event that Operation Plan 316 were also executed. Execution of Phase II of Operation Plan 314 would have the same disadvantages as Plan 314G with an added disadvantage of producing a readiness posture so high that it could not be held for even the 60-day period envisioned under Plan 314 G. Phase II of Operation Plan 316 had similar disadvantages and, furthermore, required a shift to another plan halfway through, if a further build-up of forces were desired.³²

(TOP SECRET) The Commanding General, USCOMBAC, felt that the disadvantages inherent in any one of the three courses of action proposed by CINCLANT far outweighed any advantages they might present. The greatest disadvantage by far lay in the fact that the concentration of troops required for the execution of any one of these three plans rendered a major portion of the U. S. D-Day assault capability vulnerable to enemy atomic strikes. He pointed out that it would be an excellent Soviet technique to allow us to concentrate our forces and thus increase the probability of Soviet success in a pre-emptive strike. He further believed that his previous recommendations for the pre-positioning of certain units would produce the best possible posture from which operations could commence. The picture should not be confused by trying to execute any one of the three plans proposed by CINCLANT. He reiterated that the seven-day version of Operation Plan 316 -- with pre-positioning as necessary -- was the most logical course of action to insure that initial combat forces could meet reduced reaction times.³³

31.

Msg 392275, CG USCOMBAC to CINCLANT and CINCSITRICK, 30 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

32.

Msg (USCOMBAC In M-214688), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, DTS 139531Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

33.

Msg 392470, CG USCOMBAC to CINCLANT, MSG 140120Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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(C) As a result of his commanders' recommendations, CINCLANT requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 October to drop all consideration of Operation Plan 114 and to concentrate on Plan 116, preferably its seven-day version. He also pointed out that recent changes to Operation Plan 113 had dictated certain changes in staging bases for CINCLANT forces. Plans involving these changes had been completed for both versions of Operation Plan 116, but not for Plan 114. Completion of similar planning for Operations Plan 114 would require an estimated seven additional days of planning time. Moreover, shipping schedules for Plan 114 were considerably different from those required for Plan 116. Any change back to Plan 114 at this stage of preparations would only serve to slow up these preparations and produce a diminished effort in the objective area. The posture of U. S. Army ground forces by 14 October was pointed toward execution of the seven-day version of Plan 116. In addition, certain developments by this time permitted Plan 116 to compare very favorably with the assault capabilities of Plan 114. CINCLANT intended to make further recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that selected Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) and commercial shipping be pre-positioned at docksides and that material and personnel concerned be moved into the forward area to facilitate rapid loading and deployment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred with CINCLANT's recommendation on 26 October at which time they directed that planning and preparations for Plan 114 be discontinued and that all effort be concentrated on refinements in planning for Plan 116 and on such preparatory measures as were feasible for its implementation if so directed.³⁴ Thus, by 18 October, planning priority was finally shifted to Operation Plan 116, alone.

Development of Related Planning at Headquarters, USCOMSAC

(C) Headquarters, USCOMSAC, was hampered in developing the related plans for Cuban contingency actions by the manpower commitments which were necessary to support the operation plans themselves, to provide the supporting force structure, and to provide air defense units for the proper defense of threatened areas in the Southeastern United States. The total manpower requirements which had to be provided from USCOMSAC resources during the duration of the Cuban Crisis were as follows:³⁵

34.

(1) Hag (USCOMSAC Ir W-313339), CINCLANT to CINCLANT, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, DTG 164030Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Hag (USCOMSAC In C-1255), JCS to CINCLANT, DTG 163644Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Caa.

35.

SEE Study, Sent to DC, (SCOUTS to DCSRP and GALS, 1 Box 62, reby: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 28 Nov 62. p. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Caa.

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<u>REQUIREMENTS</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>172,873</u>
STRAC Operation Plan 318	108,891
Joint Defense Plan - Florida Keys (JDF-FLAK)	4,743
Third Army Staging Support Plan	3,856
AKILANT Forward	1,262
Coordinating authority - SA (Peninsula Base Command)	1,310
Operation Plan 520 (Reinforcement of USARVNA)	32,411
Operation Plan 521 (Reinforcement of USARVNA)	18,882
air defense	2,057

(S) as the military situation in the Cuban area worsened, all levels of command were vitally interested in revising their operations plans so as to provide the best possible readiness posture for any contingency which might arise. CINCLANT discussed his operations plans with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on 4 October and proposed the possible pre-positioning of aircraft, weapons, and units, to include the movement of armored units from Ft. Hood, Texas, to Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Secretary of Defense indicated that cost was no object and that if at all possible, a duplicate set of equipment might be pre-positioned at Galveston, Texas, for the participating armor units.³⁶ Armed with this decision, the USCOMSARCOM planning staff discussed a series of refinements to the basic operations plans with Third Army and XVIII Airborne Corps, the first of which included restationing an Armored Combat Command from Fort Hood to Fort Stewart and constructing the necessary LST ramps at designated seaports to facilitate loading of the armor equipment. USCOMSARCOM also considered repositioning the assigned boat and terminal service companies or possibly pre-positioning only their equipment. Pre-positioning was also considered for the artillery battalions included in the Surface Echelon. The Commanding General, USCOMSARCOM, had already requested CINCPACRICK to activate Opa Locks Air Force Base and to designate the location of the Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB) so that

36.

Fort Stewart, DCSURF vgl Exlon, 10 Oct 62. Incl to HQ, DCSURF re ADCORF, CofS and DCSURF, 11 Oct 62, subj: CINCLANT Conference (U). (TOP SECRET) In AG TS Com.

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proper planning could proceed at the USCOMARC level. In connection with these latter actions, USCOMARC intended to pre-position materials handling equipment (OME) at the staging bases and take steps to pre-position some emergency ammunition at Ops Techs Air Force Base.³⁷ The Joint Chiefs of Staff thereupon requested an immediate cost estimate of the actions necessary to produce such an advanced readiness posture. USCOMARC/USARIANT estimates for directed actions under Operation Plan 316 were divided into two categories: immediate costs for equipping the units and immediate costs for equipment maintenance. Transportation costs were also estimated for redistributing equipment and pre-positioning units and material which would occur when the Command was authorized to assume the seven-day posture. An estimated \$6,000,000 was needed to complete Prescribed Loads Lists (PLL). Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL), and Universal Missions Loads for the participating units. An additional \$6,000,000 was required for maintenance actions to bring all units up to STRAC standards. USCOMARC pointed out that the cost for these actions in normal times would be only \$4,000,000 but that the additional \$2,000,000 was required for overtime pay and the hire of additional personnel. In this latter regard, USCOMARC required an immediate removal of all civilian personnel hire ceilings. USCOMARC also estimated that an additional 10 percent would have to be added to these costs to cover any unforeseen contingencies. When authorized to assume the seven-day readiness posture, USCOMARC/ARIANT would have to take the following actions with their estimated costs as indicated:

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| a. Redistribute USCOMARC assets in order to properly equip all units. Estimated transportation costs: | \$100,000 |
| b. Pre-position a hospital train at Atlanta, Georgia. Transportation costs from Ogden, Utah: | \$ 7,000 |
| c. Break-out of the Class IV Air Issues Project stored at Richmond, Virginia. Labor costs plus cost of the project: | \$100,000 |
| d. Temporarily relocate the 47th Field Hospital from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Fort Gordon, Georgia. Estimated transportation costs: | \$ 76,000 |
| e. Station best companies and terminal service companies from Fort Meade and Fort Story, Virginia, to the Southeastern United States. Estimated transportation costs: | \$200,000 |

³⁷.

(1) USCOMARC Telcon TT-17, 11 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET).

(2) USCOMARC Telcon TT-50 (TT-16), 200 111830Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET).
both in AG TS Com.

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1. Pre-position materials handling equipment and elements of units for staging base support at military posts in the Southeastern United States.
Estimated transportation costs: \$ 24,000

In addition, it was not possible to estimate the sum, to be reported by the Commanding General, U. S. Army Materiel Command, which would be required to fill requisitions for pre-positioned material. As in the previous costs, an additional 10 percent was estimated as required to cover any unforeseen contingencies. Thus USCOMARMC estimated that actions required to assume the best possible readiness posture in connection with Operation Plan 316 would cost approximately \$13,750,000 plus an undetermined amount for pre-positioned supplies and equipment, the cost of which would be reported by the Army Materiel Command. In addition, the estimates did not include any projection of transportation costs which might be required to make a further distribution of material or to move other units. At the same time, USCOMARMC pointed out to the Department of the Army that aircraft spare and repair parts were in critical short supply in the Continental United States and requested departmental action to retroflood such items from the depots of U. S. Army, Europe.³⁸

[38] At a conference between the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, and the Chief of Staff, United States Army, and their respective staffs on 21 October, a number of questions were raised which required further planning actions at the USCOMARMC level. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, questioned the availability of the 4th Infantry Division Brigade as a part of the Floating Reserve. The Chief of Staff stated that a possible requirement to move a two-division force to Europe of necessity held in the decision to use 4th Infantry Division troops for Operation Plan 316. When a question was raised concerning offloading capabilities for armored units, General Powell pointed out that LST ramps could not be developed because of security requirements. At this point, the Chief of Staff directed that USCOMARMC send representatives on the following day to complete on-the-spot planning and stated that they could assume that P-day would begin authority to initiate construction of the loading ramps. The Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, questioned the location of the aerial resupply point and stressed the importance of locating the Army control headquarters on the resupply complex. The USCOMARMC commander indicated that both his Forward Headquarters and the 1st Logistical Command would be so located. To close the planning conference, the Chief of Staff emphasized that this was

38.

Reg. ATLOC-P-102181, CG USCOMARMC to DA DCSOPS, DEC 1947532 Oct 62.
(TOP SECRET). In ad to Com.

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still a planning exercise -- albeit a very realistic one -- and for that reason the operations plan could be modified at any time as dictated by events.³⁹

(S) The strategic concept for implementing CINCLANT Operation Plan 316, as developed by USCOMMAC and its subordinate commands, supported the provisions of that plan for a simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault on the island of Cuba. Follow-on forces were to be deployed both by air and by sea to effect a rapid build-up of forces which would insure an early and decisive victory. USCOMMAC planned to stage the air echelon through nine staging bases in Florida and to use a total of thirteen airports from New York City to Beaumont, Texas, for these forces to be deployed by sea. In all, a total of approximately 120,000 Army troops were earmarked to support a possible assault on Cuba including those which were required to support the operation within the continental United States.⁴⁰

(S) Strict security measures, which were of necessity imposed on the planning and preliminary operations, hampered the actions that could be, and would have to be, taken by participating troop units and agencies. Downgrading plans were accordingly developed for STMAC Operation Plan 316 which governed the troop units to be provided for CINCLANT's use in the assault operations. It was announced on 22 October 1962 that the STMAC operation plan would be downgraded to SECRET on D-day and to CONFIDENTIAL on D-day.⁴¹

Estimates of USCOMMAC's Readiness Posture

(S) General Powell, Commanding General, USCOMMAC and CINCLANT, forwarded his summary of USCOMMAC's readiness posture to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on 28 October 1962. He pointed out that while planning actions had been thorough and exhaustive over a period of many months, dangers still lay ahead in the possible feasibility of American railroads to meet planned troop movement schedules; in possible enemy damage to ports, airfields, and other facilities; and in the uncertain nature of port and beach unloading facilities. He emphasized that the pre-positioning of troop units, railroad rolling stock, equipment and supplies -- including some preloading of

39.

Memorandum for Red, Lt. Col. J. W. Linn, COMUSMACV SA, 23 Oct 62, subj: Conference on Cuban Planning (S). (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

40.

Briefing for the Red Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, by Gen. H. E. Powell, CG USCOMMAC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation. (TOP SECRET). In COMUSMACV AGO Doc 47 22 files.

41.

Msg (USCOMMAC In M-214932), CG XVIII Air Corps to CG USCOMMAC 22 21, DTG 220400Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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vessels -- was required to the fullest extent practicable. He reiterated that this was one of the greatest and most complex movements that the Army had ever attempted within a limited time and over such great distances. Changes from Operation Plan 314 to 316 were made hurriedly and this did not permit as detailed a review of the planning by the USCOMARMC staff as General Powell would have liked. He pointed out that a shortage of both Infantry officers and enlisted personnel existed in the combat units and created a situation where some rifle companies reported only 70 percent of authorized strength. A shortage of aviators was also critical but this was caused both by overcommitments of aviator personnel and by the operations being conducted in Southeastern Asia. USCOMARMC was taking every step possible to alleviate these shortages and General Powell believed that an acceptable level of service could be achieved in the indicated branches. He pointed out that equipment had been transferred between units and from stock in order to make units operationally effective. Communications was still the weakest link but General Powell believed that the resources available to U. S. Army forces were adequate. As a final point, General Powell pointed out that both the morale and the fighting spirit of all the men concerned were at an extremely high level but that the required personnel turbulence had lowered the operational effectiveness of some units despite excellent training records.⁴²

Planning in Connection with USCOMARMC Foreign Liaison Officers

(TOP) As preparations for implementation of Operation Plan 316 progressed, a question arose concerning the British and Canadian Liaison Officers accredited to Headquarters, USCOMARMC. Plans which called for General Powell to displace to his Command Post in the forward area might possibly bring a request from the British and Canadian officers concerned to accompany him. Their accreditations attached them to the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, and specified that they were authorized to deal with his headquarters and other commands on matters concerning standardization, training policies, doctrine, and other non-operational matters. But when General Powell displaced to his Forward Command Post, he would be doing so as CINC-ARLANT and not as the Commanding General, USCOMARMC. Consequently, it was the considered opinion of planning officers at Headquarters, USCOMARMC, that the accredited Liaison Officers should not accompany General Powell to ARLANT's Forward Command Post and, further, that British and Canadian Liaison Officers should not be accredited to CINCARLANT. USCOMARMC presumed that Department of the Army would issue the necessary instructions at the time when appropriate U. S. Governmental Agencies deemed that such Liaison was both necessary and advisable, a situation that never came to pass.⁴³

42.

Ltr, Gen. W. B. Powell, CG USCOMARMC, to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, CofS A, 28 Oct 62, re: Operation Plan 316, (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

43.

Msg 101317, CG USCOMARMC to AG-OSI, BA, ATTN: For La Off, DTG 242210Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Substitution of Units Recommended for Operation Plan 316

(JRF) In response to planning requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanding General, USCOMSARL, prepared an additional operation plan which called for the deployment of 1 Infantry Division, 1 armored division, and 10 non-divisional units minus their equipment, to U. S. Army Europe where they would "fall-in" on pre-positioned equipment. Guidance from Department of the Army directed that the 2d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions be designated for this purpose, but the designation was complicated by the fact that the 2d Armored Division was already committed as an element of the assault forces of Operation Plan 316. The 1st Armored Division could not be substituted for the 2d Armored Division in Operation Plan 316 (Support of HAMMERS) for the simple reason that the 1st Armored Division had been organized under the ROAD concept while the divisional equipment pre-positioned in Europe was for a ROTAD division. Since the imminence of action in the Cuban area also reflected a need to reinforce the European garrison, Combat Command C of the 2d Armored Division was deleted from the Operation Plan 316 troop list, effective 15 October 1962, and a comparable force from the 1st Armored Division was substituted in order to form Task Force CHARLIE of the assault forces.⁴⁴ Three days later the 4th Infantry Division forces were likewise deleted from the Operation Plan 316 troop list. Once again, the 1st Armored Division was directed to furnish substitute forces to form this part of the Floating Reserve, but these latter forces were to be furnished from divisional resources only after Task Force CHARLIE had been constituted. Since the 4th Infantry Division had been scheduled to outload through the ports of Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia, USCOMSARL recommended that the same ports be used to outload these elements of the 1st Armored Division assigned to the Floating Reserve since the arrival times of the substitute units in the objective area would be identical with those previously established for the 4th Infantry Division.⁴⁵ In like manner, the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were released from a requirement to provide both a Division Ready Force (DRF) and an Immediate Ready Force (IRF), missions which were delegated to the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) on 22 October 1962. The plans which Fifth Army submitted for the Division Ready Force required a

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(1) USCOMSARL Briefing for the CofS A, 23 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation, pp. 8-9. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Hag 102175, CG USCOMSARL to CINCPACRIB, MSG 192213Z Oct 62. Sp. 1. (SECRET). In DCSUTR 960 Div files.

45-

(1) Hag 102316, CG USCOMSARL to CINCPACRIB and DCSOPS Bd, 22 Oct 62. Sp. 1. (TOP SECRET). (2) Hag 102364, CG USCOMSARL to DCSOPS Bd, HETS, DINS, INM, USATPCA and USATPCS, 23 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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total of only 1,496 personnel, leaving a sizeable element of the division which would be committed to other operational plans as required.⁴⁶

Augmentation Planning for Operation Plan 114

(S) By the beginning of November the Secretary of Defense felt that the forces earmarked for Operation Plan 114 seemed a bit thin. He pointed out that the three divisions which were to be held in reserve in the Continental United States could be used in the operations and that all available National Guard divisions should be called up. He called a conference of all planning agencies involved to discuss this situation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴⁷ The Commanding General, USCOMARC, recommended that a Combat Command of the 2d Armored Division and a brigade force of the 4th Infantry Division, consisting of three battle groups be added to the Troop List. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, on the other hand, recommended the movement of the entire 2d Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division to the Surface Subarea and the use of the 3d Infantry Division and either the 2d Armored or 4th Infantry Divisions -- or any desired combinations thereof -- as a floating reserve. The Chief of Staff, United States Army, pointed out that the availability of sufficient amphibious shipping capability constituted the major drawback to the suggestions made by the XVIII Airborne Corps' commander. In fact, this shortage would affect any recommendations made for augmenting the forces assigned to Operation Plan 114.⁴⁸

(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 7 November that the force level currently included in the Troop Lists of Operation Plan 114 be accepted as adequate to achieve the national objectives of the United States in the Cuban area. They did decide, however, that a combat command of the 2d Armored Division and the entire 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) -- with necessary supporting forces -- be earmarked for possible augmentation of the operations plan. Three additional divisional forces were not to be moved from their home stations without a prior directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a

46.

(1) Msg 101104, CG USCOMARC to CINCPAC and BSCOPS, SA, 21 Oct 62. op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg (USCOMARC In R-218749), CG Fifth Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 081603Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL) In DCSTEN P&O Div files.

47.

Msg 7226 (USCOMARC In R-218106), JCS to CINCLANT, DTG 041904Z Nov 62. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

48.

(1) Msg 101129, CG USCOMARC to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 6 Nov 62. op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg. AJCAG 11-1-62 (USCOMARC In R-21964), 101st Abn Div and HOMER to CINCLANT, DTG 041750Z Nov 62. op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg AJCAG 11-3-62 (USCOMARC In R-2533), 101st Abn Div and WHEELER to DA, DTG 070044Z Nov 62. op. 3. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Com.

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decision which gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff an opportunity to assess the situation following initial operations in Cuba. The Commanding General, USCOMBAG, consequently directed that the designated divisional units be brought up to 90 percent of authorized strength but that individuals already on temporary duty, or earmarked for units already on the Group List of Operation Plan 316, or assigned to units designated for Operation Plans 320 and 321, not be considered as available resources against the new requirements.⁴⁸ The 2d Armored Division pointed out that it could readily furnish a combat-ready combat command with the exception of howitzers for a 155-mm. howitzer battery. The total divisional assets in 155-mm. howitzers at that time was five tubes. The division also pointed out that diversion of Authorized Stockpile List stocks to the 1st Armored Division had created shortages in this supply category for the units designated to form the combat command. As late as the end of November 1962, CINCSALANT was still pointing out to the Department of the Army that, due mainly to shortages in equipment and supplies, neither the 3d Infantry Division nor the 1st Armored Division were at the readiness posture established for other forces earmarked for Operation Plan 316. Department of the Army had previously refused to make any changes in supply priorities for the units in question. An increase in priorities was an absolute necessity in order to bring these units to a readiness posture within the readiness time frame. On 24 November the Commanding General, USCOMBAG, requested Department of the Army to reconsider its previous decisions and to assign appropriate supply priorities to the two divisions selected for augmentation to Plan 316.⁴⁹

~~(S)~~ The addition of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) to Operation Plan 316 required the reorganization of a major portion of the division, i.e., particularly that portion which was located at Camp Carson, Colorado. The Commanding General, USCOMBAG, announced on 8 November that, for planning purposes only, he was considering the movement of elements of the 3d Division to the First or Second Army Area. The Second Army stationing plan developed in support of this requirement called for stationing the division on a temporary basis -- sixty to ninety days -- at two locations in Virginia, Camps Pickens and A. P. Hill. Second Army felt that it could accomplish the stationing plan on a temporary basis provided that additional funds were forthcoming and that austere living conditions were acceptable. First Army

48.

(1) Msg 303500, CG USCOMBAG to CG, First Army, DTG 132000Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). (2) Msg 303500, CG USCOMBAG to CG Fifth Army, DTG 132000Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). (3) Msg 303504, CG USCOMBAG to CG 2d Armored Div, DTG 132100Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). (4) Msg 303509, CG USCOMBAG to CG Sixth Army, DTG 132100Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). All in USFVTS PWD 84-Files.

50.

(1) Msg (USCOMBAG in E-1559), CG 2d Armored Div to CG USCOMBAG, DTG 081800Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 303871, CINCSALANT to SA, DTG 241900Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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developed three alternate stationing plans for its area. Since the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division was permanently located at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, the first alternate called for stationing the remainder of the division at Camp Drum, New York. The second alternate called for stationing the division at the Fort Devens - Camp Edwards area in the vicinity of Boston, Massachusetts, a plan hampered by a lack of training facilities for a division-size unit. The third alternate -- and the plan which First Army recommended -- called for splitting the division between Camp Drum and the Fort Devens - Camp Edwards complex.³¹ No decision was made by USCOMSAC in this matter since conditions never warranted the actual relocation of the division.

Army National Guard and Army Reserve Augmentation for Operation Plan 316

(S) Early in the planning stages it became evident that if Operation Plan 316 was executed, U. S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units would have to be called up to fill three distinct requirements: to provide forces for the Operation Plan 316 troop list which were not available in the active Army, to provide additional Air Defense Forces for the defense of air fields, and to provide forces for the defense of the critical Florida area. Shortly after General Powell was designated as CINCSOUTH, he discussed with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army the designation of selected Army Reserve and Army National Guard units for actual call-up. CINCSOUTH recommended calling up eight civil affairs units and two psychological warfare units from the Army Reserve to augment the Operation Plan 316 troop list. For Air Defense duties, 3 automatic Weapons (AW) battalions, 1 from the Florida National Guard and the other 2 from the Alabama National Guard, were to be selected. For the defense of the Florida area, the 31st Infantry Division and the 45th Armored Division of the Florida National Guard were earmarked for call-up. In addition, four Transportation Corps light truck companies of the Florida National Guard and the 51st Engineer Battalion and 317th Military Police Battalion -- both Army Reserve Units -- were selected to support the divisional forces.³² When the Secretary of Defense proposed the augmentation of Operation Plan 316 forces, he additionally recommended that available National Guard divisions be called up to reconstitute the Strategic Reserve in the event that all active Army divisions were used in the assault operations in Cuba. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that no call-up of National Guard Divisions be undertaken to reconstitute the Strategic Reserve until they were actually needed. The two National Guard

31.

(1) Hag 100351, CG USCOMSAC to First thru Sixth Armies, DTC 090331Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Hag (USCOMSAC In M-219034), CG Second Army to CG USCOMSAC, DTC 100445Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Hag (USCOMSAC In M-219034), CG, First Army to CG USCOMSAC, DTC 100135Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCIFR P&O Nov files.

32.

Hag 100376, CG USCOMSAC to DC209F SA, DTC 110444Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Cos.

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divisions planned for use as Occupation Forces in Cuba were to be alerted on 5-day of Operation Plan 312 and the timing of their mobilization adjusted to the progress of combat operations in Cuba. The two National Guard divisions for defense of the Florida area were already designated for call-up on 5-day of operation plan 312.³³

Changes in Planning for the Use of Armor in Cuba

(C) As actual implementation of Operation Plan 312 became more and more imminent, discussions were held between General Powell (USMACV) and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on the use of armor at various phases of the assault operations. The Chief of Staff particularly questioned the number of tanks available to Task Force CHARLIE on the 1st day of assault operations and discussed the differences between M41 and M48 tanks. General Powell consequently decided on 29 October to substitute companies within the task force itself and to place one company of M48 and one company of M41 tanks in the first day increment. This would give Task Force CHARLIE sixteen 70-mm. tubes and sixteen 76-mm. tubes with the new 76-mm. ammunition available on shore on the first day of assault operations at Mariel.³⁴

(C) A few days later the question arose as to a need for armor augmentation in the Floating Reserve. Discussion brought out the fact that the Floating Reserve was scheduled to be loaded on cargo ships and was not due in the objective area until 7-plus-10-days and could possibly unload at any 1 of 4 or more locations. Consequently, the earliest availability of the Floating Reserve closed ashore was most probably 7-plus-12-days. Although the number of tanks estimated to be in the objective area at that time was approximately 300, not all of them would be in the immediate area of operations and certainly some of the 300 would have suffered combat losses. Planned operations for that period which called for an Infantry-heavy rather than an Armor-heavy force, were now questioned by the USMACV Staff with the possibility of using additional armor. It was pointed out that the 2d Battalion, 81st Armor, of the 6th Cavalry Echelon could be substituted for the 2d Battalion, 52d Infantry, in the Floating Reserve, with the latter unit moved back to the 6th Cavalry Echelon. However, if the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, accepted this course of action, it would have to be accomplished within the shipping allocation currently authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Floating

33.

(1) Msg 7136 (USMACV to W-118106), JCS to CINCLANT, DTG 031938Z Nov 62, Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). (2) ARLANT EOC Daily Briefing, 21 Nov 62, pp. 10-11. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG IS Com.

34.

Msg 301908, CG USMACV to G-6 A, DTG 290137Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG IS Com.

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Reserve. This suggested substitution took place by 6 November to provide an augmented armor capability in the Floating Reserve. The 3d Battalion, 3d Artillery, was added to the On-Call Echelon at the same time.⁵⁵

Planning for the Headquarters, Joint Task Force, Cuba

(JMF) CINCLANT's directive with regard to the establishment of Joint Task Force, Cuba, stated that the headquarters and the task force organization would not be established until after completion of the initial assault operations and then only as the direction of CINCLANT, himself. No planning for the actual headquarters had been accomplished by either XVIII Airborne Corps or USARLANT. CINCLANT requested CINCARLANT on 11 November to submit an outline plan for the establishment of Joint Task Force, Cuba, as soon as possible to include personnel augmentation requirements. CINCARLANT pointed out to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps -- who had been designated as Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba -- that consideration was then being given to providing additional forces to Joint Task Force Cuba. Another Marine division -- in addition to the army divisions discussed earlier -- was being considered as augmentation for the Operation Plan. This would raise the force strength to approximately that of an Army Corps and a Corps-sized force of U. S. Marines. USCOMARL/USARLANT questioned the adequacy of Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, to serve as the headquarters of such an augmented Joint Task Force Cuba and asked XVIII Airborne Corps for an estimate of personnel and equipment augmentation that would be necessary for that headquarters to operate. They also questioned XVIII Airborne Corps as to whether an Army headquarters should be inserted as the Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba, or whether the Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, should merely be augmented to handle these missions and responsibilities and an additional Corps headquarters then inserted in the chain of command. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, on the other hand, realized that the augmentation of forces for the Cuban operations was necessary for planning purposes, but did not feel that all of the planned augmentation forces would actually be used and, in the event they were used, some of them would be only lightly engaged. General Howe indicated that the forces under his control would approximate the size of a large corps with the result that his headquarters could accomplish its assigned mission with little or no augmentation required.⁵⁶ The proposals

55.

(1) Msg 100120, CG USCOMARL to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 031207Z Nov 62. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Ccn. (2) Msg (USCOMARL In M-218198), CG 1st Armd Div to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 060132Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files.

56.

(1) Msg (USCOMARL In M-218198), CINCLANT to CINCARLANT, DTG 112600Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files. (2) Msg 100476, CG USCOMARL to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 120030Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg (USCOMARL In M-1679), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCARLANT, DTG 171730Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Ccn.

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developed by the USCOMMAC planning staff envisioned that the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, would serve simultaneously as the Commander, Army Component Task Force, and the Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba. Augmentation proposed for the headquarters of the joint operations included a Deputy Commander, three Deputy Chiefs of Staff -- one each from the Army, Air Force, and Navy -- an Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, from the Air Force and an Assistant Chief of Staff, J6, from the Navy. Further augmentation of the Joint Staff would be provided at later appropriate times. In addition, it was planned that the Army, in general, would provide all common user supplies and services for the joint forces.⁵⁷ This proposal was still under consideration by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, at the time that roll-up of forces was initiated.

Planning for the Defense of the Florida Exclusion Area -- JDF-FLAK

(36) In connection with the defense of Florida and the mainland United States, a joint defense plan -- designated as the Joint Defense Plan - Florida Keys (JDF-FLAK) -- had been developed for the defense of a designated area including and surrounding the Florida Keys. CINCLANT's plans for joint military operations in the Caribbean placed heavy reliance on the use of facilities at Key West to support all elements of the Joint Task Force. Major facilities at Key West were the Key West Naval Air Station and the Boca Chica Naval Air Station. Continued use of these facilities depended entirely upon the security of the overland lines of communication, water lines, and highway bridges from the Florida mainland to Key West. A joint defense force including Army and Navy elements supported by the Coast Guard and the Air Force was planned for the defense of this Florida Keys area. The Commanding General, Third Army, was designated as the Joint Defense Force commander with a headquarters located at Key West Naval Air Station.⁵⁸

(36) The initial Army Task Force for JDF-FLAK was to be furnished from Third Army resources. If and when Operation Plan 316 were implemented, it was assumed that the President of the United States would also declare a National Emergency, which would automatically authorize the mobilization of the Ground Special Security Forces for the defense of Category A strategic facilities. It was additionally assumed at the planning level that the forces contained in paragraph of the Army Partial Mobilization Plans 2-63 and 3-63 would also be mobilized. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces

⁵⁷.

Msg 340334, CG USCOMMAC/CINCLANT to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 111000Z Nov 62, (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

⁵⁸.

Std Study, Incl to RF, DCSTH to DCSHT and CofS, 8 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 20 Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARK

(25) It was quite evident to USCOMARC's logistical planners that sufficient assets were not available to properly equip those forces assigned to the operation plan without drawing down on the equipment of other USCOMARC units. Since it was also realized that these shortages were a fact of life that would plague USCOMARC for some time to come, plans were developed to earmark equipment in the hands of unassigned units for those which were assigned to the operation plan. This earmarking action was given the code name of Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARK and was subsequently approved by the Department of the Army. At this point, each Army headquarters in the continental United States made supporting plans for their own areas down to, and including, installation level. Essentially, Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARK was based on the assumption that certain items of equipment in short supply would not be available within the required reaction time, except through redistribution. When the situation in Cuba began to deteriorate and it appeared that implementation of Operation Plan 316 could be expected, Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARK was implemented in the initial stages at the installation level beginning on 17 April 1962. Implementation of Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARK on a USCOMARC-wide basis was directed on 19 October 1962. USCOMARC later pointed out that implementation of any other contingency plan would require similar action to redistribute USCOMARC assets in order to properly equip the U. S. Forces assigned to the pertinent operations plan. The success of the USCOMARC action proved that its supply system did have the capability and flexibility to respond to an emergency when a massive effort was generated in all participating agencies by means of USCOMARC headquarters properly exercising its role as "Coordinating Authority" for Department of the Army.⁶³

Increased Supply Priorities

(26) One of the first actions of the Commanding General, USCOMARC, subsequent to his appointment as CINCASLANT was to request and strongly urge that resupply requirements and transportation schedules for Operation Plan 316 be given the highest priority. The Department of the Army directed a 2.00 supply priority above all other units in the U. S. Army for those units assigned to Operation Plan 316. The use of this priority, coupled with Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARK, was responsible for the speed with which Operation Plan 316 units were made combat ready. The success of logistical actions for Operation Plan 316, proved without a doubt that low supply priorities would have to be used to the fullest extent in order to implement any of the contingency plans involving USCOMARC troop units.⁶⁴

63.

Tab C, subj: "Additional Discussion, DCSLOG," to Staff Study, sent to DF, DCSUTH to DCSGAF and GCSF, 8 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' letter to General Powell, dtd 29 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSLOG Admin Br files.

64.

(1) Ibid. (2) Msg 360139, CG USCOMARC to DCSOUTH DA, 17 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Ltr AG TS Com.

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CINCSTRIKE Directives on Pre-positioning Supplies and Equipment

(S) Toward the end of September CINCSTRIKE pointed out to his subordinate commanders that the planning priorities which had been established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for CINCLANT's contingency plans also had a distinct bearing on logistical preparations for STRIKE Forces. It was therefore essential that logistical preparations be expedited in order to assure a rapid reaction capability. Although logistical planning and preparations had been underway for sometime -- and these preparations did include the pre-positioning of supplies, equipment, and ammunition -- CINCSTRIKE on 29 September raised the question as to whether the logistical posture was sufficient to support planned operations. At that time the most essential requirement facing the command was the pre-positioning of certain supplies and equipment at designated ports of embarkation, air and surface staging bases, and employment air bases. CINCSTRIKE pointed out that prestockage should include munitions, POL for airstrikes, supplies to accompany troops to include basic loads, and supplies and air items for aerial resupply missions. In addition, he felt that where such stocks had already been pre-positioned, USCOMMAC should re-check for types, quantities, applicability, and condition of the supplies. CINCSTRIKE indicated, moreover, that this logistical build-up could be expedited without causing alarm or speculation provided it was carried out under cover of normal training requirements, service maneuvers, or joint exercises.⁶³

Resupply Planning

(S) The U. S. Army Material Command announced on 7 November that all pertinent National Inventory Control Points (NICP) had completed a computation of resupply requirements for Operation Plan 136. Once the computations were completed, supply directives were pre-positioned at the appropriate depots and at the Overseas Supply Agency, New Orleans. A few days later the same Command recommended new procedures to USCOMMAC for any changes in resupply schedules which might be desired by Task Force 125 (the Army Task Force). Any such changes were to be processed from the 3rd Logistical Command to the Peninsula Base Command and coordinated in turn with Detachment Nr. 1, U. S. Army Supply and Maintenance Command. The changes would then be published and distributed through the U. S. Army Material Command's supply system to the Overseas Supp./ Agencies and/or the National Inventory Control Points. The 3rd Logistical Command was responsible for furnishing Headquarters, U. S. Army Material Command, with an information copy of all published changes.

⁶³.

Msg (USCOMMAC to M-212499), CINCSTRIKE to CINCPACSTRIKE and CINCPACFLT, DTG 251600Z Sep 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG 18 Com.

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It was felt that this process would enable the Army Material Command to keep Operation Plan 314 current at all times.⁶⁶

(S) It soon became evident to USCOMSAC's logistical planners that more than one Emergency Aerial resupply packet would have to be established and at locations other than Opa Locke Air Force Base. A conference was held to this end on 19 October 1962 between representatives of USCOMSAC's logistical staff and the U. S. Army Supply and Material Command (SAC). As a result of these planning actions, USCOMSAC recommended the storage of additional emergency aerial resupply packets at several locations. The proposed packets were to consist of five days of supply to meet additional requirements for the air drop or air landing of materiel in the objective area. Plans called for holding Classes I, III, and III A at Atlanta General Depot, Atlanta, Georgia, and Class V at Anniston Ordnance Depot, Anniston, Alabama. USCOMSAC did suggest that Class V supplies could probably be held at a better location from an air-movement point of view, if the Commanding General, U. S. Army Material Command, so decided. There was, however, to be no pack and mark of these items and they were to be held for either delivery or pick-up on a selective basis at the call of the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command. Composition of the proposed packets was to be similar to those already laid on for shipment to Opa Locke Air Force Base with Classes III and III A supplies to be packaged rather than in bulk. The major reasoning behind this establishment of a second emergency aerial resupply factor was the assumption that the U. S. Forces might experience difficulty in landing over the beaches. Since the Peninsula Base Command indicated that they could handle the requirement, USCOMSAC planned to pre-position approximately 2,700 tons of supplies as a part of this exercise.⁶⁷

(S) The Commanding General, U. S. Army Material Command, agreed that the project outlined above could be supported commodity-wise, but indicated that a number of factors governed or controlled its availability within certain time frames. No Class I supplies were available at Atlanta General Depot because only dry storage was available at that location. Class I stocks were located in cold storage facilities at Bomar Springs, Kansas, and Groesville, Tennessee. If these stocks were actually required at Atlanta, they could be moved by rail from Groesville in a minimum of five days. On the other hand, if movement to Atlanta were not required, the stocks could be moved from Bomar Springs and loaded on aircraft to be made available at Kansas City Municipal airport within an eight-hour period. Air movement of

66.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC In M-218584), CG USMAC to CG XVIII Air Corps, DTG 071538Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMSAC In M-218641), CG USMAC to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 101743Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in RCMR 860 Div Files.

67.

(1) Msg 361843, CG USCOMSAC to CG USMAC, DTG 012343Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (TOP SECRET). (2) ARJANT SOC Daily Briefing, 16 Nov 62, pp. 13-14. (TOP SECRET). (Information cited is SECRET). Both in AG IS Cms.

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Classes III and III A supplies was already scheduled from Charleston Air Force Base. Bulk stocks could therefore be provided from that location from stocks earmarked for later increments. If Classes III and III A stocks were required at Atlanta General Depot they could be provided within a reasonable time frame period dependent upon the type of transportation authorized for movement. All Class V requirements were already located at Houston General Depot as proposed. The U. S. Army Materiel Command struck a note of caution on this project since there were no high priorities, no project codes or increment numbers, no authorization for additional days of supply, and no pick, pack, and mark instructions. The lack of these essential factors prevented the U. S. Army Materiel Command from giving positive assurance that the required quantities of stock would remain available at the specified locations at subsequent dates. The above designed procedures were dependent upon whether the material in question was to be airlanded rather than airdropped. In the event that airdropping was considered, all material would have to be moved to Atlanta General Depot along with the necessary air drop rigging materials, parachutes, and the like.⁶⁸

[P] In order to provide machinery for the actual movement of emergency resupply packets and normal resupply increments to troop units in the objective area, the Panama Base Command announced on 2 November 1962 that it would be responsible for providing the logistical link between activities in the continental United States and the Far Shore For Task Force 125. The Panama Base Command began immediate action to establish the necessary circuits and electrical connecting machinery to provide the proper links with the Overseas Supply Agency, New Orleans, Louisiana.⁶⁹

Carge Vessel Requirements for the Assault Phase

[P] Cargo vessel requirements for the assault phase were developed by joint planning actions between representatives of USCOMARMC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff originally requested a total of twenty-nine ships for the period up to and including 8-mine-3 days. By 28 October the U. S. Marine Corps indicated that they required 8 ships for the period in question, while U. S. Army forces required 22, a total which was 1 short of the JCS estimate of 29. As of 1 November 1962, the MSTS was unable to nominate vessels by name but was well aware of the fact that any and all vessels so nominated would have to be

⁶⁸.

Reg (USCOMARMC In H-1489), CG USAMC to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 021351Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Cee.

⁶⁹.

Reg (USCOMARMC In H-217493), CG PAC to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 010600Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DESUTE PAC Div files.

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self-maintaining. The cargo vessel requirements by port for the period through December 3 days were as follows:

CARGO VESSEL REQUIREMENTS

	<u>TOTAL</u>				12
	Mobile Supply Vessels				2
<u>PORT</u>	<u>R-6</u>	<u>R-3</u>	<u>R-6</u>	<u>R-3</u>	
<u>Totals</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>20</u>
Beaumont	1		1		
Empire Leads		1	2	1	
New York		1	1		
Savannah			1	1	
Sunny Point			1		
Baltimore			1		
New Orleans		2	2		
Mobile			1	1	

Army Aviation Support for Logistical Operations

(S) Within a few weeks after AMBLANT Forward was established it became evident to the headquarters staff that, in the event that Operation Plan 316 was implemented, certain critically needed supplies would have to be moved into the objective area by air, rather than by the previously planned and programmed surface movements. Since the AC-1 CASINO aircraft was available to the U. S. Army in sufficient numbers, AMBLANT Forward formulated plans for staging the needed supplies at the Army Staging Area Command (ASAC) for onward movement via these aircraft. AMBLANT Forward recommended on 14 November that a Provisional Transportation Company of CASINO aircraft be formed to support the Peninsula Base Command. At the same time, it recommended the suspension of qualifications established for crew members of the AC-1 aircraft which constituted a limiting factor.⁷⁰

Movement of Army Aircraft into the Objective Area

(S) One of the major problems facing USCOMSEC/AMBLANT logistical planners was the movement of organic Army aircraft into the objective area.

70-

memo for Secd, OSLOG Plans Div Nov 21, 62 Oct 62, sub: Cargo Vessels. (SECRET). In OSLOG LOG Nov Log, Cuban Crisis.

71-

memo (USCOMSEC In M-219612), AMBLANT Fed to CG USCOMSEC/AMBLANT, DTG 141900Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In OSOUTH P&O Nov Files.

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The Commander of the Key West Naval Base informed the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, in mid-October, that his installation was able to furnish only JP-4 Aviation fuel and No. 1180 oil requirements for those aircraft. Other types of oil could not be furnished in any quantity nor could refueling trucks be furnished. Since Key West military facilities were already fully committed to use by Air Force and U. S. Navy aircraft, all Army aircraft would have to be staged through the civilian facilities of the Key West International Airport would therefore have to be self-sufficient with regard to billeting, messing, and all other support, with the exception of the gas and oil requirements indicated earlier. Arrangements were made by mid-November to position JP-4 Aviation fuel at the Municipal Airport, Dade, Florida, and Page Airfield, Ft. Meyers, Florida. Plans also called for the positioning of fuel at Brann Airport, Labeland, Florida. The USCOMSAC/ALLANT planning staff was responsible for coordinating all deployment schedules, flight routes, and enroute support for aircraft from their home stations to staging airfields. Ground commanders in the Objective Area were made responsible for selecting initial location airfields, the security of those airfields, and for the support of the aircraft once they arrived in the objective area. Aircraft were to be dispatched from the staging fields in the United States when called up by those ground commanders who required air support.¹²

(S) Operation Plan 116 called for the dispatch of a total of 406 Army aircraft of all types into the objective area. Of this total, 118 rotary wing aircraft were scheduled for early departure on the U. S. Navy aircraft carrier, the USS INTENSE. These early departure aircraft included 32 OH-13, 19 OH-34, 48 UH-1, and 3 OH-37 helicopters. With the exception of the aircraft of the 34th Transportation Company (Medium Helicopter) located at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, all aircraft to be transported aboard the USS INTENSE were scheduled to leave their home stations on D-minus-4-days and fly in accordance with pre-planned flight routes and schedules so as to arrive at the port of embarkation, Pensacola, Florida, on D-minus-3 days. The 34th Transportation Company was scheduled to depart its home station so as to arrive at Pensacola by D-minus-3 days. U. S. Navy directives required that all aircraft be loaded on the aircraft carrier by D-minus-3 days. The loading plan for the aircraft carrier was developed by the XVIII Airborne Corps planning staff in coordination with the staff of the USS INTENSE. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, pointed out to USCOMSAC on 14 November that it was anticipated that no changes be made in the loading of aircraft aboard the carrier.¹³

11.

(1) Mag (USCOMSAC In E-215428), COMWEST to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTD 141330Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMSAC In E-1811), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG, Lat Arad Div, DTD 141730Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Con

12.

(1) Memo, Maj. E. M. Mitchell, DCSLOG Maind Div, War Br, Joint Sec, to Dir, Materiel Readiness, 14 Nov 62, subj: Movement of aircraft to Objective Area (O). (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMSAC In E-1813), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG USCOMSAC, DTD 141800Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Con.

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(28) The remainder of the aircraft were scheduled to deploy through Key West to the objective area in increments beginning on D-day and continuing to D-plus-10 days. These included L42 rotary wing aircraft and 136 fixed wing aircraft of various types. These scheduled to deploy through Key West were to remain at their base stations or staging areas and fly to Key West in accordance with pre-planned flight routes, refueling stops, and remain-over-night arrangements. Action had been taken by 14 November to insure that JP-4 fuel was stocked in sufficient quantities at the pre-planned refueling stops to service OH-1 helicopters. Aircraft movement plans which were developed by the planning staffs scheduled the aircraft to arrive at Key West two days in advance of their departure for the objective area. For example, these aircraft which were scheduled to arrive at Key West on D-minus-2 days were to depart for the objective area on D-day. Arrangements had also been completed by 14 November to insure sufficient quantities of JP-4 aviation fuel and H2/H43 Aviation gas to service all aircraft passing through Key West.¹⁴

Air Reconnaissance Planning

(29) Reconnaissance of the objective area was extremely important for those commanders who were scheduled to take part in both the air and amphibious assaults on the island of Cuba. As early as 28 October 1962 the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps -- who was also Commander, Army Task Force 125 -- requested that a total of thirty sorties in reconnaissance-type aircraft be made available to him on D-minus-3-days. The purpose of this reconnaissance was to facilitate the receipt of earliest information on Cuba and to provide division commanders, key staff officers, and battle group commanders with visual reconnaissance of the drop zones which they would be expected to use in the objective area. In giving his approval to this request CINCLANT pointed out to CINCARLANT that the execution of the requested reconnaissance missions depended entirely upon execution of the several operation plans. If the proper sequence were recognized, with Operation Plan 312 preceding Operation Plan 316 in the scheduled time frame, the flights could take place as requested, subject only to the availability of aircraft. If, on the other hand, Plan 316 was executed without Plan 312, such flights would compromise the secrecy of the operation. In the latter eventuality, only special flights would be authorized, again subject to the availability of aircraft.¹⁵ Because the fact that the approved request included the division commanders subordinate

¹⁴.

News, Maj. J. M. Mitchell, BOWLING Market Box, Mar 67, soft Dec, to Dir, Material Readiness, 14 Nov 62, subj: Movement of Aircraft to Objective Area (40). (TOP SECRET). In AG TR Cap.

¹⁵.

(1) Maj ALVIN-TR 4399 (USCINMAC to M-21661), to XVIII Air Corps to CINCLANT, DTG 220312Z Oct 62. Sp. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Maj (USCINMAC to D-6029), CINCLANT to CINCARLANT, DTG 220324Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TR Cap.

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to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, the same type of request was relayed to CINCPACFLT by the Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, in mid-November. The 101st Airborne Division requested a flight for four observers on D-minus-3-days and another flight for six observers on D-minus-1-day. The Commanding General, USMACV, as CINCPACFLT, was responsible for coordinating this matter with CINCPACFLT.²⁸

Changes in Airborne Planning

(38) Certain changes in airborne planning for the air assault phase of the Cuba operations were dictated both by changes in the operations plans themselves and by intelligence reports which indicated a build-up of strength in certain areas, etc. As was indicated earlier, Operation Plan 116 was originally a five-day reaction plan which called for an airborne assault on the island of Cuba to be followed as soon as possible by an amphibious assault. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 October changed Operation Plan 116 to a seven-day reaction time and provided for a simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault on Cuba.

Coordination of P-Hour and H-Hour

(39) At the time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff made their decisions on Operation Plan 116, CINCPACFLT agreed with his component commanders and Task Force commanders that the acceptable time for P-hour was one hour after sunrise. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, several weeks later impressed on CINCPACFLT the fact that the simultaneous initiation of both the airborne and amphibious operations was extremely important to the success of the entire operation. He considered this a basic factor in creating a maximum diversion of the defensive forces at a very critical period. Air support from the air and from U. S. Navy vessels both prior to, and at the time of, the amphibious assault would have to be capable of minimizing the inherent risk involved in such an attack. In the amphibious assault operation, a major element of Task Force 116 (the Army Task Force) was scheduled to arrive ashore in a secure beachhead. This element had to be available for tactical use as soon after P-hour as possible. Any delay in establishing the beachhead would delay this time element at a point when time was of the essence. For these reasons the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, (Commander, Task Force 116) strongly recommended that H-hour be no later than P-hour and that P-hour be no later than one hour after sunrise. In response to this recommendation, CINCPACFLT informed CINCPACFLT that the announcement of P-day for the execution of Operation Plan 116 was his sole responsibility. He did agree that, for planning purposes only, both H-hour and P-hour would be considered as occurring at one hour after sunrise. A specific H- and P-hour would be determined not later than D-minus-1-day and would be based on the

76.

(1) Msg (USCINCPAC In 8-1561), ARLANT Rel to CINCPACFLT, DTG 162000Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 303548, CG USMACV/CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 161452Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG 25 Com.

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recommendations of all three of his component commanders. This decision would be announced in sufficient time to insure that the airborne and amphibious assaults did occur simultaneously as recommended.⁷⁷

Changes in Planning for Drop Zones and Flight Schedules

(28) The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, recommended early in November that a re-examination of drop zones and flight schedules be initiated as soon as the current air movement schedules and tables to support Operation Plan 316 had been completed. Some time later he again pointed out that changes in flight plans, movements schedules, drop zones, and flight directions were desired in order to avoid the known concentration of anti-aircraft weapons in the objective area and to reduce the time that our aircraft would be exposed to the fire power of such weapons. He thereupon outlined his desired changes which included proposed movement schedules, new drop zones, and flight schedules. He additionally requested that USCOMMAC's planning effort be directed toward producing new schedules while maintaining the current schedules for use in the event of an emergency. By the end of November the USCOMMAC/CINCLANT planning staff had concurred in the changes proposed by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and forwarded these proposals to CINCPACFLT for expeditious action. The Commanding General, USCOMMAC, as CINCPACFLT, pointed out that the proposed changes should be adopted as quickly as possible since there was a possibility that Operation Plan 316 might be implemented by 20 December 1962 or soon thereafter.⁷⁸

Establishment of Bomb Lines in the Area Zone

(29) In the interests of greater safety and protection of the airborne troops which would be air dropped into the objective area, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, proposed in mid-November to his airborne division commanders that bomb lines be established around the drop zones in the objective area. The bomb lines, as proposed, would be in effect from drop

77.

(1) Msg (USCOMMAC to M-219456), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCPACFLT, DTG 142300Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMMAC to M-229147), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 180136Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in OCSUR P&O Div files.

78.

(1) Msg AFMCC-CP 4794 (USCOMMAC to E-1545), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCPACFLT, DTG 032200Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 303849, CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 291340Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) Msg AFMCC-CP 5813 (USCOMMAC to M-238416), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCPACFLT, DTG 184545Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET - Info used is SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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time to drop time-plus-45-minutes. During the period that bomblines were in effect, fighter aircraft would be permitted to attack targets of opportunity outside the bomblines without ground control. Once again, the protection of the parachutists dictated that only aircraft continuously within the drop zone area during the period in question be permitted to attack such targets.⁷⁹ This proposal was still under consideration at the USCOMSAC/USMACV level at the time that the roll-up of forces was put into effect.

Coordination of Air Targets

(28) Since the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, was also to be the Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba, he would serve as the unified commander for land operations under Operation Plan 316. He therefore submitted to CINCPACFLT a list of proposed air targets in order of priority for action by that command in the event that Operation Plan 316 was executed. He also pointed out that, from his point of view, there was no lapse of time between Operation Plans 312 and 316 and that destruction of targets under Operation Plan 316 in the priorities established would begin immediately upon completion of the attacks under Operation Plan 312. In answer to these recommendations, CINCPACFLT pointed out that the identification of air targets in Cuba with Operation Plans 312 or 316 did not, in any way, restrict air strikes on Plan 316 targets while Plan 312 was still in effect. Operation Plan 316 targets would be attacked in accordance with established priorities as soon as the proper air effort could be made available. CINCPACFLT was the designated agency for coordinating both planning and allocation of target responsibilities as long as Operation Plan 312 was in effect. During this period, both CINCPACFLT and the Commander, U. S. Navy Amphibious Forces, would submit requests for target strikes to CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT, on the other hand, would keep his component task force commanders informed at all times as to the status of air targets.⁸⁰

79.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC to M-319333), CG XVIII Air Corps to CINCPACFLT, DTG 140330Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSBTS PAC Div files. (2) ASMACV EOC Daily Briefing 14 Nov 62, p. 9. (TOP SECRET - Info used is SECRET). In AC TS Com.

80.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC to M-320398), CG XVIII Air Corps to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, DTG 101600Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSBTS PAC Div files. (2) Msg (USCOMSAC to S-3708), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 121632Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Com.

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Planning Factors for Air Aircraft Turn-Around Schedules

[P] A thorough review of Operation Plan 318 Air Movement Schedules was directed by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, at the beginning of December. The primary reason for this review was to determine if aircraft turn-around times could be reduced in order to permit a more rapid buildup of forces in the objective area. Results of the review indicated that estimated ground times for some of the aircraft during airlanded operations in the objective area were in excess of requirements. Taken cumulatively, a reduction of all excess turn-around times would permit a much earlier closing of the Air Echelon of Task Force 123 into the objective area. The XVIII Airborne Corps staff pointed out that the estimated time period required for unloading certain aircraft was thought to be excessive, particularly since the estimates were not based on any known test data or experience factors. In order to provide a valid basis for revision of aircraft turn-around times, XVIII Airborne Corps desired to conduct a series of tests using the various type loads and aircraft employed in the airlanded operations of Plan 318. The tests proposed by corps headquarters were to be conducted by all of its subordinate commands which provided airlanded elements during the operation. Tests would consist of timing the landing - taxi - parking - unloading - take-off sequence for the various type loads using the same type aircraft in which they were to be lifted for Operation Plan 318. In addition, a recommendation was made that CINCPACFLT provide officer support to coordinate with local Air Force installations in order to facilitate testing operations and also to integrate into the tests proper, such AFMST test criteria as might be desired or required.⁸¹ The proposed tests were scheduled to be held early in 1963.

Amphibious Capability Planning

[P] The provision of sufficient amphibious shipping to transport requested task organizations to the objective area were a matter of concern at all levels of command. In order to make full use of the equipment already assigned to other service echelons of the task organizations, plans were made to unload early increments of the assault forces and to use the freed shipping as shuttle service to transport additional increments of the assault waves. CINCPACFLT expressed concern in early November that there might be some confusion concerning the period of time during which two LST's and three LST's from the Western Attack Group would be available to the Western Support Group for high priority Army lift. He thereupon directed that plans be developed for the use of these ships for two approved shuttle lifts of Army equipment from ports in Florida to Mariel, Cuba.⁸²

81.

Msg (USCINCPAC In M-321855), CO XVIII Abn Corps to CINCPACFLT, DTG 041430Z Dec 62. (SECRET). In ECHLRE 960 Riv files.

82.

Msg (USCINCPAC In M-312483), CINCPACFLT to COMUSMACV, DTG 031238Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG 78 Cee.

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Increases in Amphibious Shipping Requirements

(S) By the beginning of November, however, increased requirements for the assault echelons -- plus the switch of units within echelons for tactical reasons -- resulted in a major increase in amphibious shipping requirements for USMACV/USARLANT. At a conference at CINCLANT headquarters on 3 November 1961, USMACV presented its immediate requirements for four additional LST's. One of these LST's was required to transport a Cavalry troop of Task Force CHARLIE which was substituted in the LST loads to partially accommodate the early introduction of sixteen medium tanks. A second LST was required to transport sixteen of the twenty-two tanks of the 1st Battalion, 47th Armor, 1st Infantry Division, which could not be loaded on the USS CORSET and the Army LST JOHN V. B. PAGE. The third and fourth LST's were required to transport the remaining six tanks of the 1st Battalion, 47th Armor, and an entire 8-tank heavier battalion consisting of twelve heavies. After discussing several ways of generating the additional LST's CINCLANT decided that he would first go to the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain them either from the merchant fleets, from other active fleets, or through possible charter action of civilian vessels by the Military Sea Transport Service. If this action were not successful, CINCLANT would then approach the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain the required four LST's.

(S) At the same conference, the conference took up the question of the Army's continuing requirement after D-plus-5-days for the "turn-around" lift of Army cargo in 3 fast LST's and 3 fast LSD's. Despite the information provided by CINCLANT on the previous day, CINCLANT disclosed that the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (1st MEB) from the Pacific Area might be introduced over-the-beaches at Da Nang, Quang Nam, thereby freeing five LSD's -- but no LST's -- for "turn-around" Army lift. The USARLANT representatives at the conference expressed concern over the inherent delay in putting Army tanks ashore if the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade were used in this manner. They stressed the fact that armor would have to be introduced early in the operations for use in the 1st Airborne Division zone of action. CINCLANT announced that sufficient turnaround shipping would be provided to satisfy all Army requirements but that most probably it would consist of the five LSD's of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

(S) The required augmentation for the Operation Plan 316 troop list resulted in the addition of a one and one-half division force which included the 1st Infantry Division and a combat command of the 1st Armored Division. CINCLANT estimated the shipping requirements for this additional force at 22 cargo ships, 16 troop transports and 11 LST's. The Commanding General, USMACV, pointed out to CINCLANT that the eleven additional LST's were not desired initially for transporting the augmented forces but were needed by USARLANT to permit faster introduction of the initial elements of the 1st

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Armored Division (minus) at Mariel and the 1d Infantry Division (minus) at Havana. He assessed that the four Navy LST's then assigned to move Increment B, 1 of Task Force CHARLIE were not adequate to accomplish this mission in total. The use of the USS CORBY, the Army LST JOHN W. D. BACE, and a commercial cargo vessel to transport and discharge the 1d Battalion, 69th Armor, over the beach at Havana on D-day was considered very marginal. The availability of four commercial LST's - which had been approved by that time - was only a partial solution and did not provide the desired degree of amphibious shipping needed to introduce armor, armor support units, and other desired combat elements in the time period which was considered essential as a result of new intelligence reports concerning the enemy's armored capabilities. He further recommended that this position be re-emphasized to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that the eleven LST's proposed for the transport of the augmented forces be made available to USAMARLT for essential tactical requirements early in the operation.⁸⁴

Deployment Planning for the 139th Transportation Battalion (Seab)

85 One of the Army units that was considered essential to the conduct of amphibious operations during the assault phase of Operation Plan 316 was the 139th Transportation Battalion (Seab), the only active Army unit of this type. USCOMARL/USAMARLT announced on 18 November that it had completed plans for the deployment and use of this battalion. In the event that the operation plan was implemented, the 139th Transportation Battalion (Seab), and its attached subordinate units were directed to report to the Commander, Task Force 123.1, in the vicinity of Key West at 0600 hrs on D-minus-1-day. The major purpose of this planning was to provide an escort for the battalion from the rendezvous area to the objective area. Upon implementation of the operation plan the joint operational control of the battalion passed to the Commander, Army Task Force 123.85

Planning for the Pre-positioning of Engineer Corps Landing Craft

86 The U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic (USATPCA) recommended to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Engineer Center, that the outloading part for the 497th Engineer Company (Port Construction) be redesignated and that the unit's landing craft be pre-positioned at certain locations under their own power via the Inland Waterway. Since the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, desired the immediate equipping and pre-positioning of the landing craft in question, the Commanding General, U. S. Army Engineer Center, recommended that they be pre-positioned at a location near the staging

84.

(1) Ltr, CINCLANT to JCS, 18 Nov 62, subj: Additional Forces for OFPLAN 316-62, w/encs. (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Com. (2) Msg 303603, CG USCOMARL to CINCLANT, DTG 183300Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Com.

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Msg 303606, CG USCOMARL to CG, Second Army and CG, SE Tenth Oad, DTG 183000Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In EOSEUR MSG Div Files.

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area as as to avoid a long and hazardous move from Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The only alternative to pre-positioning was the use of a tug tow or escort upon implementation of the operation plan. Accordingly, on 10 November 1962, two of the unit's landing craft were put under orders to move at once from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.⁸⁶

Use of B&AC's in the Amphibious Assault Planning

86. In the early preparations for a possible implementation of Operation Plan 318, the USCOMARMC planning staff decided that the operational capabilities of the Army's B&AC's⁸⁷ should be used in the amphibious assault scheme of the plan. There were only two operational B&AC units in the Active Army at that time: the 14th Transportation Platoon (B&AC Operation and Maintenance) at Fort Ord, California, and the 334th Transportation Platoon (B&AC Operation and Maintenance) at Fort Story, Virginia. The Commanding General, Sixth Army, was directed to be prepared to move the 14th Transportation Platoon from Fort Ord to Camp Lejeune Johnson, Louisiana, less equipment. Upon arrival at Camp Lejeune Johnson the unit was to be equipped from the assets earmarked for the 334th Transportation Platoon. The Commanding General XVIII Airborne Corps, in accordance with these plans, was directed to place both the 14th and 334th Transportation Platoons in the surface scheme of the operation plan. However, he did not feel that the B&AC's were needed in the assault elements and pointed out that the Commander, U. S. Navy Amphibious Forces, Atlantic, had already indicated that additional lightcranes was not necessary. Furthermore, the introduction of a limited number of specialized equipment imposed on the command concerned a requirement to sustain that equipment even though he did not possess sufficient means to do so. The XVIII Airborne Corps commander then introduced a limiting factor which did not seem to appear in the USCOMARMC considerations for use of such equipment; i.e., the fact that special rigs would have to be fabricated on the decks of the designated cargo ships on which to carry the B&AC's and from which they could be launched. For these reasons he felt that USCOMARMC should reconsider the decision with regard to use of the B&AC's with a view to deleting them from the troop list.⁸⁸ These

86.

(1) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-210908), USA Hqgr Ctr to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 091130Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-210909), CG, Second Army to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 100330Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCUTE F&O Div files.

87.

Barge, Amphibious, Re-supply, Cargo.

88.

(1) Mag 001117, CG USCOMARMC to CG's, Fourth and Sixth Armies and XVIII Air Corps, DTG 221344Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag AJRWB-CF 4404 (USCOMARMC In M-210671), CG XVIII Air Corps to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 282230Z Oct 62. Op. 1. (SECRET). Both in DCUTE F&O Div files.

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objections notwithstanding, the Commanding General, USCOMARC, on the following day directed the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, to place only the 354th Transportation Platoon (BASC Operation and Maintenance) in the surface echelon of the operation plan. It was pointed out in the directive that these craft should be immediately available for use upon arrival in the objective area but that conditions of storage precluded the availability of any replacements. Since the BASC's, moreover, were true amphibious⁸⁹ lighters, they were adaptable for the movement of emergency requirements from shipboard direct to inland distribution points. The 14th Transportation Platoon, on the other hand, was to be held in a state of readiness for future movement if so directed by the Commanding General, USCOMARC. Despite the warning that special equipment was needed to carry and launch the craft, USCOMARC directed that the BASC's would be deckloaded on cargo vessels and be made ready for drop discharge from the deck at the destination. This latter directive brought an immediate reaction from the Hampton Roads Army Terminal which pointed out that it did not possess the capability to fabricate the launching gear. In fact, the only known commercial contractor with this capability and experience was Norma Brothers Co. of Newport News, Virginia, which had conducted tests in the period from 1955 to 1960 for the U. S. Army Transportation Research Command. These tests were conducted only from the decks of a C&B-1 vessel. The three sets of launching gear required for the BASC's of the 354th Transportation Platoon would cost in the neighborhood of \$55,000 each. Additional limiting factors were thereupon outlined by Hampton Roads Army Terminal. In the first place, special protective wirecoring material would have to be used to cover the bow, propeller, and propeller shaft of the BASC's in order to protect them from damage resulting from the impact of the free fall. Reports of damage to BASC's launched during the testing period were available at the U. S. Army Transportation Research Command. These reports, plus the added dangers involved in such launchings, dictated that the actual launching of the BASC's should be conducted by personnel who had had previous experience in this field. These limitations were sufficient to cause USCOMARC to change its planning criteria and place requirements on the U. S. Navy for the provision of LST's to transport the BASC's at the required time. This alleviated the problems involved in carrying and launching the amphibious lighters but did not eliminate the objections to their use by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps.⁹⁰

⁸⁹.

Amphibious is defined as having both a water and land capability.

⁹⁰.

(1) Msg 101945, CG USCOMARC to CG's Second, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, DTG 101245Z Oct 61. Op. 1. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARC to M-439487), CG USATDA (H&AT) to CG, USATDA, DTG 012226Z Nov 61. (UNCLASSIFIED). (3) Msg 101211, CG, USCOMARC to CG, Second Army, DTG 032211Z Nov 61. Op. 1. (SECRET). All in DCSUTH P60 Pdr files.

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Special Warfare Planning

(S) CINCLANT Operation Plans 314 and 316 called for the establishment of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force for the Atlantic area which would be directly subordinate to his headquarters. As the possibility of implementing Operation Plan 316 loomed greater, the USCOMARMC planning staff felt that such a division of command responsibility would unfavorably reflect in reaction times and would make coordination between the ground effort and the unconventional warfare effort rather difficult. In order to insure the necessary coordination with the ground effort and to reduce reaction times, the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, recommended that the operation plans provide for the transfer of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force and the responsibility for conducting unconventional warfare to CINCSALANT, concurrently with the passage of control to CINCSALANT for execution of Operation Plan 316.⁹¹ CINCLANT, however, preferred to keep the responsibility for the conduct of joint unconventional warfare operations in the hands of a commander who reported directly to him.

(S) By early November the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, requested the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force to undertake certain additional responsibilities not already incorporated in Operation Plan 316. These included an emphasis on locating and reporting known enemy dispositions of battalion-size or larger infantry units as well as artillery batteries. Commencing at T-minus-1-hour these forces were to defend bridges which had been prepared for demolition, giving priority to those bridges along main routes whose demolition would impede rapid movement or rapid advance. If these forces undertook any mining operations, they were to be limited to antitank mines. Demolition of bridges in the objective area, however, was not to be undertaken without the prior approval of the appropriate task force commander.⁹² The assignment of additional responsibilities to the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force was felt mainly by the Army elements provided by the U. S. Army Special Warfare Center. Consequently, by mid-November the Commanding Officer of the Special Warfare Center pointed out to the USCOMARMC commander that the time had arrived to make a realistic reappraisal of Army Special Forces capabilities relating to various contingency plans and to other missions and requirements. The current situation created by the requirements of Operation Plans 314 and 316 was further complicated by the fact that Special Forces troops in Viet Nam were scheduled for replacement by February 1963. He asked General Powell to consider a reduction in commitments to

91.

Reg 102393, CG USCOMARMC to CINCLANT, DTG 151843Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

92.

Reg (USCOMARMC In 8-1510), CG XVIII Abn Corps to COMJTFPA, DTG 050520Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Operation Plans 114 and 116 and to delay replacement of the South Viet Nam detachments for a period of twelve weeks following a change in the defense readiness condition (DEFCON).⁹³

[JMF] But the situation in Cuba brought additional requirements which could only be filled through the facilities of the Army Special Warfare Center. Just a few days after the Commanding Officer of the Center had requested a reappraisal of the commitments of that facility, the Commander, Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, requested the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, to provide three Psychological Warfare Loudspeaker Teams having a Spanish language capability. These teams were to be attached to the Commander, Navy Task Force 120, as soon as possible but not later than 3-minus-1 day under the operation plan. Because of the opinions expressed earlier, USCOMARAC requested information from the Psychological Warfare Center as to its ability to provide the required personnel and equipment from current resources or attached units. The provision of personnel with these identical capabilities to the Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command (CINCARIB), had exhausted the resources of Spanish-speaking personnel. Consequently, the request of the Fleet Marine Forces had to be denied at that time.⁹⁴

Communications Planning

[JMF] Communications planning for the implementation of Operation Plan 116 consisted mainly of three separate planning areas: the establishment, operation, and maintenance of a communications network for the forward area to include the staging areas, the logistical complex, and the forward command post of CINCARIB; the establishment of a mobile command radio network for Headquarters, USCOMARAC/USCARIB; and the provision of adequate communications support for combat actions in the objective area. For the first requirement, USCOMARAC selected two signal battalions and some five signal companies including a missile command support company. Two platoons of the Forward Communications Company of the 141st Signal Battalion were exempted from this mission since they were already assigned to support of the two brigades of the 1st Armored Division which, in turn, was already committed to Operation Plan 116. The units in question were alerted by USCOMARAC/USCARIB on 22 October for a

⁹³.

Msg (USCOMARAC In E-2853), CG USA SPWARCHN to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 152030Z. (TOP SECRET -- Info used is SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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(1) Msg 183650, CG USCOMARAC to CG XVIII Air Corps and CG USA SPWARCHN, DTG 192100Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg (USCOMARAC In E-296460), CG USA SPWARCHN to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 202000Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In SECRET PAC 140 files.

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move to the Florida area to support the communications requirements of USMIANT Forward, the Pensacola Base Command, and the staging bases.⁹⁵

95. The establishment of a mobile command radio net for USCOMSAC/USMIANT required the assignment of three COMSEC-wide cleared Single Side Band (SSB) frequencies. Application for the assignment of these frequencies had to be forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer, Department of the Army. The three proposed main stations included transmitting facilities at the USCOMSAC/USMIANT War Room at Fort Monroes, the USMIANT Forward War Room in the Florida Area, and a transmitter for the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, either in the air or on the ground. The commanding generals of the state-side armies would enter the radio net as directed. The requested frequencies were approved by Department of the Army on 10 November 1962. Multiple frequencies were provided to permit a greater flexibility in the radio net and to minimize interference since these frequencies were shared with other Army assignments.⁹⁶

96. The final requirement for more adequate communications support of combat activities in the objective area led the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, to request the assignment of seven additional signal units to the Operation Plan 316 Troop List. The requested units included 4 signal construction units, 1 combat area support unit, and 1 base depot unit. The two combat area support units, however, were already committed to support bases in Florida. USCOMSAC subsequently informed XVIII Airborne Corps that one of the two units could be released only after completion of its previously assigned mission. Since all of the requested units were assigned to the Strategic Army Command (STRAC), their release had to be obtained from CINCSTRIKE. The latter commander immediately pointed out that the requested Signal construction units represented the only reserves of Signal construction capability available to STRACOM besides to meet contingency requirements other than Operation Plan 316. He further pointed out that experience factors in both World War II and in Korea for each unit indicated that the request was in excess of the combat requirements. CINCSTRIKE consequently acquiesced to the addition of the signal construction units to the troop list, but did approve the use of the combat area and base depot units.⁹⁷

95. Reg 103108, CG USCOMSAC to CINCSTRIKE, DTG 230447Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Com.

96. Reg (USCOMSAC In M-230304), SA from C/SECO to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 101303Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSSTR MAG Div files.

97. Reg 303814, CG USCOMSAC to C XVIII Air Corps, DTG 271635Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSSTR MAG Div files.

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Which is Priorities for Medical Units

At a rather late stage in the preparations, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, recommended that immediate action be taken to remove the 5th Medical Evacuation Hospital, the 28th Medical Field Hospital, the 139th Medical Detachment (CSG), and the 139th Medical Detachment (CSG) from the already pre-loaded USS TAUREL at Savannah, Georgia. These units would either be returned to their home stations or pre-positioned at another location which would permit their outloading on commercial vessels through the port of New Orleans. The XVIII Airborne Corps commander indicated that this action was made possible by the allocation of additional assault shipping to support Task Force 125. In further justification, he indicated that approval of this recommendation would enable the subject units to perform their equipment maintenance and engage in essential training. USCOMABSC, on the other hand, had not generated any additional shipping which would permit the release of commercial shipping then scheduled to arrive in the objective area on D-day. These medical units were scheduled for shipment on the USS TAUREL to meet an urgent requirement of the Commander, Task Force 125, to have such units in the area as early as possible even if the captured airfields proved unsuitable for the airlanding of such units. The USCOMABSC planning staff was of the opinion that the units were then in the best position to meet the readiness posture imposed upon them provided, of course, that the urgent requirement was still valid. USCOMABSC, moreover, had no available information which would justify offloading units from the USS TAUREL unless there was a stand-down in readiness requirements to the point where units were returned to their home stations or if the units were no longer required in the objective area prior to D-plus-3-days and could be phased in on subsequent shipping. In further justification of his original request, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, pointed out that he did not intend to convey the impression that additional assault shipping had generated additional shipping space among D-day arrivals. Additional assault shipping did, on the other hand, enable the Commander, Task Force 125, to revise and reschedule the priorities for introduction of units into the objective area and the subject medical units were rescheduled for loading in accordance with these new priorities. The units were to move from the port of New Orleans on two commercial vessels and were scheduled to arrive on the objective area on D-day and D-plus-1-day, respectively. No additional shipping would be required at New Orleans for this purpose, and the priorities for introduction of the units into the objective area still met the requirements and desires of the Commander, Task Force 125. Since the Medical units in question were only 10 percent mobile, they did not make the best use of the roll-on, roll-off capabilities of the USS TAUREL and would, therefore, unnecessarily delay unloading of the vessel during the critical early phase of the assault operations. Furthermore, General Howe, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, did not intend to recommend the movement of these units to New Orleans at that time but rather to some station such as Fort Stewart or any location in the general geographic area which would permit unloading by D-plus-4-days. General Howe did feel that the units could be returned to their home stations and still meet this deployment schedule. Two live companies and the headquarters detachment of the 3th Engineer Battalion (Opbat) were proposed for that space on the USS TAUREL which was to be vacated by

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reestablishing the medical units.³⁸ This change in priorities was held in abeyance pending decisions on the stand-down of readiness which would permit all units to return to their home stations.

Civil Affairs Planning

38. In the alert notices to the various Army commanders at the outset of the operation, USCOMSARAC had included some Civil Affairs Units in the Overall Echelon of Operations Plan 318. Despite the fact that the Army commanders concerned were instructed to bring these units to a high state of readiness due to the short reaction time, no specific missions were assigned at that time to the units in question. As late as 20 November, the Commanding General, USCOMSARAC, informed the First Army commander that for the present no further mission statements would be provided the units nor was direct liaison between the units and XVIII Airborne Corps authorized. Headquarters, USCOMSARAC, was considering a plan for briefing each individual Civil Affairs unit, and the units were to be informed when all planning details were complete. Again, the stand-down to readiness condition eliminated the need for briefing the units in question.³⁹

39. By the end of November the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, who, as Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba, would command all operations in the objective area, became aware of the fact that there was a very conspicuous lack of guidance in certain fields of Civil Affairs. As a consequence, he had his headquarters develop a short-range command policy for such areas and then ordered General Powell that he intended to follow that policy unless specific guidance to the contrary was provided by some higher headquarters.⁴⁰⁰

Planning for the Use of Large American Forces

400. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), informed the Commanding General, USCOMSARAC, on 1 November 1962 that several Western Hemisphere countries

38.

(1) Mag AJBID-CP 1076, (USCOMSARAC to M-230378), CC XVIII Abn Corps to CC USCOMSARAC, DTG 270157Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag 101018, CC USCOMSARAC to CC XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 212248Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (3) Mag (USCOMSARAC to M-230326), CC XVIII Abn Corps to CC USCOMSARAC, DTG 241935Z Nov 62. (SECRET). All in DCARTH P&O Div files.

39.

Mag 301648, CC USCOMSARAC to CG, First Army, DTG 301619Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCARTH P&O Div files.

400.

Mag (USCOMSARAC to M-230425), CC XVIII Abn Corps to CC USCOMSARAC, DTG 290650Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCARTH P&O Div files.

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had offered small naval elements to participate in the United States quarantine operations against Cuba. On this basis, they could also be expected to offer Army and Air Force units for use in air and ground operations in the event that Operation Puma J13 and J14 were executed. Such forces as might be offered would range in size from a token force to substantial numbers according to the capabilities of each country concerned. He requested General Powell to make comments and recommendations on the best method of accepting these forces, as well as for their subsequent use in the Cuban operations. He emphasized that their use should be so planned as to insure suitable favorable publicity with a resultant effect upon friendly relations with the United States. 101

(S) The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, made immediate recommendations as to the receipt, staging, processing, training, and employment of the proposed Latin-American forces. He recommended that staging be accomplished in each respective country with advice furnished by the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), through the appropriate Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), but only if such advice was requested and/or requested. Appropriate U. S. units would provide proper liaison as soon as the U. S. forces could determine what type of unit would be offered and whether the offer was acceptable. He further recommended that the participating units be moved to the objective area along with their equipment in ships furnished by their own country and with their own naval protection. He felt that the participating units should bring with them from their own countries a five-day supply of Classes I, II, and V supplies and that they should resupply themselves from their home country using their own transportation means. On the tactical side he recommended that the forces be used in a reinforcing role dependent upon the size of the unit offered. If their capabilities so permitted, they would be used as independent units under the control of the Commander, Task Force 125; on the other hand, their use would be determined when the composition of the offered force was firm. He recommended that the forces be introduced into the southern ports of Cuba and could then be assigned to any one of a number of missions. 102

(S) Considering the capabilities of the Latin American countries this viewpoint tended to be rather idealistic. The USCOMSAC commander and his planning staff, on the other hand, took a more realistic view of the receipt, training, equipping, and use of these forces. He recommended to CINCLANT that, based on the logic of language, national customs, and the like, these forces be staged through the Artillery Command (ARTCOM) of the U. S. Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB). General Powell's recommendation was based on the

101.

Msg. (USCOMSAC In M-217642), CINCLANT to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 041634Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In SECDEF AGO Div files.

102.

Msg (USCOMSAC In E-1522), CG XVIII Air Corps to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 052300Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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assumption that the Puerto Rican two-battle group force would already have been called to active duty and committed to operations in Cuba either prior to or with the Latin-American forces. If, however, the number of Latin-American forces made available for such use exceeded the capabilities of AMTCOM, they should then be staged in facilities in the continental United States such as Fort Benning, Georgia. Planning assumptions developed by General Powell's planning staff indicated that such forces would require assistance in the way of equipment, supplies and training prior to commitment in the objective area with the U. S. forces. The provision of such supplies and equipment, plus training in the use of U. S.-provided equipment, was considered essential if such forces were to be integrated into tactical operations of the U. S. forces in Cuba. Based on these assumptions, the USCOMMAC planning staff concluded that the Latin-American forces could not be committed in the initial assault phase. A recommended mission for later operations was the taking of airports and towns not included in the main axis of advance. This would relieve the U. S. forces of mop-up type operations and permit them to secure the country more rapidly and to more rapidly establish a government friendly to the United States. Upon completion of major operations, USCOMMAC felt that these Latin-American units might well be assigned their own occupation sectors until a friendly Cuban government could be established. Since certain AMTCOM forces had already been placed under the operational control of CINCLANT, the USCOMMAC commander requested the transfer of the remainder of AMTCOM's forces to his jurisdiction in order to develop planning factors and to establish facilities for the receipt, staging, and training of the forces in question.¹⁰³

Because of his knowledge of the Latin-American forces, the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those commands dealing with Cuban contingency planning of the number and types of troops which could be expected of members of the Organization of American States (OAS). He felt that the following forces could be provided without having a serious effect on the respective country's own internal security:

Argentina	• One Infantry Battalion
Bolivia	• A unit no larger than an Infantry platoon
Brazil	• One Infantry Battalion
Chile	• One Battalion Combat team
Colombia	• One Infantry company
Guinean Bissau	• One Infantry platoon
Ecuador	• One Infantry platoon
El Salvador	• One Infantry platoon
Guatemala	• One Infantry company

¹⁰³.

(1) Msg 103140, CG USCOMMAC to CINCLANT, DTG 042010Z Nov 61. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 103156, CG USCOMMAC to CG AMTCOM and CG USASMACAS, DTG 070045Z Nov 61. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg 103157, CG USCOMMAC to DA, DTG 070045Z Nov 61. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Com.

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Haiti	- One Infantry platoon (Complicated by French language problem)
Honduras	- One Infantry company
Mexico	- One Infantry battalion
Nicaragua	- One Infantry company
Paraguay	- One Infantry platoon
Pera	- 18th Infantry Battalion (Bongor) (Considered desirable by CINCARIB)
Uruguay	- One Infantry platoon
Venezuela	- One Infantry company

Neither Costa Rica nor Panama had an army from which contributions could be made.

CINCARIB pointed out that, while these contributions were relatively modest, they would, nevertheless, be politically and psychologically significant. While many problems did undoubtedly exist, he felt that they would be overcome by intensive training under the supervision of United States forces. He cautioned, however, that extreme care would have to be taken in approaching the Latin-American countries for such force contributions. In many cases the approach would be viewed or exploited by the Latin-American countries as a lever to obtain more military equipment. Therefore, he felt that the United States should spell out, at the outset, that any equipment furnished to such participating forces was for the duration of the emergency only and would have to be returned to the control of the United States upon completion of the operations. With regard to the training and staging base to be used, he was quick to point out that the extreme antipathy of many of the Latin-Americans for the Puerto Rican rule out the use of ANTCOM facilities for these purposes. CINCARIB therefore recommended that, due mainly to the language problems of the Latin-American forces, such units should be equipped, trained and staged in the Canal Zone, where he possessed both the facilities and the language capabilities to successfully carry out such a mission. This recommendation was limited by the fact that the equipment, both for the support of the forces themselves and for the support of the training effort, would have to be furnished from the continental United States.¹⁰⁴

GM The opinion of CINCARIB on the use of Puerto Rico for these purposes was strengthened by the Commanding General, Antilles Command, who outlined further factors which limited the use of that area. He pointed out that, since his plans for a General War Condition called for the mobilization of all Puerto Rican Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, that mobilization would preclude the availability of accommodations for the training of Latin-American forces. Displacement of ANTCOM units to off-island locations, however, would alter this accommodation capability. Furthermore, if the ANTCOM

¹⁰⁴.

Msg (DISCOMSEC to E-1501 and E-1504), CINCARIB to JCS, CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, DTG 092100Z Nov 63, (TOP SECRET). In AS TR Com.

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commander were required to meet the staging requirements for the Latin-American forces, he would have to call to active duty all Army National Guard and Army Reserve support units on the island. With the call-up of these units and the selected call-up of two battle groups of the Puerto Rican Army National Guard, only one installation on the island would be available for staging Latin-American troops. While this installation would be capable of accommodating approximately 4,000 troops, mainly under tentage, it was limited in suitable training areas and did not possess adequate ranges for the training of Armed and Artillery units. ANTCOM's stocks were not even considered adequate to support the programmed call-up of Army Reserve and Army National Guard components and consequently could not be expected to support a training program for upwards of 4,000 additional troops. Class I supplies would have to be immediately furnished from the continental United States and Classes II and IV stocks were critically short. ANTCOM would definitely require resupply for these latter classes on a selective basis. Class V supplies were limited to minimum quantities of small arms ammunition in support of United States weapons and could not meet the training requirements for such a large force. 185

Because of these reasons which militated against the use of Puerto Rico for such purposes, CINSLANT recommended to CINCSAIL and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that all offered Army units of Latin-American countries be sent to the continental United States for training and equipping. CINCSAIL, on the other hand, immediately rebutted this recommendation by outlining the reasons why he felt that initial training and equipping of the Latin-American forces could be more effectively accomplished in the Canal Zone. He pointed out that, first of all, most of the Latin-American Army units had not had the requisite basic training which would enable them to enter into sustained combat training with U. S. forces, nor would they be in any physical condition to do so. He proposed that all Latin-American forces be received in the Canal Zone where they would be physically examined, physically hardened, and given training according to their respective needs by Spanish-speaking instructors from U. S. Army, Caribbean, who were accustomed to working with the Latin-Americans. This initial concentrated effort would require a basic understanding of the needs of the Latin-American forces and this would be almost impossible to obtain at training bases in the United States. Very few of the officers, noncommissioned officers, or enlisted troops could be expected to speak English. While liaison officers would be invaluable during actual combat operations, they could not conduct the requisite training for such forces. The Caribbean Command could accommodate upwards of 6,000 Army troops for training, as contrasted to the 4,000 estimated for Puerto Rico. The better units might be ready for employment in 2 to 4 weeks but the poorer units would possibly require 2 to 3 months of intensive training before they could effectively serve with United States forces. The Commander in Chief, Caribbean,

185.

Msg (USCOMARL In 8-1581), 08 ANTCOM to CINCSAILANT, STD 0817/00Z Nov 61. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Gen.

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therefore recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the receipt of these forces, the conduct of their initial training and the issue of a minimum of essential equipment should be accomplished in the Canal Zone. He did concede that the final training and equipping could be accomplished in the continental United States. 106

[34] The proposals made by CINCSALANT, CINCLANT, and CINCPACIB brought a strong reaction from the Commanding General, XVII Airborne Corps, who repeated his earlier recommendations that all starting actions be accomplished in the respective home country of the proffered forces. If this was not feasible, he then felt that equipment should be provided the forces when they reached the objective area. As can easily be seen, these recommendations completely overlooked the basic need to train the units in the use of U. S.-provided equipment before an actual commitment to combat operations. He felt, however, that the issue of additional equipment and the retaining of these forces might adversely reflect upon them. He reminded the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, that the effort in Cuba should be a collective effort and should reflect the solidarity of the Organization of American States (OAS). The move of the units in question to the Canal Zone and thence to the United States would consume time, thus delaying their entry into the objective area. He felt that this was unjustified against the very reasons for their participation. While he conceded that operational capability was important, he felt that it was secondary to the psychological value of introducing the units into the objective area as soon as possible. 107 His whole argument for psychological effect was counter to the information provided by the Commander in Chief, Caribbean, that these units would be in no shape to take their place along side of U. S. military forces in actual combat operations. If the operation involved merely an occupation of the island of Cuba by foreign troops without any resistance being met, his arguments might be valid. But when the operation involved action in actual combat, it was extremely unfair to all forces in the combat area to include troops whose training and equipment did not fit them for such action.

[35] Despite the arguments presented by the Commanding General, XVII Airborne Corps, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, indicated to CINCLANT his concurrence in the position established by the Commander in Chief, Caribbean. This meant that the initial training and equipping of the Latin-American ground forces would be more appropriately accomplished in the Canal Zone with the final equipping and training to be accomplished by Headquarters,

106.

Reg CC 44899-22 (USCOMARAC to M-220311), CINCPACIB to JCS, DTC 231842 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DOWRY P&O Div files.

107.

Reg (USCOMARAC to M-220306), CC XVII Abn Corps to CINCSALANT, DTC 231853 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DOWRY P&O Div files.

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CINCLANT/USCOMARAC in the continental United States.¹⁰⁸ But this proposal, like so many others, was overtaken by events, since the decision for a complete stand-down in readiness conditions was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before they could take up this matter for final decision.

Plan of Cuban Volunteers

(P5) At the time that the Cuban emergency occurred, USCOMARAC was in the process of developing a training plan for those Cuban Nationals who volunteered to serve in the U. S. Armed Forces. The existing Army Training Plan for Cuban Volunteers consisted of a total training period of 22 weeks, 8 weeks of which was devoted to Basic Combat Training, 8 weeks to Advanced Individual Training, and the remaining 6 weeks to Basic Unit Training, all of which was conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky. At a conference with representatives of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, on 24 October 1962, USCOMARAC was directed to submit a plan to accelerate this training to a five to six weeks training period. The USCOMARAC planning and training staffs concluded that a six-week accelerated training program was the minimum training time required to attain an acceptable degree of military effectiveness. USCOMARAC was additionally directed to develop a plan for employing the Cuban Volunteers after they had completed the training period. The Armed Forces Examining and Inspection Stations (AFEIS) at both New York City and Miami, Florida, estimated that Cuban Nationals could be obtained in sufficient numbers to meet the training quotas established by USCOMARAC dependent entirely upon the volunteer rate.

(P5) USCOMARAC intended to conduct the accelerated training program at Fort Knox, Kentucky, where the existing program for training Cuban Volunteers was already underway, and planned on an initial weekly input of 400 volunteers with this input to be continued each week for four consecutive weeks. Beginning with the fifth week a reduced weekly input of 240 volunteers would be established. As was indicated above, the minimum acceptable training period to train a Cuban Volunteer for a limited tactical employment capability was a six-week period based on a fifty-four-hour training week. USCOMARAC proposed to train the Cuban Volunteers in training companies as platoon packets consisting of four eleven-man squads. Platoons, moreover, would be made up of volunteers who came from the same geographic area of Cuba. Weapons training planned for this accelerated program was to be limited to the M-1 rifle, the BAR, and hand grenades. All personnel would be qualified on the M-1 rifle with the exception of two men per squad who would be qualified on the BAR and only familiarized with the M-1. In the event that deployment of the volunteers did not occur at the end of the 6-week training period, USCOMARAC planned to continue the normal training period under the original concept, i.e., 8 weeks

¹⁰⁸.

Reg 103779, CG USCOMARAC to CINCLANT, DTG 241920Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSURF P&O Div files.

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of Basic Combat Training, 8 weeks of Advanced Individual Training, and 6 weeks of Basic Unit Training. These Basic Combat subjects which were eliminated to establish the accelerated 8-week program would be included in the remaining 2 weeks to fill out the normal 8 weeks of Basic Combat Training.

(S) In the event that platoons were deployed to the objective area at the end of the curtailed six-weeks training program, USCOMBAG proposed to deploy an officer -- or senior non-commissioned officer -- and two non-commissioned officers of the training cadre along with the unit. While the officer who was proposed to accompany the unit into action would be in a command status within the structure of the platoon he would be referred to merely as a unit adviser. One noncommissioned officer would be a senior field leader while the other should be oriented toward communications and supply. Each platoon would be authorized an overstrength of 10 percent prior to deployment as no replacement pipeline was envisioned by the USCOMBAG planners. USCOMBAG recommended that the platoons be attached to the senior headquarters within the theater for final determination as to their use. Upon completion of the accelerated training program, these platoons would be reasonably capable of such duties as guides, scouts, connecting files, interpreters, translators, members of patrol, guards at prisoner of war camps, rear area security guards, and the like.¹⁰⁹ But as occurred with so many proposals and programs of this type during the Cuban Crisis, the actual outcome was also overtaken by events. The program itself was neither approved nor disapproved by the Department of the Army, but was held in abeyance pending the actual need for implementation. Training of Cuban Volunteers was begun under the previously approved program as described above, which called for eight weeks of Basic Combat Training. The stand-down in troop readiness at the end of November elevated the need for implementing such an accelerated program and USCOMBAG continued the normal training cycles which had already been initiated.¹¹⁰

^{109.}

The four preceding paragraphs are based on: Ltr, CG USCOMBAG to OCSOPS SA, 25 Oct 62, subj: The USCOMBAG Plan for Accelerated Training and Employment of Cuban Volunteers, (ATTN-290), w/1 Incl. (TOP SECRET). In AG 28 Cms.

^{110.}

Info furnished by the DCSTI BCI Div, 20 May 63. (SECRET).

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Chapter III

THE PRE-POSITIONING AND PRE-OPERATIONAL PHASE

Activation of Units for Possible Implementation of Operation Plan 316¹¹¹

(28) At the time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the appointment of the Commanding General, USCOMARQ, as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command (USCOMARANT),¹¹² they directed him to bring all Army units contained in the Task Organization for CINCLANT Operation Plan 316 to the highest possible state of readiness in anticipation of a possible execution of that plan. The units comprising the Task Organization were contained in a troop list published by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as an annex to the supporting STRAC Operation Plan 316.

(29) The commanding generals of the six COMUS agencies were consequently instructed to use funds currently available to them for all requirements in support of this action. Their currently authorized Annual Funding Program was to be used for this purpose, disregarding all programming directive which currently served as guidance. Cost estimates would have to be developed since they would be required by higher headquarters at a later date. The Army commanders were further instructed to return all units on temporary duty to their home stations with the exception of those involved in Operation RAPID ROAD and Exercise THREE PAIRS.¹¹³ Authority to return those latter units to their home stations depended upon separate action by Department of the Army and by CINCPACRIM, respectively.

(30) USCOMARQ gave detailed instruction to the Army commanders with regard to furnishing the troops required to bring the units to deployable strengths. They were to be prepared to use all available personnel resources in bring the involved units to not less than minimum deployable strengths. This was to be accomplished originally on a temporary duty (TDY) basis. While all available troops were to be counted as deployables, no action was to be taken during the interim to recall those on leave, at schools, or on other temporary duty. In order to make more troops available for this

111.

Unless otherwise specified, the entire paragraph is based on: Msg 302100, CG USCOMARQ to CG's First thru Sixth Armies, DOW 170010Z Dec 62, (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Cee.

112.

See above, pp. 9 - 10.

113.

See below, pp. 105 - 108.

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purpose, USCOMBAG modified the criteria which governed a person's Expiration of Term of Service (ETS) as to permit the use of all those who could complete at least twenty days in an objective area prior to return to the United States for repatriation. The Army commanders were also instructed to be prepared to suspend any and all actions which might remove a man from his unit with the exception of court martial, board actions, medical actions, ETS, and retirements. All personnel with less than four months training were to be screened from the participating units but airborne units were authorized to deploy with any available overstrengths.

(24) In order to attain proper equipment readiness, the Army commanders were instructed to immediately implement Logistical Plan WETTSOWARE¹¹⁴ within installations only for the air, surface, and on-wall elements. Execution of this plan was directed for all active Army units but preparations were also to be made to complete the authorized equipment of all units assigned to the Operation Plan. All available equipment assets were to be used to bring units to their full TUE authorizations and the Army commanders were to be prepared to associate the subject logistical plan on an Army-wide basis when so directed. Army commanders were directed to immediately requisition repair parts stocks to meet the Prescribed Loads List (PLL), the Universal Minimum Load List (UML), and the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) for all participating units using available assets and requisitioning actions. The commanders were reminded that requisitioning actions were urgent because of an immediate requirement for deployment. Minimum requirements dictated that all material be immediately brought to serviceability standards as prescribed in USCOMBAG Directive 790-3. If time permitted, maintenance efforts could be directed to bringing all tactical vehicles to Preparation for Deep-sea Movement (PDM) conditions, but field maintenance priority was to be given to the attainment of prescribed serviceability standards.

Recommendations for Implementing Operation Plan 312

(25) Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had alerted Headquarters, USCOMBAG, for a possible implementation of Operation Plan 316, the planning factors which were described earlier called for Operation Plan 312 to precede Operation Plan 316 in actual execution. Operation Plan 312 was the basis governing the time reaction factor for ground force deployment under the latter plan. In other words, the implementation of Plan 312 would be the signal to initiate preparations for implementing Plan 316. At about 0600 on 20 October, CINELANT informed the Commanding General, USCOMBAG, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had that evening been considering the execution of air actions under Operation Plan 312 to commence on the following day. But even by the time that CINELANT had passed the information to USCOMBAG, the likelihood of executing Operation Plan 312 on 21 October had already passed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then recommended a two-day delay in executing the plan

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See above, p. 34.

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in order to obtain a better readiness posture for the forces involved, CINCPAC, acting in response to this recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested authority to establish a DEFCON 3 status for all Army and Air Force units which were not assigned to his operation plans. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the reasons behind his request, they informed CINCPAC that they did not intend to grant him such permission until his request had been approved by higher authority. In the interim, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired no overt actions which might attract attention. CINCPAC, on the other hand, passed this information to the Commanding General, USCOMAR, in the form of a possible alert for establishing an Army-wide DEFCON status as soon as the decision was made at the prescribed higher level. Several days later -- on 14 October 1962 -- CINCPAC strongly recommended the immediate implementation of Operation Plan 312. The Commanding General, USCOMAR, concurred in this recommendation and further recommended that a decision be made as soon as possible so that the necessary USARPAC troop movements might be initiated on the following day in order to attain the proper readiness status for possible implementation of Operation Plan 316. ¹¹⁵

Action to Increase the Readiness Posture of all USCOMAR Forces

(TOP) With the alerting of the forces assigned to Operation Plan 316, USCOMAR considered means which could be used to improve the readiness condition of all forces assigned to its control. As a first step, COMUS Army commanders were instructed to increase security measures for posts, camps, and stations under their respective jurisdictions and to institute anti-sabotage measures. At the same time they were warned that their actions would have to be undertaken in such a way as to minimize the alerting of either military personnel or the general public that anything out of the ordinary was happening. USCOMAR recommendations in this regard included the increasing of Military Police patrols, tightening of security at post entrances, increasing the security precautions concerning important military facilities located on post, and increasing counter-intelligence measures against possible espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Other security precautions included maximizing the security of planning areas and briefing rooms and reviewing the access lists to such areas; using liaison officers to transmit particularly sensitive information in lieu of electrical transmissions; and emphasizing to their personnel that no attempt to "double talk" classified information over the telephone should be made at any time. ¹¹⁶

^{115.}

(1) Msg (USCOMAR to M-116446), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, DTG 204820Z Oct 62 (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 303340, CG USCOMAR to CINCPACFLT, DTG 230432Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

^{116.}

Msg 303194, CG USCOMAR to CG's First thru Sixth Armies, DTG 182114Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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(U) Although the units assigned to Operation Plan 316 had been previously alerted for possible implementation of that plan, they had not been placed on a definite Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) status as of 20 October. On that date the USCOMBASC Commander directed all six CONUS Army commanders and the Commander of the Military District of Washington to place their headquarters on a 24-hour operating basis along with all Class I installations under their jurisdiction at which STRAC or STRAF units were located. Commanders and key staff officers of the three indicated headquarters would be available at all times, as well as persons qualified to receipt for, and handle TOP SECRET messages.¹¹⁷ By 21 October the Commanding General, USCOMBASC, was able to report to CINCLANT that all CONUS Armies had opened Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) on a full time basis and that all units as shown in the current task organization for Operation Plan 316 had been ordered to return to their home stations, including those involved in Operation RAPID ROAD and Exercise THREE PAIRS.¹¹⁸

(U) The Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command, directed the Commanding General, USCOMBASC, to place his entire command on DEFCON 3 status effective 1800 hours, 22 October 1962. Actions required under DEFCON 3 status included the completion of all actions required under lesser Defense Readiness Conditions and the return of all personnel from leave status. As an exception to this directive, CINCPAC announced that both Exercise SAGE LOWE and Exercise THREE PAIRS would be continued at a level of activity consistent with those forces remaining available to him. While he planned to continue these exercises on a reduced scale, he established a blackout day of 23 October in order to provide cover for preparatory actions required to implement the partition contingency plans.¹¹⁹ USCOMBASC notified all six CONUS Army headquarters and the Military District of Washington by 1730 hours on 22 October that a DEFCON 3 status was to be put into effect immediately and estimated at that time that this advanced readiness condition could be attained USCOMBASC-wide by midnight of the same day.¹²⁰ The Military District

117.

Msg 302248, CG USCOMBASC to CP's First thru Sixth Armies and MSM, DOW 210600Z Oct 62, (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Com.

118.

Msg 302226, CG USCOMBASC to CINCLANT and DCSGTS SA, DOW 212000Z Oct 62, (TOP SECRET). In AC TS Com.

119.

Msg (USCOMBASC In M-334729), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, DOW 220120Z Oct 62. Sp. 4, (SECRET). In DCSGTS PEO Div files.

120.

(1) Msg (USCOMBASC In E-1664), CINCPAC to ADC, DOW 230513Z Oct 62 (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 302301, CG USCOMBASC to CINCPACFLT and DCSGTS SA, 23 Oct 62, (TOP SECRET). Both in AC TS Com.

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of Washington was the first to announce complete attainment of the DEFCON 3 status which it reached by 1900 hours, 22 October, while the Sixth Army announcement followed at 2100 hours of the same day. All USOMARC/USARLANT/USAMSTRIDE forces attained DEFCON 3 status by 0130 hours, 23 October. 121

(U) In order to prevent undue attention being given to the actions of the military forces in preparing for a possible implementation of the operation plans pertaining to Cuba, the alert instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 October had specifically stated that no personnel were to be recalled from leave. When the DEFCON 3 status was announced for all Army forces on 22 October, a change was required in these instructions since this advanced readiness condition automatically included the recall of such personnel. Consequently, the Commanding General, USOMARC, authorized his Army commanders at 1813 hours, 22 October 1962, to recall all personnel from leave status. 122

Supply Readiness

(U) The USOMARC Logistical Planning Staff had long been attempting to obtain higher supply priorities for those units assigned to CINCLANT operation plans for the Cuban Area, merely to provide them with their authorized supplies and equipment. Such shortages of supplies and equipment had been reflected in the past in the operational readiness reports which these units periodically submitted to Headquarters, USOMARC. Without the proper supplies and equipment, the units in question were not operationally ready to mount a full scale assault on the island of Cuba. It was not until 19 October 1962 -- after the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already alerted Army Forces for a possible implementation of Operation Plan 316 -- that the Department of the Army assigned a higher supply priority. A priority of 2.09, as defined in AR 11-12, was limited to those active Army units included in the Troop Lists for either Operation Plans 304 or 316. By the time that this information reached his Army commanders, General Fawell had already directed the implementation of Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARE 123 on an Army-wide basis for the Air, Surface, and General Schemes of Operation Plan 316. His implementing instructions to the Army commanders for Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMARE indicated that replacement requisitions for items

121.

(1) Reg 303429, CG USOMARC to CINSTRIC and DCSOPS SA, DTD 231425Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Reg 303387, CG USOMARC to CINSTRIC and DCSOPS SA, DTD 251535Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG 75 Gen. (3) Reg 718134, CG USOMARC to DCSOPS SA and CINCLANT, DTD 241634Z Oct 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCUTE P&O Div files.

122.

Reg 718014, CG USOMARC to CG's First three Sixth Armies, DTD 230113Z Oct 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCUTE P&O Div files.

123.

See above, pp. 30, 31 & 32.

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withdrawn from units not assigned to Operation Plan 316 would be honored in accordance with normal supply priorities. He emphasized that the higher priority of 2.00, as indicated above, applied only to the support of Operation Plan 316. These instructions proved to be a bit confusing to the Army commanders since they had not yet received any indication of increased supply priorities. The message containing this latter information reached their hands some seventeen hours after the USCOMSAC Directive for implementing Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMAN. In addition to implementing the Logistical Plan, the Army commanders were instructed to take all necessary actions to bring the units assigned to the operation plan to their full TOE authorizations. USCOMSAC was to be advised of any shortfalls which could not be met from the assets of the respective Army, to include reasonable equipment substitutions. As a final measure, the Army commanders were instructed to advise USCOMSAC of the impact on their command caused by implementing the Logistical Plan and reconstituting the Parts Leads Lists, the Universal Missions Leads Lists, and the Authorized Stockage Lists. The report was to be made as soon as the redistribution of assets was complete.¹²⁴

(P) Some five days after the first increase in supply priorities, the Department of the Army assigned a still higher priority -- Supply Priority 2.00 -- to all material which was required to bring the pertinent units to their full TOE authorizations and to all accompanying supplies. The new priority, however, did not apply to the forty-five-day automatic resupply requirements. The Department of the Army instructed all Depots and National Inventory Control Points (NICEP) to pick, pack, mark, and hold both aerial and surface supply items to which the 2.00 supply priority applied. Resupply requirements received an increased supply priority of 2.00, and Department of the Army approved the pick, pack, mark, and hold of the forty-five-day resupply requirements with the exception of Classes II and IV. For these two categories, the Department approved the pick, pack, mark, and hold of only fifteen-day resupply requirements. If and when 2-day was actually announced, the U. S. Army Material Command was authorized to pick, pack, mark, and hold the remainder of the Class II and IV requirements as necessary to meet previously developed shipping schedules.¹²⁵ These increased supply priorities applied only to those units actually assigned to the troop lists for the pertinent operation plan. It was evident to the USCOMSAC logistical planners that a higher priority was also needed for the support units which were scheduled to operate in the Third Army area. Repeated requests on this matter to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army, finally bore fruit on 25 October 1962 when a Supply Priority of 2.00 was assigned by the Department for both the Third Army Support Plan units and

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(1) Msg 302189, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First thru Sixth Areas and MDW, DTG 191944Z Oct 62, Gp. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg ATLOG-5-302300, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First thru Sixth Areas and MDW, DTG 192245Z Oct 62, Gp. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSTP R&D Div files.

¹²⁵

USCOMSAC DCOLAG Sup Div SITREP, 231400H Oct 62 to 130400H Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCOLAG Admin Br files.

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Third Army JAG-FLAK units. The Third Army commander was given control of this authorization which applied to mission essential items only and included both equipment for the units and supplies for their operation. 100

Implementing Instructions for Operation Plan J16

(CST) With a possible execution of Operation Plan J16 drawing closer, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, issued a set of implementing instructions on 31 October 1962 to all commanders concerned. The purpose of these instructions was to insure that the commanders understood their responsibilities and that they were fully aware of the required sequence of events, since orders to execute the plan would require an immediate response by all. The actual directive to execute the pertinent operation plan would be issued as orders from CINCLANT and would be electrically transmitted by FLASH procedures to all concerned. The order to execute would be worded approximately as follows: "Execute SCARABEUS J16.61. B-Day is (date time group to be provided at the appropriate time). Authenticate."

(CST) All subsequent orders, instructions, and directives would be issued by the appropriate Army commanders, the Peninsula Base Command, and the appropriate Transportation Terminal Commands in accordance with instructions as set down by the Commanding General, USCOMARAC. All movements of air subsonic units to staging bases and to the objective area were to be made under the provisions of Annex E of the operation plan. Upon receipt of orders to execute, the appropriate Army commanders would publish orders to move the pertinent units to their staging bases and direct them to establish coordination with the Combined Air Landing Support Units (CALSU) at the unloading airfields. All surface movements were to be made in accordance with Annex H of the operation plan. All Army commanders were instructed to authorize direct coordination between appropriate port commanders and pertinent units commanders after the latter had received port call alerts. Moreover, they were to insure that unit commanders fully understood the fact that port call alerts did not constitute orders to move. Port call alerts were to be issued by the Commanders, Transportation Terminal Commands, Atlantic and Gulf, respectively. All port call alerts would inform the recipient unit commander that the actual port call itself would be received from the appropriate terminal commanders under separate cover. All movements of Army aviation were to be in accordance with Annex G of the operation plan. In the event that the Alternate Movement Plan was executed, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, would issue separate instructions and would advise as to the port to be used for landing the aircraft.

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(JRP) In the event that any unit movements were required which were not in accordance with, nor covered by, the provisions of the pertinent operation plan, the USCOMSAC Commander would direct his subordinate Army commanders to move the units in question to intermediate staging bases or to Army Staging Area Commands (ASAC), as appropriate. He additionally would direct the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, to request the issuance of a pass call by the appropriate Transportation Terminal commander for the actual movement of the units from their home stations or intermediate staging bases through a Port of Embarkation or Aerial Port of Embarkation -- and in this case the latter would not be located in Florida -- to the objective area. All unit movements made in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate operation plan were to be a temporary change of station for an indefinite period. While the units were located at a Port of Embarkation, Aerial Port of Embarkation, or an Army Staging Area Command, they would be under the operational control of the appropriate commander thereof. Upon departure from the continental United States, all units were attached to XVII Airborne Corps for command and control.¹²⁷

Derivation of the Army Authority to Issue Movement Orders

(JRP) Both the time frame reference provided in Operation Plan 314, plus the fact that alerting of the units in question gave no authority to move these units, constituted a matter of grave concern to the Commanding General, USCOMSAC. He consequently requested authority from the Department of the Army on 18 October to perform certain actions and to accomplish troop movements, some of which would have to be undertaken immediately. He desired immediate authority -- which he would begin to exercise only upon notification of E-hour under the operation plan -- to fill all involved units to authorized personnel strengths. He also desired authority to implement the Third Army Plan for Joint Defense of the Florida Keys (JJP-PLAN) immediately upon notification of E-hour. Additional authority was desired -- again dependent upon notification of E-hour -- to implement the personnel replacement support procedures which had been agreed upon by representatives of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, and USCOMSAC on 13 October 1962. Immediate actions and troop movements for which he desired authority included moving the 70th Replacement Battalion from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Monmouth, Georgia; the pre-positioning of boat units from Fort Eustis, Virginia, to Charleston, South Carolina, under cover; and moving the 43rd Field Hospital from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Fort Gordon, Georgia, and changes to the Florida Area where the unit would be used to support the Third

¹²⁷.

Msg 382994, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First thru Sixth Areas and HQM, PEO 010600Z Nov 62, (TOP SECRET). In AG 15 Com.

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Army JPR-FLAK 128 In answer to these requests, the Department of the Army on 22 October lifted the movement restrictions for detachments, small units, and fillers. Four days later the Department reminded the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, that these provisions were his basic guidance on the matter of troop movements and that movement of units other than those would have to be approved at the departmental level.¹²⁸ Separate authority had been issued on 23 October to move elements of the 1st Armored Division from Fort Hood to selected destinations in order to support persistent CINCLANT operation plans. But it was not until 19 October that Department of the Army authorized USCOMARAC to issue movement directives for all units assigned to Operation Flak 316. These directives, of course, would not be effective as movement orders until USCOMARAC had received instructions to implement that plan.¹²⁹

Key Personnel -- Headquarters, USARLANT

(25) Preparations for implementing the operation plans for the Cuban Area necessitated an augmentation of CINCLANT's headquarters, as well as those of his component commanders. His headquarters, moreover, had to be developed on a joint basis. On 18 October he directed the relief of Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman as Commander, Joint Task Force 4 (JTF4) -- a position which he held as Deputy Commanding General, USCOMARAC. At the same time he requested the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, to make General Truman available for assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff to CINCLANT for Cuban Planning and Operations. In order to fill the void created by General Truman's temporary departure at a time when the position of Deputy Commanding General became more important with the designation of USCOMARAC as USARLANT, Lt. Gen. John E. Waters, Fifth Army Commander, was temporarily assigned as Acting Deputy Commanding General, USCOMARAC and USARLANT.¹³⁰

128.

Msg 302216, CG USCOMARAC to DCSOPS SA, 20 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

129.

(1) Msg 910518 (USCOMARAC In M-214738), DCSOPS SA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 221930Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 920734 (USCOMARAC In M-213837), DCSOPS SA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 261817Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

130.

(1) Msg 920607 USCOMARAC In M-215941), DCSOPS SA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 232106Z Oct 62. Sp. 4. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-216710), DCSOPS SA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 292236Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In POSTER P&O Div files.

131.


(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-214387), CINCLANT to CINCLANT, DTG 191414Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-214431), CINCLANT to CINCLANT, DTG 200304Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) USCOMARAC CG 123, 23 Oct 62. (UNCLASSIFIED).

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1



ORGANIZATION CHART - TRANSLANT FORWARD



———— Operational Command
 - - - - - Operational Support
 Coordination
 - - - - - Liaison

1 - Located at Fort Lundy, NY
 2 - Located at Fort Lumbard, VA

Source: Briefing for Red Bull Gun
 Range Gun on Agency, 11 Jan
 61, by AG, USMC, with
 Review of Gun Range
 (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Establishment of USARLANT Forward

(24) In order to fulfill his missions and responsibilities as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), the Commanding General, USCOMARL, planned to activate an advance command post at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. To provide the proper administrative support for this advance command post, he relieved the 3d Missile Command (Provisional) of its emergency mission to support Joint Task Force Four and assigned it the responsibility for supporting CINCLANT. The Commanding General, Third Army, was thereupon alerted for movement of the 3d Missile Command to Homestead Air Force Base on order. The advance element of USARLANT Forward -- consisting of twenty-three officers and twenty-two enlisted personnel -- arrived at Homestead Air Force Base on 25 October 1962. By 8 November 1962 the strength of USARLANT Forward had increased to a total of 170 personnel while support units, totalling an additional 670 personnel, were attached for operations. The maximum number of personnel present at USARLANT Forward during the emergency operation was 100 officers and enlisted men, a number considered adequate to carry out the assigned missions of the headquarters. (25)

(26) USARLANT Forward, functioning as the forward command post of CINCLANT, was assigned four major missions. The first, and perhaps the most important, was to represent CINCLANT in coordinating the logistical and administrative support of Army Forces involved in Operation Plan 314. The next mission of importance was the maintenance of continuing liaison with the Advance Headquarters of CINCLANT -- USARLANT AFWH -- which was also located at Homestead Air Force Base. The two remaining missions of lesser importance were to keep current with operations and plans for the support of Operation Plan 314 and to be prepared to function as a five-day reserve as CINCLANT's actual command post. The organizational structure established for USARLANT Forward was the conventional general and special staff type organization, modified so as to be compatible with the current organization of Headquarters, USCOMARL. (Charts 4 & 5) As an exception to this rule, a special Signal Section was created at the Special Staff level. At the time that the headquarters was discontinued, the Chief of Staff, USARLANT Forward, stated that he could not over-emphasize the requirement for the Signal Officer of such a headquarters to report directly to the Chief of Staff. Several tabular distribution were developed for this headquarters during the course of the operation, increasing from an original allocation of 131 officers and

132.

(1) Msg 301304, OO USCOMARL to OO's Third Army and XVII Air Corps, DTG 120325Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARL In 8-1248). CINCLANT to JCS, DTG 241120Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg (USCOMARL In 8-1254), CINCLANT Fwd to CINCLANT, DCS 241630Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Com. (4) Msg (USCOMARL In 8-12688), CINCLANT Fwd to CINCLANT, DCS 060355Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In MOUTH PWD Div files.

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enlisted men to a final approved table of distribution calling for a total of 183. As indicated earlier, the maximum number of personnel present for duty at USARLANT Forward at its peak load was 209 officers and enlisted men and this number was considered adequate to perform its assigned missions.¹³³

~~(S)~~ Shortly after the establishment of Headquarters, USARLANT Forward, the need for aviation support of this forward headquarters was recognized. USCOMSAC proposed the establishment of a provisional aviation company with a primary mission of supporting USARLANT Forward. Accordingly, the 100th Aviation Company (Army) (Provisional) with an aggregate strength of 18 officers, 13 warrant officers, and 91 enlisted men was organized on 27 October 1962 chiefly from the assets of the 416th Signal Aviation Company of Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Since two detachments of the 416th Signal Aviation Company could not be used for this purpose, the remainder of the personnel and equipment required was furnished from resources available to the Commanding General, USCOMSAC. One detachment of the 416th Signal Company consisting of 2 rotary wing and 2 fixed wing aircraft, along with 3 aviators and 6 enlisted mechanics, was detailed to support the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command. Another detachment, consisting of twelve personnel and six aircraft was assigned to the Operation Plan 316 troop list.¹³⁴

Establishment of the Peninsula Base Command
and the Army Staging Area Command

~~(S)~~ In order to carry out his assigned mission as Department of the Army Coordinating Authority for the administrative support of Army forces in the Western Hemisphere, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, decided to establish the Peninsula Base Command in the Florida area. The major responsibilities of the new command were to operate the Army Staging Area Commands and terminal commands, to provide certain medical support, etc., and to provide coordination with logistical representatives of other Department of the Army and Department of Defense agencies in the forward area. On 23 October 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General Powell to move units into Opa Locka Air Force Base which had recently been reactivated by the Air Force to support CINCLANT operation plans for the Caribbean area. The 24 Logistical Command at Fort Lee was alerted that very day for the move to Opa Locka Air Force Base to establish the Peninsula Base Command. While both CINCLANT and the Commanding General, Third Army, indicate that the Peninsula Base Command was established effective 0730 hours, 24 October,

133.

Let, USARLANT Fwd to CINCLANT, 3 Dec 62, subj: After-Action Report, ARCS. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSTTR P&O Div Op & R files.

134.

(1) Msg 100751, OO USCOMSAC to ARLANT Fwd, DTG 171925Z Oct 62, (SECRET). In DCSTTR P&O Div files. (2) USCOMSAC OO 124, 27 Oct 62, (UNCLASSIFIED).

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USCOMARAC did not issue a directive to Second Army to move the 1st Logistical Command until 25 October. USCOMARAC officially established the Command at 0600 hours, 30 October 1962.¹³⁵

(S) The major missions assigned to the Peninsula Base Command included the administrative and logistical support of TF 125 under Operation Plan 114; the receipt, storage, rigging, and outloading, as required, of all emergency supplies and aerial resupply; and the supervision and coordination of movements of back replacements and medical evacuees. The Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, was designated as the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, the forces and activities of which were restricted to the geographical limits of the state of Florida. The Peninsula Base Commander was additionally directed to act as the coordinating agent for the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, and CINCSALANT in accordance with Department of the Army instructions and within the scope of his assigned mission.¹³⁶

Transfer of Support Responsibilities from Third Army

(S) Since the USCOMARAC General Order establishing the Peninsula Base Command assigned to that command the responsibility of supporting Task Force 125 at bases established for that purpose in Florida, USCOMARAC took steps to relieve Third Army of that particular mission. The Commanding General, Third Army, was directed to make available to the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, all logistical-type forces designated by either Third Army or USCOMARAC for the support of Task Force 125 in the state of Florida. These forces were transferred to the operational control of the Peninsula Base commander on 30 October 1962. This, in effect, designated the Southeastern Terminal Activity and the Army Staging Area Commands as its major subordinate elements. Third Army retained responsibility for the administrative and logistical support of the Peninsula Base Command and its assigned and attached Army units to include those under its operational control. The USCOMARAC directive, on the other hand, did not relieve the Commanding General, Third Army, of his responsibility for operating a Personnel Replacement Center nor did it affect his missions under JEP-FLAR, nor other missions in

¹³⁵.

(1) Mag (USCOMARAC En B-214758), CISELANT to CINCSALANT, DTG 121054Z Oct 62, (SECRET). In DCSUTR P&O Div files. (2) Mag (USCOMARAC En B-1207), CINCSALANT to AIG #30, PDS 154104Z Oct 62, (TOP SECRET). (3) Mag 302644, CG USCOMARAC to CG 1st Log Cdn, PDS 230041Z Oct 62, (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TR Cdn. (4) Mag 302642, CG USCOMARAC to CG Second Army, DTG 240136Z Oct 62, (SECRET). (5) Third Army After Action Rpt, Cuban Emergency (U), Incl 1 to Ltr, Rq Third Army to CG USCOMARAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (U), ALAGT-F, p. 3, (SECRET). Both in DCSUTR P&O Div files. (6) USCOMARAC GO 127, 29 Oct 62, (SECRET). In AG Cdn files.

¹³⁶.

USCOMARAC GO 127, 29 Oct 62, (SECRET). In AG Cdn files.

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support of Operation Plan 314 such as the initiation of aerial movements as prescribed in the deployment plans from base stations in the Third Army area of responsibility.¹³⁷

Attachment of 307th Transportation Group

(28) The 307th Transportation Group (Movements Control) was alerted for movement on 23 October and directed to move on 24 October to Ops Locks Air Force Base, Florida. The mission of this group was to provide liaison teams at all staging bases in Florida and at all surface ports of embarkation being used for STRAC Operation Plan 314. Effective 24 October the 307th Transportation Group was attached to the Peninsula Base Command for operational control.¹³⁸

Activation of Army Staging Area Commands

(29) Early on 23 October 1962 USCOMARAC directed Third Army to take immediate action to activate, assemble, and prepare for movement to their respective staging airfields, an Army Staging Area Command for each staging base to be used under Operation Plan 314. Later that same day the Commanding General, Third Army, was directed to complete activation of Headquarters, Army Staging Area Command (Provisional), and to move it to its operating location as soon as possible. Instructions and orders for the expedited movement of all units assigned on the Army Staging Area Command Troop List were to be issued at the same time. Appropriate supporting and operating units were moved to the following U. S. Air Force Bases in Florida: Eglin, MacDill, Ops Locks, Homestead, McCoy, Patrick, and Tyndall. An additional unit was moved to Mayford Naval Air Station. All of the Army Staging Area Commands were operational by 1800 hours, 24 October. The Army Staging Area Command at Key West International Airport did not become operational until 3 November since it had to await completion of negotiations for the use of that field. The Headquarters, Staging Area Command (Provisional), and the

137.

(1) Msg ATLOG-P-322843, CG USCOMARAC to CG Third Army, DTG 231600Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Third Army After Action Rpt, Cuban Emergency (U), Incl 1 to 14r, Hq 3d Army to CG USCOMARAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (U), AIACT-P, p. 3. (SECRET). In DCSOTE P&O Div files.

138.

(1) Msg 303435, CG USCOMARAC to CG Second Army, DTG 231747Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg 303643, CG USCOMARAC to CG Second Army, DTG 242134Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCSOTE P&O Div files. (3) USCOMARAC GO 127, 23 Oct 62. (SECRET). In AG Com files.

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respective Staging Area Commands were transferred to the operational control of the Panama Base Command on 30 October 1962.¹³⁹

Third Army Missions and Responsibilities

(S) Even after the Commanding General, Third Army, had been relieved of his missions and responsibilities for the support of Task Force 133 while enroute to, and while at, ports and aerial ports of embarkation in the state of Florida, he was still responsible for the support of that task force while at other ports and aerial ports of embarkation located in his area of responsibility. He was additionally responsible for furnishing facilities at Fort Stewart, Georgia, for use by elements of the Surface Echelon of Task Force 133. Since only the missions of supporting Task Force 133 in the Florida area were transferred to the Panama Base Command, the Commanding General, Third Army, retained his previously assigned missions of providing logistical and administrative support to certain U. S. air defense, air defense support, communications, and command elements which were moved into the Third Army area for various purposes associated with the Cuban emergency. In the event that Operation Plan 316 were executed, the Commanding General, Third Army, would also have to provide an 800-bed medical holding and treatment facility in the vicinity of Ops Locks Air Force Base, Florida. And, finally, upon orders of appropriate higher headquarters, he was to be prepared to execute the Joint Defense Plan for the Florida Keys Area (JDFP-FLAK).¹⁴⁰

Acquisition of Real Estate in the Forward Area

(S) The staging of such a great number of troops through the southeastern sector of the United States required the use of facilities which were not immediately available to the Commanding General, Third Army, a fact particularly true in the Florida area. Headquarters, USCOMSAC, consequently established an informal policy on the acquisition of real estate to be used as guidance by Third Army so as to preclude the temporary leasing or acquisition of expensive, privately owned real estate to include buildings. Leasing of real estate was restricted to those facilities required to house critical operational equipment if government owned facilities were not available. Privately owned facilities which were leased for such essential operations would be selected from the most austere type building in the area.

¹³⁹

(1) Msg 302416, CG USCOMSAC to CG Third Army, DTG 232543Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg 302462, CG USCOMSAC to CG Third Army, DTG 231340Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (3) Third Army After Action Rpt., Cuban Emergency (U), Incl 1 to Ltr, Hq Third Army to CG USCOMSAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (U), AIAOE-R, pp. 2-3. (SECRET). All in DCSJCS P&O Div files.

¹⁴⁰

Third Army After Action Rpt., Cuban Emergency (U), Incl 1 to Ltr, Hq Third Army to CG USCOMSAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (U), AIAOE-R, pp. 1-2. (SECRET). In P&O Div files.

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Facilities for troop billeting or normal headquarters operations would not be leased or acquired since headquarters elements and troop units would either be quartered in existing government-owned facilities or would operate under field conditions. Any leasing action taken under this policy, which called for an expenditure in excess of \$5,000 for a three-month period, required prior approval of Headquarters, USCOMARAC.

(U) Since elements of Task Force CHARLIE of the Surface Echelon were scheduled to outload through the port of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, staging areas were required in that vicinity to bilocate the troops during movement. Third Army proposed the lease of both the Yankee Stadium and the Gulf Stream Race Track for this purpose. On 1 November, Headquarters, USCOMARAC, approved the lease of the two facilities and informed Third Army that the Race Track would be held ready for use but would not be occupied until required. This latter facility was used as a bivouac area for the troops of Task Force CHARLIE during the amphibious training exercises held during the month of November.¹⁴¹

(U) Perhaps the most important piece of real estate required by the U. S. Army in the forward area was the Ray West International Airport. Approximately 300 Army aircraft required a forward staging base prior to being flight-decked into the objective area.¹⁴² It was essential that negotiations for the use of this airfield be initiated as early as possible since supplies, maintenance facilities, and POL products would have to be pre-positioned at the selected staging field. CINCLANT, moreover, pointed out to the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, that he should plan to use Ray West International Airport for those planes which exceeded the capacity or capability of available shipping. At the same time, he indicated that USCOMARAC should not expect to fly Army aircraft into Ray West International Airport in any sizeable numbers until shortly after D-day of Operation Plan 311 because of a possibility of actual interference with combat operations resulting from the high density of Air Force and Navy aircraft expected to be in the Ray West area before and during the initial stages of Operation Plan 312.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹

POWLOG BOC Briefing Notes, n.d., sub: Draft Reg ATLOG-Sugr to Third Army (OPUSSES). In POWLOG Admin Rr files.

¹⁴²

See above, pp. 38 & 40.

¹⁴³

(1) Reg 302541, CG USCOMARAC to POWLOG Bn, DGS 250745Z Oct 48. (TOP SECRET). (2) Reg (USCOMARAC In 8-1146), CINCLANT to CINCLANT, DTG 180418Z Oct 48. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TR Gen.

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(S) The USCOMNAVJAG Commander pointed out to the Department of the Army at the end of October that he desired to move a base support echelon to Key West International Airport as soon as possible. The selected aircraft contained an aircraft maintenance company of 135 men and an airfield operating detachment of approximately 75 men. He re-emphasized the point that there were no facilities at that airfield for fuel storage, servicing of the aircraft, or maintenance operations, much less for the billeting and messing of either the support personnel or the transient aircraft crews. These services would have to be established as soon as possible in satisfaction of the order to execute Operation Plan 308. He further emphasized the point that either this airfield or equivalent space at the Key West Naval Air Station would have to be provided in order to insure the success of Army operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved the request for use of the airport on 3 November 1942 and authorized the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to begin negotiations for its use, immediately. They concurrently authorized USCOMNAVJAG to pre-position the proposed support and operational facilities but directed that Army aircraft involved in Operation Plan 316 were not to be moved into the airport at that time. They pointed out that recommendations for movement of the aircraft in question should be a separate matter and requested CINCLANT to present his pertinent recommendations at the proper time. The Miami District Engineer, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, negotiated the lease for airport facilities while the Commanding General, Third Army, negotiated arrangements for actual use of the field by the support and operational detachments. Direct communication between the Commanding General, Third Army, and the Commander, Key West Forces, U. S. Navy, was authorized to insure that the support previously agreed upon by the U. S. Navy would be provided.¹⁴⁴

Plans to Pre-position Certain Units

(S) Plans were being made by 22 October to move Task Force CHARLIE of the Surface Echelon of Operation Plan 316 to either a pre-positioned location at Fort Screven, Georgia, or directly to a Gulf port of embarkation depending on a determination to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U. S. Army Transportation Terminal, Gulf, at New Orleans, Louisiana, jumped the gun on directing these movements and was reminded by the Commanding General, Fourth Army, that no authority existed to move any units assigned to Operation Plan 316 without prior approval from the Commanding General, USCOMNAVJAG.¹⁴⁵ Some felt, however, that the substitution of the 1st Armored

144.

(1) Msg 302834, CG USCOMNAVJAG to BOSLOG BA, DTG 290556Z Oct 42. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMNAVJAG In E-1408), JCS to GSA and CINCLANT, DTG 012126Z Oct 42. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg 303163, CG USCOMNAVJAG/CINCLANT to MARLANT Fed, DTG 000440Z Nov 42. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Com.

145.

Msg (USCOMNAVJAG In M-214712), CG Fourth Army, to CG USATDAG, DTG 221400Z Oct 42, Gp. 4. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Division for the 1st Armored Division on the Troop Lists of Operation Plans 314 and 316 removed a plausible cover for any troop movements at this time since the 1st Armored Division was not a designated STRAC unit, as the 2d Armored Division was. The Commanding General, III Corps, therefore recommended that the 1st Armored Division be immediately designated a STRAC unit to provide this type of cover for the proposed movement of personnel and equipment to satisfy the requirements of Operation Plan 316. ¹⁴⁶

~~(S)~~ At approximately 1330 hours, on 22 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the long-awaited instructions for movement of units in anticipation of implementing CINCLANT operation plans in the Cuban area. The Department of the Army issued more detailed instructions some five hours later. These called for the loading for movement of a composite force (Task Force CHARLIE) of the 1st Armored Division with a strength of approximately 4,600 for a temporary change of station to either Fort Stewart, Georgia, or a Gulf port of embarkation. The final destination of this composite force would be determined at a later date. The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, would determine the actual composition of the forces to meet operational requirements for armored units in either of CINCLANT Operation Plans, 314 or 316. The instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the movement was a necessary preparation for implementing either of the two operation plans which involved ground forces. No public announcement of the anticipated move was to be made without prior approval of the Department of the Army. ¹⁴⁷

Move of the 1st Armored Division to Fort Stewart, Georgia

~~(S)~~ In accordance with the instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of the Army, General Powell directed the 1st Armored Division Commander to take all steps necessary to prepare for an immediate move, including arrangements with civilian transportation authorities. First priority for the loading of unit equipment, supplies, etc., was given to the first, second, fifth, and sixth increments of Task Force CHARLIE which were to be moved to Fort Stewart, Georgia, and held there for eventual movement through Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Second priority was given to the third and fourth increments which were to be held in place at Fort Hood, Texas, for eventual movement to the objective area through the port of New Orleans. In addition, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, directed that the 2d Battalion (Medium Tank), 69th Armor, 2d Infantry Division, prepare for movement to

¹⁴⁶

Msg (USCOMARAC In E-1041), CG III Corps to CG USCOMARAC, MSG 221556Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AD TS Com.

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Msg (USCOMARAC In E-1051), JCS to CofS A and CG USCOMARAC, OTC 221833Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 000563, (USCOMARAC In M-214773), 000448 DA to CG USCOMARAC, MSG 222302Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AD TS Com.

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Fort Stewart and ultimate movement to the objective area through the port of Savannah. This latter unit was Priority Item 15A of the Surface Movement Schedule prepared on 21 October by the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army, for Operation Plan 316. To complete all necessary arrangements for these moves, the Department of the Army on 23 October 1962 authorized the Commanding General, USCOMSAR, to recall personnel on temporary duty and on leave and to redistribute personnel on a temporary duty basis, but those personnel memories were limited to only those units comprising Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division. Although the Commanding General, USCOMSAR, received verbal approval of his selected destinations for Task Force CHARLIE early in the morning of 23 October, he did not receive written approval giving him full authority to move the units in question to the selected locations until later that same day.¹⁴⁸

~~CONF~~ Acting on the strength of verbal approval from the Department of the Army, the Commanding General, USCOMSAR, directed the Commanding General, Fourth Army, at approximately 0800 hours, 23 October, to move the four selected increments of Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division, to Fort Stewart on a temporary change of station for an indefinite period. These units were to be attached to the Commanding General, Third Army, upon arrival at Fort Stewart. At the same time, instructions were issued permitting the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, to position his headquarters at either Fort Hood or Fort Sewart, at his discretion. By the following day, however, the USCOMSAR planning staff queried the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, on a recommendation that the divisional headquarters move to Fort Stewart along with the four increments of Task Force CHARLIE and that only a Division Rear Command Post remain at Fort Hood. At 1845 hours on 24 October, the Commanding General, USCOMSAR, with the concurrence of XVIII Airborne Corps, directed the Fourth Army Commander to move the 1st Armored Division headquarters to Fort Stewart concurrently with Task Force CHARLIE. At the same time, Fourth Army was informed that a movement directive was then being prepared to move 1st Armored Division elements of the Fighting Reserve, Operation Plan 316, to Fort Stewart as soon as possible subsequent to the arrival there of Task Force CHARLIE. Fourth Army was additionally directed to prepare the 1st Armored Division elements of the Go-Call Echelon for possible movement by rail to Fort Stewart as well. On the following day -- 25 October -- Fourth Army was directed to

148.

(1) Msg 300363, CG USCOMSAR to DCSOPS DA, 22 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET).
(2) Msg 328574 (USCOMSAR to M-215064), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMSAR, DTG 220219Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg 300607, (USCOMSAR to M-215064), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMSAR, DTG 222106Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). All in AG 15 Com.

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actually move all elements of the 1st Armored Division -- with the exception of the third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE -- to Fort Stewart, with priority for movement going to the task force elements. All units were to move as soon as possible with at least minimum operational strength including attached personnel.¹⁴⁹

(S) While the elements of Task Force CHARLIE were enroute to Fort Stewart, USCOMARMC indicated to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, that this task force should be introduced into the objective area as soon as possible. Pre-positioning the task force at Fort Stewart would serve this purpose provided that the carrying LST's were made available to the outloading port at an earlier date than previously indicated and that the necessary transportation movement changes were made.¹⁵⁰

(S) Late in the day on 28 October, the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, informed his subordinate Army commanders that his Headquarters was publishing a revised surface movement schedule for Operation Plan 314. This change proposed Fort Lauderdale -- rather than New Orleans -- as the outloading port for the third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE. The new schedule was designed to speed up the introduction of the task force into the objective area by three to four days. Also moved forward was the arrival of the third increment of the 1st Battalion (Medium Tank), 69th Armor, 1st Infantry Division, in the objective area from B-plus-3-days to B-day itself. On the basis of this change, USCOMARMC on the following day directed the movement of the third and fourth increments of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Stewart, thus completing the directed movement of the entire 1st Armored Division to that pre-positioned location.¹⁵¹

(S) The 1st Armored Division headquarters was the first divisional increment to arrive at Fort Stewart since the divisional commander acted upon USCOMARMC's original advice that he could move to Fort Stewart if he so desired. The headquarters, moving by air, arrived at the Georgia post at approximately 1600 hours, 24 October, or approximately two and one-half hours

149.

(1) Msg 302394, CG USCOMARMC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 230702Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 302502, CG USCOMARMC to CG XVIII Air Corps, DTG 241551Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg A5078-WF-302553, CG USCOMARMC to CG Fourth Army, D+G 242345Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (4) Msg 302634, CG USCOMARMC to CG Fourth Army, 15 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Cen.

150.

Msg 302538, CG USCOMARMC to DCSOPS DA, DTG 242225Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Cen.

151.

(1) Msg 302708, CG USCOMARMC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies, DTG 262331Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Cen. (2) Msg 718287, CG USCOMARMC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 271339Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In DCSOPS P&O Div files.

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before USCOMARAC directed Fourth Army to complete such a move. The First Element of Task Force CHARLIE closed at Fort Stewart at 0900 hours on 26 October. The entire Task Force closed some four and one-half days later -- 1200 hours on 30 October. The 1st Armored Division elements assigned to the Floating Reserve began their movement to Fort Stewart on 28 October 1962 while the air-aid forces commenced loading for movement on 1 November.¹³²

(S) Original surface movement schedules for Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division, called for outloading through the ports of Charleston and Savannah. With the substitution of the 1st Armored for the 1st Armored Division, the U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic, assumed that the outloading ports would remain the same and as indicated in movement instructions to the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, on 23 October. Now, as indicated above, USCOMARAC plans and movement instructions for the 1st Armored Division, called for outloading the first, second, fifth, and sixth increments of Task Force CHARLIE through Fort Lauderdale and the third and fourth increments through New Orleans. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, concerned at this move on its receipt at Department of the Army level, wanted information from USCOMARAC as to whether Fort Lauderdale was the final answer for outloading the four increments of the Task Force, and desired to know the effects of this arrangement on movement and deployment times. The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, explained to the Chief of Staff that his planning staff had considered the use of Savannah as an outloading port but had decided in favor of Fort Lauderdale because of over all requirements. Movement schedules developed in support of Operation Plan 316 were based on the availability of appropriate types of vessels to move the units in question, i.e., the USNS COMET, the USNS TARDUS, and sufficient LST's. The distance between Fort Lauderdale and the objective area permitted a quick turnaround time for the vessels concerned which resulted in arrival of selected units in the objective area in the quickest possible times. The USNS COMET, for example, was initially scheduled to transport elements of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, from Savannah to the objective area. That distance did not permit sufficient time to unload this initial unit and return to Savannah to meet the schedules developed of Task Force CHARLIE. Upon receipt of approval from Department of

¹³²

Msg (USCOMARAC In E-1197), CINCLANT to JCS, DTG 200102Z Oct 62.
(TOP SECRET) In AG TS Cee. (3) USCOMARAC DCSLOG Nov 62, Nov Status Rept, 011002 hrs, 26 Oct 62, (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) USCOMARAC DCSLOG Nov 62, Nov Status Rept, 1 Nov 62, subj: Movement Status of 1st Armored Division as of 011000 Nov 62 (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSLOG Nov 62 Nov Log, Cuban Crisis.

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the Army of this arrangement, the Commanding General confirmed to CINCLANT that Fort Lauderdale was the outloading port for the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE. 133

(S) The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, indicated to USCOMARAC that the switch in outloading ports to Fort Lauderdale would require on-the-ground reconnaissance to confirm the routes to be used for shipment to the port area. Consequently, on 26 October, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, directed Third Army to insure that both the 1st Armored Division and the 3d Battalion, 99th Armor, reconnoitered the routes from Fort Stewart to their appropriate outloading ports and that the appropriate port commanders were contacted in order to coordinate the outloading. He emphasized that only a minimum number of essential personnel should be used for this project and that they wear civilian clothing, if available, in order not to attract attention to their presence. 134

(S) Because the problem of storing loaded railroad cars for an entire Armored Division at Fort Stewart became so acute, the divisional commander indicated that the period of time required for the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE to move to Fort Lauderdale might be extended beyond the estimated three to four days. For this reason he desired to move the first increment of Task Force CHARLIE and one medium tank company of the second increment to Fort Lauderdale immediately. This would permit optimum loading of the four LST's located at that port and would provide appropriate medium tank effect in the first force arriving in the objective area. By 27 October he had already made tentative plans to bypass the forces of the first increment in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale. 135 But USCOMARAC could not approve this move because the decision to implement the operation plans had not yet been made.

133.

(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In E-1119), CG, USAFICA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 231730Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 320983Z (USCOMARAC In H-214848), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 231411Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). (3) Msg 302444, CG USCOMARAC to DCSOPS DA, DTG 232341Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). (4) Msg 302600, CG USCOMARAC/CINCLANT to CINCLANT, DTG 232010Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (5) Msg 320607, (USCOMARAC In H-213861), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 232106Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (TOP SECRET). All in AG TS Com.

134.

Msg 302688, CG USCOMARAC to CG Third Army, DTG 242049Z Oct 62. (SECRET), In DCSOPS M&O Div files.

135.

Msg (USCOMARAC In H-215878), CG 1st Arm Div to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 271155Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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✓ On the day prior to the arrival of the first elements of Task Force CHARLIE at Fort Stewart, USCOMARMC became aware of a problem created by the fact that no date had been determined for implementing the operation plan. This meant that the date for onward movement of the units from Fort Stewart was equally undetermined. USCOMARMC consequently considered the expedient of holding all freight and baggage cars under load at Fort Stewart or at adjacent railheads, pending a decision as to the date for forwarding to outloading ports. The comments of the Defense Traffic Management Service (DTMS) on this recommendation were requested and USCOMARMC pointed out that they would examine the situation daily and consult with DTMS on any untoward developments. After consultation with representatives of the American Association of Railroads as to the feasibility of the proposal, the Director, DTMS, indicated his concurrence but stated that it did not extend to units beyond Priority 32 of the Movements Schedule for Operation Plan 316. He further pointed out that the total rail equipment involved in this proposal would involve a total of 440 cars and would definitely have an impact on the carriers' capabilities. The railroads, however, would make no concessions on passenger equipment since these would have to be unloaded and released to the carrier immediately. ¹³⁶

✓ In the meantime, General Powell had instructed the Commanding General, Third Army, to retain all tracked vehicles on the flat cars on which they were shipped to Fort Stewart. This provision applied only to elements of Task Force CHARLIE and the 34 Battalion, 89th Armor, to permit a rapid subsequent rail movement to a port of embarkation. Wheeled vehicles, on the other hand, were to be offloaded from the rail equipment but retained in a combat loaded condition. USCOMARMC intended that these would subsequently move to the port of embarkation in overland convoys. Any equipment, which was already loaded in box cars or gondola cars and which could not be moved to the port of embarkation in organic unit vehicles, was to be retained in these rail cars for short-notice forwarding to the appropriate port. The 1st Armored Division elements of both the Floating Reserve and the On-rail Solutions of Operation Plan 316 were instructed to offload all vehicles -- including tracked vehicles -- upon arrival at Fort Stewart. It was considered that these units would have sufficient time in which to reload and reach the appropriate port of embarkation. ¹³⁷ All U. S. Army-owned (USAR) flat cars were to be retained

136.

(1) Msg 302575, CG USCOMARMC to Dir, DTMS, DTG 250527Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In R-215422), Dir, DTMS to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 251535Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

137.

(1) Msg 302576, CG USCOMARMC to CG's 1st Armored Div and Third Army, DTG 250530Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In R-1443), CG 1st Armored Div to CINCSALANT, DTG 012399Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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either at Fort Stewart or somewhere in the immediate vicinity, but all commercial flat cars were to be released as soon as they were empty.¹³⁸ As a result of these instructions, a critical problem was created in the storing of the flat cars which were required for rations under load, a problem which will be discussed at a later point.¹³⁹

✓ The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, on 2 November 1962 directed the establishment of a five-day alert status for that portion of the 1st Armored Division contained in the On-call Rotation on Operation Plan 314 when it reached Fort Stewart. These forces would assume a stepped up 48-hour alert status only upon receipt of an order to execute Operation Plan 314. This expanded alert status was the basis for ordering the On-call forces to unload all equipment from flat cars at Fort Stewart. Their equipment could then be used in furtherance of training for those units whose tracked vehicles remained loaded on flat cars. While the 1st Armored Division elements of the Flanking Reserve were instructed to offload all vehicles including tracked vehicles upon arrival at Fort Stewart, they were also told to maintain an alert status of twelve hours in which to begin reloading. Ten days later this twelve-hour alert status for the reloading of tracked vehicles was extended to twenty-four hours.¹⁴⁰

Additional Units Pre-positioned at Fort Stewart

✓ One of the first units -- in addition to those of the 1st Armored Division -- to be pre-positioned at Fort Stewart was the 24 Battalion (Medium Tank), 69th Armor, which was scheduled for shipment out of Savannah, and was planned among the early arrivals in the objective area. This unit was directed to move at 0133 hours, 23 October, for a short move from Fort Benning to Fort Stewart.¹⁴¹ On 31 October, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, directed the movement of a number of supporting units to Fort Stewart which were included on the Troop List for Operation Plan 314 and intended for combat

138.

Reg 303104, CG USCOMARAC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 022149Z Nov 62, (SECRET). In USMTH P&D Div files.

139.

See below, pp. 129 - 132.

140.

(1) Reg 303104, CG USCOMARAC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 022149Z Nov 62, Op. 3. (SECRET). (2) Reg 303449, CG USCOMARAC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 121658Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Op. 4. Both in USMTH P&D Div files.

141.

Reg 303396, CG USCOMARAC to CG Third Army, DTG 230655Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG 33 Cpn.

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support in the objective area. Two of the seven selected units were Signal Corps support units -- a group headquarters and a Signal packet. The remaining units were Medical Corps units and included a group headquarters, two hospitals -- one field hospital and one evacuation hospital -- and two specialized detachments, one Ortho (K2) detachment and one Thor (K1) detachment. The two hospitals were directed to move to Port Bismar with their currently assigned personnel and full TOE equipment, and USCOMARAC agreed to furnish additional professional personnel when required. The two medical detachments were directed to move, less professionals, since they were highly specialized units. Such specialized personnel would also be furnished by USCOMARAC when required. By 7 November, these units had been joined by the 118th and 125th Transportation Companies (Terminal Service) which were scheduled to piggy-back into the objective area on the vessels of the 159th Transportation Battalion (Reat), 182

Pre-conditions for Army Boat Units

(S) A substantial portion of the initial success of the combat operations in the objective area depended upon the ability of the 4th Transportation Command (Terminal C) to unload shipping in the objective area harbors. Lighterage and allied shipping in support of these unloading operations was to be furnished by boat units, hovercraft, and floating equipment under the control of the 159th Transportation Boat Battalion. Since these resources required the Boat Battalion, along with its assigned and attached units and equipment, to rendezvous early with a designated U. S. Navy Task Force for conveyer protection, the commanders concerned desired to move them into a pre-positioned location as soon as possible. On 11 October USCOMARAC was informally apprised of the fact that the Army commanders concerned and the XVII Airborne Corps commander intended to move the units and craft in question early on the following day. The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, reminded the pertinent commanders that no authority existed to move any units assigned to Operation Plan 114 without his express approval. He thereupon requested authority from CINCLANT and from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, to move these units already located at King's Bay, Georgia, and Parris Point, South Carolina, to a more southerly point, along with units still at Port Bastia and those which the U. S. Army Terminal Command, Gulf, was to furnish from its command resources at New Orleans. He justified this action

182

(1) Msg 718416, CG USCOMARAC to CG's Second, Third and Fourth Armies, 000 311826Z Oct 62. (CPLINAC) (2) Msg (USCOMARAC to Mac210344), CG Third Army to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 071205Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (3) Third Army After-Action Rpt, Cuban Emergency (U), Incl 1 to Ltr, Bq Third Army to CG USCOMARAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After-Action Report for Cuban Emergency (U), A3AGT-F, p. 1. (SECRET). All in DOWNS P&O Doc files.

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on the grounds that the craft which had been engaged in amphibious exercises at King's Bay, as well as those which would make the long trip from Fort Rattle and New Orleans, would require down time for maintenance prior to moving into the objective area. 181

(S) Despite the fact that authority had not yet been granted by Department of the Army, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, directed the XVIII Airborne Corps commander on 21 October to take necessary action to move the units in question from their present location in support of Operation Plan 308; a directive which was limited to the units listed therein. For this reason, USCOMSAC amended the message some twelve hours later to include all the required boat units, attached helicopters, and floating equipment. The boat unit and attached equipment from New Orleans was directed to move to the vicinity of Tampa, Florida, while those under the direct control of the U. S. Army Transportation Center were merely directed to move to a preplanned location. 182 USCOMSAC was forced to rescind this directive since the requisite authority for the move was not granted by the Department of the Army. 183

(S) As late as 28 October, the Commanding General, U. S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Rattle, Virginia, was still asking Second Army for authority to preposition his boat units at Fort Lauderdale. He re-emphasized the point that pre-positioning was an absolute necessity for landing craft and auxiliary craft in order for them to accomplish their planned rendezvous with the Navy Task Force at the time and date required. The XVIII Airborne Corps commander, in a similar manner, restated his concerns over the fact that the units and allied equipment were too far from their mission area in terms of

181.

(1) Hag 302304, CG USCOMSAC to CG's Second and Third Armies and XVIII Abn Corps, 21 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Hag 302343, CG USCOMSAC to CINCLANT and DOSOPS BA, 22 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

182.

(1) Hag 302415, CG USCOMSAC to CINCPACRICK and DOSOPS BA, DOW 231423Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Hag 302432, CG USCOMSAC to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 231900Z Oct 62. Cp. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) Hag 302418, CG USCOMSAC to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 230710Z Oct 62. Cp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (4) Hag AJRTM-C-4422, (USCOMSAC In R-215272), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG, 4th TC (Tcom C), DTG 241600Z Oct 62. Cp. 4. (SECRET). (5) Hag AJRTM-C-4486, CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG, Camp LeJays Johnson, La, DTG 231336Z Oct 62. Cp. 4. (SECRET). All in DCSTMT P40 Doc files.

183.

Hq, XVIII Abn Corps. The Role of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U). pp. V-21 - V-22, Cp. 3. (TOP SECRET - Info used is SECRET). Copy in DCSTMT Hist Br.

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time and distance. Despite the urgency of the situation, General Powell was once again forced to inform the Second Army commander that the request could not be favorably considered at that time.¹⁶⁵

~~(S)~~ The units and allied equipment in question were eventually moved to forward locations at Fort Lauderdale and St. Petersburg, Florida. The 159th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), a 100-ton floating crane, and allied equipment furnished by the U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Gulf, at New Orleans were pre-positioned at St. Petersburg on the western coast of the Florida peninsula. The Commanding General, USCOMARC, directed on 1 November that this latter unit and allied craft be attached to the 159th Transportation Battalion (Boat) at Fort Lauderdale for operational control during the entire operations in the Cuban area, effective upon arrival at St. Petersburg. Upon termination of the operations, the boat company and allied craft and equipment were to revert to the operational control of the Commanding General, Fourth Army. A total of eighty-five Army water craft, auxiliary vessels, and allied equipment were pre-positioned at these two locations in southern Florida.¹⁶⁶

Maneuvers of the Pre-positioning Actions

~~(S)~~ By the end of November 1962 -- when the forces were returned to their home stations -- USCOMARC had furnished a total of 27,300 troops for pre-positioning actions in the southeastern sector of the United States in support of Operation Plan 304. This included 17,993 men in the combat units pre-positioned for possible implementation of the operation plan and 7,484 men in units and headquarters designated for area support in the Third Army area. In addition, USCOMARC furnished a total of 1,925 troops to the U. S. Army Air Defense Command (USARADCOM) for the air protection of strategic locations in the state of Florida.¹⁶⁷

^{166.}

(1) Msg (USCOMARC In 8-1304), CG USATCAMP to CG Second Army, DDC 280704Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg (USCOMARC In 8-218412), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCAGSANT, DTG 281743Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Msg 302814, CG USCOMARC to CG Second Army, DTG 281846Z Oct 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSTTR P&D Div files.

^{167.}

(1) Briefing for Def Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, by Gen R. B. Powell, CG USCOMARC, 31 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation, Gp. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (3) Msg, XVIII Abn Corps, The Role of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (V), pp. V-12 - V-13. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET - Info used is SECRET). Copy in DCSTTR Hist Re.

^{168.}

Briefing for the Def Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, by Gen R. B. Powell, CG USCOMARC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of the Cuban Situation. Gp. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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(S) The movement of Task Force CHARLIE and then the remainder of the 1st Armored Division to Fort Stewart involved a total of 36 trains pulling 1,483 rail cars of various types, including 103 passenger coaches which were used to haul a total of 4,799 personnel, 1,876 flat cars, 138 gondola cars, 43 box cars, and 28 baggage cars. Of this total, 874 cars were used to move Task Force CHARLIE, including 994 flat cars, 134 passenger coaches, 38 gondola cars, and 3 baggage cars. There is no break-out of air movements directly for the 1st Armored Division and more specifically for Task Force CHARLIE. The total of air movements for the entire operation prior to return of personnel and units to their home stations indicated the movement of 17,879 personnel in commercial and U. S. Air Force planes. This included 143 commercial air movements and 183 separate shipments in planes of the Tactical Air Force (TAF). 169

Issuing and Pre-loading of Amphibious Vessels

(S) General Powell discussed the problem of spotting and pre-loading of amphibious vessels with General Earle K. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, during a conference on 28 October. As a result of this conference and General Wheeler's approval, General Powell decided to preload the Roll-on, Roll-off vessels -- the USS COMET and USS TAURUS -- and the Army Beach Discharge Lighter (BDL), the JOHN U. D. PAGE, at Savannah and four LST's furnished by the Navy for Task Force CHARLIE at Fort Lauderdale. The Roll-on, Roll-off vessels were originally scheduled to load out of Fort Lauderdale but an agreement was reached to load them out of Savannah since the troops which would be using them were being pre-positioned at Fort Stewart. USCOMARV loading plans called for a progressive working of the vessels in question as they arrived on station and for the loading of equipment and caretaker detachments only. The Commanding General, USCOMARV, additionally desired -- dependent entirely upon the time frame involved -- to rehearse partial unloading in conjunction with the Commander of Group II, U. S. Navy Atlantic Amphibious Force, and the Army unit commanders who would be responsible for this operation in the objective area. The USCOMARV logistical planning staff believed that a rehearsal was essential in view of the peculiar characteristics of the two Roll-on, Roll-off vessels and the Beach Discharge Lighter. A further limiting factor which had to be taken into consideration was the close clearances of the four World War II-type LST's when loaded with M-48 tanks. Since the Roll-on, Roll-off vessels were not combat vessels, some extraordinary measures would have to be taken in order to insure their proper unloading in

169

(1) Reg 301918, CG USCOMARV to CINCLANT, DCS 100910Z Dec 62.
(SECRET): In DCSEAFR P&O Div files. (2) USARLANT SOC Daily Briefing, 7 Nov 62, p. 15. (TOP SECRET). (3) USARLANT SOC Daily Briefing, 8 Nov 62, pp. 13-14. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG 18 Com. (4) DCSLOG Nov Br JMW Station Report, 27 Nov 62, subj: Rail Station, 1st Armored Div. (CONFIDENTIAL). (5) DCSLOG Nov Br JMW Station Report, 30 Nov 62, subj: Air Movements Schedule.
(CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSLOG Nov Br Daily Nov Log, Cuban Crisis.

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the objective area. In the event that Operation Plan 316 was ordered into execution, USCOMBAC intended to immediately suspend all rehearsals and proceed with the proper loading in time to arrive in the objective area on schedule.¹⁷⁰ The four U. S. Navy LST's allocated to USARLANT for Task Force CHARLES -- the HENRYMAN COUNTY, DUVAL COUNTY, MIDDLESEX COUNTY, and WOODS COUNTY -- arrived in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on 30 October 1962. The actual loading of the remaining vessels at Savannah, Georgia, began on 3 and 4 November 1962. Loading sites for pre-loading equipment included Savannah, Fort Lauderdale, and St. Petersburg. Approximately 14,300 measurement tons of supplies and equipment were loaded at Savannah on the two Roll-on, Roll-off vessels, the Beach Discharge Lighter and LST's. An additional 9,110 measurement tons of supplies and equipment were placed on board the four Navy LST's at Fort Lauderdale, while some 225 measurement tons of supplies and equipment were preloaded on Army watercraft at St. Petersburg. In all, a total of 24,265 measurement tons of supplies and equipment were preloaded aboard amphibious vessels in readiness for implementation of Operation Plan 316.¹⁷¹

Pre-Positioning of Supplies

~~170~~ The pre-positioning of emergency supplies and aerial resupply items at various locations in proximity to the logistical handling and forwarding agencies was a matter of great concern to USCOMBAC. The major logistical installation in the forward area was planned for Ops Locks Air Force Base which had been returned to active status by the Department of the Air Force in preparation for implementing the CINCLANT Operation Plans. CINCLANT confirmed to both CINCARLANT and CINCPACANT on 22 October the authority to pre-position material and equipment at that air base as required for support of Operation Plan 316. In addition, he granted authority to rehabilitate the POL system, the storage areas, and other facilities as might be required. A few days later, the Commanding General, USCOMBAC, as CINCPACANT, informed CINCLANT that, unless otherwise directed, he intended to pre-position emergency supplies and aerial resupply at all intermediate staging bases as soon as the Army Staging Area Command at each of the staging bases was operationally ready to receive cargo for the operations in Cuba. In preparation for this support, the National Wholesale Supply Sources operated by

170

(1) USARLANT MSG Daily Briefing, 19 Oct 62, pp. 10-12. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg ATL06-NOV-302910, CG USCOMBAC to CINCLANT and MSG075 DM, DTG 300114Z Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCNTR P&O Div files.

171

(1) USCOMBAC DCLOG Nov 62, Daily Nov Log, 30 Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) USCOMBAC DCLOG Nov 62 Status Reps, 031300Z Nov 62, p. 2, subj: Vessel Status. (CONFIDENTIAL). Back in D.S.O. Nov 62 files. (3) Briefing for Jef Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, by General H. B. Powell, CG USCOMBAC, 11 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation. (TOP SECRET). In DCNTR P&O Div Mar Plans Br files.

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both the Department of the Army and the Defense Supply Agency acted to insure the availability of supplies in the event that the Operation Plan was executed. Supplies were prepared in this connection for immediate shipment to air and surface terminals. 172

~~TOP SECRET~~ Shortly after USCOMSARC was alerted for possible implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316, it took action to insure the ready availability of selected types of ammunition. A total of 2,500 short tons of ammunition were shipped to Anniston, Alabama, ready to move forward on order. In addition, 128 NAAM missiles, 72 VIXEN-HERCULES missiles, and 300 SS-11 anti-tank missiles totaling 1,000 short tons were pre-positioned with units in Florida. USCOMSARC experienced some difficulty with the storage of the atomic components for these missiles since a Special Ammunition Supply Point (SASP) had to be established to accomplish this storage responsibility. Two locations were selected by the Peninsula Base Command for this purpose -- Opa Locka and McCoy Air Force Bases. Opa Locka Air Force Base had the necessary igloos but these were not in an exclusive area as required for atomic components. Commercial costs for fencing the area in question were estimated at \$76,700 to include required lighting. At this location, a hospital tent would also have to be moved to comply with safety regulations. McCoy Air Force Base did have the requisite igloos located in a proper exclusion area, but these were reserved for use by the Strategic Air Command. Four cubicles within the area were not reserved, but Army use for the storage of atomic rounds would require authorization from the Department of the Air Force, just as the use of Opa Locka Air Force Base for this purpose would also require special authorization. The Peninsula Base Command thoroughly placed the matter in the hands of USCOMSARC for settlement at a higher level. 173 Authorization for use of both storage areas was obtained but no atomic components were pre-positioned in the Florida area.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Although aerial resupply was the responsibility of the logistical agencies in the forward area, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander and his staff had a vital interest in such operations. Plans developed for early resupply operations in the objective area called for the airdropping of aerial resupply packets through usable airfields captured from enemy forces, but precautions were included to insure that supplies would be forthcoming even

172.

(1) Mag (USCOMSARC In M-214909), CINCLANT to CINCLANT and CINCLANT, DTG 201734Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DESUTE P&O Ex Files. (2) Mag 302649, CG USCOMSARC to CINCLANT, DTG 260316Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

173 (1) Mag (USCOMSARC In E-1344), CG PBC to CG USCOMSARC, DTG 072143Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Briefing for Def Sub-Com, SecSec Com on Approp, by General H. E. Powell, CG USCOMSARC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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If the airlanded operations were initially impossible, XVIII Airborne Corps consequently pre-positioned G-120 parachutes and other air items to meet just such an emergency situation. A total of 30,782 of these parachutes were pre-positioned at 4 different airfields in Florida which were to be used for marshalling supplies and equipment for shipment into the objective area. The greater majority of these, 17,308, were stored at Ops Locks Air Force Base.¹⁷⁴

~~TOP SECRET~~ In order to avoid congestion during the period from D-day to D-plus-3-days, the Commanding General, Panama Base Command, recommended on 8 November that the First Emergency Resupply Packet be shipped as near to its staging base locations. He also recommended that the increments of the Automatic Air Resupply be pre-positioned as soon as the First Emergency Resupply Packet was complete. Arrival rates for the Air Resupply shipments were to be limited to 1,000 tons per day at Ops Locks Air Force Base and to 600 tons a day at each of the other two air bases. Supplies to be pre-positioned were those scheduled to arrive at the staging bases during the period from D-day to D-plus-3-days.¹⁷⁵ Several days later, he indicated that the Army Staging Area Commands at Ops Locks and McCoy Air Force Bases and Sanford Naval Air Station had been alerted and were prepared to receive the supplies which he had previously requested and expressed the desire that orders be immediately issued so that his headquarters could begin to call the supplies forward from the Overseas Supply Agency in New Orleans. The Commanding General, Panama Base Command, further requested that the Class I portions of the Automatic Aerial Resupply be delivered to McCoy Air Force Base on 19 November and that Class III portions be delivered to Sanford Naval Air Station on the same day. Increments AUC and AUE of the First Emergency Resupply Packet were to be delivered to Ops Locks Air Force Base on 18 November. Later that same day -- 13 November -- USCOMARMC directed USARLANT Forward headquarters to initiate movements of Class V supplies in Increments AUC and AUE of the First Emergency Resupply Packet but hold in abeyance a decision to move Class I and III supplies.¹⁷⁶

~~TOP SECRET~~ The Commanding General, U. S. Army Materiel Command, in response to repeated requests by the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, agreed to establish a Second Emergency Aerial Resupply Packet, the composition of which would be identical with that of the First Packet scheduled for Ops Locks Air Force Base. New project codes and increment numbers established by the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army, for the Second Packet were Codes AWF,

^{174.}

Msg (USCOMARMC In E-1574), CG XVIII Air Corps to CG USCOMARMC, DDO 081045Z Nov 42. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

^{175.}

Msg (USCOMARMC In M-218707), CG PBC to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 080243Z Nov 42. (SECRET). In DCSTP P&O Div files.

^{176.}

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-219499), CG PBC to CG USCOMARMC, DDO 131000Z Nov 42. (SECRET). (2) Msg AFLOG-P-303517, CG USCOMARMC/USARLANT to USARLANT Fwd, DDO 132327Z Nov 42. (SECRET). Both in DCSTP P&O Div files.

92
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AVC, and AMB and Increments 100, 109, and 110, respectively. The locations established for this second packet were Atlantic General Depot for Classes I, III and IIIA supplies and American Army Depot for Class V supplies. Supply sources -- Atlantic and Amalston Depots -- were instructed to hold the pertinent supplies for either pick-up or onward shipment as required on a selective basis at the call of the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, through the Chief, Overseas Supply Agency, New Orleans. 177

Despite the fact that a Second Emergency Resupply Packet had been established, the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, recommended on 8 November that two additional complete emergency resupply packets and a third partial packet of selected items be established. He wanted an additional Emergency Resupply Packet in the vicinity of Port Everglades, Florida, which would be identical to that stocked at Opa Locka Air Force Base under Project Code NMA, AUC, and AMK, a step which would permit a further distribution of assets in close proximity to both aerial and surface ports. He wanted another identical packet in the vicinity of McCoy Air Force Base to permit a still further distribution of logistical assets in close proximity to the aerial ports. His final recommendation was for the establishment of an Emergency Class II and IV Resupply Point in the vicinity of Port Everglades which would be stocked with critical items of supply to include high mortality repair parts for Signal, Transportation, Aviation, Engineer, and Ordnance equipment. 178 These recommendations were not acted upon prior to the stand-down in readiness conditions and the return of all units to their base stations.

In order to test the reaction capability of supply sources to meet emergency resupply requirements, USCOMSARC held a supply exercise on 15 November during which some 3,000 tons of supplies were moved to Opa Locka and McCoy Air Force Bases and Sanford Naval Air Station. These supplies were moved to the designated Army Staging Area Commands in Florida on a very short deadline. The three Staging Area Commands conducted a concurrent training exercise which began immediately upon arrival of the material at their respective airfields. The material was unloaded from arriving aircraft and prepared for outloading according to U. S. Air Force aircraft configuration requirements. The major purpose of the exercise was to test the capability of each Army Staging Area Command to handle large cargoes for air shipment to overseas terminals. General Powell was gratified with the results of the

177.

Msg (USCOMSARC In H-215831), CG USMAC to USMAC and CINCSARP, DTG 082304Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSUTH P&O Plv files.

178.

Msg (USCOMSARC In H-215707), CG P&O to CG USCOMSARC, DTG 082341Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSUTH P&O Plv files.

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scenario which showed that each of the three participating commands was capable of meeting the supply requirements imposed on them by the Operation Plans.¹⁷⁹

Press Camp Registrations

~~TOP SECRET~~ The imminence of hostilities caused USCOMAR to become aware of several areas in which unit registration would be necessary, particularly since such units did not exist in the active Army. A major field was the provision for adequate press coverage and efficient field press censorship. USCOMAR accordingly organized the 1st Press Camp (Provisional) (Combat Area) at Fort Burtis, Virginia, on 1 November 1962. This Press Camp, with an aggregate strength of 13 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 81 enlisted men, was assigned to Headquarters, USCOMAR/USARLANT but attached to Headquarters, Special Troops, Fort Belvoir, for organization, equipping, and initial training. The mission assigned to the new unit was that of providing information services, facilities, and administrative support for accredited news media representatives operating with the U. S. Forces in the objective area. It was also capable of providing logistical support -- to include billeting, messing, and transportation -- for up to 300 news media representatives. To prepare for the possibility of field press censorship in the objective area, USCOMAR recommended that Department of the Army mobilize the 101st and 118th Field Press Censorship Detachments (USARV of Lodi, New Jersey, immediately upon execution of Operation Plan 316. Five officers with a field press censorship MOS -- most of them from units concerned -- volunteered for active duty on 23 October 1962 and completed all necessary plans and preparations for field press censorship. As mentioned above, it was necessary to use reserve personnel for this purpose since there were no gen. staff or units in the active Army with the proper specialization. These actions marked two "firsts" in U. S. Army preparations for eventual hostilities: the first time that such a press camp was established prior to the start of hostilities and the first time that a field press censorship system was planned in peacetime to cover future military combat operations.¹⁸⁰

~~TOP SECRET~~ On 6 November CINCPAC directed the Commanding General, USCOMAR, to take action to establish a Joint Central Graves Registration Office to

179.

Briefing for Def Sub-Com, House Com on Appropri. by Gen H. E. Powell, CG USCOMAR, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of the Cuban Situation (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

180.

(1) USCOMAR CG 128, 29 Oct 62. (UNCLASSIFIED) (2) Msg 302322, CG USCOMAR to DCSPR SA, MSG 212304Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (3) Semi-Annual Hist Repts, USCOMAR 80, 1 Jul - 30 Dec 62, pp. 1-2. (UNCLASSIFIED). In NSCUT Hist Br files.

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support Operation Plan 316, based upon previously published Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions for the operation of such an office. The Joint Central Graves Registration Office, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command (JCSGOLANT) (Provisional) was organized at Fort Monroe effective 21 November 1962 with both CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT furnishing appropriate personnel. This organization, with an aggregate strength of five officers, reviewed the mission of formulating and publishing the plans and procedures required for graves registration activities in support of Operation Plan 316 and for implementing those plans at the proper time.¹⁸¹

Use of Army Amphibious Capabilities

~~182~~ Shortly after pre-positioning actions were initiated for USARLANT troop units and after activity was stepped up in the Forward Area, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), informed the Chief of Naval Operations, of an urgent requirement for three Landing Craft Utility (LCU) at the Key West Naval Base to be used for a high priority project directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One was required for an indefinite basis while the other two were needed for a period of only one week beginning 1 November 1962. The Department of the Army directed USCOMARL to provide three LCU's if feasible, despite the fact that the U. S. Navy was supposed to possess an unlimited amphibious capability. For the long term assignment the Peninsula Base Command selected the LCU-1573 from one of the units attached to the 159th Transportation Battalion (BOMB). Equipment already preloaded on this craft had to be off-loaded at Fort Rucker and the pertinent equipment operators remained there with their equipment for maintenance purposes. The Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, pointed out that, since the off-loaded equipment was scheduled for arrival in the objective area 2-day, the craft in question would be required to return to Fort Rucker upon orders to execute Operation Plan 316 before it could depart for the objective area.¹⁸²

¹⁸¹.

(1) The Chief of the Office was an Army officer, the Deputy was a Navy officer, and the Executive Officer was from the Air Force. Two other Army officers completed the staff. (2) Reg (USCOMARL In M-218464), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, RTO 043154Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCSPTR P&O Div files. (3) USCOMARL GO L31, 21 Nov 62. (OFFUSE).

¹⁸².

(1) Reg 930834 (USCOMARL In M-216239), DCSPTR DA to CG USCOMARL, RTO 240022Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (2) Reg (USCOMARL In M-218464), CG PAC to CG USCOMARL, RTO 082247Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSPTR P&O Div files.

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Establishment of Headquarters,
Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command

✓ In fulfillment of CINCLANT's desire to have a joint unconventional warfare task force which would be directly subordinate to him, the Commanding General, U. S. Army Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was designated as the Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command (JUNUCWTFAC). On 13 October he announced his intention to open a Command Post and a Joint Unconventional Warfare Base at Fort Bragg sometime in the near future. Initially, he intended to use Opa Locka Air Force Base as an Advance Staging Base with the possibility that he might move the Unconventional Warfare Base to that same location at a later date. Since his contingency plans in support of Operation Plan 316 did not designate Opa Locka Air Force Base for that purpose, he requested all holders of the plan to note that he intended to use Opa Locka Air Force Base and not Eglin Air Force Base as the site for the Unconventional Warfare Base. Both Headquarters, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command (JUNUCWTFAC), and the Unconventional Warfare Base (UWB) were opened at Fort Bragg effective 1600 hours on 13 October 1962.¹⁸³

JTF-FLAC Activities

✓ As has been indicated earlier,¹⁸⁴ a plan had been developed for the joint defense of the Florida Keys area in support of CINCLANT's Operation Plans for Cuba since he depended, to a certain degree, on the continued operation of military installations and facilities located there. Despite the fact that the Commanding General, Third Army, had been designated as the commander of the joint task force for the defense of the Florida Keys area and that certain troops had been earmarked for this purpose, CINCPACIRK announced on 13 October that he was reconstituting the General Reserve from those forces which had not been committed to CINCLANT's Operation Plans 312, 314, and 316. He notified the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, that no portion of this reserve could be moved nor any changes made in unit status without prior clearance from his headquarters. CINCPACIRK included the 1st Infantry Brigade of Fort Benning, Georgia,¹⁸⁵ in his reserve, a step which prompted a

183.

(1) Msg (USCOMARAC to M-315088), COMUSMACV to CINCLANT, DTG 132130Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARAC to M-315088), COMUSMACV to CINCLANT, DTG 160041Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET) Both in AG TS Com.

184.

See above, pp. 31 - 32.

185.

(1) Msg SEC13-P-602, (USCOMARAC to M-314966), CINCPACIRK to USCOMARAC, DTG 151853Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg SEC02 594, (USCOMARAC to M-314911), CINCPACIRK to CINCPACIRK and CINCPACIRK, DTG 131810Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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quick reminder from General Powell that this particular organization, comprised of the 1st Armored Rifle Battalion, 38th Infantry, and the 1st Battle Group, 29th Infantry, was not part of the STRAC Troop List and, therefore, not subject to the control of CINCSTRIDE. Furthermore, this unit was already committed to JDP-FLAX and could not be released as CINCSTRIDE for General Reserve purposes. At the same time, General Powell requested that several hospital units and technical service support units be relieved from their STRAC designation since he felt that their employment was essential to the successful execution of both JDP-FLAX and the Third Army Support Plan for the various CINCLANT Operation Plans. The affected units included four field hospitals and eight technical service units, the predecessor being Signal Corps and Transportation Corps. This request was, in effect, cancelled on the following day when word was received from the Department of the Army that, although the implementation of JDP-FLAX was admittedly possible, the plan in its entirety was not necessarily an integral part of CINCLANT Operation Plan J1A. Consequently, the Department of the Army considered certain activities in connection with the plan -- e.g., troop deployments, requests for reserve call-ups, and the declaration of an exclusion area -- to be premature. The Department of the Army Planning Staff did point out that preparatory staff work had been accomplished at that level so that prompt action could be taken, if and when necessary, on both reserve call-ups and exclusion areas. While the prepositioning of troops for JDP-FLAX was not considered necessary, the Department of the Army expressed no objections to reconnaissance by mail advanced parties from appropriate units listed in the Army Task Force for this Defense Plan.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ This opinion of the Department of the Army Planning Staff notwithstanding, the Commanding General, Third Army -- as the one responsible for implementing JDP-FLAX -- informed the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, that he was firmly convinced that the forces involved should be immediately prepositioned and recommended, on 24 October, that he be given the authority to position these forces at once. If immediate pre-positioning were not possible, he requested authority to position the forces in sufficient time to permit a proper troop disposition which would enable him to enforce the exclusion areas when they were proclaimed. He reminded the USCOMARAC staff that he would require approximately four days to move and close all appropriate forces in the Florida Keys area. The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, concurred in these

104

(1) Msg 301369, CINCARLANT/CINCARSTRIDE re CINCSTRIDE, DDC 240929Z Oct 62, Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 918720, (USCOMARAC to H-315511), DCSOPS BA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 232147Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG 25 Copy.

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recommendations and forwarded them to CINCLANT for appropriate action with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A small advanced party of the Third Army Group responsible for manning JOP-FLAK occupied an advanced command post near Key West on 28 October 1962. 187

✓ (P) The focus of the Third Army commander in this regard were allayed on 6 November when the Department of the Army extended the alert status of the units comprising the Army Task Force for the defense of the Florida Keys from a 12-hour to a 72-hour basis. As a result of this lessening of tensions which, in effect, indicated that the possibility of implementing JOP-FLAK was becoming more and more remote, Third Army withdrew its advance party from the Florida Keys area on 9 November 1962. 188

Air Defense of the Southeastern United States

✓ While actual air defense operations in the continental United States were not the responsibility of the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, he did possess the only source of units with which to augment the air defense of the southeastern sector of the United States during the Cuban Crisis. This situation resulted from the fact that he was responsible for the training of all air defense units regardless of their ultimate assignment. Reserve units in training, as well as units such as school troops and SONAG units intended for use outside the continental United States, were under the command and operational control of the Commanding General. USCOMSAC, in possession of an adequate source of units for augmentation purposes.

Immediate BARK Missile Augmentation

✓ (P) The urgency of the situation by mid-October required the immediate augmentation of air defense capabilities in the Florida area to provide additional surface-to-air missile (SAM) defense for Key West military installations. On 18 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General Powell that they had directed the Department of the Army to expedite the operational readiness of the 4th Battalion (BARK Missile), 65th Artillery.

187.

(1) Msg 306623, CG USCOMSAC to CINCLANT, DTG 260012Z Oct 62, Sp. 1, (TOP SECRET). In AG 25 Con. (2) Third Army After-Action Rept., Cuban Emergency (U), Incl to Ltr, Rq Third Army to CG USCOMSAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After-Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (U), AIACT-P, p. 4. (SECRET). In DCSTIC P&O Div files.

188.

Msg 31004-WB-303249, CG USCOMSAC to CG Third Army, DTG 062231Z Oct 62, (SECRET). (3) Third Army After-Action Rept., Cuban Emergency (U), Incl to Ltr, Rq Third Army to CG USCOMSAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After-Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (U), AIACT-P, p. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSTIC P&O Div files.

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undergoing training at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, and had additionally authorized the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCOMCAD), to move it to the Key West area at his discretion. The latter immediately directed the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Defense Command (USARADCOM), to take necessary action with USCOMSAC to deploy the unit as required.¹⁸⁹ Early on the morning of 31 October the USCOMSAC commander directed the unit to move to Key West, Florida, as soon as possible and established a deadline of 0030 hours, 14 October for completion of the move. Since the seriousness of the situation called for expeditious movement, all personnel and equipment shortages were to be filled after arrival at Key West. The 6th Battalion was informed at this time that its operations would be limited to certain specific targets as directed by the Commander, 12d Continental Air Defense Region.¹⁹⁰

~~(S)~~ The extreme sensitivity of the situation decreed a high security classification for all actions being taken at that time with the result that neither the unit itself nor key personnel at Headquarters, Second Army, seemed to sense the urgency of this directed move. USCOMSAC logistical representatives who were dispatched to Fort George G. Meade on 31 October discovered that movement plans for the unit were based on an administrative move with only the first increment scheduled to depart in accordance with the deadline imposed by USCOMSAC and the final increment scheduled to depart on 17 October. A further disturbing factor was a report from the Defense Traffic Management Service that the running time between Fort George G. Meade and Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, was three days. The USCOMSAC logistical planners decided that, if certain classification restrictions could be removed from the pertinent directives, a minimum of two flying batteries could be in position at their operational location by 17 October. As a result, that portion of the movement orders which would permit rapid movement was reduced to the classification "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." To further expedite the move the USCOMSAC representatives directed that administrative packing be held to a minimum and that the loading of files cars begin immediately and continue around the clock, with vehicles and equipment loaded in a manner which would permit rapid deployment. A Fort George G. Meade Engineer Battalion was detailed to assist in the loading operations. It was decided that battery personnel would travel with their equipment in mixed trains in order to preserve unit integrity and to speed unloading operations. Coordination with the Defense Traffic Management Service proceeded in reducing the running time for the mixed trains from 72 to 48 hours with a further attempt made to reduce this time to 36 hours.

¹⁸⁹

(1) Msg 4378 (USCOMSAC In M-214303), JCS to CINCOMCAD and CG USCOMSAC, DDC 191723Z Oct 62. Sp. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg COMS-0 TE 488 (USCOMSAC In M-214419), CINCOMCAD to CG USARADCOM and CG USCOMSAC, DDC 190359Z Oct 62. Sp. 1. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Doc

¹⁹⁰

Msg 301163, CG USCOMSAC to CG Second Army, DDC 110613Z Oct 62, (UNCLASSIFIED). In COMSAC PEO Div files.

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As a result of these actions -- even though the 6th Battalion was not a STRAC unit and, therefore, not prepared for rapid deployment -- an advance party arrived at Key West Naval Air Station by 0330 hours on 24 October and the first firing element arrived two hours later. The 2d Region, USARADCOM, planned to use the entire battalion for air defense of the Key West and Boca Chica Naval Air Stations. The use of the unit was limited by the fact that it did not possess its basic load of missiles since it was still in a training status. The basic load held at Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, had to be shipped directly from the Depot to the operational site in Florida. 191

Requests for Automatic Weapons Units

On 26 October the Commanding General, Tactical Air Command, U. S. Air Force, expressed a desire to General Powell that Army automatic weapons units be used for the air defense of certain airfields in Florida. To meet this request, the USCOMSAC planning staff contemplated the call-up of U. S. Army Reserve 48-mm. units for assignment to the U. S. Army Air Defense Command. As an interim measure, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, directed the Fourth Army commander to immediately bring both Battery 2, 59th Artillery Battalion (Automatic Weapons), and the Automatic Weapons Training Battery, both of which were Air Defense School troops, to operational status on an austere basis with as much personnel and equipment as possible provided from Fourth Army resources. The two batteries were to be capable of airfield defense and the USCOMSAC planning staff visualized their initial role as being that of "shoot when attacked." Because both batteries were skeletal with regards to equipment and personnel, they were not to be immediately brought to full TDS strength and authorization, but were expected to attain only a minimum capability for self-sustainment and field operations. USCOMSAC pointed out to Fourth Army that, if these units were both engaged in a training cycle, every effort should be made to consolidate the training and bring at least one of the batteries to operational status and prepare it for movement on a twenty-four hour notice; the second battery would, in turn, be filled on a continuing basis without disrupting training activities. Eventually one of the batteries -- Battery 2, 59th Artillery Battalion (Automatic Weapons) -- was used in air defense operations in Florida. 192

191.

(1) OP, DCSLOG New Rr to CG USCOMSAC, 31 Oct 62, subj: Movement of 6th Nat Bn, 45th Artillery and Detachments. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.
(2) Mag (USCOMSAC In M-215161), 2d Region ARADCOM (Key West) to 2d Region ARADCOM, DTG 241625Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCSCTR P&O Div files.

192.

(1) Mag 303262, CG USCOMSAC to CG USARADCOM, 20 Oct 62. Cn. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag 303264, CG USCOMSAC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 210613Z Oct 62 (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) Third Army After-Action Rpt, Cuban Emergency (T); Incl to Ltr, Hq Third Army to CG USCOMSAC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After-Action Report for the Cuban Emergency (T), AJAGT-7, p. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSCTR P&O Div files.

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Actual and Planned Reorganizations

✓ By 24 October USCOMARL requested the deployment of two additional air defense units to the Florida area. The 3d Battalion (NICE-HERCULES), 12d Artillery (less one battery), provided surface-to-air missile defense for Homestead Air Force Base and the contiguous population, while the 8th Battalion (BAMK), 15th Artillery, was split, with one battery defending Homestead Air Force Base and one battery each defending Patrick and MacBil Air Force Bases. Included in these moves were not only the missile battalions proper, but the requisite attached Ordnance and Signal support detachments.¹⁹³ Since USCOMARL had now placed three Air Defense missile battalions and a separate automatic weapons battery under the operational control of USARADCOM in the Florida area, that command requested USCOMARL to move the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 13th Artillery Group (Air Defense), from Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, to Homestead Air Force Base as soon as possible, a move previously approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon its arrival in Florida, the unit was attached to the 3d Region, USARADCOM, for operational control.¹⁹⁴

✓ The Joint Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that further augmentation would probably be necessary and so queried Department of the Army on the availability of additional BAMK and NICE-HERCULES missile units for this purpose. As a result, the Department of the Army requested information from USCOMARL as to the status of training, personnel, and equipment of two BAMK missile battalions -- 8th Missile Battalion, 7th Artillery, and the 6th Missile Battalion, 56d Artillery -- and asked whether the training of these units could be accelerated to permit early availability. Information was also requested concerning the 4th Missile Battalion, 6th Artillery (NICE-HERCULES), which was then assigned to Air Defense School Troops at Fort Bliss, Texas.¹⁹⁵ But by 3 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, that further air defense augmentation in the Florida area was not then considered necessary but, if circumstances should change, the two BAMK battalions mentioned above could be made available, although they were scheduled for overseas deployment upon completion of their training cycle.

193.

(1) Mag (USCOMARL In M-213310), USCOMARL to CG ARADCOM and CG USCOMARL, DCG 142010Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMARL In M-21372), CG USARADCOM to CG USCOMARL, DTG 241938Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) Mag (USCOMARL In M-216618), USCOMARL to Off, Homestead AFB to CG USCOMARL, DCG 181730Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCOUTR MAG Div File.

194.

Mag (USCOMARL In M-218421), CG USARADCOM to CG USCOMARL, DTG 142354Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

195.

Mag #20663 (USCOMARL In M-215225), DCOUTR SA to CG USCOMARL, DCG 142947Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Consequently, on 5 November the Department of the Army directed that the deployment of the two Nike units be held in abeyance, a hold order which would be reviewed in a week's time. The 6th Missile Battalion, 343d Artillery, was released from this temporary hold status on 9 November and the Commanding General, USCOMSAR, was authorized to deploy the unit overseas in accordance with previously approved movement plans.¹⁹⁶

NIXE-MERCOLES Operations

407 The 2d Missile Battalion, 51d Artillery (NIXE-MERCOLES), had been shipped to Florida minus Battery 3 since that element of the battalion had just returned from a specialized mission in the South Pacific in support of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and time was needed to demodify its equipment for normal use in air defense operations. On 9 November, the Commanding General, USARADCOM, requested deployment of Battery 3 to the Homestead-Miami area by the fastest means available, pointing out that this area had already been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Powell, in turn, directed Fourth Army to move the battery by the most expeditious means but to first complete demodification of the unit's equipment. Before the required demodification could be completed -- and this was twelve days after USARADCOM's request for immediate movement -- the Joint Chiefs of Staff took under consideration certain recommendations for the area by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, and pending a decision, the Commanding General, USARADCOM, told the USCOMSAR commander to neither load nor move Battery 3 until receipt of further instructions.¹⁹⁷ These instructions were not received prior to the directed stand-down in readiness conditions, and the battery was never moved despite the fact that the remainder of the battalion was indefinitely retained in Florida.

408 Within the Florida defense area, the 13th Artillery Group (Air Defense) sought to improve its NIXE-MERCOLES capability by recommending the transfer of one firing battery of the 2d Missile Battalion, 51d Artillery, from Homestead Air Force Base to Key Largo. The estimated construction costs

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(1) Msg 7230 (USCOMSAR In M-1486), JCS to CINCOMSAS, DTG 032140Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg 921287 (USCOMSAR In M-218376), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMSAR, DTG 061632Z Nov 62. Op. 6. (SECRET). (3) Msg 923496 (USCOMSAR In M-218977), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMSAR, DTG 092130Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTE P&O Div files.

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Msg (USCOMSAR In M-218979), CG USARADCOM to CG USCOMSAR, DTG 092107Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg 380433, CG USCOMSAR to CG Fourth Army, DTG 110609Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Msg (USCOMSAR In M-229669), CG USARADCOM to CG USCOMSAR, DTG 220623Z Nov 62. (SECRET). All in DCSUTE P&O Div files.

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for the new site -- to include site preparation and erection of radar towers -- was estimated at approximately \$43,000.¹⁷⁸ This project was neither funded nor initiated prior to the stand-down in readiness and roll-up of troops at the end of November, at which time it became the responsibility of the Continental Air Defense Command.

By mid-November improved enemy capabilities in the communications and electronics fields led to a decision by USABADCOM to move two improved NIKK-HERCULES Integrated Fire Control (IFC) sets from the MacDugger Missile Range, New Mexico, to Homestead Air Force Base. These sets, which had anti-jam display modifications were intended to replace the Basic Integrated Fire Control sets of two of the firing batteries at the Florida locations. Several problems arose in connection with this proposed transfer, the chief of which was the maintenance of training activities at the MacDugger Range due to the lack of fire control equipment. To solve this problem, USABADCOM proposed a complete exchange of the equipment in question, with that then in use in Florida being sent to New Mexico as the alternate equipment was received. However, there still remained the problem of maintaining the new equipment. USCOMSARC furnished USABADCOM with a new Prescribed Loads List and Authorized Storage List for the Ordnance Direct Support Detachment supporting the NIKK-HERCULES installation. USABADCOM, on the other hand, agreed to furnish qualified operator-trainers to conduct on-the-job training, as well as first and second echelon maintenance personnel to augment the two batteries of the missile battalion which would be using the new equipment, an expedient which would enable the two batteries to operate with an improved missile capability at the earliest possible date. The 300th Ordnance Detachment (General Support), attached to the 2d Missile Battalion, 32d Artillery, did have the capability but not the field maintenance equipment to provide third and fourth echelon maintenance on the equipment in question. Since the equipment was scheduled to arrive in Florida on 30 November, the personnel were shipped so as to arrive on 1 December at the very time that USCOMSARC was returning all Operation Plan 318 units to their home stations.¹⁷⁹

178.

Msg (USCOMSARC In M-219467), 2d Region USABADCOM to CG Third Army, DTG 131820Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCBUTR P40 Div files.

179.

(1) Msg (USCOMSARC In M-220472), CG USABADCOM to CG USCOMSARC, DTG 202337Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMSARC In M-220487), CG USABADCOM to CG USCOMSARC, DTG 210019Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (3) Msg ADCOR-942 (USCOMSARC In M-220511), CG USABADCOM to CG USCOMSARC, DTG 210018Z Nov 62. (SECRET). All in DCBUTR P40 Div files.

OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

(40) One of the major guidelines used by the military historian as the principle of the leading problem. Basically, all military actions and decisions can be considered as attempts to cope successfully with problems -- problems which are inherent in the very fact that an organization or command must perform a mission within a framework of limiting conditions and circumstances. Problems exist at all levels and since the decision of one commander must be carried out by another, they are interrelated at all levels. The major problems which concern us here are those which had to be solved if USCOMARMC was to carry out its assigned missions. Some could not be solved at the USCOMARMC level; others were solved at lower echelons with the approval and concurrence of the USCOMARMC commander and staff. Many were caused by a conflict of command and control at higher levels, and these, understandably, had to be settled at that level. In addition, the importance of time was exaggerated by the USCOMARMC staff; others were minimized. Yet their resolution was just as important particularly in view of the impending tactical assault on the island of Cuba which USCOMARMC was expected to accomplish successfully. The urgency of the situation, the shortness of the reaction time frame, the presence of Soviet military capability on the island of Cuba, all seemed to further intensify the importance of problems which played the actions of USCOMARMC and its subordinate commands.

Conflict of Plans and Decisions

Conflict of CINCPACFLT's Operation Plan 313 and 314

(41) A conflict between the requirements of CINCPACFLT under CINCPACFLT's Operation Plan 313 and CINCPACFLT's Operation Plan 314 dictated the elimination of MacBull and McCoy Air Force Bases as Intermediate Staging Bases for troops comprising the Air Taskforce of Operation Plan 313. The U. S. Air Force offered Tyndall and Eglin Air Force Bases as substitutes. This change was personally directed by Admiral Termonia, Commander in Chief, Atlantic, on 17 October 1962 at a conference attended by representatives of the U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command and XVIII Airborne Corps. Planning for the air movement of tactical troops was supposedly carried out on the basis of this change. According to the XVIII Airborne commander the substitution of Tyndall and Eglin Air Force Bases for MacBull and McCoy resulted in a recomputation of air movement schedules for the seven-day version of Operation Plan 313, and none for the five-day version. 200 Yet on

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(1) Mag (USCOMARMC In 8-213539), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, DDC 1603300 Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMARMC In 8-12462), CG XVIII Air Corps, to CINCPACFLT, DDC 242057E Oct 62. (TOP SECRET) Both in AG TS Cee

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26 October, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic, pointed out that a conflict would possibly still exist if Operation Plan 316 and pre-positioning actions under the seven-day version of Operation Plan 316 were simultaneously executed. CINCLANT once again directed the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, to review plans for the use of McCoy Air Force Base.²⁰¹

(C) These factors notwithstanding, Third Army had already established Army Staging Area Commands to be used under OPLAN 316 at both MacDill and McCoy Air Force Bases some two days earlier -- 24 October. After-action reports of the Army Staging Area Commands at both locations give no indication of any conflict with their Air Force hosts nor any conflict in any actual operations or plans. In fact, McCoy Air Force Base was selected as one of the major staging areas for Airborne troops during Exercise SURESHIELD No. 1.²⁰² MacDill was also used to stage forces of the 1st Battalion, 303d Infantry, during the same exercise. In addition, McCoy Air Force Base was used to pre-position some 7,200 each large parachutes and cargo containers for aerial resupply operations and approximately 1,500 short tons of Classes III and IV supplies.²⁰³ So in fact, the conflict seemed to exist more on paper than in actual practice since Exercise SURESHIELD No. 1 used the same airfields that these troops would have used in executing the invasion of Cuba if Operation Plan 316 had been executed. Thus, by mid-November, USCOMSAC and XVIII Airborne Corps were still planning to use McCoy Air Force Base to its full capacity as a staging area for Airborne troops despite the U. S. Air Force opinion that the two plans would be in conflict at that location.

Operation RAPID ROAD

(C) During the month of October 1962 the agreed responsibilities of the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, led to the assignment of his subordinate troop units to several operational missions -- actions which had distinct bearing upon his ability to react quickly under Operation Plan 316. Operation RAPID ROAD was an exercise in support of a U. S. Federal Court Order to desegregate the University of Mississippi at Oxford, Mississippi. Public disorders accompanying the registration of a Negro student for the beginning of the Fall Semester led the appropriate U. S. Government officials to deploy Federal

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²⁰² Reg (USCOMSAC In M-213817), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACFLT, STD 240026Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Exercise SURESHIELD No. 1 was a training exercise for the airborne assault elements of Operation Plan 316. See below, pp. 176 - 181.

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(1) Reg (USCOMSAC In M-213238), CG Third Army to CINCPACFLT, STD 242843Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Rq, 7th Base Cdn, After-action Rpt, 3 Jan 63, Vol II, TABS E and F. (SECRET). In DOSTH Hist Br Files.

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creeps into that area, an operation which during the early part of October involved the use of forces earmarked for participation in Operation Plan 316. In addition, on 1 October Department of the Army designated Lt Gen. Hamilton H. Brown, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as field commander at the scene of the Oxford operations. General Brown was already the designated Interim Army Task Force Commander to furnish planning assistance to CINCLANT with regard to the area surrounding Cuba. He was relieved of the command responsibility at Oxford, Mississippi, on 10 October.¹⁰⁴

Units involved in Operation RAPID ROAD during the first part of October -- at the very time that preparations for implementing CINCLANT's Operation Plans were getting underway -- included 5 battle groups each from the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, 2 battle groups from the 1st Infantry Division, and 3 Military Police Battalions. By 10 October, however, the Oxford situation had so quieted that the major combat units had already been redeployed to their home stations. So it was that when the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, in preparing for implementation of Operation Plan 316, directed the return of all USCOMARMC units to their home stations on 17 October (with the exception of those involved in Operation RAPID ROAD and certain designated exercises) only two of the three Military Police Battalions still remained at Oxford, Mississippi. While these latter units were earmarked for participation in Operation Plan 316, their retention at Oxford did not present a major problem for USCOMARMC. Within the next few days, moreover, the 328th Military Police Battalion and all but two companies of the 716th Military Police Battalion were returned to their home stations in order that they might complete directed actions prior to implementation of Operation Plan 316.¹⁰⁵

On 11 October the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, specifically requested the return of the two remaining companies of the 716th Military Police Battalion to their home stations. He reiterated that these units were on the Troop List for Operation Plan 316 and should be returned to their home station as soon as possible in view of the imminence of hostilities. Despite the urgency of the situation, USCOMARMC did not forward this problem to Department of the Army for solution until seven days later. At that time, USCOMARMC pointed out that not only would these two Military Police companies need complete a one-month tour of duty at Oxford making them eligible for rotation, but also they were needed to support Operation Plan 316. Replacements would be difficult to find, as the 728th Military Police Battalion at Fort

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(1) Msg 909750, USCOMARMC to CG XVIII Abn Corps, 11 Oct 62 (CONFIDENTIAL). In COMUSMACV PWD Div War Plans Br files. (2) Msg AJHQ-J-1 (USCOMARMC to 90-474198), CG 1st Inf Div to DA War Room, 11 Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In AG Mag Com.

205

Info furnished by COMUSMACV PWD Div War Plans Br, 10 Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Head, Texas, the 304th Military Police Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 304th Military Police Battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington, were all included in the Operation Plan 316 Troop List. As an expedient based on the needs of the particular period, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, recommended that the two Military Police companies at Oxford be replaced by augmented Infantry companies which could well come from School Troops at both Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Knox, Kentucky. In fact, tentative plans developed by USCOMSAC called for the Fort Sill School Troops to replace one of the Military Police companies on 6 November and the Fort Knox School Troops to replace the other company on or about 28 November. The Department of the Army immediately vetted this expedient and detected that the Military Police companies at Oxford, Mississippi, would only be replaced with other Military Police companies and that the Oxford requirement took priority over Operation Plan 316. 208

✍ The USCOMSAC staff subsequently developed a replacement schedule on a continuing basis using the 64th Military Police Company, Companies A, B, and C of the 716th Military Police Battalion, and Companies A and B of the 720th Military Police Battalion, rotating each after a one-month tour of duty. This schedule brought an immediate protest from the Commanding General, Fourth Army, who pointed out that Company A of the 720th Military Police Battalion and the 64th Military Police Company were scheduled for early deployment under Operation Plan 316. The matter of returning these units from their duty station at Oxford, Mississippi, to their home stations for preparation and deployment under Annexes M and N, respectively, of Operation Plan 316 would involve unworkable time-space factors. Fort Crockett, Arkansas, furthermore, would face the loss of all Military Police support during the absence of the 64th Military Police Company. Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion, on the other hand, was programmed for later deployment under Operation Plan 316 as a schedule that could be met even if it were located at Oxford, Mississippi, when alerted for movement. He reiterated that the Commanding General, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was still prepared to furnish a provisional Military Police company (Infantry) as had been recommended to Department of the Army by USCOMSAC. The Fourth Army commander therefore recommended that Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion and the Provisional Military Police Company (Infantry) from Fort Sill be used to replace the two companies of the 716th Military Police Battalion on 12 and 19 November, respectively. The designation of the unit to report for duty on 12 December should be withheld until

208.

(1) Maj AJMCG-OO-4340 (USCOMSAC In M-214391), CG XVII Sth Corps, cc CG USCOMSAC, DTG 212133Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Maj 301639, CG USCOMSAC to DCSOPS DA, DTG 282310Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Maj 939908, (USCOMSAC In M-216719), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 300027Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCSOPS MAG Riv files.

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approximately 1 December when a decision could be made which would be based on the urgency of the situation at that time. In justifying this recommendation, he pointed out that it would permit two high priority units to meet the deployment schedules demanded by Operation Plan 316 and would leave necessary Military Police support at Fort Chaffee, pending implementation of the Operation Plan.²⁰⁷

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ As the same time, the Commanding General, Fourth Army, pointed out that the situation would become even more serious if and when Operation Plan 316 were implemented. Execution of that plan would strip Fourth Army of all 106 Military Police units with the exception of the 582d Military Police Company of the 1st Airmobile Division which, in turn, was committed to USCOMSARV Operation Plan 330. Particularly critical areas would be Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and Fort Hood, Texas, where there would be no Military Police support of any kind, and Fort Polk, Louisiana, where the 10 Military Police unit was only 25 percent of its authorized strength, a situation which would persist until either Army Reserve or Army National Guard units were called to active duty under mobilization plans.²⁰⁸

(U) Lessening of the urgency of the situation by mid-November rendered this whole problem less acute and the stand-down in readiness and return of units to their home stations beginning on 1 December permitted USCOMSARV to proceed with the original schedule.

Exercise THREE PAIRS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ In addition to his operational responsibilities as Commanding General, USCOMSARV, General Powell, in his capacity as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, STRIKE Command (CINCSASTRIK), was responsible for providing those Army troops subordinate to USCOMSARV to meet the requirements of the Commander in Chief, U. S. STRIKE Command (CINCSASTRIK). This responsibility had a definite bearing on the ability of the Commanding General, USCOMSARV, to react to Operation Plan 316. For example, a major CINCSASTRIK training exercise -- Exercise THREE PAIRS -- was scheduled for the vicinity of Fort Hood, Texas, during the latter part of October 1962. As it eventually evolved in the planning stages, Exercise THREE PAIRS was a 7-phase exercise consisting of a pre-exercise phase, 3 field training exercise (FTX) phases of approximately 3 days duration each, 2 live-fire phases of 24-hours duration each, and a post-exercise phase. During each FTX phase, a brigade

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(1) Hag F14539, CG USCOMSARV to CG's First, Third and Fourth Armies, DTG 042032Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (OPLANES) (2) Hag (USCOMSARV In M-218743), CG Fourth Army to CG USCOMSARV, DTG 081600Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSTAF P&O Div files.

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Hag (USCOMSARV In M-218743), CG Fourth Army to CG USCOMSARV, DTG 081600Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). In DCSTAF P&O Div files.

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of the 1st Armored Division was to maneuver against a combat command of the 1st Armored Division on the military reservation at Fort Hood while the remaining commands of the two divisions underwent Command Post Exercises (CPE). Each Joint Task Force (JTF) was scheduled to participate in 1 of the 2 live-fire phases through the use of either 2 brigades or 2 combat commands. Each brigade and combat command of the two divisions was scheduled to rotate through this cycle. 108 This exercise had just begun when the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, to bring the units contained in the Task Organization for Operation Plan 316 to the highest state of readiness for possible implementation of the plan. General Powell began immediate negotiations with General Adams, CINCENTAF, to release the appropriate units. General Adams agreed on 18 October to release those units provided that their withdrawal would not cripple the exercise. General Adams further announced that he did not intend to cancel Exercise THREE PAIRS because of the danger of widespread speculation as to the reasons for such cancellation and the possible compromise of strategic surprise, particularly in view of the widespread publicity which the land acquisition for this exercise had received. 214

~~(S)~~ In addition to the two Armored divisions, Exercise THREE PAIRS involved a number of other units which were co-located either on the Troop List for Operation Plan 316 or on the Third Army Support Plan Troop List. Consistent with his negotiations with General Adams, General Powell directed the Commanding General, III Corps and Fourth Army, to prepare plans to return these units to their home stations on twelve-hour notice. This directive brought an immediate reaction from CINCENTAF who felt that his command prerogatives were being infringed upon. He informed the Commanding General, USCOMSAC -- within a matter of four hours after the USCOMSAC directive had been issued -- that he was complying with this directive for planning purposes only, but requested that the Fourth Army commander be instructed to keep the planning under close surveillance. He further pointed out that he was responsible for providing forces for operations by other unified commands only at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Consequently, he deemed that the utmost care be taken by the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, that no units or elements be ordered home from Exercise THREE PAIRS unless either directed by him or cleared with him in advance of issuing orders, regardless of the source of directives received by USCOMSAC. This stand on command prerogative, which seemed rather surprising coming on the heels of his agreement with General Powell just a few hours earlier that he would immediately release the units in question, could have slowed up preparations.

108.

"Joint Exercise THREE PAIRS Final Report," 12 Nov 62, Rq Div/ Controller, Ex THREE PAIRS, Ft. Hood, Tex. (CONFIDENTIAL) In USGUR AGO Div Op Rr files.

110.

(1) Mag 302180, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First thru Fifth Armies, DTG 170001Z Oct 62. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag 303196, CG USCOMSAC to CG's A, DTG 182237Z Oct 62. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). Both in AD TS Com.

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of the forces which were asked to be early introduction into the objective area had Operation Plan 316 been implemented. ¹¹¹

By this time, the first of the PIR phases had been completed and the second was already begun. The Joint Chiefs of Staff entered the picture late in the day on 20 October when they directed CINCENTRE to immediately release from the exercise all Army and Air Force units required for implementation of CINCLANT's Operation Plans 312, 314, and 316. They further directed CINCENTRE to continue Exercise THREE PAIRS as previously scheduled but on a reduced basis until 21 October 1962 in order to provide a cover for the pertinent contingency plans. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the fact that training benefits to be derived from the exercise would be seriously curtailed, it was felt that the urgency of the situation far outweighed any training advantages of a large-scale exercise. ¹¹² With this authority as backing, the Commanding General, USCOMARV, requested the Commanding General, U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command and the Commanding General, Fourth Army, to take immediate steps to return the units in question to their home stations. USCOMARV at that time established air priorities for the shipment of units in the event that air lift was not available in sufficient quantity to move all units to home stations in less time than by surface means. ¹¹³

A further complication arose in that most of the Fourth Army units which were subject to the provisions of Logistical Plan DESTROHAWK for evacuation transfers of equipment were also participating in Exercise THREE PAIRS. Although the Commanding General, Fourth Army, felt that the total requirements for Task Force CHARLIE could be provided from assets available at Fort Rood, regardless of current unit assignments, he did face problems. Because of a recent decision to eliminate Combat Command C, 1st Armored Division, from Task Force CHARLIE and substitute a comparable force from the 1st Armored Division, he was hampered in implementing Logistical Plan DESTROHAWK until he knew the composition of the 1st Armored Division forces which were allocated to the task force. In addition, he pointed out that many items of communications equipment and vehicles belonging to units assigned to Operation Plan 316 were

111.

(1) Msg 301198, CG USCOMARV to CG Fourth Army, DTG 190146Z Oct 62, Sp. 4. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARV In M-214281), CINCENTRE to CINCOMASTRIKE, DTG 190548Z Oct 62, Sp. 4. (TOP SECRET). Both to AG TS Com.

112.

Msg 4414 (USCOMARV In M-214482), JCS to CINCENTRE, DTG 210154Z Oct 62, Sp. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

113.

Msg 382174, CG USCOMARV to COMTAC and CG Fourth Army, DTG 210644Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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being used by the airlines and the Joint Task Force headquarters in support of the exercise. Authority to return this equipment to owning units had to be given concurrently with the release of these units for return to their home stations.³¹⁴

✓ In actual practice Exercise THREE PAIRS began as scheduled and progressed successfully through the first pair and into the second pair of the PTX phases. The Commander in Chief, USSTRIDOM, terminated the second pair on 20 October, one day earlier than planned, when he received the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to return Operation Plan 316 units to their home stations. Contrary to the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he continue the exercise on a reduced scale until 27 October, he cancelled the third pair (PTX). The withdrawal of Air Force support and 1st Airborne Division units made the continuance of the exercise impracticable, so say the leaves.³¹⁵

Exercise SHORELINE

✓ Exercise SHORELINE had been planned as a joint Army-Navy-Air Force exercise to be conducted in the Puget Sound area of the state of Washington at the same time that Exercise THREE PAIRS was being held in Texas. Major Army units participating in this exercise were the 4th Infantry Division and the 2d Logistical Command. The concept of this exercise envisaged the tactical landing of Joint Amphibious Task Force followed by a larger land operation.³¹⁶ Late on 21 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued instructions to the Commander in Chief, USSTRIDOM, similar to those issued the day previous in connection with Exercise THREE PAIRS, the immediate release of any Army, Navy, and Air Force units required for possible implementation of CINCLANT's Operation Plans 312, 314, and 316. As was the case with Exercise THREE PAIRS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized him to continue Exercise SHORELINE at his discretion on a reduced basis through 27 October in order to obtain any training benefits which might accrue.³¹⁷ At the time that this directive was issued, the 4th Infantry Division was responsible for furnishing a division headquarters and a brigade as part of the Floating Reserve for Operation Plan 316. On the following day, however, a decision was reached that the 4th Infantry Division

314.

Mag (USCOMBAC In M-214272), 02 Fourth Army to CG USCOMBAC, JTC 190456Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In ROUTE 260 Div files.

315.

"Joint Exercise THREE PAIRS Final Report," 12 Nov 62, Hq Dir/Controller, Re THREE PAIRS, Ft. Hood, Tex. (CONFIDENTIAL). In ROUTE 260 Div Ops Br files.

316.

Exercise SHORELINE Administrative Plan, 28 July 1962. (UNCLASSIFIED). In USCOMBAC AG Library.

317.

(1) Mag 4845, JCS to CINCSITRIX, DTG 230512Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET).
(2) Mag (USCOMBAC In E-1032), CINCSITRIX to CINCSANITRIX, DTG 230512Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Back to AG TR Com.

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should be released from Operation Plan 316 and assigned to Operation Plan 320. This factor relieved GDSOSTRIKE from the necessity of releasing that portion of the 4th Infantry Division from participation in the exercise. Later decisions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered the use of the 4th Infantry Division for Operation Plan 316, but by that time the exercise had been completed.¹¹⁸

Operation LONGSTRIKE VI

✓ A series of LONGSTRIKE operations had been initiated as a somewhat modified Operation OYUSKOCHE to rotate battle groups between the Continental United States and U. S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Battle group equipment and supplies were left in place at both stations while personnel were airlifted between the United States and Europe. Since the battle groups selected for this purpose were still organized under the ROAD concept, units of the 16th Infantry Division (Mechanized), organized under ROAD, could not be used as substitutes because of equipment incompatibility. In mid-November the Commanding General, Fifth Army, contacted USCOMARAC that the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, was assigned to Operation LONGSTRIKE VI with a rotation date to U. S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) scheduled for early 1963. Because this unit was assigned to the Surface Echelon of Operation Plan 316, Fifth Army commander recommended that it be released from its assignment to Operation Plan 316 no later than 15 December 1962 in order to permit sufficient time for preparation and pre-deployment leaves prior to rotation. Due to the organizational differences indicated above, he also recommended that comparable units of the 16th Infantry Division (Mechanized) not be used as a replacement on the Operation Plan 316 Troop List for the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry. Since units of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) were the only assets available to the Commanding General, Fifth Army, he further recommended that a replacement be obtained from other than Fifth Army resources until such time as the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, completed its rotation move and attained a readiness posture for Operation Plan 316.¹¹⁹ The stand-down in readiness of forces and the return of units to their home stations at the beginning of December lessened the urgency of this situation.

Training Problems

For Exercise Training Commitments

✓ Units assigned to the Troop List for Operation Plan 316 generally were considered as being operationally ready insofar as training was concerned.

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See above, pp. 26 - 28.

¹¹⁹

Reg (USCOMARAC In M-210616), CG Fifth Army, to CG USCOMARAC, DDC 1118360 Rev 62, (SECRET), In DCSUR P&D Div files.

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The units would have to be capable of using their equipment, weapons systems, etc., if and when they took part in combat operations in Cuba. Despite this fact, the 1st Armored Division commander informed the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, on 30 November that he had just received the first thirty-six of their authorized 50-mm. M42 recoilless rifles, and while his organization would be expected to use these weapons in any possible actions in Cuba, training ammunition was not made available along with the weapons. The 1st Armored Division did request the Commanding General, Fort Benning, Georgia, to provide an M42 Recoilless Rifle Instruction Team for a three-day period to assist in familiarizing the division personnel with the new weapons.¹²⁰ Familiarization instruction was completed before the departure of the division from Fort Stewart in December 1961.

Effect on School Training

At the time that USCOMARMC was officially notified of the impending crisis, many of its units were short certain items of equipment due to a requirement to pre-position like items of equipment in Europe to support a two-division augmentation force (including ten supporting units), a measure taken to insure a capability for rapid reinforcement of U. S. Army, Europe. As a result, corrective action had to be taken in order to bring the units assigned to Operation Plan 304 to a proper state of readiness, including transfer of equipment from Service Schools, Training Centers, and those units which were not earmarked for Cuban operations. The transfer of equipment was completed within a very short time in accordance with previously prepared plans -- chiefly Logistical Plan DEUTSCHMAN -- thus insuring USCOMARMC's ability to cope with the situation. As a result of this equipment transfer, training in many of the service schools was hampered to a certain extent but not to the point where it had to be suspended.¹²¹

Fiscal Problems

Once alerted to the Cuban Crisis, the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, made every effort to attain the readiness posture required of his command regardless of fund availability. He told his subordinate commanders on 23 October that a lack of funds would not handicap actions which were necessary to attain that readiness posture. From a fiscal standpoint, this Command was fortunate in that the Cuban Crisis occurred relatively early in the

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Msg (USCOMARMC In M-220435), CG 1st Arm Div, to CG Ft. Benning, DTG 201610Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSITE R&O Div files.

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Briefing for the Prof Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, by General H. B. Powell, CG USCOMARMC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of the Cuban Situation, Slide No 16. (TOP SECRET). In DCSITE R&O Div War Plans Rr files.

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fiscal year. Although the Command was given authority to exceed its budget programs, the actual costs of the operation were financed by funds programmed for essential normal operations during the latter portion of the fiscal year, a policy which obviously impaired the accomplishment of approved programs upon which the future combat readiness of USCOMSAC depended. If an emergency occurred in the latter portion of the fiscal year, this policy certainly would not work. Based on guidance from the Department of Defense the subordinate commanders were directed to maintain a record of all costs associated with the Cuban Crisis. Such records were necessary to effect adjustments in the funding program and support requests for supplemental funding. Sources for replacement of the funds used and revisions to USCOMSAC's Annual Funding Program had not yet been decided upon at the beginning of the second half of FY 1963. It is significant that the entire crisis passed with no provision being made by the Department of Defense to fund the actions required of USCOMSAC to support the appropriate contingency plans.¹²²

Logistical Problems

(C) By far the greatest number of USCOMSAC's problems concerned logistical support. Without the proper equipment, transportation, maintenance, etc., the tactical units would have had a more difficult time in successfully accomplishing the actions required of them under the appropriate contingency plans.

Condition of Key West Road Net

(D) As was indicated earlier in this study, the Key West area of Florida would play a dominant role in any of CINCLANT's various contingency plans for Cuba were implemented. The importance of this area had led to the development of the Joint Defense Plan, Florida Keys Area (JDP-FLAK). As a matter related to this plan, the Washington, D. C., office of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads advised the Department of the Army on 9 November that the condition of the highways leading to Key West, Florida, was extremely poor. Of particular significance was the seven-mile bridge between Knight Key and Bahia Honda Key which, because of its reported critical condition, might or might not be able to carry the loads intended under emergency conditions. Imposition of load limits or the complete closing of the highway on loaded trucks would have a significant effect upon the capability of USCOMSAC to defend the Florida Keys area. On 11 November a Corps of Engineers officer assigned to Headquarters, USCOMSAC, accompanied by a representative of Headquarters, USALLANT Forward, inspected the bridge and found it to be

122

(1) Briefing for Def Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, by Gen. H. A. Powell, CG USCOMSAC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation, Slide No. 38, (TOP SECRET). In AD TS Com. (2) Ltr, USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee to SCMTB, 13 May 63, subj: Summary Report of Ad Hoc Committee, Lessons Learned (OPLAN 316) (U), AFUTE-PRO (S), pp. 16-26, (SECRET). In SCMTB 360 Div Ops Br Files.

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structurally sound and capable of carrying all the equipment scheduled to move across it. With controlled one-way traffic, it was capable of carrying military classification loads up to fifty tons.¹²³

Equipping the 1st Armored Division

✓ A more immediate problem in the field of logistics was created when Headquarters, USCOMARMC, relieved the 1st Armored Division of its assignment to Operation Plan 316 and substituted the 1st Armored Division in its place. The latter division, organized under the ROAD concept, had not yet reached a stage of equipment readiness which would permit it to carry out a combat mission. The 1st Armored Division, on the other hand, was fully equipped but because of its ROAD organization was committed to support Operation Plan 320--Reinforcement of U. S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). On 12 October, the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, authorized Fourth Army to use the equipment assets of the 1st Armored Division, insofar as this was possible, to equip the 1st Armored Division. Because the equipment for the implementation of Operation Plan 320 was already pre-positioned in Europe, the 1st Armored Division would need to retain only its authorized Minimum Equipment for Training Requirements. Only equipment assets, and not personnel, were to be used to bring the 1st Armored Division to operational readiness status. The Commanding General, USCOMARMC, further directed that, because of its assignment to another contingency plan, the equipment assets of the 1st Armored Division could not be used for equipping units other than the 1st Armored Division.¹²⁴

Vehicle Shortages

✓ By mid-November the Commanding General, Third Army, notified USCOMARMC that equipment transfers had created a critical shortage of quarter ton vehicles at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, even though equipment assets had been sufficient to supply the need of Third Army units assigned to Operation Plan 316. Even upon completion of rebuild activities, Fort Bragg would still be fifth vehicles short of satisfying STRAC unit requirements. Moreover, transfer of equipment under Logistical Plan DUTCHMAN had reduced the equipment assets available for non-committed STRAC units at that installation and reduced their capability to react to other contingency plans. As a result, units assigned to Operation Plan 316 desired to be supplied with

¹²³.

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-481208), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMARMC, WFO 921349Z Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Msg 921783 (USCOMARMC In M-220264), DCSOPS DA to CG USCOMARMC, DND 191335Z Nov 62. Op. 1. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTR P&O Dev files.

¹²⁴.

Msg 301402, CG USCOMARMC to CG Fourth Army, WFO 230428Z Oct 62. (SECRET) In DCSUTR P&O Dev files.

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new-model M-151 vehicles in lieu of the discontinued M561 which had been supplied them under logistical Plan DEUTSCHMANN. The Commanding General, Third Army, requested immediate action to provide a total of fifty M-151 vehicles with major share going to Headquarters Detachment, XVIII Airborne Corps, and Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery. The M-561 vehicles made available as a result of this action would then be distributed to fill existing shortages in other STRAD units located at that installation, etc.

Requirements for Basic Loads of Ammunition

At the time when units assigned to Operation Plan 316 were being prepared at home stations for prepositioning actions and for possible implementation of Operation Plan 316, the Commanding General, USCOMARC, directed that all participating units would be required to have on hand their full basic loads of Class V requirements to include Chemical items. By mid-November, however, the Peninsula Base Command became concerned over the adequacy of basic loads of ammunition for Task Force CHARLIE, the first element of the Surface Rebelon scheduled for entry into the objective area. The Peninsula Base Command particularly questioned the sufficiency of seventy-five rounds per tank for five days of combat operation in the objective area. They pointed out that the situation might become even more critical if automatic air resupply were delayed for any reason. Consequently, the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, recommended that USCOMARC thoroughly study this problem and take action to increase substantially the basic load of ammunition for tanks. This question was still under study at USCOMARC and Department of the Army levels at the time that the units in question were returned to their home stations. ¹¹⁵

Procurement of SS-116 Missiles

One problem which assumed some measure of importance because of its international aspects was the fact that units assigned to Operation Plan 316 were expected to use the SS-116 Anti-Tank Missile which was produced by the French Government. At the time that the Cuban Crisis occurred, stocks of the missile were in short supply when compared to combat requirements. Since procurement of these missiles was an international transaction and subject to the regulations concerning the outflow of gold, approval of the Department of Defense was required before procurement action could be initiated. The U. S. Army Materiel Command informed USCOMARC on 16 November 1961 that the Commander in Chief, European Command, had received information from the French

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Reg (USCOMARC In M-116556), CG Third Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 100400Z Nov 61. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSTAF P&O Div files.

116

(1) Reg 300768, CG USCOMARC to CG Sixth Army, DTG 172100Z Oct 61. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Reg (USCOMARC In M-216751), CG P&O to CG USCOMARC, DTG 151510Z Nov 61. (SECRET). Both in DCSTAF P&O Div files.

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Government that 700 such missiles could be made available from French Army stocks. The transaction, however, was also dependent upon approval by the French Ministry of Defense. The U. S. Army Materiel Command initiated action at once to obtain Department of Defense approval for procurement of some 600 of these missiles, with procurement action to be implemented as soon as approval was obtained. By mid-November the U. S. Army Communications Zone, Europe, had not provided any information concerning the production capability of the French Government for a follow-on supply of these missiles which would be necessary if combat operations were initiated under Operation Plan 304.227 The slowness with which such international transactions move prevented the receipt of any of these missiles prior to the stand-down in readiness conditions and return of the units to their home stations.

Breakdown of BOMX Missiles

~~(S)~~ A problem which could have been of greater significance to defense of the Florida area concerned the basic load of BOMX missiles for the 8th Missile Battalion (BOMX), 65th Artillery, directed to move to the Florida Keys as early as possible beginning on 14 October. This unit was required to the southern Florida area to provide Surface-to-air Missile defense against air attacks from the island of Cuba. Because it was still engaged in its training cycle, the unit's basic load of missiles was stored at the Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Orders directing the move of the unit called for shipment of the missiles from the depot direct to the operational site. Shipment was made by commercial tractor-trailer rather than by military vehicle, despite the urgency of the situation and the fact that the shipment was classified in nature. Three of the trucks were stopped at the first truck weighing station in Virginia -- just south of Alexandria -- because of a 1,000-pound overload, and the Virginia State Police thereupon directed the trucks to return to Letterkenny Army Depot for reloading. This return of the trucks to Pennsylvania caused a seven-hour delay in the dispatch of the critical missiles from the Army depot at a time when the situation was so urgent that USCOMMAC was using every available means to get the unit's firing batteries into position as quickly as possible, this would not have happened if the loads had been under military control as an on-site adjustment could have been made with the Virginia State Police.²²⁸

227.

Reg (USCOMMAC Ltr M-220031), CG USMAC to CG USCOMMAC, DTG 162345Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In BCSGPR 360 Div Files,

228.

(1) See above, pp. 58 - 100. (2) Reg 302529, CG USCOMMAC to CINC-STRIKE and BCSGPR 18, DTG 162215Z Oct 62. Gp. 3, (TOP SECRET). In AG 73 Cav,

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PO2 Fuel Support Problems in the Objective Area

✓ The original provisions of Operation Plan 316 for PO2 support capabilities called for Air Force KB-30 tanker planes to move fuel from Charleston, South Carolina, to the objective area. USCOMMAC representatives met with their US Air Force Tactical Air Command counterparts to review the situation and to make further arrangements to improve such support capabilities. The first move was to change the origin location for these sorties from Charleston to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. In addition, an alternate contingency plan was developed to be used if KB-30 tanker aircraft were not available for this purpose. The alternate plan provided for the use of C-130 aircraft in lieu of the KB-30, with seven collapsible 300-gallon containers mounted on each substitute aircraft and a manifold system provided for the rapid loading and unloading of fuel. This alternate method of delivery would increase the planned daily sorties from twenty (KB-30 aircraft) to twenty-six (C-130 aircraft). The major reason for this alternate plan was the fact that the C-130 aircraft possessed a shorter take-off and landing capability, thus permitting the use of a greater variety of airfields in the objective area.

✓ As a result of this conference and the subsequent arrangements with the U. S. Air Force, the U. S. Army Petroleum Center relocated the pre-positioned bulk PO2 supplies -- mainly motor gasoline -- to MacDill Air Force Base to support either the prime operation using KB-30 Tanker Aircraft or the alternate operation using C-130 aircraft. At the same time, the USCOMMAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics directed the movement of one hundred 300-gallon collapsible containers from the contractor -- the U. S. Rubber Company -- to MacDill Air Force Base. This change also affected the Third Army staging plan for support forces since a detachment of thirty men and two supervisors was required at MacDill to carry out the fuel loading operations.

✓ In addition, USCOMMAC logistical planners decided to use a total of thirty-five 1,000-gallon Rolling Liquid Transporters (RLT) to accompany the combat units. The Commander General, XVIII Airborne Corps, recommended the following distribution of RLT's: 10 to the 1st Armored Division, 9 each to the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, and 4 and 3 to the 2d and 1st Infantry Divisions, respectively. He also directed the commanders concerned to take action to provide for easy access of these transporters into the objective area within current air or surface shipping allocations. These transporters, which were to be moved from home stations to Intermediate Staging Bases, were to be carried empty and filled at the staging bases for onward movement by air into the objective area. Those which would be moved to the ports of embarkation for subsequent movement by surface transportation, were to be filled at home stations since procurement of the proper product -- combat-grade motor gasoline, 115 or 145 octane rating -- would be a complicated process at the various ports. The Rolling Liquid Transporters were

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distributed to the appropriate units as they became available so that they could be incorporated in the loading tables.¹²⁹

Rail Car Problems

(C) One of the major problems connected with the pre-positioning of heavy units under Operation Plan 316 -- and one which might have become even more acute if the plan had been implemented -- was that of furnishing and holding the railroad cars required to move troops and equipment of the combat units from home stations to their points of embarkation. As early as 23 October 1962, the Chief of Transportation, U. S. Army, directed the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, to request immediate positioning of the required railroad cars at designated home stations by the Defense Traffic Management Service (DTMS). The Chief of Transportation recommended that the affected unit commanders begin loading operations as soon as railroad cars were positioned for them. That same day, however, DTMS informed the Transportation Officer at Fort Hood, Texas, that, while flat cars were no problem, only enough day coaches could be immediately provided to carry personnel scheduled for the first train of the First Increment of Task Force CHARLIE, 1st Armored Division. Mixed trains were desired by the 1st Armored Division in order to preserve unit integrity. Day coaches presented a problem during the entire pre-positioning phase in the extent that, while mixed trains were used, unit commanders concerned were under orders to immediately release all passenger coaches upon arrival at their destination.¹³⁰

(C) The movement of the 1st Armored Division and the heavy combat equipment of the Infantry Divisions assigned to Operation Plan 316 created a need for heavy-duty flat cars which the commercial railroads might not be able to satisfy. In order to satisfy movement requirements generated by Army units in support of Operation Plan 316, the Chief of Transportation, U. S. Army, on 24 October authorized the use of U. S. Army-owned (USARC), 100-ton heavy duty flat cars which were stored in STRAC equipment pools. These cars were to be used only if requirements could not be satisfied through commercial means or through other Department of Defense interchange fleet capabilities. Exempted from this blanket authorization were the heavy duty flat cars assigned to the STRAC rail equipment pool at Fort Lewis, Washington, whose use was

129

(1) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-129731), CG XVIII Air Corps to CG USCOMARAC, REG 1586582 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files. (2) Memo for Red, Mr. C. E. Sizoo, DCSTH Sup Div, Omaha Cos Bc, Gen Sup Sec, 16 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH Admin Br files. (3) USARLANT RMC Daily Briefing, 16 Nov 62, p. 14. (TOP SECRET - Info used is SECRET). In AG TR Com.

130.

(1) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-214917), CG&T BA to CG USCOMARAC, REG 1315542 Oct 62, Op. 4. (SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-214975), CG 1st Armd Div to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 133020Z Oct 62, Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSTH P&O Div files.

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subject to the prior approval of the Commanding General, USCOMARAC. Upon completion of movement action, all cars assigned as STAC equipment pools were to be returned to their original pools, unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Transportation or the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, as appropriate. Because of the limited number of such cars available for use, the Chief of Transportation requested the USCOMARAC commander to restrict all origin Transportation Officers not to use these cars to load any equipment which could be moved on carrier-furnished equipment of lesser capacity. All Army-owned cars were to be expeditiously through USCOMARAC channels, while interchange cars were to be requisitioned through established Department of Defense channels. 231

✓ The movement of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Stewart, Georgia, was considered a temporary expedient to permit rapid deployment of the task force when and if Operation Plan 305 was implemented. The USCOMARAC commander, after conferring with the Chief of Transportation and the Defense Traffic Management Service, directed that all tracked vehicles of the task force elements be held on the rail cars on which they were shipped from Fort Hood, Texas. According to estimates of COMUS, this procedure would tie up approximately 600 flat cars in the vicinity of Fort Stewart. In addition, while the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, directed the 1st Armored Division elements of the Floating Reserve and On-rail Detachments to unload all equipment upon arrival at Fort Stewart, the Floating Reserve was originally on a twelve-hour alert status for loading their tracked vehicles. Although the alert was later extended to a twenty-two-hour basis, it still required the retention of a certain number of rail cars for that purpose. The elements of both the Floating Reserve and the On-rail Detachments were instructed to retain all U. S. Army-owned rail cars in the vicinity of Fort Stewart but to immediately release all commercial rail rolling stock. 232

✓ As the first elements of Task Force CHARLIE began to arrive at Fort Stewart it became evident that rail sidings on that post were not sufficient to store the estimated 600 cars. Available rail sidings measured approximately six and one-half miles in length and could supposedly hold an estimated 128 cars. The Third Army commander took immediate steps to alleviate the situation and thus prevent any undue delay in the arrival of the necessary units on the Fort Stewart area. He proposed the use of rail sidings at Milledgeville, Daniels, Milledgeville, and Savannah, Georgia, and requested space at Hunter Air Force Base. This latter request was turned down by the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, which was an element of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and not under the control of CINCPACFLT -- the Commanding General, Eastern Air Command (EAC). General Powell immediately requested the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, to make arrangements

231.

Reg (USCOMARAC In M-211548), OGeT DA to CG USCOMARAC, DOD 2481542
Oct 63. Cp. 4. (SECRET). In BSMR 960 Div files.

232.

See above, pp. 79 - 83.

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with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, to use these rail sidings. On the same day that the request was forwarded for settlement at the Departmental level, the SAC commander directed the Eighth Air Force commander to give maximum support at Hunter Air Force Base in providing use of on-base rail sidings, but to advise him whether or not meeting this requirement would present a serious interruption of the SAC mission. 133

133. The storage of rail cars -- both loaded and unloaded -- for use by the elements of the Surface, Flaming Reserve, and On-call Echelons both at Fort Stewart and at Fort Benning and vicinity became a direct problem of greater magnitude day by day. By 1 November the 1st Armored Division had a total of 451 flat cars under load with almost an equal number -- approximately 1300 -- stored at Fort Stewart and the towns of Milledgeville and Daniels, Georgia, and with the remainder stored at Hunter Air Force Base. Three days later this number had increased to 497, of which 363 were commercial cars. Task Force CHARLIE had a total of 310 cars under load, of which 135 were commercial cars. It was at this point that the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, directed all elements other than Task Force CHARLIE to offload all equipment. Demurrage costs on the 135 commercial cars held for Task Force CHARLIE were charged at the rate of \$8.00 per car per day for a total daily demurrage cost of \$1,080.00. 134 Despite the orders to release all cars except those for Task Force CHARLIE, the number of commercial cars under load had increased by two additional by 7 November. As a means of comparison, however, the move of various elements of the 1st Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas, by that time, had required a total of 1,943 flat cars. 135 During the month of November, the effect of the USCOMARMC directive, plus the move of increments of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for amphibious exercises, drastically reduced the number of cars in retention. By 28 November the total number of cars in storage in the Fort Stewart area had been reduced to 174, of which 78 were being held under load and, of this latter number, only 30 were commercial cars. In addition to the cars held in the Fort Stewart area for Task Force CHARLIE, a total of 140 cars were stored at Fort Benning for these

133

(1) Mag 102789, CG USCOMARMC to DCSSTB SA, DTC 180143Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Mag (USCOMARMC to M-218408), CG SAC to CG Eighth AF, DTC 181845Z Op 3. (SECRET). In DCSSTB 960 Div files.

134

(1) DCSLOC New Br, New Status Rept, 221300Z Nov 62, subj: Status of 1st Armored Division as of 221300Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOC Nov Br Daily Nov Log, Cuban Crisis. (2) CHARLANT SEC Daily Briefing, 3 Nov 62, p. 6-9. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

135

DCSLOC Nov Br, Nov Status Rept, 070000Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOC Nov Br Daily Nov Log, Cuban Crisis.

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elements of the 1st Infantry Division which were included in the Surface Section of Operation Plan 318. Of the total at Fort Benning, 81 were commercial cars, 18 of which were empty but were held on a 4-hour alert basis.²³⁶ By 3 December 1962, after the roll-up of forces had begun, a total of sixteen cars still remained under load in the Fort Stewart area. These included sixteen U. S. Army-owned cars at Fort Stewart, itself, and five commercial cars located at Milledgeville, Georgia. The final demurrage cost report which was submitted to USCOMSAC on 3 December pointed out that these costs would continue at the rate of \$46.00 per day at Milledgeville until the cars were finally moved. Demurrage cost estimates furnished the Commanding General, Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USCOMSAC, by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad had not been verified by this Command at the time of the final Movement Status Report due to incomplete verifications. The estimated total demurrage costs incurred for the 1st Armored Division in the vicinity of Fort Stewart and for the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Benning during the entire pre-positioning and pre-operational period are as follows:²³⁷

<u>RAIL SHEDDING LOCATION</u>	<u>DEMURRAGE COSTS</u> (Estimated)
<u>Total Costs</u>	
Operation Plan 318 -	<u>\$45,438.00</u>
Fort Benning -	21,932.00
<u>Subtotal</u>	
1st Armored Division -	<u>428,776.00</u>
Milledgeville -	508.00
Fort Stewart -	5,960.00
Denial -	4,168.00
Milledgeville -	10,648.00
Hunter Air Force Base -	3,872.00

General Trailer Requirements at Army Staging Area Commands

✓ A significant problem arose at the Army Staging Area Commands -- Intermediate Staging Bases -- with regard to the tractor-trailer combination which were required for outloading supplies from the airfields on the re-

²³⁶. DCSLOG Nov 8r, How Status Rpt, 18 Nov 62, subj: Rail Car Status. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Nov 8r Daily How Log, Cuban Crisis.

²³⁷. (1) Ibid. (2) Hag (USCOMSAC In M-313445), CG Ft. Stewart, Ga., to CG USCOMSAC, DSO 142100Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Hag (USCOMSAC In M-311894), CG Ft. Stewart, Ga., to CG USCOMSAC, DSO 062100Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Same in DCBUTE R&D Div files.

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spelling turnaround. A total of 130 aircraft -- both C-130 and C-119 -- were scheduled for the re-cycling turnaround which permitted each aircraft to take approximately two hours and ten minutes to complete airfield approach, landing, parking, loading, and take-off operations. Since an average of forty-five to fifty aircraft loads were scheduled to be moved at each of the four airfields concerned with this operation, the tightness of the loading schedule required the use of expedited loading methods. The Air Force consequently established a requirement that trailers for this purpose must have bed heights which matched pertinent aircraft ramps -- approximately thirty-nine to forty-five inches in height.¹³⁸

(U) In order to meet the requirement for proper trailer-trailer equipment during the early part of November, USCOMSARC had commercial equipment consisting of tractors with drivers and 130 trailers standing by. The approximate daily cost for this equipment was \$13,180.00 based on a rate of \$140.00 per day per tractor with driver and \$30.00 per day per trailer. The Commanding General, Third Army, reported on 10 November that the total estimated cost up to that time had been \$291,050.00. In view of the high cost of this equipment as merely a standby resource and the fact that some of it would be used only in case of extreme emergency, the Commanding General, Third Army -- who was responsible for funding this aspect of the operation -- requested a careful evaluation of the retention of this equipment and the resultant costs. Despite the fact that the Defense Traffic Management Service could give no positive assurances that the vehicles could be repositioned within a given time frame, he felt that they should be released, provided that USCOMSARC considered such release operationally acceptable. After several days of careful study, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USCOMSARC, directed Third Army to release all tractors and trailers under lease from commercial sources as quickly as possible. At the same time he requested DOTS to make whatever arrangements were necessary to assure that the vehicles could be in position at each Army Staging Area Command by no later than 1200 hours on 3-plus-4-days.¹³⁹

(U) This USCOMSARC directive brought an immediate response from the Director, Defense Traffic Management Service, who pointed out that the remodification of the trailers which was required for this operation prevented any assurance that they could be provided to the staging area commands within

¹³⁸

USARLANT SGC Daily Briefing, 16 Nov 82. pp. 14-15. (TOP SECRET) -- Info used in SECRET). In AG TS Con.

¹³⁹

(1) Mag AJAGL-O 161341 (USCOMSARC La M-219603), CG Third Army to CG USCOMSARC, DTS 141459Z Nov 82. Gp. 3. (SECRET). (2) Mag ATLOO-P-303522, CG USCOMSARC to CG Third Army, DTS 140353Z Nov 82. (SECRET). (3) Mag (USCOMSARC La M-219603), CG Third Army to CG FSO, DTS 141700Z Nov 82, Gp. 4. (SECRET). All in DOTSUR P&O Riv files.

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a period of seventy-two hours as specified by USCOMSAC plans. He did, however, propose the release of approximately 30 percent of the trailers and 25 percent of the tractors then under contract. At the same time he requested relief from such stringent trailer bed height requirements and recommended the use of standard height trailers 240

¶ In order to determine the proper course of action in this matter, the Third Army commander dispatched a team of two officers to the Army Staging Area Command (ASAC) beginning at Eglin Air Force Base on 16 November. The major mission of this team was to re-evaluate the semi-trailer and tractor requirements for support of Operation Plan 306 resupply operations. He requested that knowledgeable Army and Air Force officers be made available at each ASAC to aid in the review of both aircraft and semi-trailer characteristics, of aircraft turnaround times, and of other contingencies in the use of the equipment. This review, plus a conference on 19 November attended by representatives from the U. S. Army Materiel Command, the U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, Third Army, and XVIII Airborne Corps, resulted in a conclusion that the requirement established by the Air Force for trailer bed heights was not only a firm one but one which was an operational necessity. The conference also concluded that all commercial equipment should be replaced by Army-owned equipment as soon as practicable and estimated that a total of 108 M-171 or M-173A1 trailers would be required to accomplish this switch. The conference pointed out that if sufficient trailers of the M-171 category were not available, the M-27 trailer could be used, provided that it was fitted with smaller diameter wheels to bring the bed height down from the 68 3/4 inch standard height to the required height of from 39 to 45 inches. Third Army had a total of fifty-nine of the M-27 trailers on hand and could immediately obtain an additional sixty-six from the U. S. Army Materiel Command, provided that the smaller diameter wheels were also available.²⁴¹ Meanwhile, General Powell had also raised the possibility of using Army-owned trailers for ASAC resupply operations. His Transportation Corps advisers pointed out, however, that the use of the M-27 trailer was further limited by the fact that it was only twenty-three feet in length while many of the loads required a trailer with a minimum length of twenty-eight feet.

240.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC In M-218688), DLS/BSA to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 161135Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg 303676, CG USCOMSAC to CG USMACV, DTG 200148Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTE P&O Div files.

241.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC In M-219941), CG Third Army, to CINCPACFLT and CG MACV, DTG 161738Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg 303676, CG USCOMSAC, to CG USMACV, DTG 200148Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTE P&O Div files.

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✍ The Commanding General, Third Army, took steps by 21 November to furnish the required 105 trailers from available resources. The review indicated above revealed that a total of forty-nine M-172 and M-172A1 trailers were already at Tyndall and Eglin Air Force Bases. Since the requirement at Tyndall was for only 22, and 27 such trailers were on hand, the Commanding General, Third Army, directed the transfer of the 3 excess trailers to Eglin Air Force Base to help meet that Staging Area Command's requirements for 47. At the same time, he directed the commanders of six installations under his control to place a total of sixty-seven additional M-172 or M-172A1 trailers in serviceable condition and transfer them to the Army Staging Area Command which he had indicated. In addition to the trailers, the commander of Fort Snagg was required to furnish fifteen military tractors to the ASAC at Cape Lacke Air Force Base. The Commanding General, Third Army, recommended that the commercial tractors and trailers be released as soon as the M-172 or M-172A1 trailers were received by the Staging Area Command. Even though this allocation of trailers plus the 49 already on hand exceeded the stated requirement for 105 trailers, additional liberations of this type of trailer were to be made as soon as they were made available by USCOMSAC. The Third Army commander recommended to the Commanding General, Peninsular Base Command, that elements of Transportation Corps truck companies be transferred to those Staging Areas, where none were already assigned, to handle the military trailers, a move which would take place as soon as the air-landed/air-dropped phase of re-supply actions had been completed. As a result of these actions, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USCOMSAC, was able to report on 23 November that the Command's holdings of commercial leased equipment had been reduced to 39 tractors and 38 trailers and that the daily equipment costs had been reduced from \$12,000 to \$6,000.¹⁴²

✍ The Commanding General, Third Army, also pointed out to USCOMSAC that Pan-American Airlines was then under contract to the United States Government to provide at Cape Canaveral forty tractors and low bed semi-trailers of the required height. These tractors and trailers would be used at the Cape in the event that CINCLANT Operation Plan 314 was executed. He therefore requested the immediate negotiation of a written agreement to use these forty low bed trailers -- complete with tractors and drivers -- at no additional cost to the government. Fifteen of the tractor-trailer combinations would be allocated to Stanford Naval Air Station, 15 to Patrick Air Force Base, and the remaining 10 to McCoy Air Force Base. He further pointed out that the agreement should specify availability of the tractor-trailer combinations within twenty-four hours after USCOMSAC received notification

142.

(1) Mag (USCOMSAC In M-320639), CG Third Army to CG USCOMSAC, and CG FSC, DTD 212216Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMSAC In M-320634), CG Third Army to CG FSC, et al., DTD 212300Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTH R&O Div files. (3) USASCLANT EOC Daily Briefing, 26 Nov 62, pp. 14-15; and 23 Nov 62, pp. 12-13. (TOP SECRET - Info used as SECRET). In AG TE Con.

125
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that Operation Plan 316 was to be executed. All forty of the tractor-trailer combinations would be required during the period from E-day through the air landing and air drop portion of the operation.²⁴³ This recommendation was made toward the end of November, too late to be suggested with either the National Aeronautics and Space Administration at Cape Canaveral or with the Pan American Airlines.

Amphibious Shipping Difficulties

~~TOP SECRET~~ One of USCOMMAC's most pressing problems was the provision of an adequate amphibious shipping capability to mount the amphibious assault phase of the invasion operations envisioned under Operation Plan 316. As was indicated earlier, Operation Plan 316 called for a simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault of the island of Cuba, beginning seven days after the implementation of Operations Plan 312. The Army Task Force 125 was dependent upon the U. S. Navy for amphibious shipping needed to carry out its missions during the amphibious assault phase. While some of the units scheduled for transport in these amphibious vessels were to be lifted from the port of Savannah, no LST ramps existed at that port nor was USCOMMAC able to construct such ramps without compromising some of the surprise elements contained in the operation plan. On 11 October this question was taken up with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who authorized the USCOMMAC commander to send an advance party to Savannah to plan such construction, pointing out that E-day would definitely bring authority for its initiation. The pre-positioning of Task Force CHARLIE at Fort Stewart, however, created an immediate requirement for this construction and four LST rags were employed at the port of Savannah by 1830 hours on 31 October 1942.²⁴⁴

~~TOP SECRET~~ a. Weight Limitations. The four LST's originally allocated by the U. S. Navy to Task Force CHARLIE for the amphibious assault phase of Operation Plan 316 created an immediate problem. The planning group which developed the original shipping requirements had assumed that Task Force CHARLIE would be carried in modern LST's which were basically a 1,800 dead weight ton vessel. The four U. S. Navy LST's allocated to USCOMMAC for use with Task Force CHARLIE, however, were of World War II vintage and, according to USCOMMAC's transportation planning group, were normally capable of a maximum weight tonnage of only 360 dead weight tons. World War II experience had proven that a maximum load of 600 dead weight tons could be achieved with little difficulty in landing over the beaches, but a load of 300 or more dead weight tons would

²⁴³

Mag (USCOMMAC In M-210633), CG Third Army to CG EAC, and CG USCOMMAC, 206 210216Z Nov 42. (SECRET). In DCSMTR P&O Div Files.

²⁴⁴

(1) Memo for Asst. Lt. Col. James M. Linn, SMC2005 BA, 23 Oct 42, subj: Conference on Cuban Planning (S). (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Con
(2) USCOMMAC DCSMOC SMC Briefing Notes, 2 Nov 42. (SECRET). In DCSMOC Admin. &c Files.

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require the ship to beach farther out in the water. In this latter case, either the vehicles would have to be waterproofed or a causeway landing would have to be made. The original planning for Task Force CHARLIE called for a total of 3,900 tons of equipment for Increment Nr. 1. If the ships were loaded at 900 tons -- as envisioned by USCOMMAC logistical planners -- an additional LST would definitely be required to move this increment, and the equipment which the task force intended to land over the beaches would have to be reduced by approximately 900 tons. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, on the other hand, pointed out that data available to his headquarters indicated that the four LST's could be beached in the objective area with the maximum planned beaching weight -- 3,885 tons. He therefore recommended that Increment Nr. 1 of Task Force CHARLIE be loaded on the four allocated LST's but that one of the four vessels also carry a complete causeway pier of four sections. This would permit the four vessels in question to carry the maximum planned weight loads and free them from the requirement to beach under adverse conditions.²⁴³ A conference on this matter was held at Fort Monroe on 8 November between representatives of USCOMMAC and representatives of the U. S. Navy Amphibious Group II. The latter group insisted that the vessels could be loaded at 900 dead weight tons and successfully beached in the objective area. During the amphibious exercise conducted for the Increment Nr. 1 of Task Force CHARLIE during the latter part of November,²⁴⁴ the four allocated vessels were loaded to maximum weight capacity (3800 tons) and a causeway pier of four sections was added to the Increment's equipment as previously recommended by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps. All landings during the amphibious exercises involving the various increments of Task Force CHARLIE were made over the causeway pier, a time-consuming operation.²⁴⁵

243. Additional Amphibious Shipping Requirements. On 3 November the XVIII Airborne Corps commander introduced the subject of additional amphibious vessels for Task Force CHARLIE. By that time USCOMMAC directives required the task force to introduce tank heavy combat teams into the objective area as early as possible during combat operations. The original allocation of assault shipping -- only four LST's for Task Force CHARLIE -- required that some of the

243.

(1) USARLANT EOC Daily Briefing, 30 Oct 62, pp. 15-18. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Mag 303348, CG USCOMMAC to CINCLANT, DTG 012153Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (3) Mag (USCOMMAC In R-319478), CG XVIII Airm Corps to CG USCOMMAC, and CG 1st Amd Div, DTG 031015Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCUTEF MAG Div files.

244.

See below, pp. 184 - 186.

245.

(1) Mag (USCOMMAC In R-319478), CG USAFIC-SEA to CG USCOMMAC, DTG 110648Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag 303348, CG USCOMMAC to CINCLANT, DTG 082331Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCUTEF MAG Div files.

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armored equipment be carried in commercial freight vessels which was, of course, a most undesirable method of introducing armored equipment into a combat zone. Consequently, the XVII Airborne Corps commander requested that all possible resources be exploited to obtain additional LST's or LSD's. Later on the same day he indicated that a minimum of four LST's would be needed in addition to the four already provided. One of these additional vessels would be used to lift the Cavalry Troop, 1st Cavalry Squadron, 1st Armored Division, which had been displaced by a medium tank company at USCOMMAC direction. Another vessel would carry six of the M48 tank of the 2d Battalion (Medium Tank), 48th Armor, which were then loaded on a commercial vessel scheduled to arrive in the objective area on D-plus-3-days, and two vessels were required to lift the remaining tanks of the armored battalion and an eight-inch towed howitzer battalion. ¹⁴⁸

Since no additional LST's were available from resources of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), both the Commanding General, USCOMMAC, and the Commander, Military Sea Transport Service (COMSTIS), investigated the availability of commercial LST's. The latter pointed out that, even if commercial LST's were available, they would not meet stated requirements but might be suitable for the forces held in reserve. As an alternate solution, he recommended that the required number of LST's be immediately commissioned from the Atlantic Reserve Fleet. However, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), pointed out to the Chief of Naval Operations that the activation of four LST's from the Atlantic Reserve Fleet could not possibly meet immediate contingency requirements because of the time required for re-activation. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were then considering an Augmented Operation Plan 118 which would most probably require all eleven LST's in the Atlantic Reserve Fleet. The longer reaction time established for the augmentation forces would afford the Navy sufficient time to reactivate all eleven vessels. ¹⁴⁹

Because time limitations imposed by Operation Plan 118 meant that the only answer to USCOMMAC's problem lay in the leasing of additional commercial

148.

(1) Reg AJRGS-CF 4123 (USCOMMAC In M-217741), CG XVII Air Corps to CG USCOMMAC, DTD 100340 Nov 62. Gp. 3. (SECRET). (2) Reg AJRGS-CF 4128 (USCOMMAC In M-217788, CG XVII Air Corps to CG USCOMMAC, DTD 031930 Nov 62. Gp. 3. (SECRET). (3) Reg USCOMMAC In M-218704, CINCLANT to JCS, DTD 043142 Nov 62. Gp. 1. (SECRET). All in COMSTIS Ptd Div Files.

149.

(1) Reg (SECRET In M-218354), CINCLANTFLT to CNO, DTD 090341 Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (2) Reg USCOMMAC In M-218190, CINCLANT to JCS and CNO, DTD 100342 Nov 62. Gp. 3. (SECRET). Both in COMSTIS Ptd Div Files.

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LST's, CINCLANT requested authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Commander, Military Sea Transport Service, to charter such vessels from commercial sources for use by the USCOMBAC commander in his capacity as CINCLANT. He stipulated that U. S. flag vessels with operable bow doors were preferred to meet U. S. military requirements. CINCLANT further recommended that the U. S. Navy fund the chartering of the vessels since they would be used to augment the amphibious assault shipping already provided by the Navy.¹²⁹

While these discussions were being held, USCOMBAC received information that a commercial LST -- the CAL-AGRO -- was available for charter at the Swan City Terminal, Savannah, Georgia. Preliminary inspection by marine inspectors representing USCOMBAC indicated that the vessel was in good shape, that it could be chartered at a nominal cost, and that a maximum of three days would be required to re-install her bow ramp and thus bring her closer to her original configuration. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy Atlantic Fleet, pointed out to USCOMBAC that the ship would have to be manned by a military crew before it could operate as an integral part of the Amphibious Assault Task Force. Since military manning was not feasible at that time, planning for the use of the CAL-AGRO would have to be predicated upon tasks compatible with those normally assigned to vessels chartered by the Military Sea Transport Service. Consequently, if USCOMBAC urgently required the vessel for training purposes or for other tasks suitably performed by civilian crews, the requirements should be submitted through proper military channels to the Commander, Military Sea Transport Service. On 4 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the MSTS commander to charter the CAL-AGRO and make it available to the Commanding General, USCOMBAC.¹³¹

As a result of CINCLANT's request of 10 November for additional LST's, the Chief of Naval Operations informed the MSTS commander on the following day that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized him to proceed with the charter of three additional commercial LST's to be used by the Commanding General, USCOMBAC. In a matter of 3 days the Military Sea Transport Service had negotiated a charter with the West India Steam Ship Company, Inc., for the lease of 3 Liberian flag, foreign-manned LST's for a period of 60 to 90 days. All three vessels -- the INAGUA FOAM, the INAGUA CREST, and the INAGUA SHIPPER -- had operable bow doors and were to be made available at the Key West Charleston

129.

Msg (USCOMBAC In M-215199), CINCLANT to JCS and CNO, RTE 182316Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). In DCNTRC MAG Div files.

131.

(1) Msg 302939, CG-USCOMBAC to CINCLANTFLT, DEG 310441Z Oct 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMBAC In M-217499), CINCLANTFLT to CINCLANT, DEG 012140Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (3) Msg (USCOMBAC In M-215196), JCS to COMSTS, DEG 050431Z Nov 62. (SECRET). All in DCNTRC MAG Div files.

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Lunga, which was the U. S. Government's option port of delivery. Two of the ships -- the IMAGUA FOAM and the IMAGUA SHEPHER -- had deep-tension crawler cranes aboard which could be removed if desired. On 20 November the Military Sea Transport Service furnished the Commanding General, USCOMARV, with the dates by which the three vessels would be available for use. The ramp of the IMAGUA FOAM was scheduled for reinstallation on or about 22 November, while that of the IMAGUA SHEPHER was to be reinstalled after 24 November. At the same time, it was estimated that repairs to the IMAGUA CREST would be completed by 28 November 1962. The Military Sea Transport Service planned to deploy the IMAGUA FOAM and the IMAGUA SHEPHER to Fort Lauderdale and the IMAGUA CREST to Savannah where she would be used in conjunction with the previously leased CAL-AGRO¹⁵². These four commercial LST's were eventually used to transport a portion of the equipment and personnel of the 1st Armored Division from Fort Lauderdale to Da Nang, Texas, during the roll-up of forces resulting from the stand-down in readiness conditions.¹⁵³

Assaulting of Deep Water Fording Kits

(C) A major logistical problem, closely connected with the weight limitations of the allocated amphibious assault shipping, was that of providing sufficient deep water fording kits for the tracked and wheeled vehicles to be landed over the beaches during the assault phase of the operations. Despite the weight limitations of the four U. S. Navy-allocated LST's as described above, the Logistical Planning Group of Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, indicated that beach gradients in the objective area were such that, with one exception, a maximum of thirty inches of water would be encountered at all beach locations. They pointed out that U. S. Navy representatives had assured them of a "dry foot landing" in the objective area. If a landing were made at the one unhelpful spot, a runway pier carried by one of the four Navy LST's could be used. Consequently, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, decided that deep water fording kits were not necessary for the 1st Armored Division. Maj. Gen. Richard M. Meyer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USCOMARV, advised General Powell on 21 October that the XVIII Airborne Corps staff was being rather naive in thinking that they could land all of their vehicles through water that was not more than thirty inches deep. For that reason, he prepared a message to the Department of the Army stating that, as a precautionary measure, a requirement should be developed for at least enough waterproofing kits for one Armored and one Infantry division. This decision of General Meyer was borne out by the 1st Armored Division's After-Action Report

252.

(1) Msg (USCOMARV In M-218388), CNO to COMUSMACV, DOW 113000Z Nov 62, (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARV In M-219644), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, DOW 142100Z Nov 62, (SECRET). (3) Msg (USCOMARV In M-220444), COMUSMACV Area to USCOMARV, DOW 202128Z Nov 62.. (SECRET). All in DESUTE P&O Riv files.

253.

DP, USCOMARV DESLOG to CofS, 17 Dec 62, subj: Daily Summary of Movements -- Roll-Up (U), AFLOG-NOV. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DESLOG Admin Br files.

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which stated that the draft of the allocated LST's when combat loaded, coupled with the selected beaches in the objective area, militated against a dry beach operation and would force a time consuming floating causeway operation.¹³⁴

✓ As a result of General Meyer's inquiry, the U. S. Army Tank and Automotive Command informed USCOMARMC at the beginning of November that no depot stocks of kits existed for either the M44 tank or the 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer, thus only seven kits were available for the 154-mm. self-propelled howitzer, and that only one existed for the M44 tank. 7 Nov. November the 1st Armored Division commander requested authorization to requisition sufficient deep water landing kits to equip all of Task Force CHARLIE. These kits were needed by the division for use during the proposed amphibious training exercises and would be used to equip elements of the task force for actual execution of Operation Plan 116. USCOMARMC tried to get these kits from its own resources and a good many were uncovered, with the majority located at Fort Story, Virginia, and Fort Hood, Texas, where they had been positioned for training exercises scheduled during the summer of Calendar Year 1963. USCOMARMC immediately directed the transfer of all available kits at Fort Story and Fort Hood to the 1st Armored Division. Upon review of records taken, USCOMARMC pointed out that 173 of the required 228 tank kits were available and that the U. S. Army Materiel Command had been requested to procure the remaining 47. There were no available assets on hand for either tank recovery vehicles or for the 105-mm. self-propelled howitzer -- kits for these would have to be obtained through time consuming local procurement actions. The Quartermaster Center at Fort Lee indicated that sufficient assets were on hand to meet the requirements for 129 truck kits. In general, it appeared to the USCOMARMC logistical planners that considerable shortages would exist, in an assessment of assets. By 21 November, a sufficient number of the various kits were on hand to conduct partial training in some units, but not enough to equip the entire Task Force CHARLIE. 25 In response to the USCOMARMC

134.

(1) Reg ATLOS-3-387734, CG USCOMARMC to CG's XVIII Abn Corps and USATTC, DTG 202002Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files. (2) USARLANT RMC Daily Briefing, 31 Oct 62, pp. 17-18. (TOP SECRET). In AG TF Com. (3) Hq. XVIII Abn Corps, The Role of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Cuban Springs, 1962 (U). Part II, p. 5. Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSTH RMC Br files.

135.

(1) Reg AD-11-62-61-ARDA-OC (USCOMARMC to M-221011), CG, 1st Arm Div, to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 171518Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files. (2) USARLANT RMC Daily Briefing, 31 Oct 62, pp. 17-18; and 21 Nov 62, pp. 13-14. (TOP SECRET). In AG TF Com. (3) USCOMARMC DCSTH RMC Briefing Notes, 21 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH Admin Br files.

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request for procurement of sufficient kits to equip both an Armored and an Infantry division, the U. S. Army Materiel Command on 13 November, directed its subordinate Mobility Command to initiate procurement actions. These kits would be available not only to support pertinent contingency plans but to support training exercises for the divisional units.¹²⁴

Differences Concerning the Roll-on, Roll-off Vessels

125. Ten years before the Cuban Crisis, the Department of the Army had developed plans for specialized shipping which would meet its requirement for strategic deployment of ready forces. Transportation Corps planners were high in their praise of the Roll-on, Roll-off type of vessel which would permit the loading and discharging of mobile combat and tactical equipment in a matter of hours rather than days. These ships were designed to operate under rather standard conditions using conventional port berths or for off-shore discharge by mating with appropriate lighters.¹²⁷ For these reasons, USCOMBAC logistical planners had included the use of the two existing Roll-on, Roll-off vessels, the USS COMET and USS TARTAN, and their companion U. S. Army Beach Discharge Lighter (BDL), the JOHN V. B. PAGE.

126. a. Limitations to Off-Shore Discharge Operations. Experience gained by U. S. Army, Europe, in MOEX operations off the coast of France which involved both the USS COMET and the U. S. Army BDL JOHN V. B. PAGE, as well as tests conducted by the U. S. Army Transportation Research Command, proved that the USS COMET could not be unloaded off-shore during moderate or worse weather. At the conclusion of MOEX Operation No. 11 held during October 1959 at Les Sables d'Olonne, France, the Commanding Officer, 11th Transportation Terminal Command C, included among his lessons learned the fact that the U. S. Army BDL JOHN V. B. PAGE was unable to mate with the USS COMET in heavy seas and large swells. As a result of his experience, he recommended that an alternate protected anchorage be selected in advance if anticipated weather and sea conditions might affect the marriage of the two vessels.¹²⁸ Yet three years later, despite the widespread distribution of

124.

Msg (USCOMBAC In 8-120846), CG USAMC to CG MOCOM and CG USCOMBAC, POS 132345Z Nov 62, (CONFIDENTIAL). In SCOUTS PWG Div files.

127.

OGCOT DA Hist Reel Off, Lesson, A Test of Army Contingency Planning (U), 25 Nov 58, pp. 11-13. (SECRET).

128.

Msg, 15th T Bn (Term) and Hq, 11th TDC S, "Final Report, MOEX 921, 19-27 Oct 59," p. 1, (OFFUSE). In USA Trans Sch Library.

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the NODIC reports, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps indicated to USCOMSAC that this information had been made known to him and his staff only recently on an informal basis. Acting on the recommendation for an alternate protected anchorage, he requested 3-day authority for the Commander of Task Force 113 to divert the USS COMET, the U. S. Army M1 JOSS T, O, PAIR, and the two LST's carrying elements of the 1st Battalion, 68th Armor, from the amphibious assault area at Tarara Beach to Marjal Bay, if conditions warranted the move. In answer to this request, the Commander, U. S. Navy Atlantic Amphibious Force (COMPHILANT), indicated that such a decision would be made at the proper time by the Commander of the U. S. Navy Western Support Group -- amphibious Group 11 -- through the XVIII Airborne Corps Tactical Logistics Command (TALCOG) which would be located on his flagship. 139

~~(S)~~ At the end of the Lebanon Crisis in 1958, the Bremerhaven Port of Submarine, U. S. Army Europe, recommended that future Roll-on, Roll-off vessels be designed to accommodate all types of wheeled and tracked military equipment to include the newer large size tanks. The following year the Military Sea Transport Service secured the USS TAURUS as a second Roll-on, Roll-off vessel which was regularly scheduled on the Roll-on, Roll-off trailer run between New York and France but was practically useless in this same capacity for combat operations. Because the USS TAURUS had no internal ramps between decks, permanent dockside unloading ramps were provided at both the Brooklyn Army Terminal and the St. Nazaire Army Terminal in France. In off-shore discharge operations the lack of internal ramps required that cargo be discharged directly from the decks of the vessel. In order to assure a capability for off-shore discharge of at least the cargo loaded on the main and mezzanine decks of the USS TAURUS, it was necessary to provide a properly positioned and secured forty-ton trailer crane aboard the vessel. Consequently, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander recommended that, prior to proceeding to Savannah, Georgia, the USS TAURUS be sailed to Hampton Roads Army Terminal where a proper crane from either the 285th or 117th Transportation Companies (Terminal Service) would be made available for this requirement, an action completed on 27 October 1962. 140

~~(S)~~ b. Loading Difficulties at Savannah. The USS COMET arrived in Savannah on 28 October and began preparations to preload the equipment of the

139.

(1) Mag (USCOMSAC In 3-1877), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG USCOMSAC/ COMPHILANT, DTG 171805Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMSAC In 3-1899), COMPHILANT to COMPHILANT, DTG 201920Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Con.

140.

(1) Mag (USCOMSAC In 9-216037), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 370430Z Oct 62. (SECRET). In DCSTATE Rld Sys files. (2) PHILANT SOC Daily Briefing, 30 Oct 62, pp. 11-12. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Con.

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1st Battalion (Medium Tank), 19th Armor. It was at this time that the discovery was made that decks number 3 and 4 had a limited ceiling and that neither tanks nor Tg-top crucks could be loaded in that area. This resulted in loading the tanks on the weather decks of the vessel rather than on the lower decks. At a dockside offloading rehearsal between the USNS COMET and the U. S. Army 304 COMM B. B. PAGE held at Savannah on 4 November, several major problem areas were revealed. First of all, the loading of heavy tank equipment on the weather decks made the ship so top heavy that the master of the vessel announced that he would not, on his own responsibility, put to sea until the condition was rectified. After a close study of several possibilities for lowering the load's center of gravity, a recommendation was made that the T&B periscope and guard be removed from the capola of the M&S&I tank, a solution which unfortunately would destroy the zero and brought on the .50 caliber machine guns on the tanks.

✓ The USNS COMET's limitations in regard to deck ceilings were revealed four years earlier when the vessel transported the 1st Battalion (Medium Tank), 19th Armor, from Bremerhaven, Germany, to Beirut, Lebanon, during the Lebanon Crisis of 1958. At the end of that operation, the chief criticism of the USNS COMET made by the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation was this same lack of headroom on the lower decks which prevented full use of the vessel's roll-on, roll-off capabilities by the tanks of the 1st Battalion. Unfortunately, this knowledge, learned the hard way at the time of the Lebanon Crisis, evidently was not available to the planning staff of the 8TH Airborne Corps.

✓ Still another difficulty arose during the preloading exercise at Savannah. The heavy load placed on the USNS COMET resulted in the vessel lying eighteen inches too low in the water to carry her stern ramp with the U. S. Army 304 PAGE. During the offloading rehearsal described above, an expedient of placing four tanks on the after deck of the PAGE was used but would not be feasible in an actual off-shore discharge under combat conditions. Representatives of the U. S. Army Atlantic Transportation Terminal Command recommended that fuel be removed from the COMET's after fuel tanks. While this would succeed in raising the vessel some twenty-four inches at the stern, it further aggravated the vessel's top-heavy condition. This solution, moreover, was dependent upon how far the ship would be required to steam before refueling and was completely contrary to the ship's current orders. The only possible solution for lightening the vessel's load was the omission

361

(1) OCOFT DE RICE RICH OFF, Lebanon, A Test of Army Sustainability Planning (U), 25 Nov 58, pp. 20-22. (SECRET). (2) MARSHAL RICE Div, The U. S. Army Tank Force in Lebanon (U), 1958, pp. 34-25. (SECRET). (3) UNARMED BNC Daily Briefing, 30 Oct 62, pp. 13-12. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Con.

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of some additional vehicles from the first increment of the 16 Battalion, 89th Armor. At the same time, the offloading rehearsal uncovered the fact that the ship's crew was not very adept at handling the heavy lifting gear. During the rehearsal, skilled commercial stevedores assisted and instructed the crew in this operation. A decision was quickly made to assign eight skilled heavy boom operators to the ship's complement from the U. S. Army Transportation Center at Fort Rucker, Virginia.²⁸² These problems did result in a recommendation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USCOMARMC, that the Roll-on, Roll-off ships be eliminated from future operations of this sort since they did not seem to be adaptable to tactical operations of an amphibious assault.²⁸³

Status of Landing Craft Replacements

(S) Landing craft replacements for the beach units involved in the assault operations and required for later rear-the-beach landing of resupply operations were available only at the Charleston Army Depot, South Carolina. A review of this equipment replacement problem, directed by the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, determined by 18 October that the Charleston Depot had a total of thirty-one Landing Craft, Utility (LCU), on hand for possible replacement action, with only one in an operational condition, and this one was already on orders for shipment to U. S. Army, Europe. The Charleston Depot had an in-house maintenance capability for placing three landing craft into operation in a period of from two to three weeks. This rebuild period might possibly be shortened if the craft were carefully selected for this purpose on the basis of the least amount of rehabilitation necessary. The remainder of the landing craft would have to be processed by commercial contract with a time frame of five to six weeks for complete rebuild.²⁸⁴ Since rebuild actions were predicated upon commencement of hostilities, no action was taken in regard to the landing craft since GENLANT Operation Plan 316 was never executed.

Availability of a Floating Depot

(S) Because the problem of providing floating depots to meet emergency situations in various parts of the world was under discussion at the Department

²⁸²

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-118348), CO 2d Bn, 89th Armor, to CG 14 1st Bde, Ft. Benning, Ga., DTG 080310Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-118439), CO 2d Bn, 89th Armor, to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 041335Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCBUTN 890 Div files.

²⁸³

See below, pp. 234 - 235.

²⁸⁴

CHARLANT ROC Daily Briefing, 18 Oct 62, p. 13. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Gon.

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of the Army level during the latter part of 1963, it naturally received attention from USCIBMAC in relation to the Cuban Crisis. A meeting was held on 29 October between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USCIBMAC, and representatives of the U. S. Army Supply and Maintenance Command, the 5th Logistical Command, and XVIII Airborne Corps which reviewed the supply schedules and made arrangements for a floating depot to be used during the Cuban emergency. The conference decided that two vessels would be required for this purpose and that they would be outloaded from the ports of Texas City and Galveston, Texas. The floating depot vessels were scheduled to arrive at Mariel Harbor, Cuba, on D-plus-3 days with a stock consisting of five days supply of Classes I, III, and IIIA items. Supplies contained in the floating depot were to be furnished from Resupply Increment Number Thirteen, originally scheduled to arrive in the objective area on D-plus-13 days.

Accountability for Aerial Delivery Equipment

Based on requirements data developed by the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, and approved by the Department of the Army, depots of the Defense Supply Agency and U. S. Army supply systems shipped considerable quantities of heavy drop air items to installations and Intermediate Staging Bases in support of Operations Plan 318. As early as 1 November, USCIBMAC directed the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, to give this equipment his careful attention in order to prevent disappearance, deterioration, or damage. The critical nature of the items made essential their maximum recovery and return to the depot system. The Commanding General, USCIBMAC, stated that no authority had been given to retain any of these items in excess of authorized allowances once the operation was completed.

By mid-November the Commanding General, Third Army, pointed out that, while Department of the Army and USCIBMAC were then working out detailed accounting procedures for the items in question, they were actually on loan from the landing depots to the units for which they were intended. He recommended that action be taken to formalize the shipments as a loan of depot stock fund-owned property to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as assigned inventory and subsequent issues on loan as temporarily in use to the units involved. He further pointed out that, in any event, reimbursement for any loss, damage, or consumption would be required from some designated station which, most probably, would be Fort Bragg. The Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, on the other hand, took immediate exception to the recommendation since the stock in question was located at the various Army Staging

293

USARLANT EOC Daily Briefing, 30 Oct 62, pp. 13-14 (TOP SECRET).
In AC TS Com.

294

Reg 303046, GS USCIBMAC to GS 2d Log Cnd, DTG 001348Z Nov 62. Sp. 1.
(TOP SECRET) In AC TS Com.

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Area Commands, and not under the control of Fort Bragg. Any of the items, moreover, would not be used by XVIII Airborne Corps but rather by the Peninsula Base Command in support of Task Force 173. For these reasons, he recommended that accounting responsibility for the items in question be given to the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, and that the items be further hand-receipted to the appropriate Army Staging Area Commands.²⁶⁷ This matter was settled a short time later by the stand-down in readiness conditions which permitted the return of the items to the depot system.

Readiness Status of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)

✓ Because of the consideration given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the use of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) as a back-up reserve for Operation Plan 316,²⁶⁸ USCOMMAC forwarded the unit's Operational Readiness Report to Department of the Army on 21 November 1962. This report indicated that the division had completed pertinent Army Training Tests under the READ concept and that it had attained a satisfactory state of operational readiness commensurate with certain personnel and equipment shortages. Specific equipment shortages in certain areas had a significant bearing upon the division's actual operational readiness. For example, the Aviation Battalion, the Air Cavalry Troop, and the Brigade Aviation Platoon were not considered operational because of equipment shortages. The ratings of certain divisional units, moreover, included the relatively low scores of C-4 and C-3 in repair parts. Despite these limiting factors, the Commanding General, USCOMMAC, did feel that the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) could assume a STRAC mission providing that Department of the Army would accept the limitations. At the same time, he pointed out that assignment of this division to the Operation Plan 316 Troop List would require that it be brought to full operational status, a step which could not be accomplished from resources available to USCOMMAC without depleting the equipment already assigned to other high priority units.²⁶⁹ While the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by mid-November, remarked the 1st Infantry Division for future augmentation of Operation Plan 316, the Department of the Army reiterated its position that the division's supply priorities would not

267.

(1) Msg (USCOMMAC In M-220494), CG Third Army to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DDC 220202 Nov 62, (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg (USCOMMAC In M-2207100, CG XVIII Abn Corps to CG USCOMMAC and CG Third Army, DTG 221703Z Nov 62. (SECRET) Both in RCHUTE P&G Div files.

268.

See above, pp. 26 - 28.

269.

Msg, CG USCOMMAC to RCHQGS DA, DTG 211700Z Nov 62. Op. 1. (SECRET) In RCHUTE P&G Div files.

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be raised. The Commanding General, USCOMARMC, repeated his request on 24 November that supply priorities be increased for the divisions in order to bring it up to the readiness status established for other forces under the operations plan. This request still had not been answered by Department of the Army at the time that the stand-down in readiness conditions occurred, thereby lessening the urgency of this action. 270

Ordnance Support Requirements -- Peninsula Base Command

✓ The planned amphibious exercises for Task Force CHARLIE using Port Lauderdale (Fort Everglades), Florida, as an outloading port created a maintenance problem for the Peninsula Base Command which had not been foreseen by the planning staffs. A planned density of 100 tracked vehicles and approximately 300 wheeled vehicles created a requirement for maintenance support on a continuing basis. Because the Port Lauderdale area contained no ordnance support other than that assigned to the armored units, the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, requested the attachment of a forward support platoon of an Ordnance direct support company to his command. The selected unit would have to carry a parts load commensurate with the planned density of vehicles. Within three days USCOMARMC selected one Direct Support Platoon (paragraph 10, TOE 9-72) of the 618th Ordnance Company (Direct Support) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, for this mission and added it to the troop list of forces supporting Task Force 123 in the Florida area. The Commanding General, Third Army, was directed to bring the unit up to strength in both personnel and equipment to include the spare parts for the planned vehicle density and prepare it for movement within seventy-two hours. 271

Clothing Problems

✓ At the time that Task Force CHARLIE and other elements of the 1st Armored Division were ordered into their pre-positioned location at Fort Stewart, it was assumed that they would be there for only a short period of time before deploying into the objective area and the personnel were limited in the clothing authorized for shipment. By 27 October, however, the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, authorized the 1st Armored Division commander to ship such individual winter-type and garrison-type clothing for all troops at Fort Stewart as he deemed necessary. Clothing was to be shipped with the last elements of the division leaving Fort Hood. The USCOMARMC commander pointed

270.

Reg 303875, CG USCOMARMC to DCSOPS DA, DTG 241901Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AD TS Cn.

271.

(1) Reg (USCOMARMC In M-210908), CG PAC to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 140632Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Reg 303662, CG USCOMARMC to CG Third Army, DCS 192026Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSOPS PAC Div files.

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out that if Operation Plan 314 were implemented by that time, winter clothing for Task Force CHARLIE need not be shipped unless the division commander so desired. At the same time, General Powell authorized the 1st Armored Division to ship the same types of clothing for units in the On-call Echelon, as well as for other divisional elements which might be remaining at Fort Stewart for a longer period of time.²¹²

✓ Related personnel on temporary duty in the Support Area -- the state of Florida -- of Operation Plan 314 were in much the same condition regarding clothing, since they moved into the area rapidly and without the normal alert time. The conditions surrounding the shuffling of troop units, moreover, were such that individuals could not be properly equipped at their home stations. Since the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, considered the khaki summer uniform essential for maintaining an acceptable soldierly image during the emergency period, he requested authority for, and the Department of the Army approved, a gratuitous issue of one complete summer khaki uniform -- shirt and trousers -- to all troops located in the support area. USCOMSAC estimated requirements for this purpose were 6,000 sets of trousers and shirts.²¹³

Communications Problems

✓ One of the major problems in the Forward Area -- the state of Florida --²¹⁴ was the provision of an adequate communications net for Headquarters, USARLANT Forward. For example, that headquarters on 27 October requested the provision of three circuits (two telephone and one classified teletype) from its headquarters area to each base within the forward area. By 6 November only one telephone circuit had been provided to each of the following staging commands: Sanford Naval Air Station and MacDill, McCoy, Patrick, and Tyndall Air Force Bases. As the Chief of Staff, USARLANT Forward, pointed out at that time, the operational capability of the forward headquarters was dependent upon a completely responsive communications system. This deficiency in communications seriously affected the headquarters' operational readiness. At the end of the operation, the Chief of Staff, USARLANT Forward, indicated that the major problem in developing a proper communications net

212.

Reg 362313, CG USCOMSAC to CG 1st Arm Div, DTG 270429Z Oct 62.
(TOP SECRET) In AS TS Con.

213.

Reg A1L06-SN-303040, CG USCOMSAC to DA, DTG 012131Z Nov 62. (SECRET).
In DCSITE P&O Div files.

214.

The state of Florida was considered both the Forward Area and the Support Area for USARLANT's contingency planning for the Cuban area.

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for that headquarters covered the broad fields of organization, personnel, and equipment. He pointed out, first of all, that the organization which supported USARLANT Forward was put together from all over USCOMSAC. This procedure was not only wasteful of time, equipment, and manpower but, in many instances, it disrupted communications at the stations which furnished the units in question. Not only was the provisional communications system wasteful of manpower, but it did not even provide the properly trained manpower where it was needed. For example, telephone operators were not furnished in the required numbers and so had to be trained on-the-job or in company areas. Then too, much unnecessary, critical communications equipment was brought along with the units while other equipment which was sorely needed in the forward area was not furnished in sufficient quantities. In addition, certain items of equipment which were furnished such as radios, did not possess the required characteristics. As a result, satisfactory radio communications were not established during the secure operation. It was the considered conclusion of the USARLANT Forward staff that alternate means of communications -- i.e., other than land lines -- would have to be established. It was evident in this regard that a single act of subversion at Rosendahl Air Force Base could destroy all the land lines leading from that installation. USARLANT Forward was in the process of developing such an alternate means of communication using a combination of radio and microwave relay, when the troop redeployment was ordered by higher headquarters. The radio equipment which was required to provide these backup communications, however, had to be obtained from several services within the USCOMSAC area.²⁷⁵ This was considered to be a continuing problem; the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, at the time of directed troop redeployment, pointed out that the prepositioning of the communications net in the forward area was a matter of urgency.²⁷⁶

Personnel Problems

General Personnel Factors²⁷⁷

✓ The U. S. Army Strategic Capabilities Plan (ASCP) required the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, to maintain assigned units of the United States

275.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC In M-218491), USARLANT Fwd to CG USCOMSAC, DTC 042220Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files. (2) Ltr, CofS USARLANT Fwd to CENARLANT, 3 Dec 62, subj: After-Action Report, ARCS, pp. 3-4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSTH P&O Div Opn Br files.

276.

See below, pp. 219 - 220.

277.

This section is based on: Tab B, subj: "Additional Personnel Discussion," to Staff Study, Incl to DP, DCSTH to DCDSF and CofS, 8 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' Letter to General Ewell, dtd 10 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTH P&O Div files.

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Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) of a prescribed state of readiness as a matter of priority in accordance with the policies and requirements prescribed by the Department of the Army. This same plan defined the minimum personnel maintenance criteria which had been established for these units as not less than 90 percent deployable strength for STRAC I units and 85 percent for STRAC II units. Although approximately one-half of the units involved in Operation Plan 316 had reached, or slightly exceeded, this level by 10 September 1961, a shortage of resources had resulted in the bulk of the remainder being at or above only 50 percent deployable strength. Priority in hard skill Military Occupational Specialist (MOS) which were in short supply worldwide -- particularly aviators and aviation maintenance and signal operations specialists -- had been given by higher authority to units committed to Southeast Asia at the expense of those assigned to Operation Plan 316. USCOMBAC's personnel priority was lower than that of both U. S. Army, Europe, and Eighth U. S. Army in the Far East. Consequently, the remaining resources were apportioned in favor of these latter commands.

(U) When Department of the Army directed the highest priority for Operation Plan 316 units in mid-October, Headquarters, USCOMBAC, in compliance, directed the MOS Army commands to earmark troops for possible attachment on a temporary duty basis to the units in question. The Department of the Army directive also provided that the minimum personnel maintenance criteria for the units in question were to be 90 percent deployable strength. USCOMBAC directed the Army to begin actual movement of the earmarked individuals on 13 October. Initially, all individuals within USCOMBAC jurisdiction and not already assigned to such units were considered as available for this temporary duty. Subsequently, certain exceptions were made to this rule.

(U) USCOMBAC had exhausted all its possible resources by 25 October since it had already placed some 1,300 officers and 4,000 enlisted men on temporary duty. As a result the Command requested assistance from Department of the Army on that date, specifically asking for an additional 1,400 enlisted men for the 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division. Subsequently, the requirement placed on Department of the Army was raised to approximately 150 officers and 3,000 enlisted men. Initially, the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO), Department of the Army, was of the opinion that USCOMBAC possessed sufficient resources of personnel not committed to Operation Plan 316 to meet the additional requirements. USCOMBAC, on the other hand, successfully pointed out that limitations had been placed on the Command's resources as a result of requirements imposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain those units which were committed to other high priority operations plans, the personnel of which could not be used to meet additional personnel requirements for Operation Plan 316. The Department of the Army eventually assigned 13 officers and allocated 3,200 enlisted men against the USCOMBAC requirements for Operation Plan 316; all of the enlisted men were actually assigned to Operation Plan 316 units. An additional 137 officers were earmarked for possible temporary duty by Department of the Army in the event that they were needed.

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✓ At the end of the operation, the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, felt that his Command had made the most judicious use of the limited personnel resources which were available. Of the 368 units involved in the Operation Flare, all but 33 were at, or above, 90 percent deployable strength on the last day of November. These below this figure included Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, and Medical units whose specialist or professional elements had been earmarked but had not as yet joined their organizations. In addition -- with the exception of these hard-skill Military Operating Specialties which were in world-wide short supply -- USCOMARAC was able to support concurrently not only the units assigned to Operation Flare 316 but those assigned to other high priority operation plans, as well.

Minimum Personnel Strengths

✓ While many personnel matters were of great concern to USCOMARAC, one of the most pressing at the outset of the operations was that of getting enough fillers to enable units to deploy to the objective area with their minimum deployable strengths. A total of 263 combat and combat support units -- exclusive of Third Army Support Flare units -- were committed to the Cuban operations and USCOMARAC in conjunction with Department of the Army established the minimum deployable strength for these units as 90 percent of authorized strength. At the beginning of the crisis, only 135 units out of the total of 263 met this minimum deployable criteria. An additional 26 units were at 85 percent of authorized strength; 24 units were in the 80 through 84 percent bracket; and 24 units were actually below the 80 percent level. The most important units in this latter category were those of the 2d Infantry Division which were scheduled to participate both in the Surface Echelon of the Operation Flare and in the Floating Reserve. The Commanding General, Third Army, notified USCOMARAC on 15 October that three battle groups of the 2d Infantry Division were in the 70 percent bracket with the 2d Battle Group, 1st Infantry, standing at 71.1 percent. USCOMARAC immediately furnished over 400 fillers to bring them as close to minimum deployable strength as possible.²⁷⁸

✓ While the divisions were customarily authorized to deploy with any assigned overstrength because of the severe casualties expected in the initial airborne assault,²⁷⁹ the actual deployable strength of the 3d and

278.

(1) Briefing for Dad Sub-Com, House Com on Appropri. by Mon. E. E. Powell, CG USCOMARAC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation, Slide #31. (TOP SECRET). (2) Reg (USCOMARAC to M-113927), CG Third Army to CG USCOMARAC, DCG 1345905 Oct 62, with pencilled memo, and by Lt. Col. J. A. Gorden, USCOMARAC INOPER Plans Div. Op. 4. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG 15 Com.

279.

Reg 301849, CG USCOMARAC to CG EPTIL Aka Corps, DCG 1400345 Oct 62, Op. 4. (SECRET). In INOPER Study Div files.

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101st Airborne Division was considerably less than the combined assigned and attached strengths, a fact which proved a point made earlier that there sometimes was a considerable difference between authorized strengths, present for duty strengths, and deployable strengths. To bring home this example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, USCOMARAC, compiled a list of the major participating units -- along with other division-sized units -- on 3 November, contrasting their combined authorized/attached strengths with their deployable strengths, as follows:²⁸³

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ASSIGNED and/or TOY STRENGTHS</u>	<u>DEPLOYABLE STRENGTHS</u>
82d Airborne Division	11,751	11,320
101st Airborne Division	12,103	11,313
1st Inf Div	9,349	8,929
2d Infantry Division	13,333 ^{a/}	12,832
1st Armored Division	18,483	15,311
B Co (2d Tank), 66th Armored Bn	118	107
1st Battalion, 32d Field Artillery	383	353
2d Battalion, 11th Field Artillery	300	481
2d Battalion (Med Tank), 69th Armor	748 ^{b/}	749
34th Artillery Group	133	128
32d Artillery Group	118	111
8th Battalion (Med Tank), 34th Armor	786	708
3d Battalion, 16th Field Artillery	312	482
2d Armored Division	14,314	12,784
4th Infantry Division	12,422	11,039
5th Infantry Division	18,883	14,793

^{a/} Includes strength of 2d Battalion (Med Tank), 69th Armor

^{b/} Assigned to 2d Infantry Division

✍ Vigorous action on the part of both USCOMARAC and the Department of the Army brought about a considerable improvement in the deployable strength status of the units concerned. This improvement came mainly from the attachment, on a temporary duty basis, of some 1,200 officers and 8,000 enlisted men in accordance with previous plans. By 13 November, a total of 310 units were above the established minimum of 90 percent of authorized strength. Of the 33 units which were still below the prescribed minimum standard on that date, only 7 were below 80 percent of authorized strength. By the end of November an additional 45 units supporting the Operation Plan

120

Reg 103107, CG USCOMARAC to USAFLANT Pwd, DTG 081004Z Nov 63. Sp. 4.
(CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSPER Heavy Div files.

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were in the Forward Area bringing the total number of units involved in the entire operation to 308. As of 27 November 1962 the deployable strengths of all but 33 of the 308 units were at or above 90 percent. As was noted earlier, many of these units were Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, or Medical units whose professional or specialized elements had been earmarked but had never joined the units.¹⁸¹

Filler Personnel

~~(S)~~ As early as 18 October USCOMSARC alerted the six COMUS Armies and the Military District of Washington to be prepared to provide filler personnel for all units involved in Operation Plan 318 so as to bring them up to maximum specified deployable strengths. The commanders concerned were to be prepared to furnish fillers originally on a temporary duty basis. Certain rules regarding deployment qualifications were relaxed on 21 October when USCOMSARC changed criteria pertaining to the expiration of term of service (ETS) of enlisted personnel to permit the use of any and all men who could complete twenty days of service in an objective area prior to return to the United States for separation. Actual fill of the Operation Plan 318 units began on 23 October when the Commanding General, USCOMSARC, directed his Army commanders to place all personnel, who had been earmarked in compliance with his previous directives, on temporary duty with the appropriate units. All such personnel were instructed to report immediately to the selected unit. The Army commanders were additionally instructed to fill troop list units to maximum deployable strengths and to make every effort to fill them to 100 percent of authorized deployment strengths as indicated in Annex B of Operation Plan 318. At the same time, they were authorized to recall personnel from leave and from temporary duty status with the exception of those attending schools. A few days later, USCOMSARC pointed out to the Army commanders that any filler personnel who were returned to home station for expiration of term of service were to be immediately replaced in the same unit by equally qualified fillers from resources available to the respective commander. This method of filler replacement was necessary in order to maintain deployment strength and operational capability of those units receiving fillers.¹⁸²

181.

(1) Briefing for Ref Sub-Com, Issues Com on Approp, by Gen H. A. Powell, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation, Slide #32. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Tab B, subj: "Additional MOSPEL Discussion," to Ref Study, Incl to DF, DCSUTH to DCSMT and Ce25, 5 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 29 Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSUTH NSG Div Files.

182.

(1) Msg 301180, CG USCOMSARC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies and NW, DTG 170600Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 301287, CG USCOMSARC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies, NW and XVIII Air Corps, DTG 211716Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com. (3) Msg 303410, CG USCOMSARC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies and NW, DTG 230336Z Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (4) Msg 303237, CG USCOMSARC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies, DTG 061832Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTH NSG Div Files.

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(S) a. Personnel Exceptions -- In order to preclude personnel turbulence in those units committed to the Troop List of Operation Plan 316, Headquarters, USCOMMAC, requested the indefinite suspension of certain personnel actions, including duty with civilian components, overseas assignment except with the unit to which the person was assigned, recruiting duty, reassignment for other than compassionate reasons, re-enlistment options which would lead to reassignment, and curtailment of the tour of duty to attend a civilian school or for seasonal employment.²⁸³ The Department of the Army relieved all personnel in units listed in STMAC Operation Plan 316 from complying with overseas assignment instructions with the exception of those already in receipt of reassignment orders or alerted for reassignment to U. S. Army, Pacific, to include Hawaii, Eighth U. S. Army, U. S. Army Ryukyu Islands, U. S. Army Japan, Vietnam, any Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG), or as Military Attaches Personnel, however, who had already departed their home stations or who had taken preparatory actions which would cause a personal hardship if their orders were revoked -- e.g., sale of house or movement of household goods -- were directed to comply with their current reassignment orders. These exceptions were reaffirmed to the 1st Armored Division on 25 October, even though that unit was pressing for any advantage which would enable it to reach 100 percent deployable strength.²⁸⁴

(S) At the time that the COMUS Army commanders were alerted to prepare filler personnel for Operation Plan 316 units, USCOMMAC flatly prohibited them from including personnel of service schools or training centers in such actions. This stand was somewhat modified after the actual fall of the pertinent units had been initiated. The Commanding General, USCOMMAC, pointed out on 24 October that the continued operation of such and every service school was mandatory even during the current emergency. For that reason, no levies would be placed on any USCOMMAC-controlled school unless he had given specific instructions or prior approval of the action. Three days later, the Department of the Army entered the picture when they repeated the stand of USCOMMAC that the continuation of the Army School System was mandatory, and further, prohibited any levying of students or further levying against the facilities of the schools without prior approval by the Department, itself. Any exceptions to this directive which might be recommended by USCOMMAC would have to be submitted to Department of the Army on a by-name basis for individual action. This meant that any request for personnel attending a service school or for a member of one of the school faculties would have the

283.

Msg 302515, GS USCOMMAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 240101Z Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In COMUSMACV 260 Div files.

284

(1) Msg 302637, GS USCOMMAC to GS's First three South America and NWG, DTG 260555Z Oct 62. Sp. 4- (SECRET). (2) Msg 302641, GS USCOMMAC to GS 1st Arm Div, DTG 260008Z Oct 62. Sp. 4- (SECRET). Such is COMUSMACV 260 Div (11a).

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approval of both USCOMSAC and the Department of the Army. At the same time, the Department of the Army turned down a request by USCOMSAC for authority to levy students attending the current course at the Command and General Staff School. 283

✓ Six-month trainees under the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act were in many instances attached for training purposes to units assigned to the Operation Plan 316 Troop List. Shortly after pertinent units were alerted for movement, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, directed that all RFA personnel in this category be immediately relieved of attachment to such units and transferred to an appropriate non-participating unit or to non-participating elements of a larger unit. It was the desire of both USCOMSAC and the Department of the Army that the training of RFA personnel suffer a minimum of disruption even during the emergency period. 284

✓ b. Failure of USCOMSAC Resources. Before the end of October, USCOMSAC forwarded a request to the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, for approximately 1,500 personnel to fill specific Military Occupational Specialties which it had been unable to fill from its available resources and increased this number by 2,000 within the next few days. In answer to these requests, GPO pointed out that Department of the Army possessed negligible manpower resources outside of USCOMSAC to meet such needs. Before action could be determined on these requests a complete re-evaluation of the personnel status of all commands and units would have to be made on an Army-wide basis. Such a re-evaluation could not be made, however, until a complete report was received from Headquarters, USCOMSAC, as to the number of personnel placed on temporary duty to Operation Plan 316 units. In order to aid in this re-evaluation, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, pointed out to Department of the Army that he was committed to support not only Operation Plan 316 but also Operation Plans 320 and 321 and the Joint Defense Plan for the Florida Keys (JDP-FLAK). Definite deployment strengths for all units committed to the above-mentioned operations plans had been specified by the appropriate Joint or Combined Commander and directives had been issued which required USCOMSAC to maintain such minimum strengths. In addition to these limiting factors, General Powell reiterated the fact that Department of the Army itself had eliminated school personnel from consideration in this regard. He, as

285

(1) Mag 71816, CG USCOMSAC to CG Third Army, DTG 210100Z Oct 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag 718161, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies and HEM, DTG 230230Z Oct 62. (FORLSE). (3) Mag 938975, MCSOPS DA to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 311446Z Oct 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (4) Mag 303512, CG USCOMSAC to CG Third Army, DTG 130317Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCSFTR P&O Div files.

286.

Mag 303803, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies, DTG 280428Z Oct 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSFTR P&O Div files.

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Commanding General, USCOMARC, had taken every possible action within his authority to transfer available personnel to support his operational requirements. Moreover, at the time he was providing this information to Department of the Army, service schools, Army Training Centers, COMUS Army operations and uncommitted Strategic Army Force (STRAF) units were already operating on a marginal basis, particularly in the areas requiring those combat and combat support Military Occupational Specialties which USCOMARC had requested Department of the Army to furnish. Although the 1st Armored and 4th and 3rd Infantry Divisions were committed to other operation plans as indicated earlier, General Powell had reduced their present for duty strength to the minimum necessary to support the appropriate plans. All personnel made excess by these actions were transferred to other units. Department of the Army, on the other hand, seemed to have an idea that USCOMARC possessed an appreciable pool of uncommitted manpower. To refute this feeling, General Powell pointed out that the present for duty strength in most USCOMARC units was less than the total assigned strength of that unit and, what was more, deployable strength was even less than present for duty strength. Many individuals carried on morning reports as assigned to a particular unit did not meet the criteria established for filler replacement in the units committed to Operation Plan 316. Moreover, many categories of personnel assigned to USCOMARC units were not available to meet those requirements which that Command had asked the Department of the Army to provide. These particular categories included: personnel on leave or on travel status while to or from an overseas assignment; personnel on temporary duty to service schools; personnel with unrelated Military Occupational Specialties; those who were physically unqualified; personnel on leave to exempted overseas areas; personnel with a short period for expiration of term of service, and those who were already on temporary duty to units committed to Operation Plan 316. In General Powell's opinion, he had no further personnel resources available for use without sacrificing his mission or degrading it to an unacceptable degree.²⁸⁷ As was indicated earlier, Department of the Army recognized the validity of General Powell's arguments and made some attempts to meet the personnel requirements of the Command.

c. Professional Medical Personnel Professional medical personnel was one category which helped create serious problems during the Cuban Crisis. This category was in short supply not only to USCOMARC but also Army-wide, and the requirements to support Operation Plan 316 had to be met from this limited supply. As a result, when certain medical units were pre-positioned at Fort Stewart, Georgia,²⁸⁸ they were instructed to move only with assigned personnel

²⁸⁷.

(1) Msg 302190, CG USCOMARC to GPO DA, DTG 280118Z Oct 62, Gp. 4, (SECRET). (2) Msg 303003, CG USCOMARC to GPO DA, DTG 031716Z Nov 62, Gp. 4, (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Msg 303121, CG USCOMARC to GPO DA, DTG 030100Z Nov 62, Gp. 4, (CONFIDENTIAL). (4) Msg 321210, (USCOMARC In 8-217880), GPO DA to CG USCOMARC, DTG 031800Z Nov 62, Gp. 4, (CONFIDENTIAL). (5) Msg 303293, CG USCOMARC to GPO DA, DTG 080610Z Nov 62, Gp. 4, (CONFIDENTIAL). All in COMUSAR First Div Files.

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See below, p. 86.

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and informed that professional medical fillers would be attached to the particular units at the time that they received their port calls. Several of the more specialized medical units were directed to move, keep all professional personnel who would be provided only upon orders of USCOMSARC. 138 By early November, the shortage of medical people called for some drastic policies, particularly since those in the pre-positioned units were not being used to their full professional capabilities and since Operation Plan 318 was not being immediately implemented. The Commanding General, Peninsular Area Command, was directed on 10 November to return the maximum number of professional medical service personnel to their home stations as soon as possible. Excepted from this directive were all unit commanders, personnel on duty in Third Army fixed hospital facilities, and those required for medical support in Army group units and individuals at Ops Locks Air Force Base and at the various Army Staging Area Commands. It was also directed to consider the use of existing Air Force medical facilities for support of U. S. Army troops in the area which was supported by the 3d Field Hospital. All officers of the 46th and 62d Medical Detachments, to include the commander, and all anesthesiologists were to be immediately returned to their home stations. All personnel who were relieved of their current duties as a result of this directive were to be placed on a forty-eight hour alert status as soon as they reached their home station so that they would be available to join their proper units if necessary. 219

4. Replacement Packets. Originally the 7d Armored Division and the 3th Infantry Division (Mechanized) were directed to earmark certain individuals to be used as replacement packets for emergency conditions. The 7d Armored Division was to provide one Armor Overstrength Replacement Packet while the 3th Infantry Division was to provide two Infantry and one Artillery Overstrength Replacement Packets. The two divisions were informed by USCOMSARC on 13 October, that they were to continue to identify the earmarked packets as such, but that positively no action was to be taken to either alert or move the personnel in question. At the same time, both divisions were warned that the Commanding Generals of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, respectively, could not consider personnel of the two divisions for use as filler personnel to fill the requirements placed upon them by USCOMSARC. This directive was relaxed to a certain extent with regard to the 3th Infantry Division in that any overstrength personnel of that division could be used as fillers. This action seriously

138.

Reg 718418, CG USCOMSARC, to CG's Second, Third, and Fourth Armies, RTO 311828Z Nov 62. (OPLSARC). In DCSFOS P&O Div files

219.

Reg 393401, CG USCOMSARC to CG PAC, RTO 101545Z Nov 62. Cp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSFOS Pacar Div files.

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limited the capability of the Fourth and Fifth Army commanders to furnish the filler personnel required for support of Operation Plan 316.²⁹¹

✓ c. Use of STRAC Unit Personnel. Because of the limited manpower resources which were available for filler action to bring Operation Plan 316 units up to designated deployment strengths, the COMUS Army commanders very early in the campaign requested authority to use troops of STRAC units which were not committed to Operation Plan 316. During these initial stages, the Commanding General, Second Army, was given such authority.²⁹² On 11 November, on the other hand, a similar request from the Commanding General, Third Army, resulted in a limitation being placed on the use of such troops. At that time, General Powell directed that STRAC units which were not committed to Operation Plan 316 could not be levied beyond the prescribed minimum personnel maintenance standards.²⁹³

Replacement Policy for Operation Plan 316 Units

✓ A necessary adjunct to any plans which involved combat operations was a workable replacement policy to insure adequate numbers of properly trained personnel for the combat units. While the plans and supporting plans did make provisions for personnel replacements, certain revisions to that policy were necessary. The Commanding General, USCOMMAC, published his revised replacement policy on 13 October which provided that there would be no automatic shipment of replacements to the objective area and that Department of the Army would furnish replacements based on actual rather than on estimated losses. All requisitions for replacements, based on actual losses, were to be submitted by the Army Task Force Commander directly to the Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, with only an information copy to the headquarters of USCOMMAC and TRANSLANT Forward. All initial requisitions for replacements were to be submitted on D-plus-7-days with the actual replacements

291.

(1) Msg 301240, CG USCOMMAC to CG Fifth Army, DTG 210124Z Oct 62. Gp 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg 301241, CG USCOMMAC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 210125Z Oct 62. Gp 4. (SECRET). (3) Msg 302411, CG USCOMMAC to CG Fifth Army, DTG 220137Z Oct 62. Gp 4. (SECRET). (4) Msg 302412, CG USCOMMAC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 220138Z Oct 62. Gp 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCSPER Distr Div files.

292.

(1) Msg 3148G-PE 2400, (USCOMMAC In 2-214310), CG Second Army to CG USCOMMAC, DTG 191300Z Oct 62. Gp 1. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg 302415, CG USCOMMAC to CG Second Army, DTG 221302Z Oct 62. Gp 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSPER Distr Div files.

293.

Msg 303512, CG USCOMMAC to CG Third Army, DTG 131317Z Nov 62. Gp 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSPER Distr Div files.

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scheduled to begin arriving in the replacement staging area by D-plus-11-days. Subsequent requisitions were to be submitted every seven days thereafter but emergency requisitions could be submitted at any time. The Department of the Army agreed to provide an advance allocation of 1,000 replacements who could be applied toward the initial requisitions. The Commanding General, Third Army, was to establish and operate a staging area at Fort Benning to receive, process, and forward to the objective area those replacements which were provided by the Department of the Army, for which purpose the 90th Replacement Battalion of Fort Lewis, Washington, was made available to him. Within the objective area itself, the 14 Infantry Division Replacement Company was responsible for operating the required Replacement Center. 294

✓ This replacement policy was once again revised on 9 November to provide for some necessary refinements in the process and to take into consideration any changes in command jurisdictions, support responsibilities, etc. By that time it was decided that the advance allocation of 1,000 replacements to be provided by Department of the Army would be of representative combat Military Occupational Specialists. These men would be shipped to Fort Benning beginning on E-day and would be used to satisfy any requirements for emergency replacements then on hand with the remainder to be applied toward the initial requisitions. While the channels for submission of replacement requisitions remained the same, the time frame schedule was altered to provide for the submission of initial replacement requisitions on E-plus-1-day, with subsequent requisitions to be submitted on a daily basis thereafter. The Commanding General, Third Army, still retained the responsibility for establishing and operating a personnel replacement staging area at Fort Benning using the 90th Replacement Battalion. He was now, however, to receive, process, POR qualify, and forward replacements only to designated ports and airfields on the call of the Commanding General, Panama Base Command. The latter commander had the responsibility for issuing port calls to the appropriate commander -- either an Army Staging Area Command or the 80th Replacement Battalion -- for the movement of the replacement packages from the staging area to replacement units in the objective area. 295

Lack of Airborne Replacements

✓ As preparations went forward for the implementation of Operation Plan 318, great emphasis was placed upon the fill of the two airborne divisions and the provision of properly trained replacements during assault operations. The initial success of the assault phase depended upon these divisions which would provide a secure beachhead for the amphibious assault wave. Because of

294.

Reg 301468, CG USMACV to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 140034Z Oct 62 Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSER Distr Bw files

295

Reg 303364, CG USMACV to CG's PSC, Third Army, and XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 092048Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSER Distr Bw files.

the peculiar requirements of the airborne divisions, vacant positions could not be filled except by airborne-trained troops, a limitation repeated by Headquarters, USCOMBAC, on a number of occasions.¹⁹⁶ Early in November, when it became evident that the number of airborne volunteers in the Army Training Center was not sufficient to support the replacement requirements of USCOMBAC's airborne forces, General Powell directed his subordinate Army commanders to take immediate steps to encourage all eligible enlisted men to volunteer for airborne duty. To this end he established input goals for volunteer airborne training as follows: 3,300 during the month of November 1962, 3,800 during December, 3,300 during January 1963, 4,000 during February, and then 3,300 for each month from March through June of 1963. At the same time, USCOMBAC reviewed the personnel requirements and facilities of the Basic Airborne School and decided that it had the capacity to expand its current training load to 150 a week. When and if USCOMBAC noted that the trend in airborne volunteers showed an increase, orders would be taken to provide the additional space and people to support the anticipated increase in the training load. It was hoped that these actions, if made a matter of priority for all concerned, would provide adequate trained replacements for USCOMBAC's airborne forces.¹⁹⁷

Recommendations of FOR Qualifications

One of the major problems in connection with determining the deployable strength status of units participating in Operation Plan J16 was the application of Preparation for Overseas Replacement (FOR) qualification criteria. In order to permit the deployment of units as close to 100 percent of authorized strength as possible, criteria pertaining to Expiration of Term of Service was modified to permit deployment of all personnel who could complete at least twenty days in an objective area prior to return to the United States for repatriation.¹⁹⁸ This procedure, however, envisioned the implementation of the operation plan within a matter of a few days after the initial alert. As time passed, and the units remained on alert status, their requirement for reporting deployable criteria continued and became of more importance. Since the possibility of implementing the operation plan did not diminish, the short status of the units and the fact that deployment strength

196.

Msg 303112, CG USCOMBAC to CG Third Army, DTG 130311Z Nov 62 Gp 4 (CONFIDENTIAL) In DCSPER Distr Div files.

197.

(1) Msg 303171, CG USCOMBAC to CG Third Army, DTG 041624Z Nov 62, Gp 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg 303172, CG USCOMBAC to CG's First thru Sixth Armies and HQ, DTG 041623Z Nov 62, Gp 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSPER Distr Div files.

198.

Msg 303489, CG USCOMBAC to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 240036Z Oct 62, Gp 4. (SECRET) In DCSPER Distr Div files.

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had to be kept at the prescribed minimum, created problems for Headquarters, USCOMMAC. Even when the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a stepdown in readiness conditions and a return of all units to their home stations, the possibility remained that the plan still might be implemented. For that reason, USCOMMAC revised its policy for the computation of FOR qualifications for units committed to the Operation Plan affecting COMUS Army commanders on 23 November to use 28 December as the cut-off date for FOR qualification criteria until 15 December. If no post mail had been established for the participating units at that time, a cut-off date of 15 January would be used until 5 January, FOR qualification dates would be advanced in semi-monthly increments as required.³⁹⁹

Need for Recall of Reserve Personnel

As a result of the previously described Joint Chiefs of Staff plan for beefing up Operation Plan 314, CINCPAC recommended additional forces for inclusion in the troop list of the operation plan. Upon receiving the list of additional forces recommended for inclusion, the Commanding General, USCOMMAC, Informed Department of the Army that he had already exhausted those personnel resources which would be required to bring such additional units up to 80 percent deployment criteria. In all, the addition of the recommended units would require a total of 2,231 fillers, which USCOMMAC could not provide.⁴⁰⁰ Once again his ability to provide the filler replacements, which he indicated by grade and MOS, was practically nonexistent, since they could not be provided by USCOMMAC without seriously affecting the already marginal operational capabilities of service schools, Army Training Centers, and other essential service activities. In view of the numbers and criticality of the MOS's required, General Fowell requested that Department of the Army consider establishing a program for the recall of volunteer reservists to extend active duty. Such a program would be of material benefit in providing an additional source of technical skills, affording a reservist an opportunity to demonstrate his obligation to duty and country, and actively manifesting the "One-Army" concept. Once again the problem was overtaken by events and the lifting of the naval quarantine on 21 November lessened the need for additional troops in the operation plan.

³⁹⁹

Reg 303764, CG USCOMMAC to CG's First thru Sixth Areas, DTG 211240Z Nov 62. Cp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCPTF Distr Div files.

⁴⁰⁰

Reg 302421, CG USCOMMAC to DCPTF DA, DTG 170250Z Nov 62. Cp. 4. (SECRET). In DCPTF Distr Div files.

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Assignment of SABCOM Units

✓ The Army Air Defense units which USCOMARAC had to provide to augment the U. S. Continental Air Defense Command (CONRAD) in the Florida area, were not part of the troop list for Operation Plan 304. While these units remained assigned to the appropriate Army Command subordinate to USCOMARAC, they were attached for operational control to the U. S. Army Air Defense Command (SABADCOM). For example, the two SAM battalions -- the 6th Missile Battalion, 65th Artillery, and the 8th Missile Battalion, 13th Artillery -- along with their supporting units were assigned to the Second and Sixth Armies, respectively. At the time that they were first required for air defense missions in the Florida area, the respective Army commanders were directed to fill all existing unlisted vacancies in these units from all resources available to their commands with the exception that troops would not be taken from Operation Plan 304 units. Personnel were to be selected without reference to the status of the present assignment of their parent unit or their individual status other than sick, hospitalized, or on temporary duty outside the Army commander's jurisdiction. 304

✓ Once the units had passed to the operational control of the U. S. Army Air Defense Command, the question of replacements and filler replacement presented a problem. For example, on 4 November, the Commanding General, SABADCOM, notified USCOMARAC that, while the 13th Artillery Group was authorized sufficient personnel for the operation of a communications center, certain shortages existed which affected the accomplishment of the missions which he had assigned to the unit. He requested General Powell to take necessary action to fill any shortages in the 13th Artillery Group's personnel authorization which were required for full time operation of a communications center, to include replacement of individuals who did not possess a SECRET security clearance and who were not sufficiently trained. (He pointed out the existence of an inexperienced personnel situation which could only result in security compromises during the operation of a communications center.) 304 USCOMARAC concurred in this request on the grounds that the unit remained assigned to Second Army, and that it possessed sufficient personnel to carry out its assigned mission within Second Army. The request for replacement personnel resulted from the assignment of an additional mission by the Commanding General,

301

(1) Msg 302134, CG USCOMARAC to CG Second Army, 21 Oct 62. Gp. 4 (SECRET). (2) Msg 302134, CG USCOMARAC to CG Sixth Army, WFO 210200Z Oct 62, Gp. 4. (SECRET). (3) Msg 302465, CG USCOMARAC to CG Sixth Army, DCS 240300Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). All in DESPER Plain Day files.

302

Msg A3550-890 (USCOMARAC to M-318476), CG SABADCOM to CG USCOMARAC, DCS 042235Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DESPER Dues Day files.

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USARADCOM, and he, therefore, should furnish the additional personnel. This information was relayed to the U. S. Army Air Defense Command by Second Army on 16 November 1962.³⁰³

Problems with Combat-Ready Troops

(C) A serious problem soon arose with the airborne troops which were alerted for a possible air assault on the island of Cuba. As early as 16 October, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander notified General Powell that the troops of the two Airborne Divisions were at such a state of anticipation that the Division commanders were "having a hard time keeping the lid on the pot." In order to keep the airborne troops busy until such time as the operation plan was actually implemented, he recommended the conduct of local field exercises of a type which would not increase the load on the of the airborne units in excess of six hours or would not diminish the units' equipment readiness. For this purpose he requested that CINCLANT dispatch the Forward Air Control Parties and AMBICO³⁰⁴ teams to their posts with Corps headquarters and the headquarters of the two divisions just as they would in case Operation Plan 314 were implemented. These parties were required to report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky, not later than 0900 hours on 29 October for a seventy-two hour period. The Chief of Staff, USMACV, gave approval to this recommendation on the same day it was received.³⁰⁵ This problem of "keeping the lid on" was to remain for all troops as long as they were held in an alert status for the implementation of a combat assault which never took place.

Problems of Subversion

Attempted Subversion in the Florida Area

(FOUO) The pre-positioning of troops, supplies, ammunition, etc., in the Forward Area was expected to attract many attempts at subversion. It is perhaps significant that only one such overt attempt was made during the entire operation in the Forward Area and, interestingly enough, it did not involve a Cuban National as might be expected. A civilian, Austin L. Smith, sustained a gunshot wound in the left arm as a result of a shot fired by

303.

None for Red, Lt. Col. W. A. Long, Ch/Alton & Levy Sec, Distr Div, BOSTER, 16 Nov 62, subj: Message ADM50-640 (U). (UNCLASSIFIED).

304.

Air and naval gunfire liaison company.

305.

(1) Mag (USCOMBANC In M-215777), CG XVIII Abn Corps, to CG USCOMBANC, DOW 161300Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) OGCDS Daily Sec Jnl, 16 Oct 62, Item #3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Gen.

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Sg/4 Allen Bryant, Company B, 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, at approximately 1000 hours, 25 November 1962. Sg/4 Bryant, a military guard on post at Masters Airfield near Ops Locks Air Force Base, detained Smith for questioning after he discovered him intruding near the ammunition dump. Smith allegedly tried to escape while Sg/4 Bryant was phoning for instructions. Smith was treated at the 13th Field Hospital for a flesh wound on the left arm and was later evacuated to Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Florida. The case was referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for custody which removed Smith from U. S. Military jurisdiction. 306

306.

Reg (USCOMMAC In M-484270), CG FBC to TAG and CG USCOSMAC, DTG 280130Z Nov 62. (CPL/SEC). In DCSSTB P&O Div files.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS

✓ The delineation between "command" and "operational control" of U. S. Army troop units was a source of some confusion during the Cuban Crisis. Since the units involved in this contingency-type operation were based in the continental United States, they were assigned to the "Command" of the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command (USCOMAR). Because of the many factors which influence the modern military control picture, "operational control" does not always rest with the particular commander having "command jurisdiction." "Operational control" was but a facet in the over-all command responsibilities and involved mainly the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of specific tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish a pertinent mission. Not included in the concept of "operational control" were such command prerogatives as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training.¹⁰⁷

✓ The establishment of a unified command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff necessitated the assignment of troops of several services in order to accomplish the mission assigned to that particular commander. Such assignment, however, entailed only "operational control" of the units and did not include such responsibilities as the provision of filler and replacement personnel for the units concerned, the development of proper tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for a particular type unit, or even the specific training program which a unit pursued in order to attain operational readiness. The U. S. Army units participating in contingency operations were under the "command" of a U. S. Army commander (in this instance the Commanding General, USCOMAR) but under the "operational control" of a unified commander designated for that purpose by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

✓ All combat-ready forces of USCOMAR had been placed under the continuous operational control of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command (CINCSTRICK), after his command was established in late 1961. (Certain USCOMAR units, such as training units or units assigned as school troops, were thus exempted from the operational control of CINCSTRICK.) These same combat-ready forces, however, were available to other unified commanders for the support of certain contingency plans. CINCSTRICK, subsequent to March 1962, was the point of contact for augmentation planning by these other unified commanders, rather than the Department of the Army and USCOMAR. This meant that during planning phases and up to the point of actual transfer of operational control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all USCOMAR combat-ready troops were under the control of CINCSTRICK, even though the Commanding General, USCOMAR, had been assigned certain responsibilities in support of

¹⁰⁷.

AR 129-5, 13 Jan 61. (UNCLASSIFIED).

other unified or specified commanders. This situation was further complicated by the fact that CINCSOUTH had certain continuing missions for which he was responsible, despite the fact that certain of his troops were subject to transfer from his operational control. During the Cuban Crisis, as a result of these factors, the constant interjection of CINCSOUTH into an operation controlled by CINCLANT created problems for the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, which required tactful handling both on his part and on the part of his staff. This problem would most probably be repeated in connection with other unified commanders when a similar situation was involved.

⚡ A similar problem cropped up from time to time even at the lower levels of command within the USCOMSAC structure. Units assigned to the command jurisdiction of a particular Army or corps commander had to be released to the control of another commander in order for the latter to carry out mission responsibilities assigned in support of an appropriate contingency plan. In some cases the established control channels did not seem to function properly and, at times, appeared to be at variance with actual command channels. In other instances, the command prerogatives of certain commanders seemed to have been ignored or at least overlooked in the development of missions and responsibilities required to carry out and/or support an appropriate operations plan. At times, the command and control channels established for CINCLANT's Operation Plan J18 seemed cumbersome and impractical for the accomplishment of required tactical missions. Some of the subordinate commanders felt, moreover, that since certain of their other responsibilities did not diminish in importance, their accomplishment became more difficult in view of the confused command structure.

(U) Some of these conflicts, as well as the unwieldy organizational structure, resulted from decisions at a higher level while others were the result of USCOMSAC decisions. All of these were problems which were frequently inherent within the present U. S. military structure and, in all probability, would occur again in a set of similar circumstances.

Command Responsibilities of the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command

⚡ By the time that the various contingency plans for the Cuban area were developed and preparations for the actual implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan J18 had begun, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, was simultaneously "wearing four hats." In addition to his primary responsibility as Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command, he was concurrently designated as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command (CINCPACSTRIKE), Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command (CINCPACSLANT), and Department of the Army Coordinating Authority. These three latter designations were entirely dependent upon his primary responsibility.

Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command

⚡ Army participation in the early phases of contingency planning for the Cuban area was the responsibility of the Commanding General, USCOMSAC.

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By July 1961, contingency planning had progressed to such a point that the Department of the Army -- in compliance with a decision by the Secretary of Defense -- directed the Commanding General, USCOMAR, to designate an Interim Army Component Commander to assist the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) in the subject contingency planning. In addition, as Commanding General, USCOMAR, he was responsible for furnishing such Army Forces as might be required for the execution of the completed contingency plans.³⁰⁸

Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command

A new unified command was injected into the picture in October 1961 when the U. S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was established with two component commands, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command (USARSTRIKE) and U. S. Air Forces, Strike Command (USAFSTRIKE). The Commanding General, USCOMAR, was designated as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command (CINARSTRIKE) and placed under the continuous operational control of CINCPAC along with all USCOMAR combat ready forces as required for the accomplishment of CINCPAC's missions which included, among others, the constant readiness to support other unified commands and to implement plans already approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, the combat ready forces of USCOMAR continued to be available to other unified commands, as in the past. This provision alone proved to be complicated and confusing. The Joint Chiefs of Staff designated CINCPAC as the point of contact for augmentation force planning rather than the Department of the Army and USCOMAR, as in the past. CINCPAC, therefore, was assigned the responsibility of developing supporting plans in consultation with appropriate unified commands. This directive relieved the Commanding General, USCOMAR, of the responsibility delegated to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July 1961.³⁰⁹ Complications arose over the fact that the Commanding General, USCOMAR, in July 1961 had designated the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Interim Army Component Commander to assist CINCLANT in his contingency planning for Cuba.³¹⁰ Since the Commanding General, USCOMAR, was now designated as CINCPAC's Army Component Commander, a change was required either in the previous designation or in the terminology of the designation. This was partially clarified by the

308.

Msg 799447 (USCOMAR In M-224005), BA to CG USCOMAR, DTG 181651Z Jul 61. (SECRET). In AG Msg Gen.

309.

(1) Ltr, Gen. F. B. Adams, CINCPAC, to Gen. H. B. Powell, CG, USCOMAR, 11 Oct 61, w/Incl. sub: Command Relationships. (CONFIDENTIAL).
(2) Msg 1343 (USCOMAR In M-203318), JCS to CINCLANT and other Unified/Specified Cds, DTG 221957Z Mar 61. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in SCIVER P&O Div files.

310.

See above, pp. 1 - 4.

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Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March when they directed CINCSTRICK to either designate, or request his component commanders to designate, Army and Air Force Commanders as Interim Task Force Component Commanders to assist CINCLANT in his contingency planning for the Cuban area. As soon as CINCSTRICK notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this action had been completed, they intended to rescind the instructions which had previously been issued to the Commanding General, USCOMARAC. 311 In order to provide continuity to the subject contingency planning, CINCSTRICK informed the Commanding General, USCOMARAC -- in his capacity as CINCASSTRICK -- that he intended to confirm the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Interim Army Task Force Commander as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The source of misunderstanding was CINCSTRICK's terminology which indicated that he was reaffirming a designation previously made by the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, when actually he was designating a new position as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, informed the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) of his designation by CINCSTRICK as Interim Army Component Commander. Since this latter designation was contrary to the directives issued both by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCSTRICK, the latter commander requested that the original acknowledgment be withdrawn and that a proper acknowledgment be substituted which reflected a designation as Interim Army Task Force Commander. 312 While this change in designation caused some consternation on the part of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, no action was taken at that time by the Department of the Army, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to rescind the previous instructions which it had passed to the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, on July 1961.

Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command

311 Not until some seven months after the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCSTRICK that they would rescind their instructions of July 1961 did the Department of the Army specifically designate the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, as the Interim Army Component Commander to assist CINCLANT in his contingency planning for the Cuban area. The Department of the Army directive on 16 October relieved Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Brown, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, of this designation in favor of the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCSTRICK had, in effect, relieved him of the designation months earlier. The Department of the Army further pointed out that this directive did not in any way affect CINCSTRICK's

311.

Reg 3743 (USCOMARAC In M-203312), JCS to CINCLANT and CINCSTRICK, DCS 2219482 Mar 62. (SECRET). In DCSTTR P&O Div files.

312.

(1) Reg (USCOMARAC In M-203323), CINCSTRICK to CINCASSTRICK and CINCASSTRICK, DTS 2820268 Mar 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). (2) Reg STDC-272 (USCOMARAC In M-201835), CINCSTRICK to JCS, CINCLANT and CINCASSTRICK, DTS 0621352 Apr 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). (3) Reg (USCOMARAC In M-204336), CINCSTRICK to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTS 2820332 Apr 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). All in DCSTTR P&O Div files.

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previous designation of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, as the Interim Army Task Force Commander for the same purpose. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) subsequently directed certain changes on JTRAD Operation Plan 100-82 on 12 October 1942 among which was the designation of the Commanding General, USOMAC, as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). A further directed change provided that, subsequent to the initial assault phase and when directed by CINCLANT, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, would become Commander, Joint Task Force Cuba, but this latter change was subsequently rescinded and the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, was designated for the proposed command of Joint Task Force Cuba.¹¹³

Department of the Army Coordinating Authority

(U) Two days after the Department of the Army designated the Commanding General, USOMAC, as the Interim Army Component Commander in chief CINCLANT in his contingency planning for the Cuban area, they also designated him as the Departmental Coordinating Authority for the administrative support of the USOMAC Army forces employed in CINCLANT's contingency plans and operations conducted in the Western Hemisphere. The Department of the Army placed particular emphasis on logistical and personnel support in order to insure the provision of adequate, timely and continuous support to the appropriate Army forces. In addition, the Commanding General, USOMAC, was designated as CINCLANT's single point of contact with the appropriate Department of the Army elements and commands. In performing these responsibilities, the Commanding General, USOMAC, was authorized to deal directly with other Departments of the Army staff agencies and commands, military services, and Department of Defense agencies. All coordination, moreover, was to be conducted at the lowest level of command consistent with the function concerned.¹¹⁴

Command Relationships as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command

(U) The Commanding General, USOMAC, completed his command structure for Cuban contingency operations late on 12 October and announced its establishment on 14 October. As Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT), he intended to establish two headquarters, a MAIN at Fort Meade, Virginia, and a Forward at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.

113.

(1) Mag 910294 (USOMAC In M-214134), DCSOPS DA to CG, USOMAC, STD 182111Z Oct 42. (SECRET). In DCSOPS MAG Div files. (2) Mag 42840-CP 4264 (USOMAC In M-214934), CG XVIII Abn Corps to DCSOPS DA, CG, USOMAC, at 01, STD 222140Z Oct 42. (TOP SECRET). In AG TR Com.

114.

Mag (USOMAC In M-475087), DCSOPS DA to CG, USOMAC, STD 181744Z Oct 42. (FOUO). In DCSOPS MAG Div files.

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Headquarters, USARLANT Main, was to have over-all control of Army operations and would exercise primary coordinating authority with the Commander in Chief, Atlantic; Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command; Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic Command; Headquarters, U. S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) Headquarters, U. S. Army Supply and Maintenance Command (USASMC); and the Department of the Army. Headquarters, USARLANT Forward, was to provide an advanced point of contact with the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, for all operational and administrative matters and to provide a single point of contact with USARLANT Forward for the adjustment of troop carrier schedules when required. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, intended to open his command post at the forward headquarters on or about 2-day with the actual date and hour of establishment to be announced at the appropriate time. To carry out his responsibilities as Department of the Army Coordinating Authority, the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, established the Peninsula Base Command at Ops Locks Air Force Base, Florida, and limited its command jurisdiction to the geographic area of the state of Florida. The Commanding General, 2d Logistical Command, was designated as the Peninsula Base commander with the pertinent headquarters and staff to be furnished from the resources of the 2d Logistical Command. The major subordinate commands of the Peninsula Base Command were Headquarters, Army Staging Area Command -- with its subordinate staging area commands -- and the Transportation Terminal Command Southeastern Activity. The Terminal Activity was to be established at Fort Everglades, Florida, with the personnel and operating resources furnished by the Commanding General, USAMC. In addition, the Peninsula Base Command was assigned responsibility for the command and operation of all logistical, administrative, and security units in the state of Florida. The Commanding General, Third Army, received responsibility for the logistical and administrative support of the 2d Logistical Command, the Peninsula Base Command with its assigned units and installations, and the personnel assigned and attached to the U. S. Army Materiel Command Forward Control Group.³¹⁵

Conflicts in Command and Control -- U. S. Strike Command

(C) Subsequent to 16 October the command relationships of the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, tended to become a bit complicated. As previously indicated, all USCOMSAC combat ready forces were under the continuous operational control of CINCSOUTH and the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, was the Army Component Commander of the U. S. Strike Command. After 16 October, however, he was also a component commander of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, with the title of Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command. The forces that he would require for operational use in executing CINCLANT's contingency plans for the Cuban area were under the operational control of CINCSOUTH although

^{315.}

(1) Reg 100333, CC USCOMSAC to CINCLANT, DTG 230443Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Reg 300468, CC USCOMSAC to CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH and G-3's, PD-41 thru Black Armbies, DTG 341302Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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that commander had no responsibilities to CINCLANT except to provide operational forces when so directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This had already caused a conflict with CINCPAC on 19 October when the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, directed the Commanding Generals, III Corps and Fourth Army to begin preparations to return all pertinent units then on Exercise THREE PAIRS to their home stations on twelve-hour notice. CINCPAC immediately pointed out to the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, that he, CINCPAC, was responsible for providing forces for operations by other unified commanders only when directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He requested the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, to exercise the utmost care in seeing that no units were ordered home from Exercise THREE PAIRS unless directed by CINCPAC, himself, or cleared with him in advance of leaving orders, regardless of the source of directives received by Headquarters, USCOMARMC.316 Later that same day, CINCLANT advised the USCOMARMC commander that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing to alert CINCPAC for a Change of Operational Control (COP) of all Army and Air Force units required for his Operation Plans 112 and 116. Despite the urgency of the situation and the fact that some of the units would undoubtedly have to be pre-positioned -- as they later were -- CINCPAC proposed to CINCLANT on the following day that operational control of all units concerned be simultaneously passed to the latter commander at 1-hour unless otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.317

(C) Although CINCPAC would have no control over the units once they were transferred to CINCLANT's operational control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCPAC to report on the status of movement and deployment of the units supporting CINCLANT's Operation Plans 112 and 116. CINCLANT and CINCPAC -- although they were also CINCPACWEST and CINCPACWEST -- were component commanders of CINCLANT and as such were not under the control of CINCPAC. Yet in pursuance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive CINCPAC directed the two commanders by these former titles to provide him with the necessary information. The first report was to be developed as of 1900 hours on 21 October and similar reports would be submitted at six-hour intervals thereafter containing applicable correct unit locations, the estimated time and date of departure for their next destination, and the time and date of their arrival at a final destination.318

316.

(1) Msg 202100, CG USCOMARMC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 190140Z Oct 62, Gp. 4. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In N-214381), CINCPAC to CINCPACWEST, DTG 190500Z Oct 62, Gp. 4. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG IS Com.

317.

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In N-214302), CINCLANT to CINCPACWEST, DTG 191640Z Oct 62, (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In N-214453), CINCPAC to CINCLANT, DTG 202100Z Oct 62, Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG IS Com.

318.

Msg (USCOMARMC In N-214607), CINCPAC to CINCPACWEST and CINCPACWEST, DTG 212500Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG IS Com.

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Temporary operational control of all Army Forces included in CINCLANT's Operation Plans 112, 114, and 118 actually passed to CINCLANT as of 2300 hours 31 October 1962.¹¹⁹ Two days later, however, CINCPACFLT instructed the Commanding General, III Corps -- a subordinate command of Fourth Army and thus of USCOMARMC -- on the circumstances under which he would conduct training and prepare the 1st Armored Division for the missions which were then assigned to it. (It should be remembered that unit training by definition of Army regulations was not included in the scope of operational control.) Since the 1st Armored Division was then committed to a contingency plan, it could be trained only in those activities which could be conducted close in on the installation at Fort Hood, Texas, subject, of course, to any other orders that might be forthcoming from the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, in his capacity as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command. In addition, despite the fact that the two Roll-on, Roll-off vessels, the USSS COMET and USSS TARKER, were committed to Operation Plan 118, CINCPACFLT directed the Commanding General, III Corps, to make plans to conduct outloading training for the 1st Armored Division at Houston, Texas, using the two vessels in question.¹²⁰

By 4 November, when preparations for implementation of CINCLANT's Operation Plan 118 were well underway, CINCPACFLT requested from the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, complete information on all Forces of the USSEICOM to include those which had passed to the control of CINCLANT. First of all, he asked General Powell to identify each unit and element committed to the support of CINCLANT over and above those mentioned in Annex E of STRAC Operation Plan 118. In addition, an evaluation of the current combat status of the residual General Reserve Forces was requested. Any actions taken to withdraw troops and equipment from units in the General Reserve in order to reinforce CINCLANT Operation Plan 118 were to be identified. This latter information was to include actual losses of personnel with the effect of such actions upon the operational capability of the losing unit; the losses of major items of equipment such as aircraft and vehicles; and the losses of major items of Signal communications electronic equipment which were essential to the performance of the losing unit's mission. The Commanding General, USCOMARMC, immediately pointed out that not enough information was then available within his headquarters to satisfy CINCPACFLT's requirements. Furthermore, while one-time reports could be obtained from all of the units concerned, the results

119.

(1) Msg 6842 (USCOMARMC to M-214639), AG to CINCPACFLT, DTG 230200Z Oct 62. Co. 2. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg STRAC-C 336/63 (USCOMARMC to M-214633), CINCPACFLT to CINCLANT, CINCSASBASTIAN and CINCSAFATINE, DTG 230430Z Oct 62. Co. 4. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG IS Com.

120.

Msg (USCOMARMC to M-213040), CINCPACFLT to CG III Corps, DTG 232104Z Oct 62. Co. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG IS Com.

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of these reports would be misleading and incomplete and would most probably present a confusing picture of the readiness picture. Fully evaluated information was to be available within Headquarters, USCOMARC, by 10 December 1962 and the USCOMARC commander recommended that the CINOSTRIKE request be held in abeyance until that date.¹²¹ By that time, however, the crisis had passed and the units had reverted to the operational control of CINOSTRIKE.

Command Channels of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic

~~(S)~~ As preparations for the implementation of CINCLANT's Operation Plan 316 gathered momentum -- but before operational control of the portinear combat forces was assigned to him -- the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, altered the command channels which had previously been established in his contingency plans. First, he abolished Joint Task Force 122¹²² and assumed for himself the functions of the Commander, Joint Task Force 122, as outlined in the current Joint Task Force Operation Plans 314 and 316. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic, intended to exercise operational control of his forces through his respective service component commanders, CINCLANTFLT, CINCLANTFLT, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), the Commander, Atlantic Defense Command (COMANTDEFCON), and the Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command (COMJUNTA). Subsequent to the initial assault phase -- and at the direction of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic -- Joint Task Force Cuba was to be established and its forces assigned. As has been indicated earlier, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, was selected as the Commander Designate, Joint Task Force, Cuba, operating directly under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic.¹²³

Command Relationships -- Third Army and the Panama Canal Command

~~(S)~~ In response to his designation as Department of the Army Coordinating Authority, the Commanding General, USCOMARC, established the Panama Canal Command encompassing the geographical limits of the state of Florida. The new command was to report directly to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces,

331.

(1) Msg (USCOMARC In M-218478), CINOSTRIKE to CINCPACSTRIKE, DTG 070100Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg 100300, CG USCOMARC to CINOSTRIKE, DTG 081348Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DOSTER MAG Div files.

322.

See above, p. 1.

323.

(1) Msg (USCOMARC In S-10803), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT, DTG 190438Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARC In M-214894), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 221322Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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Atlantic Command, who felt that this arrangement would provide maximum flexibility, control, and coordination.¹²⁴ Prior to the establishment of the new command, the Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, who was the commander-designee of the Peninsula Base Command, recommended that he be given responsibility for the logistical and administrative support of all elements in Florida which were involved in, or supporting, CINCLANT Operation Plan 116. His proposal included the assignment of operational control of all elements in logistical or administrative support roles, including the Army Staging Area Commands (ASAC) which had already been established by Third Army. The Commanding General, Third Army, concurred in this proposal at the time since it eliminated a split of responsibilities within the state of Florida. Operational control of the Army Staging Area Commands was transferred to the Peninsula Base Command concurrent with its establishment at 0001 hours, 30 October. Third Army remained responsible for the logistical and administrative support of the Peninsula Base Command.¹²⁵

At the close of the operation, the Chief of Staff, USARLANT Forward, indicated that support arrangements would have been better if the Peninsula Base Command had been placed under the control of the Commanding General, Third Army. He pointed out that the concept of the Peninsula Base Command was a late change in the support plans for Operation Plan 116. He did believe that the need for such an organization was fully justified when the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, was designated as the Department of the Army Coordinating Authority for the logistical and administrative support of all CINCLANT Operation Plan 116 forces. He logically concluded that some sort of a command was needed in the Florida area to act as the agency of the Commanding General, USCOMARMC, in carrying out this coordinating function. But because Third Army was the USCOMARMC organization charged with logistical and administrative support responsibilities for the entire southeastern United States, it was only logical that it should have established a command such as the Peninsula Base Command in the Florida area. The Chief of Staff, USARLANT Forward, emphasized the point that such a command would have to be in the Florida area and relatively close to Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the headquarters of its attached 3rd Logistical Command, and would have to be responsive to the requirements of the latter headquarters. He felt, therefore, that it would be appropriate to salvage the 1st Logistical Command -- or

124.

Msg 102803, CG USCOMARMC to SCORPS SA, DTG 150550Z Oct 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

125.

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In H-316180), CG Third Army to CG, USCOMARMC, DTG 170450Z Oct 61. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In 156925), CG Third Army to ASAC's, DTG 180100Z Oct 61. Op. 1. (SECRET). In SCORPS PEO Div files.

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a similar type logistical command -- to Third Army for the purpose of carrying out the coordinating mission.³²⁵

Transfer of the 1st Armored Division to the Operational Control of the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command

(~~S~~) A question concerning the operational control of the 1st Armored Division arose shortly after the first elements of Task Force CHARLIE were ordered into a pre-positioned location at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Commanding General, III Corps, pointed out that Annex E of STRAC Operation Plan 316 provided that units in Task Force 125, not organic to XVIII Airborne Corps, would be assigned to the operational control of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, upon arrival at designated port of embarkation or departure airfield. Directives from USCOMSARC for the movement of Task Force CHARLIE, on the other hand, stated that elements of Task Force CHARLIE would be attached to Third Army upon arrival at Fort Stewart.³²⁷ Later directives concerning the movement of additional elements of the 1st Armored Division -- including Division Headquarters -- to Fort Stewart, gave no indication as to whether the 1st Armored Division itself was to be attached to Third Army on arrival. Consequently, the III Corps commander assumed on 30 October that the 1st Armored Division was attached to Third Army for all purposes and that the attachment had been effective upon arrival of the Division Headquarters at Fort Stewart.³²⁸ This situation was clarified by the Commanding General, USCOMSARC, on 3 November when he announced that the 1st Armored Division was placed under his operational control as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, for all matters pertaining to Operation Plan 316 -- matters which were to be coordinated directly with the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps. The Third Army commander would provide logistical support for 1st Armored Division units located at Fort Stewart. For all other purposes the 1st Armored Division remained under the Commanding General, Fourth Army, and the Commanding General, Fort Hood, Texas.³²⁹

325.

Ltr, CHARLANT Fwd to CINCUSARLANT, 3 Dec 62, subj: After-Action Report, ABCE, pp. 2-3. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSTAR P&O Div Ops Br files.

327.

Msg 3021304, CG USCOMSARC to CG Fourth Army, DTG 230702Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In Ad TS Com.

328.

Msg (USCOMSARC In E-1138), CG III Corps to CG Fourth Army, DTG 302113Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In Ad TS Com.

329.

Msg 303146, CG USCOMSARC to CG's, 1st Armd Div, Third and Fourth Armies and XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 031826Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). In DCSTAR P&O Div files.

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Command and Control of Air Defense Units

330. Shortly after the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, was required to provide certain of his Air Defense units to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Defense Command (USARADCOM), for air defense in the southeastern United States, he noted that a misunderstanding had arisen concerning matters of command and operational control of the units in question. Messages dispatched by the Commanding General, USARADCOM, to his subordinate commanders in the southeastern United States indicated that command of the temporary reinforcement Air Defense units was being passed to USARADCOM upon arrival of the units at their destination. General Powell issued a reminder on 26 October that his movement directives for these units definitely stated that only operational control would pass to USARADCOM upon their arrival. The administrative and logistical support of these units remained the responsibility of the appropriate Army commander in whose area the units were located -- in this instance, the Commanding General, Third Army. General Powell thereupon requested the USARADCOM commander to amend his directives to reflect the passage of operational control only.³³⁰ While the latter commander did agree to General Powell's request regarding "command" and "operational control," he objected to the fact that the Third Army commander was responsible for all administrative and logistical support of these units. He pointed out that his responsibilities for the logistical support of the temporary reinforcement units placed under his operational control would be exactly the same as that for units under his command. He insisted that this measure of control was necessary in order that he might insure that the logistical posture of the reinforcement units was in keeping with the operational readiness requirements of the Continental Air Defense Command.³³¹ Despite these objections, Third Army remained responsible for the administrative and logistical support of these units during the Cuban Crisis and, subsequent to the stand-down on readiness conditions, all Air Defense units remaining in the Florida area were formally attached to Third Army for these purposes.³³²

Command Relationships with the Commander,
Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command

331. CISELANT's original plans with regard to his organizational structure provided for the establishment of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task

330.

Msg 302674, CG USCOMSAC to CG USARADCOM, DTG 261838Z Oct 62.
(SECRET). In DCSTUR MSG Dev files.

331.

Msg ADGP8-756 (USCOMSAC In R-216043), CG USARADCOM to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 230732Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). In AG Msg Com.

332.

See below, pp. 217-18.

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Force, Atlantic Command (JUNTA), whose commander would be directly responsible to him.³³³ The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, on the other hand, felt that such a command relationship would hinder the coordination which was necessary between unconventional warfare elements and the major ground combat effort in the objective area and thus retard reaction times. Consequently, he recommended a plan to transfer both JUNTA and the responsibility for unconventional warfare operations to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, concurrently with the passage of control to that commander for the execution of CINCLANT Operation Plan 314. In reply to this recommendation, CINCLANT pointed out that upon execution of his Operation Plan 314, all amphibious assault operations would initially be under the operational control of the Commander, Task Force 121 (Navy Task Force). Therefore, all unconventional warfare forces or assets which could be of assistance in amphibious assault operations would be placed under the operational control of that commander. Similarly, any unconventional warfare forces or assets which could be of assistance in the airborne assault phase would be placed under the operational control of the Commander, Task Force 123 (Army Task Force). To further clarify matters, CINCLANT issued new instructions concerning the command relationships applicable to the Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command, and the control of his forces or assets. For command purposes, the Unconventional Warfare Commander would remain directly subordinate to CINCLANT. But whenever unconventional warfare forces or assets were so located as to be of concern to the conventional component commanders, and when the latter were in a position to control the affected forces or assets, operational control of such unconventional warfare forces or assets would be transferred to the appropriate component commander. In conjunction with these transfers of operational control, unconventional warfare liaison teams would be attached to the component commanders as appropriate in order to provide the necessary continuity of operations. In turn, component commanders could further assign operational control of the unconventional warfare forces or assets to subordinate tactical units. The Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command, was responsible for furnishing the required liaison teams to the appropriate commanders.³³⁴ This arrangement satisfied the desires of the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, for actual control and coordination of unconventional warfare activities in the objective area.

333.

See above, p. 144.

334.

(1) Msg 301393, CG, USCOMARAC, to CINCLANT, DTG 351443Z Oct 62, Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG IS Cav. (2) Msg (USCOMARAC to N-213034), CINCLANT to COMUSMACV, DTG 261412Z Oct 62. Op. 3. (SECRET). In DCSUTH PAC Div files.

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Transfer of the Antilles Command to the Control of the
Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command

~~(S)~~ Included in planning developments for the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 318, was the use of the facilities, etc., of the Antilles Command, U. S. Army Caribbean (ANTCOM, USARGARIB), for the purpose of staging Latin American military units. Warfare in the Caribbean would also require the mobilization of the U. S. Army Reserve and Puerto Rican National Guard units of the Antilles Command and their use under the control of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command. On 30 October, CINCLANT informed the Commanding General, USCOMARAC, -- CINCOMARANT -- that he felt that forces of ANTCOM should be immediately assigned to the latter's operational control. General Powell concurred with this position and forwarded the request to the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army. By way of explanation, he pointed out that this action would permit time to clear up command arrangements, to bring the Antilles Command up to date on the situation in the Caribbean, and to enable that command to prepare plans for the staging of those Latin American units which might be committed to the objective area. The Department of the Army Staff, however, preferred to transfer the Antilles Command to the operational control of CINCOMARANT at the time when CINCLANT Operation Plan 318 was actually implemented. The reasoning behind this preference was that it was more compatible with the current operational requirements of both CINCLANT and CINCOMARANT and was in concert with the planning accomplished up to that point and with the authority accorded to CINCLANT during major emergencies. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, suggested that, if the immediate transfer was urgently desired, the recommendation for such action be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CINCLANT. In view of the mutual interests in this area, he also suggested that the latter commander coordinate his recommendation with the Commander in Chief, Caribbean.¹³⁵

~~(S)~~ As a result of this recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the transfer of operational control of the Antilles Command, U. S. Army Caribbean, to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces Atlantic Command, effective 4 November 1961. In this regard, CINCLANT requested authority for direct liaison between the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, and the Commanding General, U. S. Army Caribbean, so that arrangements could be made for the Antilles Command to continue these missions currently being performed for U. S. Army, Caribbean, until

135.

(1) Reg 302936, CG USCOMARAC to CoS A, DTG 302113Z Oct 61. Gp. 4. (TOP SECRET). (2) Reg 303038, CG USCOMARAC to CINCLANT, DTG 012143Z Nov 61, Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Cor.

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such time as an emergency precluded their accomplishment. Authority for such direct liaison was granted by the Commander in Chief, Caribbean, on 7 November. 336

Reversion of Command and Control Functions

✓ All problems and conflicts concerning command and control functions which were related to the partial implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 336, were brought to a close on 10 November 1962. CINCLANT authorized the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command -- the Commanding General, USCOMARAC -- to return all commands and units then in position to normal operational control effective as of 1636 hours, 30 November. The operational control of those units was yet at their home stations was to revert to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Africa Command, or to the appropriate commander concerned, effective upon closing at their home stations. 337

336.

(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In E-218303), CINCLANT to CINCSACARLANT, DTG 070018Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DESUTE P&O Div files. (2) Msg (USCOMARAC In E-1346), CINCLANT to CINCSACARLANT and CG USARCARL, DTG 071302Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

337.

(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In E-1741), CINCLANT to CINCSACARLANT, DTG 302128Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 301913, CG USCOMARAC to CG's, First thru Sixth Armies, DTG 021638Z Dec 62. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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Chapter VI

SPECIAL READINESS TRAINING FOR THE CUBAN EMERGENCY

✓ The impending implementation of a contingency plan on the Cuban area marked the first time since the Korean Conflict that major U. S. Army units in the United States would be expected to execute airborne and amphibious assault operations and conduct subsequent ground combat operations in a foreign territory. While many of the units had participated in large-scale maneuvers in the past, there often was little sense of urgency in such training operations and the units were usually given sufficient time in which to ready, pack, and load their accompanying equipment. What is more, many of the units had never fully loaded their organic equipment for an extended overland move to a staging base or port of embarkation. Some of the units selected for the amphibious assault phase of Operation Plan 316 had had a minimum of amphibious training in the past but had never participated in full-scale exercises simulating a tactical amphibious assault. The 1st Armored Division, moreover, had had no amphibious training whatsoever. The delay in implementing Operation Plan 316 afforded USCOMSAC an opportunity to conduct limited training in the required areas.

Readiness Training Policy of the
U. S. Continental Army Command

✓ Shortly after the beginning of November 1962, Headquarters, U. S. Continental Army Command, formulated a readiness training policy which was applicable to all units -- both divisional and non-divisional -- assigned to Operation Plan 316 cross lists to assure that these units maintained the highest possible readiness posture for the period of the next five to six weeks. (By the time that USCOMSAC disseminated this policy, the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) had been added to the troop list by separate action.) Training would be conducted within the limits imposed by CINCARTY Operation Plan 316 and would be conducted in a way which would not degrade the capability of any unit to meet its contingency plan requirements. To this end, the training policy stipulated the concentration of exercises and similar activities at the battle group and battalion level as below. Training was limited by the fact that base bands -- particularly Class V -- would have to remain intact. As a general recommendation, all units were urged to concentrate on training for the roles assigned to them in the operation plan. The airborne units, for example, were to concentrate on maintaining individual jump proficiency and on aircraft loading and unloading procedures. The primary combat command and Cavalry squadrons of the 1st Armored Division were to conduct an intensive review of a particular phase of amphibious training which they had completed. The Infantry divisions were urged to concentrate on air movement, both loading and unloading, staging requirements, to include movement through either air or water ports of embarkation, and exposure of airheads and beachheads. Headquarters, USCOMSAC,

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pointed out that there was no need to conduct this training under security conditions; a logical response to inquiries from the public press need only indicate that participating units were conducting realistic readiness training exercises.

Consistent with this training designed to increase the operational readiness of the various units, USCOMMAC directed that a high degree of proficiency be maintained in field sanitation, maintenance of equipment, military discipline and courtesy, and physical fitness. Inspections would insure that the designated Army units were in a high state of readiness and that they presented to the American public the image of the Army at its best and ready to execute its assigned tasks.

In order to carry out the full intent of this training policy, Headquarters, USCOMMAC, planned a series of small amphibious exercises, as well as exercises which provided for the rotation of air transported elements through staging areas. Some of these exercises were to consist of actual movements to a port area, while others would merely be simulated movements from home stations, or current location, to a staging or marshalling area. All participating units were reminded that requests for aircraft to maintain individual jump proficiency, or for the practice of loading and unloading techniques and procedures, would have to be submitted to USCOMMAC Headquarters. Aircraft for this purpose had already been scheduled for units of both XVIII Airborne Corps and the 2d Infantry Division.

Army Readiness Training

In accordance with the training policy established by USCOMMAC, the various Army commanders whose subordinate units were involved in Operation Plan 318 initiated training exercises designed to increase the readiness posture of the troops concerned. First Army troop units assigned to the Operation Plan 318 troop list were all located at Fort Dix and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. First Army designated Exercise COCKED PISTOL as the first of a series of training exercises designed to speed up alert procedures and reaction times. Units at Fort Dix initiated the first phase of Exercise COCKED PISTOL on 26 November, while those at Fort Monmouth joined the exercises early on the morning of 27 November. By 0730 hours, 27 November, all units entered the second phase of their training exercises which included loading procedures and an evaluation of their capability to move to port and storage areas. The units located at Fort Dix actually moved to the local staging area. All participating

338

Reg ATTN: DSO-303339, CG USCOMMAC to CG's First three Sixth Armies, DTG 081330Z Nov 62 (SECRET) In MOUTH P&O Div files.

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units completed Exercise COINED PISTOL by approximately 1700 hours, 27 November, and then initiated Operation FADE OUT, a retrograde movement, 139

✓ The Commanding General, Second Army, recommended that all troop units under his jurisdiction included in the Operation Plan 316 troop list conduct simulated movement exercises from their home stations, pointing out that adequate local areas existed for conducting the practice staging and marshalling exercises. On the assumption that the simulated movement exercises would commence on 13 November, the Second Army commander recommended participation by installations on the following dates: Fort Knox, Kentucky, 13 - 18 November; Fort Lee, Virginia, 18 November - 2 December; Fort Eustis, Virginia, 3 - 9 December; Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 10 - 16 December; Walter Reed Army Hospital, Washington, D. C., 18 - 18 December; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 17 - 22 December; Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, 17 - 22 December; and Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, 17 - 22 December. 340

✓ The Commanding General, Third Army informed USCOMARC on 16 November that, with certain exceptions, he considered simulated movement exercises adequate to achieve the training program's objectives within his Army area. He pointed out that one exception concerned actual movements for all units participating in the SENSEADE Field Training Exercise (FTE) series. 341 In addition, local Air Force flights were needed to conduct the air transportability training required for certain elements of the 2d Infantry Division. The Third Army commander recommended that both the 34th Artillery Group and the 2d Battalion, 36th Artillery, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, be moved to Little Creek, Virginia, if amphibious training was considered appropriate. Except for this amphibious training, he considered local areas in the vicinity of permanent installations completely adequate for all practice staging and marshalling operations. Certain factors did serve to limit the training: for example, available aircraft were not identical to those allocated in Operation Plan 316,

139.

(1) Reg AIRPC (9) 5135 (USCOMARC In M-221025), CG First Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 261920Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (2) Reg AIRPC-13-5133 (USCOMARC In M-221003), CG First Army to CG Feet Dix, DTG 262345Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (3) Reg (USCOMARC In M-221047), CG First Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 271335Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (4) Reg (USCOMARC In M-221064), CG First Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 271850Z Nov 62, Gp. 4. (SECRET). (5) Reg (USCOMARC In M-221089), CG First Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 280022Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). All in SCRYPT P60 Div files.

340.

Reg (USCOMARC In M-218947), CG Second Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 091245Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). In SCRYPT P60 Div files.

341.

See below, pp. 174 - 181.

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units were required to maintain their equipment in a packed and ready condition and government-owned railroad cars were not available to fully load the large sized units deployed from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division requested Headquarters, U. S. Continental Army Command, to assure the availability of three C-130 and two C-119 aircraft for two periods, 4 - 6 and 11 - 13 December, so that his division's directed readiness training could be carried out. The Third Army commander emphasized that C-130 aircraft were not considered suitable replacements for the C-119 aircraft because of their configuration and the size of the intended aircraft loads.³⁴²

342 The Commanding General, Fifth Army, recommended a series of exercises between 13 November and 31 December for various readiness training exercises for divisional units located at Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. These dates did not conflict with any scheduled Army Training Tests or command post exercises for the units concerned. In addition, he recommended the period between 13 November and 31 December for units of the 9th Infantry Division (Mechanized) if that organization was included in the Operation Plan 318 troop list.³⁴³

Elimination of STRAC Mobility Exercises

343 Directives which governed the training of Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) units required that a minimum of one mobility test be conducted annually for each such unit in an Army area as directed by that Army commander. On 6 November the Commanding General, First Army, pointed out to USCOMARMC that the current progressive readiness directives had placed all STRAC units in his Army area, with the exception of the 29th Evacuation Hospital, in a high state of operational readiness for an indefinite period to execute the requirements imposed by CINCLANT Operation Plan 318. For these reasons he recommended that FY 1963 Mobility Test Requirements be waived for all STRAC units included on the Operation Plan 318 troop list.³⁴⁴ The Commanding General, USCOMARMC, agreed on the validity of the recommendation and waived the stated requirement.

342

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-219878), CG Third Army to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 141800Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-682175), CG 3d Inf Div to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 131330Z Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). Both in DCSTIC P&O Div files.

343

Msg ALPFO-TMG 98258 (USCOMARMC In M-219430), CG Fifth Army to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 130834Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSTIC P&O Div files.

344

Msg (USCOMARMC In M-218782), CG First Army to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 082100Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTIC P&O Div files.

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Command Post Exercise: GLOBE SHAPE

~~(S)~~ A joint Command Post Exercise -- Exercise GLOBE SHAPE -- sponsored by U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, and U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic Command, was scheduled for the period 17 - 22 November 1962 in order to test the USARLANT and USAFLANT deployment and employment phases of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316. Headquarters, USARLANT Forward, was designated as the planning agent for the USARLANT portion of the CPX. Principal USARLANT participants included Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, the headquarters of the two Airborne divisions; Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, and Brigade Headquarters, Task Force CHARLIE; the Brigade Headquarters and Separate Battle Group Task Force Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division; Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division, along with its brigade headquarters and the headquarters of the two battle group Task Force; and Headquarters, Peninsula Base Command (3d Logistical Command). No actual movement of either a Headquarters or of representative units was to occur in connection with this CPX. All headquarters were to participate from their current location at the time of the exercise.

~~(S)~~ The tentative concept of the CPX provided for an examination of all actions of both USARLANT and USAFLANT which were planned for the period of E-day through D-plus-4-days of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316. Exercise traffic was to be so designed as to portray as nearly as possible the actions and orders which could be required during the selected period and would include passage of command and control from Headquarters, USARLANT, to USARLANT Forward. The time phasing of the six-day schedule of the CPX was set as follows:

PERIOD

TO BE COMPLETED IN:

E-day through E-minus-6-days	24 hours
E-minus-5-days through E-minus-3-days	24 hours
E-minus-2-days through E-minus-1-days	24 hours
D-day	24 hours
D-plus-1-day	24 hours
D-plus-2-days through D-plus-4-days	24 hours

~~(S)~~ All headquarters were to participate on a player-controller basis, with the control staff at each player headquarters having the primary function of preparing and injecting only those situations which were logical and anticipated, provided that both CINCLANT's and supporting Headquarters' Operation Plans 316 were implemented. A small joint control group located at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, would direct the CPX with the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic Command, functioning as Joint Exercise Directors. Participating headquarters were cautioned to take extreme care to insure that exercise traffic was appropriately classified so as not to disclose the relationship of the CPX to Operation Plan 316.

~~(S)~~ In planning for this exercise, provisions had to be made for a possible implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316. It was consequently

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succeded that the GFE would be automatically terminated upon receipt of the code word "GREEN LIGHT." At that time, all communications equipment would be cleared for actual traffic and all Operation Plan 316 troop list units alerted for receipt of further high priority instructions. In order to prevent any possible confusion, all communications in connection with planning for, and actual conduct of, the GFE would begin and end with the words "CLOSE SHAPE." 343

(U) In addition to elements of U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, General Powell recommended to Department of the Army that certain appropriate departmental agencies and headquarters, such as the U. S. Army Materiel Command and its various subordinate commands and headquarters, also participate in the GFE. The Department of the Army notified the USARLANT commander on 10 November that the departmental agencies specified in his recommendation had informally given favorable consideration to their participation in the exercise. At that time, however, the extent of their participation was still under consideration prior to final commitment. 344

(U) The proposed GFE CLOSE SHAPE did not begin on 11 November as originally scheduled and on the following day, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, cancelled the exercise since he felt that the units and headquarters of the Operation Plan 316 troop list were deriving sufficient GFE-type benefits from participation in Exercise SUNSHADE No. 1. 347

SUNSHADE EXERCISES SERIES

(U) By mid-November the Commander in Chief, USARLANT and USAFLANT, had prepared plans for a series of joint field training exercises for certain of their forces committed in Operation Plan 316. A total of five SUNSHADE Exercises were proposed for the period from 19 November to 22 December, with Exercise SUNSHADE No. 1 scheduled for 19 to 21 November. The series was designed to exercise certain afloat portions of USAFLANT Operation Plan 316 and to provide training for selected fighter aircraft forces committed to that plan. Not only would the exercises increase the operational readiness of the selected forces, but would provide training for the commanders and staffs of USARLANT Main and USARLANT Forward, USAFLANT Main and USAFLANT ADVON, and NAVS AVON, as well as the commanders, staffs and units of their subordinate headquarters. 345

343. Mag 1003304, CG USCOMSAC to USARLANT Fwd, DTG 081934Z Nov 62. Cpy 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

344. Mag (TS COMSAC In M-481446), DCSPS DA to CG USCOMSAC, DTG 102147Z Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED).

347. Mag 1011166, CINARLANT to USARLANT Fwd, DTG 240035Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In COMINT FWD Div Files.

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✓ Each separate SUNSHADE exercise was designed to test selected portions of Operation Plan 316 and included a definite sequence of events. After the issuance of proper alert orders, selected airlift forces of both the Military Air Transport Service and the U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command would move selected battle group personnel and equipment from Pope Air Force Base adjacent to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Campbell Army Airfield, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to those deployment staging bases in Florida designated for the respective unit in USAFLANT Operation Plan 316. Upon arrival at the staging bases, the troops would conduct off-loading and turnaround operations and participate in briefings and other related activities. The employment phase of each exercise included a pre-dawn takeoff and airdrop of both troops and heavy drop platforms in drop zones located at Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell. As a final phase, the airborne battle groups were to conduct a two to three day tactical problem closely paralleling the operations assigned to the same unit in the objective area. The final phase ground problems were to be supported by live fire operations from both organic artillery units and USAFLANT fighter aircraft.³⁴⁸

✓ Even before Exercise SUNSHADE No. 1 began, it was evident that the anticipated increase in communications traffic during the exercise series required communications security support for both Headquarters, USARLANT Forward and Headquarters, Peninsula Base Command, because their location made them vulnerable to foreign interception. Headquarters, USARLANT Forward, requested the provision of one security monitoring platform, the size of which was considered capable of rendering the required security support to both headquarters.³⁴⁹

✓ Headquarters, USARLANT Forward, directed the execution of Exercise SUNSHADE No. 1 on 17 November, designating X-hour (the time that the first aircraft was to arrive at the home station onload base) as 0800 hours, 19 November, while Y-hour (the time that the first parachute was scheduled to exit an aircraft at home station drop zone) was set for 0900 hours, 21 November 1962.³⁵⁰ On Monday, 19 November, USAFLANT transported one Airborne battle group of the 101st Airborne Division from Campbell Army Airfield to Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, in twenty C-124 aircraft and one Airborne battle group of

348.

(1) Mag (USCOMSARC In M-219543), USARLANT Fwd to CINCPACFLT, DTG 131915Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMSARC In M-219332), CINCPACFLT to CG 33d Pres AF, DTG 112354Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSCTR PWD Div files.

349.

Mag (USCOMSARC In M-219431), USARLANT Fwd to CINCPACFLT, DTG 141950Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET - Info used is SECRET). In DCSCTR PWD Div files.

350.

Mag 303618, USARLANT Fwd to CG's, PBC and XVIII Air Corps, DTG 171410Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSCTR PWD Div files.

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the 82d Airborne Division from Pope Air Force Base to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in twenty-four C-124 aircraft. Each of the Airborne battle groups received an additional thirty-six C-119 aircraft (USAF Reserve) to transport heavy airdrop loads from Campbell Army Airfield to McCoy Air Force Base, Florida, and from Pope Air Force Base to MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

(U) The units staged, marshalled, and conducted joint coordination and unit briefings on Tuesday, 10 November, in preparation for the return flight to the drop zones (Drop Zones HARRIS at Fort Campbell and SICILY at Fort Bragg) in the vicinity of their home stations. Although the units were scheduled to load aircraft during the hours of darkness on Wednesday, 11 November, so as to conduct an early hour parachute assault at 0800 hours at Fort Campbell and 0900 hours at Fort Bragg, their departure from the southern staging bases was delayed for twenty-four hours by inclement weather. Continued bad weather on the morning of 22 November further delayed the scheduled departure for four hours and, once the aircraft were finally aloft, forced the abandoning of the planned mass formation flying in favor of flying in trail at five minute intervals. It was intended at the time of takeoff that, only if weather conditions permitted, would troops parachute into the home station drop zones. Although the return flights were successful, the troop paratroops were cancelled because of extreme high winds at both home stations. Aircraft carrying troops of the two Airborne battle groups airlanded at Campbell Army Airfield and Pope Air Force Base in mid-afternoon on 22 November, while the heavy-drop aircraft followed and airlanded in the evening of the same day. The two battle groups then moved to training areas at their respective home stations to participate in a tactical problem commencing on 23 November 1962.³⁵¹

(U) Shortly before SUNSHADE Exercise Nr. 1 had begun, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander questioned the fact that lighter aircraft participating in the final phase ground problems were not authorized the use of Napalm ordnance and consequently submitted a request for its use during the close air support operations of the live fire phase. The USAFLANT Planning Staff agreed that it was feasible to use this type of munitions in the SUNSHADE Exercises but pointed out that it was not so much a question of authorization as it was one of short supply. Since the USAFLANT staff also agreed that the use of Napalm for this purpose was worthwhile, General Powell concurred in the Airborne Corps commander's recommendation and authorized direct communication in the matter between the latter commander and the Commander in Chief, USAFLANT.³⁵²

351.

Ltr, USCOMARMC to OCS, XVIII Abn Corps, to CG USCOMARMC ATTN: DCS/IR, 19 Nov 62, subj: USCOMARMC Liaison Officer Observations - SUNSHADE Exercise Nr. 1. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCS/IR R&D Div files.

352.

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC to HQ 16-110146), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCPACFLT, DTG 172200Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg 103043, CG USCOMARMC to CINCPACFLT, DTG 181453Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (3) TELCOM, Col. Barfette, Dir/Op Plans, Hq SAC, and Lt. Col. Framwright, SDC, Hq USCOMARMC, 17 Nov 62. (SECRET). All in DCS/IR R&D Div files.

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On 21 November, while Exercise SUNSHADE Nr. 1 was still in progress, General Sweeney, CINCPACFLT, informed Admiral Penhiss that he was recommending the cancellation of all further SUNSHADE exercises in view of the pending early return of reserve airlift forces to inactive status. In immediate rebuttal, General Powell, CINCPACFLT, pointed out that the SUNSHADE series was providing highly desirable training of a scope seldom available to Army forces. Their major training benefits, moreover, were not limited to merely the Airborne Battle groups but included both the staging base organizations and those higher headquarters required to support extensive airborne operations. General Powell recommended that, as a minimum, Exercise SUNSHADE Nr. 1 be completed and Exercise Nr. 3 be substituted for Exercise Nr. 2 commencing on 26 November, dependent, of course, on the availability of USAFLANT airlift capacity. Only on this basis would he concur in the cancellation of Exercise Nr. 2, 4, and 5. Such a solution not only permitted participation by all intermediate staging bases with the exception of that at Sanford Naval Air Station, but also afforded an opportunity to correct the deficiencies revealed during Exercise Nr. 1. 333

By 23 November, however, the lack of available aircraft caused General Powell to change his mind, and he thereupon concurred in the recommendation made by General Sweeney two days earlier. In place of the extensive airborne exercises, General Powell now recommended to CINCPACFLT that the two Airborne divisions conduct training at their home stations during the ensuing four weeks, dependent, of course, to the extent that the Commander in Chief, USAFLANT, could furnish the required support. General Powell emphasized the need for a minimum of ten C-119 aircraft at each of the home stations, with each plane to fly a minimum of two sorties to initiate the exercises on Wednesdays of successive weeks. Tactical aircraft with live ordnance would also be required on a limited basis during the exercises. This concurrence came more than soon, as six hours later -- early on 24 November -- the Commander in Chief, USAFLANT, notified the Shaw Air Force Base commander that the demobilization of all Air Force Reserve units caused him to withdraw Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units from further SUNSHADE Exercises. 334

333

(1) Mag 0801-042-12391 (USCOMNAV In M-120881), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 220304Z Nov 61. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Mag 303742, CG USCOMNAV to CINCPACFLT, DTG 221601Z Nov 61. Gp. 4. (SECRET) Both in DCNTR PAC Div files.

334.

(1) Mag 303768, CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 230301Z Nov 61. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Mag (USCOMNAV In M-484065), CINCPACFLT to CG Shaw AFB, DTG 240554Z Nov 61. (UNCLASSIFIED) Both in DCNTR PAC Div files.

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By 15 November, the actions of the Commander in Chief, USAFLANT, had caused extensive modifications to the concept of the SUBSARAC Exercise Series. In line with General Powell's recommendations, they would now be conducted for Airborne Battle groups at home station locations, thus eliminating the intermediate staging bases from active participation. The XVIII Airborne Corps commander was designated as the director for all future SUBSARAC exercises, the overall concept of which provided for modified marshalling and unloading procedures at home station airfields, air drops at selected drop zones, and live-fire jungle group field training exercises supported by close air support missions using live ordnance. Ten C-130 aircraft were to be made available at each location on 18 November for SUBSARAC Exercise No. 2, but the number and types of aircraft for each of the three subsequent exercises would be determined by the availability of aircraft at the proper time. Headquarters, USAFLANT Forward, in coordination with Headquarters, USAFLANT APOB, was responsible for determining the time and extent of each subsequent exercise. The absence of aircraft to airdrop heavy equipment resulted in permission for units to pre-position any equipment normally delivered in this manner. Four fighter aircraft were also to be provided for the individual exercises to support ground action at each location on the first and second day and to conduct live fire exercises on the third day.³⁰³

Headquarters, USAFLANT Forward, informed General Powell on 19 November that troop carrier and fighter aircraft support requirements for SUBSARAC Exercise No. 3 were identical to those for No. 2 and that, presumably, the identical support would be required for the remainder of the exercises. At the same time, USAFLANT Forward was intent on holding to the scheduled dates, i.e., exercises to begin on Wednesdays of successive weeks. The very next day, however, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander recommended to the Commander in Chief, USAFLANT, that the remainder of the exercises begin on Tuesdays of each week. Because a possible conflict with USCOMARAC's troop roll back made an earlier date inadvisable for Exercise No. 3, it was held as previously scheduled. The USAFLANT commander did, however, reschedule Exercises No. 4 and 5 to begin on Tuesdays depending on aircraft availability.³⁰⁴

303.

(1) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-320166), CINCLANT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 231630Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag 303789, CINCPACFLT to USAFLANT Pac and CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 230100Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-321166), USAFLANT Pac to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 271631Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCSTN PAC Div files.

304.

(1) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-221437), USAFLANT Pac to CINCPACFLT, DTG 300130Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Mag (USCOMARAC In M-321343), CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT, DTG 303342Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSTN PAC Div files.

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Since the termination date for the modified SUGMADE Exercise Series had been set for 31 December, the proposed stand-down in readiness conditions and return of units to their home stations was bound to have a certain effect. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command, informed his Air Force component commander on 19 November that he proposed to continue the series of exercises if the two Airborne divisions reverted to his operational control prior to its completion. As a result, the Commander in Chief, USAFSTRIDE, issued revised instructions to his subordinate commanders concerning air support for the remainder of the SUGMADE exercises. Headquarters, USAFSTRIDE, assumed planning and control responsibilities for SUGMADE Exercise No. 3, while Headquarters, Third Air Force, received identical responsibilities for Exercises No. 4 and No. 5. 357

Logistical Training Exercise

In conjunction with the airborne training exercises just described, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, decided to hold a logistical exercise involving increments of the aerial resupply packets. The proposed logistical training exercise involved actual movement of specified increments of the aerial resupply packets from depots in the continental United States to three selected intermediate staging bases: Sanford Naval Air Station and Ops Locks and McCoy Air Force Bases in Florida. Headquarters, USAFLANT, decided that increments AAA, ARL, and ARF -- less their Class V portions -- as well as Increments AUC and ABB, would be called forward to the staging bases to arrive within a three day period beginning not later than 19 November. Headquarters, USAFLANT, reminded the Peninsula Base Command that any supplies which required special storage facilities or which might deteriorate in open storage were to be left at the depots. The staging operations proposed for the exercise did not include the actual rigging or loading of supplies and aircraft unless a further decision in this matter was made by USAFLANT. The training exercise would include only the receipt, storage, simulated rigging and holding of the supplies in question. Headquarters, USAFLANT, did not intend to include concurrent staging of the actual aircraft allocated for the automatic aerial resupply, but the staging bases were to simulate their arrival and departure. All supplies and equipment received during the exercise were to be held in storage for an indefinite period under the control of the Peninsula Base Command. 358

357.

(1) Msg (USCOMSEC In M-121642), CINOSTRIKE to CINAFSTRIDE, DTG 290344Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg (USCOMSEC In M-221679), CINAFSTRIDE to CG Sixth AF, DTG 021717Z Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in JCSSTAFF P&O Div files.

358.

Msg 290345, CG USCOMSEC to USAFLANT P&O, DTG 121154Z Nov 62, Op. 4. (SECRET). In JCSSTAFF P&O Div files.

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(S) Plans developed by the Peninsula Base Command called for the delivery of the Class I portions of Increments AAA, ABL, and AGF to Sanford Naval Air Station and the Class III and IIIA portions of these increments to McCoy Air Force Base on 19 November. Increments AUC and AIL of the Emergency Aerial Resupply Program were to be delivered to Ops Locks Air Force Base on 19 and 20 November, respectively. The Peninsula Base Command covered Headquarters, CINCLANT, that no supplies whatsoever were included in these increments which might require special storage facilities. In all a total of approximately 1,600 tons of supplies were moved to the three intermediate staging bases. At the close of the exercise, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, announced that its purpose had been twofold, both to test the reaction capability of supply sources in the continental United States, and to test the capability of each Army Staging Area Command to handle large tonnages for air shipment to overseas terminals. Both the supply sources and the Army Staging Area Commands had been found capable of meeting the supply requirements of the pertinent operation plans. 109

Training in Loading and Unloading
the Roll-on, Roll-off Vessels

(S) At the time that the Cuban Crisis occurred, both the 1st and 1st Armored Divisions were scheduled to conduct a training exercise in loading and unloading the two roll-on, roll-off vessels available to the Army for transport purposes, and CINCPAC had arranged for both the USNS COMST and the USNS TAINOS to be present at Houston, Texas, during the period 29 October to 8 November. The passage of the 1st Armored Division to the operational control of CINCLANT effectively removed that unit from the responsibility of conducting such a training exercise at that time. Moreover, both of the roll-on, roll-off vessels were assigned to the support of CINCLANT Operation Plan 314 and thus were not available for training exercises as any of the Gulf ports. 160

(S) Toward the latter part of November, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, pointed out to General Powell that the two roll-on, roll-off

109.

(1) Msg F8C-GP 1179 (USCOMBAC In M-219438), CG F8C to CINCLANT, DTG 131000Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). In DCSYR P&O Div files. (2) Briefing for Def Sub-Com, House Com on Appropriations, Gen. M. B. Powell, CG USCOMBAC, 21 Jan 63, subj: Review of Cuban Situation. Slide Nr. 30, Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

160.

(1) Msg (USCOMBAC In M-219437), CG III Corps to CINCPAC, DTG 131552Z Dec 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMBAC In M-219440), CINCPAC to CG III Corps, DTG 232104Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Com.

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vessels were then in the harbor of Savannah, Georgia, in a periodized condition. He consequently requested that both vessels be made available to his division immediately after their current cargo was unloaded in order that he might conduct loading and unloading practice training and satisfy CINCPACFLT's requirement. With the stand-down in readiness condition, both the USS COMET and the USS TARDUS completed unloading operations at Savannah on 1 December and the Commander, Atlantic Area, Military Sea Transport Service, announced that, since they were being immediately returned to normal operations, they would not be available to the Commander in Chief, USARPAC, subsequent to that date. Also, since the vessels had lost some six weeks of hauling operations to U. S. Army, Europe, it was doubtful that they could be made available in the near future for training exercises of the type envisioned.³⁶¹

Amphibious Training for the 1st Armored Division

✎ The substitution of the 1st Armored Division for the 2d Armored Division in both Task Force CHARLIE and in the Floating Reserve and On-call Echelon of Operation Plan 316 meant that a division without any amphibious training had been selected to participate in tactical amphibious assault operations. Task Force CHARLIE, scheduled for the initial amphibious assault move, was particularly affected. Since actual implementation of CINCPACFLT Operation Plan 316 was delayed, the intervening time permitted Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, to conduct amphibious training for most of the 1st Armored Division units.

Driver Training Program

✎ The Department of the Army confirmed the authority of the Commander in Chief, USARPAC, on 10 October to move Increment No. 1 of Task Force CHARLIE to Fort Lauderdale to execute rehearsals and to prelude the four allocated LST's. As a first step in this rehearsal training, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, informed General Powell on 2 November that he was sending 4 M48 tanks, 4 M41 tanks, and 1 M59 armored vehicle to Fort Lauderdale to conduct proper driver training in conjunction with the LST's. Personnel -- some 20 in number -- selected for the first driver training class included all tank commanders and drivers of Increment No. 1, Task Force CHARLIE, as well as some division supervisory personnel. The 1st Armored Division commander requested authority on 24 November to leave the equipment at Fort Lauderdale and to dispatch on

361.

(1) Msg (USCOMMAC Ia M-210805), CG 1st Armd Div to CINCPACFLT, DDC 231900Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMMAC Ia M-485448), COMUSARPAC to HQTs 3d AF Area, DTG 001413Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). Both in DCSOTE P&O Div files.

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additional eighth Task Force CHARLIE troops to Fort Lauderdale for training as soon as the first group had completed their class.³⁶² Driver training classes continued at Fort Lauderdale for all task force troops requiring this type of training.

Amphibious Training Exercises

(TOP) In the meantime, Headquarters, USARLANT, made plans to conduct actual amphibious training exercises in the Florida area. An adequate bivouac area had already been obtained in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale including covered areas with limited shower and latrine facilities capable of accommodating 1,000 troops. In addition, the port complex itself had adequate rail lines and unloading facilities.³⁶³ Increment No. 1, Task Force CHARLIE, was scheduled to kick off the training exercise during the week of 12 November. Troops, equipment, and vehicles of this increment would move by organic transportation and rail from Fort Stewart to Fort Lauderdale in accordance with established port call procedures. The entire increment, along with all equipment and vehicles, was to be combat loaded on the four allocated LST's and sail to a pre-selected training objective area. Once there, the increment was to conduct a ship to shore movement of all troops and equipment using a causeway link from the LST's to the shore, seize a limited objective, regroup, and execute a retrograde movement. The proposed training exercises were designed to give the units practice in driver training (both roll-on, roll-off techniques and driving under sand conditions), embarkation and disembarkation, lashing and tie-down techniques, and waterproofing techniques. In addition, the exercises were intended to familiarize all personnel with shipboard life, special amphibious maintenance requirements, and assault landing techniques.³⁶⁴

(TOP) As a prelude to the actual amphibious training exercises, the Commander, U. S. Navy Atlantic Amphibious Forces, agreed to provide amphibious

362.

(1) Mag 301942, CG USCOMARMC to CINCPACFLT and DCSOPS DA, DTG 311100Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET - Info used is CONFIDENTIAL). In AG TS Com. (2) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-217653), CG 1st Armd Div to CINCPACFLT, DTG 022330Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (3) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-218403), CG 1st Armd Div to CINCPACFLT, DTG 042000Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSOPS P&O Div files.

363.

(1) Mag 301767, CG USCOMARMC to CG Third Army, DTG 280010Z Oct 62. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSOPS P&O Div files. (2) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-218435), CG Third Army to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 282130Z Oct 62. Gp. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

364.

Mag 303282, CG USCOMARMC to CG's Third Army, XVIII Abn Corps, 1st Armd Div, and COMUSMACV, DTG 072124Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSOPS P&O Div files.

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orientation for all units of the 1st Armored Division while they were still stationed at Fort Stewart, making available on 12 November a team of instructors to conduct orientation training in the Fort Stewart - Savannah area. Instructional presentations included on-loading and off-loading procedures, vehicle waterproofing, sand driving, shipboard troop life, shipboard training, and such pertinent amphibious subjects as desired by the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division. The practical application of these subjects was limited by the equipment, facilities, and amphibious vessels available in the Fort Stewart - Savannah area. Only one commercial LST -- the CAL-AGRO -- was then available in Savannah harbor for training purposes. The subjects presented by the U. S. Navy instructional team attempted to highlight the problems associated with loading, movement overseas, and unloading of Armored division troop units. 185

By 8 November all preparations had been completed for the first amphibious exercise and the four U. S. Navy LST's allocated to USARLANT had already been berthed at Fort Everglades in the Fort Lauderdale port complex. Port calls were issued for the troops involved to arrive at Fort Everglades on 10 November, with a proposed embarkation date of 13 November. In the meantime, the 1st Armored Division commander requested Headquarters, USCOMARMC, to obtain maneuver rights on Hutchinson Island in St. Lucie County which was under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Army District Engineer, Jacksonville, Florida. The first increments of Task Force CHARLIE moved from Fort Stewart to Fort Everglades in three sections: 419 officers and enlisted men moved in rail passenger accommodations; 21 officers and enlisted men accompanied a freight train composed of 40 U. S. Army-owned and 22 commercial flat and gondola cars; while some 478 officers and enlisted men moved in a military convoy composed of 174 organic vehicles. The four U. S. Navy LST's -- DUVAL COUNTY, CHRISTIAN COUNTY, DOUGLASS COUNTY, and MIDDLESEX COUNTY -- departed Fort Everglades at 1814 hours, 13 November, bound for Jupiter Inlet, Florida. All four vessels were self-sustaining and carried elements of the 1st Cavalry, 8th Artillery, and 1st Armored Regiments, while the DUVAL COUNTY additionally carried four sections of beach cannony. 186

185.

(1) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-218944), CO 1st Arm Div to CG USCOMARMC, DTC 041030Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-218934), COMUSLANT to CG 1st Arm Div, DTC 110522Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSTIC P&O Div files.

186.

(1) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-218750), CO USATTC-SEA to CO Ft. Stewart, Ga., DTC 041700Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Mag (USCOMARMC In M-218930), CG 1st Arm Div to CG USCOMARMC, DTC 110040Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSTIC P&O Div files. (3) USCOMARMC DCSLOG Nov 62 Status Rpt, 101800Z Nov 62, p. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Nov 62 Dly Nov Lg, Cuban Crisis. (4) Mags (USCOMARMC In M-219443, DTC 131635Z Nov 62; M-218474, DTC 131635Z Nov 62; and M-218948, DTC 131640Z Nov 62), CO USATTC-SEA to CG USCOMARMC. (SECRET). In DCSTIC P&O Div files.

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367. While the first training exercise for increments of Task Force CHARLIE was still underway, Headquarters, USCOMSARMC, proposed the development of a second amphibious exercise for additional task force increments to be held during the week of 19 November 1962. The Commander, U. S. Navy Task Force 46, concurred in the USCOMSARMC recommendation but requested that the start of shipboard training be delayed until after 21 November in order to give the U. S. Army units involved sufficient time to offload and reload replacements as necessary.³⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, assumed that USCOMSARMC's plans for the amphibious exercises considered comparable training for the entire division. He consequently requested the use of one platoon of cargo trucks to supplement the organic vehicles of those units which were scheduled to be in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale during the period from 14 November to 17 December 1962. This additional vehicular support was required to move personnel between the base camp and the operations site and would permit a sizeable reduction in the heavy costs of commercial transportation for that purpose.³⁶⁸ By mutual agreement, the embarkation date for the second exercise was set for 14 November 1962. Port calls issued for this exercise stipulated that rail movements were to arrive at Port Everglades no later than 0800 hours, 24 November, while highway movements and truck convoys were to arrive no later than 1800 hours of the same day. Some 1300 troops were moved from Fort Stewart to Fort Lauderdale for this exercise: a total of 973 officers and enlisted men moved by military convey in 170 organic vehicles; 320 troops were moved in a commercial bus convey; and the remainder of the troops accompanied equipment by rail-freight movement. The Commander, U. S. Navy Task Force 138, arranged to conduct the second exercise at Spout Key in Tampa Bay, Florida. By 28 November 1962, Headquarters, Third Army, had completed a detailed costing of this second amphibious training exercise, with the total cost established at \$287,700.³⁶⁹

367.

(1) Mag 303992, CG USCOMSARMC to COMPREHLANT, DTG 161327Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Mag (USCOMSARMC In M-326444), CTF 44 to CG USCOMSARMC, DTG 181235Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSITE P60 Div files.

368.

Mag (USCOMSARMC In M-462188), CG 1st Armd Div to CG PAC, DTG 212100Z Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCSITE P60 Div files.

369.

(1) Mag 303435, CG USCOMSARMC to CG Third Army, DTG 191333Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Mag (USCOMSARMC In M-326275), CG USATPC-88A to CG USCOMSARMC, DTG 191800Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Mag (USCOMSARMC In M-326885), CTF 128 to CINCPACFLT, DTG 132243Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (4) Mag (USCOMSARMC In M-326301), CG Third Army to CG USCOMSARMC, DTG 181900Z Nov 62. (SECRET). All in DCSITE P60 Div files. (5) USCOMSARMC DESLOG Nov 62 Nov States Rept, 24 Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DESLOG Nov 62 Div Nov Log, Cuban Crisis.

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Proposals for Relocating the Exercises

✓ Upon completion of the second exercise, USCOMSARC planned to conduct three additional exercises in the Florida area for any remaining increment of Task Force CHARLIE and any additional 1st Armored Division units as desired by the division commander. But even prior to the initiation of the second exercise, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, desired to move the four U. S. Navy LST's from Fort Lauderdale to Savannah to cut excessive costs which resulted mainly from the necessity to transport troop units from Fort Stewart to Fort Lauderdale and return. CINCLANT additionally wanted to get the exercises away from the annual influx of Florida tourists. He did state on 17 November that the second exercise should be held as planned, but that his staff and subordinate commanders should look into the feasibility of subsequent exercises landing at Savannah and using the beaches in that area. The Commander, U. S. Navy Task Unit 44.7.2, was directed to survey the beach areas in the vicinity of Savannah and Mayport, Georgia, and to select beach areas which would be suitable for amphibious training exercises similar in scope to those then being conducted in Florida. The Commander of U. S. Navy Task Force 128, however, informed General Powell that neither Mayport nor Savannah were considered desirable for such training purposes. Since he had already made arrangements to conduct the second training exercise at Egmont Key in Tampa Bay, and since this area was actually acceptable for training purposes, he announced that he was considering the feasibility of conducting the remaining exercises at Egmont Key in lieu of Fort Lauderdale.370

✓ As a result of this information concerning the use of Egmont Key, General Powell requested the Headquarters, U. S. Army Transportation Southeast Terminal Activity, to determine the feasibility of embarking units for the three remaining exercises from the Tampa Bay area, a step which would cut the sailing time to and from Fort Lauderdale. The Terminal Activity commander was requested to explore all possibilities including over the beach loading of the LST's. In order to allay any misinterpretations of these instructions, the USCOMSARC commander emphasized that Fort Lauderdale would be retained as the embarkation point for Task Force CHARLIE in the event that Operation Plan 104 was implemented. The survey was limited by the fact that USCOMSARC did not envision any new construction or major expenditure of funds. Although the survey of the Tampa Bay area included a 100-mile stretch from Clearwater to Gasparilla Island, it uncovered no suitable facilities which could be made ready within the allowable time frame or without a major expenditure of funds. The results were

370.

(1) Memo, USCOMSARC G-2 to DODLOG, 17 Nov 62, subj: Amphibious Exercises for Task Force CHARLIE. (TOP SECRET). In DODLOG SEC Briefing Notes, 17 Nov 62. (2) Msg (USCOMSARC In M-220211), COMPHIBRON 2 to CTF 44.7.2, DTG 181630Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Msg (USCOMSARC In M-220884), CTF 128 to CINCLANT, DTG 232243Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in SECUTR P&O Div files.

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concurred in by Headquarters, U. S. Army Transportation Southeastern Terminal Activity, the Peninsula Base Command, Task Force GABLE, the Commander of U. S. Navy Task Unit 44.7.2, and the senior Coast Guard representative in the Tampa Bay area.³⁷¹ As a result of this survey, the Commander, U. S. Navy Task Unit 44.7.2, recommended that Egmont Key be dropped from consideration after completion of the second exercise and that the use of Hutchinsons Island in the Fort Pierce area -- the scene of the first exercise -- be secured for the remainder of the training exercises. He further recommended that the third and fourth exercises be combined during the period from 3 to 6 December, using Fort Everglades as the embarkation and debarkation point and Hutchinson Island as the exercise area. A final exercise under the same conditions was proposed for the period from 8 to 11 December 1962. As a result of these recommendations, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, requested Third Army for maneuver rights on Hutchinson Island for the period from 6 to 11 December, indicating that this request already had the approval of the local representatives of the U. S. Army District Engineer.³⁷²

(S) The Commander, U. S. Navy Amphibious Group 2, with the concurrence of the Commander, U. S. Navy Atlantic Amphibious Force, took exception to the proposals made for the final training exercises. He pointed out that the use of Hutchinsons Island at Fort Pierce, Florida, was neither reliable nor desirable at that time of the year due to both the weather and sea and surf conditions. In addition, the approaches to the beach and the beach gradient itself were unreliable due to shifting sand bars. Experience gained at this location during the first exercise indicated that these conditions made ships, casualties, and landing craft extremely vulnerable with regard to personnel casualties and damaged materiel. The Navy amphibious commander also pointed out that Egmont Key in Tampa Bay was not desirable because of excessive transit time and increased costs. In view of these facts, he recommended a simple method for training the remaining division elements. First, he recommended the positioning of six sections of causeway pier at Davis Island which lay just south of the entrance to Fort Everglades and requested that this area be designated as a landing beach. Units participating in each of the three remaining exercises would embark during the daytime, spend a night at sea, and land at the beach site the following day. All units would backload the same day on which they landed and return to Fort Everglades for debarkation. The three remaining exercises were scheduled to begin on 3, 5, and 7 December, respectively, thus completing all amphibious training for the 1st Armored

³⁷¹.

(1) Msg 303739, CINCSALT to CG USATTC-SEA, FPO 221435Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-330965), CG USATTC-SEA to CINCSALT, 25 Nov 62. (OFLINE). Both in DCSUTR P&O Div files.

³⁷².

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-330967), CG P&O to CG USCOMARMC, FPO 240500Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-464549), CG 1st Arm Div to CG Third Army, FPO 271750Z Nov 62. (OFLINE). Both in DCSUTR P&O Div files.

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Division by 9 December 1962. Upon completion of the training exercises, the four U. S. Navy LST's involved in the training operation would be available to return any remaining 1st Armored Division elements to Savannah, Georgia, by sea. 373

Amphibious Training Accomplishments

~~(S)~~ The amphibious training exercises described above were designed by the planning staffs for the six increments of Task Force CHARLIE and any other division elements desired by the 1st Armored Division commander. The latter commander reported at the end of the training operation that all of Task Force CHARLIE had completed its amphibious training during the first two training exercises. Participating in the third exercise beginning on 4 December were elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, which was the designated Division Floating Reserve, Operation Plan 316. After-action reports of the 1st Armored Division indicate that amphibious training at Fort Lauderdale (Fort Everglades) continued until 12 December and that by that time all combat elements of the division had participated with the exception of two mechanized infantry and two artillery battalions. When the training exercises ended on 12 December, elements of the 3d Brigade -- the On-Call Echelon on Operation Plan 316 -- were involved at Fort Lauderdale. It was determined that two battalions of the 3d Brigade would return to their home station at Fort Hood, Texas, using the four commercial LST's chartered by the Military Sea Transport Service between Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Houston, Texas. Thus, even the return trip to the home station area was used as amphibious training for the two participating battalions. 374

Training with a Landing Ship Dock (LSD)

~~(S)~~ After amphibious training exercises had begun in Florida, the 1st Armored Division commander requested the use of a U. S. Navy landing ship dock (LSD) for the purpose of practice loading. The Commander, U. S. Navy Atlantic Amphibious Force, informed USCOMARV that all U. S. Navy LSD's were combat loaded at that time and consequently were not available. In order to provide for proper attention and a study of loading problems, General Powell did make suitable arrangements with the Commander, U. S. Navy Amphibious Group 4, for appropriate representatives of the 1st Armored Division to visit one or more of the LSD's which would be at Charleston, South Carolina, during the

373.

Msg (USCOMARV to W-231346), COMPHIBRON 1 to CINCPACFLT, DTG 272242Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSUTR P&O Div files.

374.

Hq, 1st Armd Div, The Role of the 1st Armored Division in the Cuban Crisis, 1962. pp. 10 - 13. Gp. 4. (SECRET). In DCSUTR Hist Br files.

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period from 24 November to 12 December. The Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, on the other hand, arranged for a representative to merely inspect one of the recommended LSP's in order to plan training activities. He thereupon repeated his earlier request that consideration be given to providing at least one LSP to the 1st Armored Division, but added that this could be done after the current cargo of each ship was unloaded. He intended to use the vessel both for loading practice and for possible amphibious exercises at sea.³⁷⁵ His request was obstructed by the stand-down in readiness conditions and return of all units to their home stations.

Signal Units Training at Savannah, Georgia

376. By the third week in November, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, pointed out to General Powell that the equipment for the surface element of the 30th Signal Battalion (ASNC) -- including elements of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 2d Signal Group, and some highly specialized Signal equipment -- had been loaded aboard the USS TAMMAM in Garden City Terminal, Savannah, since 4 November. All of the troops assigned to these unit elements were located at the terminal and were associated with the equipment aboard ship. Consequently, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander requested instructions which would permit practice in off-loading and on-loading the communications equipment and would permit the conduct of as much communications training as possible in the local area, a request repeated four days later. The XVIII Airborne Corps commander stated that limitations placed on this training would be such that both troops and equipment could be loaded aboard ship and be ready to sail on a twenty-four hour notice. The Commander in Chief, USARLANT, approved this exercise, whereupon the XVIII Airborne Corps commander announced that it would begin at 0800 hours, 26 November, and would consist of off-loading and on-loading operations to be followed by a short seaborne phase. Upon return of the USS TAMMAM to the port of Savannah, the unit would begin conduct offloading operations and, as a final phase, conduct a communications exercise of one to two days duration at a derelict location.³⁷⁸

377.

(1) Msg 303730, CG USCOMARC to CG 1st Arm Div, DTG 212230Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg (USCOMARC In M-220804), CG 1st Arm Div to CG USCOMARC, DTG 231900Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DCSTAR M&D Div files.

378.

(1) Msg AJR81 3061 (USCOMARC In M-220468), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCARLANT, DTG 160115Z Nov 62, Op. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg AJR81 3068 (USCOMARC In M-220463), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCARLANT, DTG 161650Z Nov 62, Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) Msg (USCOMARC In M-684216), CG XVIII Abn Corps to CINCARLANT, DTG 150600Z Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). All in DCSTAR M&D Div files.

STAND DOWN AND REEMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

✍ A vital question in developing contingency plans is the ability of troops and troop units to maintain a high degree of combat readiness to meet an impending emergency for a protracted period of time. The first degree of training required to bring troop units to a high state of readiness is bound to deteriorate when these units are held in an alert status over an extended period of time. The circumstances surrounding the Cuban Crisis were such that actual conflict depended on the meeting of several ultimatums issued to the Russian Government, during which time the troop units had to be ready to react within the seven days allotted by Operation Plan 316. Despite the meeting of these ultimatums, the fact that the United States Government could never be quite sure of Russian intentions meant that U. S. military forces had to maintain a high degree of readiness over an extended period without actually initiating combat operations. Sooner or later, the prospect that armed conflict would not materialize would force consideration of a stand down in these readiness conditions. Many eventualities had to be considered first, but by the end of November the international situation had reached the point where it was no longer necessary for the United States to hold its military forces to such a "short-haul" readiness posture.

Stand Down Planning

✍ While the actual starting of army troops and troop units had only begun around 20 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 6 November were already raising the question as to the length of time that this alert posture could be maintained. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned both Admiral Gorman, CINCLANT, and General Powell, CENCLANT, as to the length of time that forces under their control could maintain an established alert posture without seriously affecting their combat capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves indicated that a date of 15 November had been already mentioned as an approximate time at which some measures for stand down should be considered dependent upon the degree of certainty that Operation Plan 316 would not be executed.¹³⁷

✍ The Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, had previously outlined the capability of his command to maintain its current operational and deployment posture without seriously affecting its combat readiness. (The entire 1st Armored Division, with a few minor exceptions, was committed either

137.

(1) Msg (USCOMS&C In E-1529), JCS to CINCENTRAL, 070 061711Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMS&C In E-1536), JCS to CINCLANT and CENCLANT, 070 061710Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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to Task Force CHARLIE, the Division Floating Reserve, or the On-Call Echelon of CINCLANT Operation Plan 116.) He had pointed out on 4 November that units of Task Force CHARLIE were already located at Fort Stewart in a virtual DEFCON 1 status. All personnel were psychologically prepared for combat and were restricted to the Fort Stewart military reservation on a three-hour alert basis. The division commander estimated that this alert posture could be maintained for approximately two weeks, or until 10 November, without seriously affecting the operational readiness of the task force. The units committed to the Division Floating Reserve were likewise in a virtual DEFCON 1 status and restricted to the Fort Stewart reservation, but on a twelve-hour alert basis. Like Task Force CHARLIE, this alert posture could be maintained for approximately two weeks without any serious effects. While the units assigned to the On-Call Echelon had not yet arrived at Fort Stewart on 4 November, the division commander indicated that he intended to place them on a five-day alert basis with a requirement to assume a six-hour operational readiness posture in the event that Operation Plan 116 was implemented. Units of the Floating Reserve could maintain such an alert posture for approximately forty-five days. The 1st Armored Division commander then went on to point out that a somewhat lesser state of readiness, such as a twenty-four hour alert basis, could be maintained for an additional thirty days (or until approximately 10 December) provided that certain of the restrictions imposed on both Task Force CHARLIE and the units of the Floating Reserve were relaxed. He suggested, in particular, a controlled relaxation of pass and uniform policies, and a controlled off-loading and re-loading of tracked equipment for firing and maintenance purposes. Since the question of a stand down in readiness conditions was already being proposed, the 1st Armored Division commander assumed that this entailed reverting to a DEFCON 4, or lesser status. He pointed out the limitations inherent in such a move, since Task Force CHARLIE would then require a maximum of forty-eight hours to regain its current readiness posture while the Floating Reserve would require seventy-two hours. The On-Call Echelon could meet any readiness posture since it was not required to move until both the task force and the floating reserve had proceeded it into the objective area. The 1st Armored Division commander did recommend that, if a stand down condition were ordered, consideration be given to a phased re-positioning of elements of his division to their home station at Fort Hood, Texas. 378

✓ On the night of November reached its mid-point without actual implementation of either CINCLANT Operation Plans 112 or 116, commanders at all levels began to examine more closely the consequences of a protracted operational readiness status for units assigned to the plans. Admiral Bannison, CINCLANT, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that while the pressure of various material factors would eventually require a reduction in the readiness posture, troop morale would remain high as long as a general feeling of purpose

378.

Msg 4611-62-16 (SECOWARC In 2-1568), CG 1st Arm Div to CG Ft. Hood, Texas, DTG 042400Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In Ad To Com.

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remained. The Army units which had been pre-positioned or alerted for movement in support of Operation Plan 316 could maintain their advanced readiness posture for a period of thirty days from the time that they were placed in that status. Admiral Benzon further indicated that, if individual passengers and unit loading requirements were relaxed, this readiness posture could be extended for an additional thirty days, thus permitting the holding of a DEFCON 3 status until 20 December without seriously affecting troop morale or unit efficiency. Consequently, a complete stand down to a lower DEFCON status was not recommended. On the positive side, Admiral Benzon made several recommendations which could assure an ability to regain the current readiness posture in a maximum of seventy-two hours, a modified posture which could be maintained until 20 December. As a first measure, he recommended the authorization of seventy-two hour-passes for 15 percent of company-size units. He also recommended authority to off-load wheeled and tracked vehicles for firing, training, and maintenance operations, but that the off-loaded equipment should not exceed that which could be reloaded for movement within seventy-two hours. In this regard, CINCLANT cautioned that cradling exercises be held to a minimum because of limited available back-up maintenance capability. Admiral Benzon then went on to point out other limiting factors which were inherent in the prolonged maintenance of an advanced readiness posture to support his operation plans. For example, the current readiness posture for Operation Plan 316 seriously affected the ability of USCOMARC to meet the requirements of other contingency plans and this deterioration was bound to increase day-by-day as personnel losses, lowered morale, and the limited training of replacements possible under DEFCON 3 conditions were felt. Furthermore, the loss of personnel on temporary duty to units committed to Operation Plan 316 temporarily limited the capabilities of the non-committed landing units, and the laying of personnel from Army schools or training installations for temporary duty assignments effectively reduced the operational capability of the Army training base to react to other contingency requirements. Admiral Benzon emphasized the fact that, while the advanced readiness posture did inflict hardships on the troops involved, the posture would be maintained until approximately 20 December if his recommendations were adopted. Factors which would have to be considered were that both morale and efficiency would suffer if the importance of the Cuban Crisis was reduced in the public view, as well as from lengthening family separations near or during the holiday season. 179

The Department of the Army formulated its plans based on a complete stand down in the readiness conditions, although it was emphasized that there was no indication that these plans would be adopted in the immediate future. For the purposes of future planning, USCOMARC was to comment on several proposed alternatives such as the return of all units to their home stations, redeployment of the 1st Armored Division at Fort Stewart, with all other units

179.

Mag (USCOMARC In M-212314), CINCLANT to JCS, DTG 141400Z Nov 62, Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG ES Com.

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returning to their home stations; or any other variation which General Powell and his staff might desire to consider. The Department of the Army also desired information as follows: significant actions which could be taken with regard to prestacked supplies; the retention of transport capabilities; and any other logistical actions which could be taken, or present arrangements which could be retained, to appreciably improve the reaction ability of the U.S. Armed Forces. The most important factor to be considered in all proposals was the required reaction time under the provisions of Operation Plan 318.³⁸⁰ In reply to this query, USCOMARMC determined that a minimum reaction time of 14 days would be required if all units were to return to their home stations which included 11 days for return to base stations; 7 days for leave purposes, maintenance, and return of equipment to parent units; 14 days to reissue equipment under Logistical Plan SEITCHENARK; and 12 days for redeployment of the troops. The retention of the 1st Armored Division at Fort Stewart would not reduce this minimum reaction time since it was based on the sea travel time required by the 158th Transportation Battalion (Boat) co and from Fort Eustis, Virginia, its home station. This unit required the longest reaction time and contained the necessary landing craft, floating cranes, tugs, and assorted harborcraft which were essential to the success of the initial amphibious assault operations. The only variation which would possibly permit a reduction of this minimum reaction time was to leave in place with caretaker detachments all equipment, supplies, and communications networks to include leased commercial facilities. If this were done, only the troops would be returned to their home stations permitting redeployment in a matter of seven days. This short reaction time, however, depended upon a stability of personnel which would result only from a policy of no losses and an immediate replacement of persons approaching their estimated time of separation. Continuation of the pre-positioned shipping was vital to the seven-day reaction time. As a matter of information which might affect the decisions made, USCOMARMC pointed out that a one-way move of the 1st Armored Division cost close to \$5 million, a figure which caused General Powell to urge that for the present, at least, Task Force CHARLIE remain at Fort Stewart and that the entire division receive amphibious training before being returned to Fort Hood, Texas. As a parting gesture, General Powell announced that leave was the best method of stand down from the viewpoint of morale. While the effects of any other method of stand down on troop morale could not be accurately measure, he felt that they certainly would be detrimental.³⁸¹

380.

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In 8-1643), SCORPUS BA to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 130137Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In 8-1644), SCORPUS BA to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 130134Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Cnn.

381.

(1) Msg 303340, CINCSOUTHLANT to USARLANT Fed, DTG 150445Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). (2) Msg 303354, CG USCOMARMC to SCORPUS BA, DTG 151350Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). Both in AG TS Cnn.

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387. The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum to the President of the United States on 14 November 1962 which dealt with the readiness of the Forces involved in Operation Plans 312 and 316 and stressed that maintenance and training shortfalls would reduce the over-all capability of these Forces if the advanced alert levels were maintained for a protracted period. They did feel that the current readiness status could be maintained for an additional thirty days without any adverse effect and recommended remaining in the current position for the immediate future. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic, and his subordinate commanders were consequently instructed to maintain the current readiness posture until otherwise directed.³⁸⁸

388. In view of the problems arising from the protracted high defense readiness conditions, General Powell informed Admiral Brandson on 23 November that relaxation of the readiness condition could be accomplished only by permitting the troops to go on leave, or to return to their home stations. In the latter event, all equipment should remain in place with caretaker detachments. General Powell further recommended a DEFCON 5 status for those units which were under alert conditions at their home stations. At the same time, he conceded that certain units and installations would have to remain operational for approximately another month because of the EVERMORE Exercise series and the 1st Armored Division's amphibious training operations.³⁸⁹ Since plans had to be developed to cope with the eventual stand down in readiness conditions, General Powell queried the Department of the Army concerning directed reaction time for Operation Plan 316 units, stationing plans for those units, funding instructions, and any other advice which the Department of the Army planning staff might consider pertinent. By that time, the Department of the Army and the Joint Staff had established a position to be maintained until such time as the United States was given positive assurance that the Soviets were acting in good faith. Minimum requirements to be considered in this regard included: maintain a capability to invade Cuba on a fourteen-day notice; return all Army units except the 1st Armored Division to their home stations where they would maintain an advanced readiness posture, and retain the 1st Armored Division at Fort Stewart, and all necessary headquarters and logistical and administrative units in their present positions in Florida. This joint position also provided for retention of the eight Military Sea Transport Service bases en route to the Atlantic ports, as well as the two roll-on, roll-off vessels. In addition, it was still considered necessary to cancel the eleven LST's from the U. S. Navy Reserve Fleet in order to provide optimum amphibious support in the objective area. All Forces of the Continental Air Defense Command in the southeastern United States would retain

389.

Msg 7441 (INFOBANG In M-220017), JOB to CINCSACANT, DPO 172324Z Nov 62. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Con.

390.

Msg 303733, CINCSACANT to CINCLANT, DTG 220025Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Con.

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their present posture except that the missile battery which USCOMARMC had provided at Hanesand Air Force Base could be returned to its home station since it was no longer needed.³⁸⁴

~~(C)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined for the Secretary of Defense their ideas of a readiness posture for both short range and long range periods on 24 November. The first period (short range) extended until 20 December with the second or long range period beginning on that date. (They chose 20 December because it was felt that Khrushchev's commitments would be met by that time). Operation Plan 316 would be continued during the first period with a reaction time of fourteen days, but during the second period the reaction time would be lengthened to eighteen days based on the length of time required for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade to travel from its California base via the Panama Canal. Two days later, in attempting to explain the significance of these decisions to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, the USCOMARMC commander indicated that certain major units would have to be pre-positioned and that any definitive plans developed for a reduced readiness posture would have to provide for the reception of all communications equipment, certain supplies in the forward area, elements of the Army Staging Area Commands, and certain pre-positioned units. According to estimates developed by the USCOMARMC planning staff, approximately 13,000 troops would be permitted to return to their home stations while an additional 13,500 would remain in their present locations. General Powell further stated that revised plans would have to consider the fact that shipping could not be retained indefinitely and that once the roll-on, roll-off vessels were released, they could not be expected for use prior to D-plus-10-days. While the revised plans could count on using the eight LST's then available for assault operations, the eleven LST's of the U. S. Navy Reserve Fleet should not be included until they were actually made available. For the purpose of the revised plans, moreover, D-day was to be considered as occurring at least seven days prior to D-day.³⁸⁵

Suspension of the Cuban Quarantine

~~(C)~~ The first indication that a stand down in readiness conditions might be in order occurred on Tuesday, 20 November 1962, when Admiral Benmore, CINELANT, directed the Commander, U. S. Navy Task Force 117, to discontinue the Cuban Quarantine Operations. This directive was a result of actions which had occurred earlier in the day in Washington, D. C., when

384.

(1) Msg 303753, CG USCOMARMC to USCOMAR DA, DTG 201728Z Nov 62, Co. 3, (SECRET). In USCOMAR P60 Div files. (2) Msg 8-1713 (USCOMARMC In M-330439), DA ME to CG USCOMARMC, DTG 201942Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

385.

TELECOM (USCOMARMC In M-220432), DA War Room with Hq, USCOMARMC, DTG 240158Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com.

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President Kennedy had announced at a press conference that the Soviets had agreed to remove all ILL8 aircraft in Cuba within thirty days and that, in view of this agreement, he was lifting the quarantine of Cuba as soon. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Admiral Bennett to immediately lift the sea quarantine and to return the Atlantic Fleet ships to their respective home ports and normal areas of operation. While the lifting of the quarantine did not mean a complete fulfillment of Soviet commitments, it did mean that the possibility of conflict had been lessened and that the United States had until 30 December to determine whether the Soviet commitment was being fulfilled. Soviet intentions and actions at this point seemed to indicate that the need for a high state of operational readiness for units committed to Operation Plan 316 was diminishing in importance.³⁸⁶

Lessening of the DEFOOM Status -- COMUS-MIA

✓ The matter of retaining a high degree of readiness for a protracted period affected not only those units assigned to Operation Plan 316 a. in support of that plan, but all STRAC and STRAF units which had been placed in DEFOOM 3 status on 22 October. As early as 5 November, the Third Army commander recommended that all units under his jurisdiction which had been placed on DEFOOM 3 status be permitted to revert to DEFOOM 4 status on or about 9 November. By way of explanation, he indicated that the maintenance, training and morale of these units would be adversely affected to a significant degree if they were retained in such a high degree of readiness beyond that date. At the same time he estimated that the units in question could re-attain their present readiness posture within a matter of seventy-two hours.³⁸⁷ But, as was indicated earlier, the general consensus at that time was that any and all units would hold a high readiness posture for approximately thirty days from the time that they were placed on alert.

✓ The first break in the high readiness conditions occurred on 17 November 1962 when Headquarters, USCOMSAC, changed the pass limitations for all units assigned to, or in support of Operation Plan 316. This gesture, which was intended as a morale booster, also presaged a lessening of the DEFOOM status for the units concerned. Headquarters, USCOMSAC, authorized the absence of 15 percent of a unit's personnel as follows: 10 percent for a maximum of 72 hours and the remaining 15 percent for a maximum of 24 hours.

³⁸⁶.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC to M-210317), GENCLANT to CTF 137, DTG 210254Z Nov 62, Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSTW P&O Div Files. (2) Msg, O. 8, Atlantic Com, GENCLANT Historical Account of the Cuban Crisis - 1963, 29 Apr 63, p. 107. Op. 1. (TOP SECRET). In AG 15 Com.

³⁸⁷.

Msg (USCOMSAC to M-210199), CG, Third Army to CG, USCOMSAC, DTG 051700Z Nov 62, (SECRET). In DCSTW P&O Div Files.

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All troops authorized to be absent on pass, however, had to be capable of returning to their unit on four hours notice.¹⁸⁸

(U) After the Joint Chiefs of Staff had presented a plan to the Secretary of Defense on 17 November for relaxing the Operation Plan 316 reaction time to eighteen days, they directed a return to DEFCON 3 status on a world-wide basis. Joint or specified commanders in chief were authorized to retain a higher DEFCON status for their respective areas, or for Forces under their operational control, if such was required to assure appropriate responsiveness to the military requirements of the current Cuban situation or other world tensions.¹⁸⁹ This meant, of course, that the DEFCON status for all non-Operation Plan 316 units could be lowered immediately. The Commanding General, USCOMARAC, notified his COMUS Army commanders at 1800 hours, 18 November that a DEFCON 3 status was in effect upon receipt of his notification except for those units assigned to, or in support of, Operation Plan 316, and those A1AF Air Defense units which had been deployed to the Florida area. The above mentioned units remained in DEFCON 3 status, but General Powell expected very shortly to have additional instructions. He consequently alerted the COMUS Army commanders to the fact that all pre-positioned units assigned to, or in support of, Operation Plan 316 would be returning to their home station in the immediate future, and directed them to be prepared to operate on a twenty-four hour basis in order to effectively supervise the operation.¹⁹⁰

(U) Since planning for the return of these units was already proceeding at a lively pace, General Powell, on that same day, recommended to Admiral Dennison that all Operation Plan 316 units and support forces be placed in a DEFCON 3 status as well. To support this recommendation, he pointed out that all Army units pre-positioned in the southeastern portion of the United States were prepared to move to their home stations as soon as authorized by Admiral Dennison to do so. General Powell also recommended that authority to implement a lower DEFCON status be simultaneously delegated to the Commanders in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, and U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic

188.

Msg 100630, CG USCOMARAC to CG's, First three Sixth Armies, XVIII Air Corps and PSC, PSC 172018Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSUTR P&O Div files.

189.

(1) Msg 7535 (USCOMARAC In M-221043), JCS to CINCLANT, et al, PSC 272144Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg 932138 (USCOMARAC In M-221043), JCSOPS SA to CG USCOMARAC, PSC 221544Z Nov 62. Op. 3. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSUTR P&O Div files.

190.

Msg 101847, CG USCOMARAC to CG, First three Sixth Armies, PSC 221300Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSUTR P&O Div files.

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Command to insure proper coordination. On the following day, while preparing to issue instructions to the Commanding General, Third Army, General Powell notified Admiral Bennessen that he was placing all Operation Plan 316 units and support forces on DEFCON 3 status immediately unless directed otherwise. While informal authority for a lower DEFCON status was granted to Headquarters, USOMARC, at the time, the actual directive from CINCLANT authorizing a reversion to DEFCON 3 status for all elements of U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, was dispatched some forty minutes (1344 hours) after General Powell had notified the Third Army commander that all units, installations, and headquarters under the control of the Commanding General, USOMARC, were immediately reverting to DEFCON 3 status.³⁹¹

Relief of Key Personnel

(U) The apparent stand down in readiness conditions and preparations for the return of Operation Plan 316 units to their home stations permitted the release of Lt. Gen. John E. Waters, Commanding General, Fifth Army, from his temporary duty assignment as Acting Deputy Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command, effective 24 November 1962. General Waters had been assigned this temporary duty in addition to his regular duty approximately one month earlier when Lt. Gen. Louis M. Trueman, Deputy Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command had been assigned on temporary duty to Admiral Bennessen's staff for the duration of the Cuban emergency.³⁹²

Relief of Temporary Duty Personnel

✓ The Department of the Army directed the USOMARC Commander on 10 November to remove all individuals then attached to Operation Plan 316 units on a temporary duty basis to their home stations without delay. Since it was realized at the departmental level that the release of such personnel would probably reduce the deployable strengths of certain units below established acceptable levels, USOMARC was directed to take whatever actions necessary to bring the units up to minimum deployable strengths through permanent change of station assignments. But an allocation of personnel was included to meet these demands. Additional individuals who had been attached on a temporary duty basis to units or activities in support of Operation Plan 316 were to be returned to their parent units at home stations as quickly as

391.

(1) Msg 303846, CG USOMARC to CINCLANT, DTG 282345Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg 303838, CG USOMARC to CINCLANT, DTG 291850Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (3) Msg 303850, CG USOMARC to CG Third Army, DTG 291804Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (SECRET). (4) Msg (USOMARC In 8-221415), CINCLANT to CINCLANT, DTG 291844Z Nov 62. Gp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in RCDUTE P&O Div files.

392.

USOMARC CO 113, 27 Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED).

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possible subject to the overriding requirement for effecting a smooth phase out of support activities. In any event, they were to be returned to home stations prior to Christmas, if possible.³⁹³

(S) Three days later, the Commanding General, U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, informed General Powell that all U. S. Air Force personnel then on temporary duty with U. S. Army units would remain in that status and would not be released prior to their directed termination date without the express approval of his headquarters. He did outline a number of exceptions to this rule but indicated that USCOMARAC should inform his headquarters as to whether replacements would be required for any such personnel who were released.³⁹⁴

Planning for the Return of Units to Home Stations

(S) The Department of the Army requested information from USCOMARAC as early as 24 November 1962 as to units which could be moved to their home stations and still maintain a fourteen-day reaction time. Specific information desired at that time included the number of troops which could be moved and the numbers required for a caretaker detachment at each location. The fourteen-day reaction time was predicated on the retention of the major portion of the 1st Armored Division in its pre-positioned location. Headquarters, USCOMARAC, passed this request to USARLANT Forward for computation of the pertinent reaction times, designation of units to be moved in entirety, the size and composition of caretaker detachments, and other pertinent data. As a basis for computing the required information, USARLANT Forward defined D-day as occurring on E-plus-14-days, and concluded that communications would have to be operational by E-plus-7-days and that USARLANT Forward would be operational by E-plus-10-days. All caretaker detachments left behind at the pre-positioned locations would have to contain the minimum essential personnel to perform such necessary details as maintenance, guard, fatigue, and the like.³⁹⁵ On the basis of figures furnished by USARLANT Forward, it was determined that approximately 13,000 troops would be permitted to return to

³⁹³.

Msg 922257 (USCOMARAC In M-321545), DCORPS DA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 302048Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCORPS P&O Div files.

³⁹⁴.

Msg (USCOMARAC In M-324699), COMUSMACV to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 010332Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCORPS P&O Div files.

³⁹⁵.

(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-320690), DCORPS DA to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 241700Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg 18-0, USARLANT Fwd to COMUSMACV, DTG 250216Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCORPS P&O Div files.

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their home station while an additional 13,300 would be retained in pre-positioned locations as follows:³⁹⁰

<u>STATION</u>	<u>Mr. Returning to Home Station</u>	<u>Mr. Remaining</u>
<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>13,063</u>	<u>13,320</u>
Atlantic General Depot, Georgia	55	0
ASAC - Eglin AFB, Florida	661	99
Fort Stewart - Savannah, Georgia	1,123	0
Homestead AFB, Florida	814	189
ASAC - Key West International airport, Florida	72	13
Fort Everglades, Florida	357	885
ASAC - MacDill AFB, Florida	32	34
ASAC - McCoy AFB, Florida	730	104
Opa Locks AFB, Florida	2,283	343
ASAC - Detrick AFB, Florida	297	81
ASAC - Sanford HAD, Florida	756	90
Fort Stewart, Georgia	3,140	11,467
ASAC - Tyndall AFB, Florida	340	90
St. Petersburg, Florida	117	10

By 23 November there was no longer a question of retaining the 1st Armored Division in its pre-positioned location and plans were to be prepared for return of all units to their home stations as quickly as possible. At approximately 1300 hours on that date, General Powell notified the Third Army commander that he was transferring the Fort Meade Base Command to the latter's operational control as of 1200 hours and that all units, installations, and headquarters reverted immediately to a DESPOON 3 status, all of which had been made possible by the establishment of an eighteen-day reaction time for Operation Flans J16 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Third Army commander was responsible for planning and implementing the return of all units to their proper station locations when so directed. Amphibious training which was then being conducted for elements of the 1st Armored Division was to be completed and operations at Fort Lauderdale would be continued until that time. USCOMARV directed that the entire 1st Armored Division be returned to Fort Hood and that, where feasible, selected divisional elements be returned by means of available amphibious shipping to ports as close to their home station as possible. Organic transportation was authorized for the return of any and all units wherever this method was practicable. A minimum caretaker detachment was to remain at USARLANT Forward for the purpose of securing and periodically testing the communications equipment. The only units exempted

³⁹⁰.

USARLANT SOC Stry Briefing, 26 Nov 62, pp. 10 - 11. (TOP SECRET).
La AG TS Com.

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from this directive were the USCOMSAC Air Defense missile units then in the Florida area which, for the time being, would remain under the operational control of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Defense Command. The return of the support units was to be phased in such a way that Third Army would be able to provide adequate medical care, communications, transportation, and other required support during the entire phase out period.³⁹⁷

Orders to begin actual movement of units were dispatched to Third Army on the morning of the following day. The Third Army commander was authorized to immediately begin movement of all Operation Plan 316 troop list units and support forces and to proceed at a rate commensurate with optimum administrative efficiency with a deadline of 20 December 1962, for all units to close at home stations. Operational control of all Operation Plan 316 units and support forces passed to the Commanding General, Third Army, effective with the receipt of the USCOMSAC directive, with the exception of the Air Defense missile units under the operational control of the Commanding General, USADCOM, and certain Signal units which remained under the operational control of USARLANT Forward. Operational control of all affected units reverted to their normal commanders when the units closed at home stations. USCOMSAC established the following priority for movement:

1. Units having organic transportation and not required for Operation ROLL UP.
2. Equipment on the USSS COMET and the USSS TAURUS.
3. Units having the greatest distance to travel.
4. Units formerly required for staging operations.
5. All other units not required for the ROLL UP operations.

Since the amphibious training for the 1st Armored Division was to continue until its completion, both Fort Everglades and the 15th Transportation Battalion (Boat) were directed to remain operational until that time. All units returning to their home stations were directed to maintain an eight-day reaction capability.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁷.

Msg 101860, CG USCOMSAC to CG Third Army, DTG 290840Z Nov 62. Cp. 4. (SECRET). In DCSUTH P&O Div files.

³⁹⁸.

(1) Msg (USCOMSAC In M-321486), CINCLANT to CINCLANT, DTG 101318Z Nov 62. Cp. 4. (SECRET). (2) Msg 101860, CG USCOMSAC to CG's First three South Armas, DTG 300840Z Nov 62. Cp. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSUTH P&O Div files.

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Operation SOUL UP

(U) Even before Headquarters, USCOMARC, assigned responsibility to Third Army both for planning and actually implementing the return of Operation Plan 318 units and support forces to their home stations, USARLANT Forward assigned to the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, the responsibility for coordinating and implementing all matters pertaining to the transportation of Army units from their pre-positioned locations. Matters involved in this instance included survey clearances, requests for commercial transportation, and technical assistance in loading, blocking, and bracing of unit equipment. At the same time, the Peninsula Base Command was directed to designate a single point of contact between the Army and the Air Force at each installation concerned. This was the major reason that prompted USCOMARC to place the Peninsula Base Command under the operational control of the Commanding General, Third Army, effective 29 November, 1959.

By the time that Headquarters, USCOMARC, gave the orders at 0340 hours, 10 November, to begin movement of units, a task of great magnitude was facing both Third Army and the Peninsula Base Command. Movement records indicated that a total of 25,373 troops had been moved to the Florida area or other East Coast installations and included 15,429 1st Armored Division troops (troops of the 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery, are included in this figure), 2,460 troops of other Operation Plan 318 units, and a total of 7,484 troops in the support forces of the Peninsula Base Command.⁴⁰⁰ Initial movements in Operation SOUL UP -- as it was designated by Third Army -- began immediately after receipt of the USCOMARC implementing directive. The two roll-on, roll-off vessels immediately began discharge operations which were completed by 1800 hours, 1 December. The first equipment off the vessels was that of the 50th Signal Battalion which had conducted offloading and reloading practice with the USS TAURUS some weeks previous. As a result of early discharge of the equipment in question, the 50th Signal Battalion was the first unit to depart the pre-positioned location at Garden City Terminal, Savannah, Georgia, at 0800 hours, 28 November, for its home station at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁴⁰¹ Third Army issued additional implementing instructions for Operation SOUL UP on 1 December which lifted all restrictions on pass and leave policy for the entire Third Army Area. At the same time, the Commanding General, Third Army, directed all pertinent subordinate commanders to return

399.

Msg (USCOMARC to M-484177), USARLANT Fwd to CG FPO, DTG 241842Z Nov 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCSRTR FPO For files.

400.

DF, DCSLOG to CofS, 11 Dec 62, sub: Daily Status of Movements -- Soul Up (U). ATLOG-MEM-25348. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Admin Br files.

401.

USCOMARC DCSLOG Nov 86, Nov Status Rpts, 1 Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Nov Br Bty Nav Log, Cuban Crisis.

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temporary duty personnel to their parent units and home stations as soon as operational requirements permitted, but troops in this category were not to be delayed beyond 30 December 1962. In the meantime, USCOMARAC authorized the departure of numerous units at the Various Army Staging Area Commands in Florida on 1 December 1962, and notified CINCLANT of the major units at Fort Stewart (with the exception of the 1st Armored Division) which were authorized to depart on 2 and 3 December. Operation ROLL UP began full-scale operations on 2 December when 4 units departed for home station via rail, 8 additional units departed via highway convoy, and the troops of 6 units departed by air.⁴⁰²

While the actual troop movements had begun on a full-scale basis on 2 December, it was not until approximately 1200 hours, 3 December, that the Third Army commander authorized the Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, to move units to their home stations in accordance with previously submitted movement schedules. At the same time, the Peninsula Base Commander informed all of his subordinate commanders that Operation ROLL UP would have to be conducted in an orderly manner and in a phased program which would take priority over all other activities. He pointed out that the units required to conduct Operation ROLL UP functions would be retained as long as necessary and would not, under any condition, be released until all applicable requirements were met. He stated that inspection teams from the Peninsula Base Command would visit each Army Staging Area Command and the U. S. Army Transportation Southeastern Terminal Activity prior to the departure of the last troops so as to insure that all required actions were completed, that the areas were properly policed, and to determine the status of real estate at that time.⁴⁰³

In order to provide sufficient rolling stock for the retrograde movement of the 1st Armored Division to Fort Hood, the Third Army commander directed all subordinate installations and commanders to move the empty U. S. Army-owned rail cars then held in the Fort Snelling STRAC pool to Fort Stewart as quickly as possible. In addition, all flat cars of this category used by Fort Stewart and the Savannah export to move the 2d Battalion, 45th Armor,

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(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-483317), CG Third Army to CG USAIC, Ft. Rensselaer, DTG 021704Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Msg 103324, CG USCOMARAC to CINCLANT, DTG 021707Z Dec 62. (SECRET). Both in POSUTR P&O Div files. (3) RF, POSLOC to G-03, 3 Dec 62, subj: Daily Status of Movements -- Roll Up (D), SILOC-MOV-23039, w/Encl, subj: Status Rpt, 021800 - 021800 Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In POSLOC Admin Br files.

⁴⁰³.

(1) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-483706), CG Third Army to CG FBC, DTG 021735Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Msg (USCOMARAC In M-221807), CG FBC to CG USCOMARAC, DTG 021700Z Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in POSUTR P&O Div files.

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to Fort Stewart were to be expeditiously unloaded and returned to Fort Stewart.⁴⁰⁴ With the major rail movements for the 1st Armored Division scheduled to begin on 1 December, the Third Army commander informed the Director, Defense Traffic Management Service (DTMS), that all movements were subject to the availability of rail cars for the divisional equipment which would move in sections beginning on that date and ending on 17 December. While Third Army and the Peninsula Base Command had planned to move the 1st Armored Division troops by rail between 1 and 18 December, passenger cars still presented the same problem as was seen in the move to Georgia at the end of October. Other deterrent factors in this regard included the overloaded conditions of the rail yards which would be aggravated by the addition of passenger coaches and the estimated travel time of three to four days between Fort Stewart and Fort Hood. The Third Army commander consequently recommended that DTMS consider the movement of troops by air. By noon of the following day, Maj. Gen. Sewell Morris, Director of the Defense Traffic Management Service, forwarded to USCOMARMC a report of the American Association of Railroads that a critical shortage of flat cars would exist for the next forty-eight hours. General Morris consequently took action to freeze flat car demands for commercial use until assets were redistributed. Third Army, on the other hand, indicated that a lack of flat cars for a period of such short duration would not adversely affect their planned administrative troop moves. By 13 December both Third Army and DTMS reported that no significant shortages of rail equipment had occurred up to that point and that ample rolling stock was available in the Georgia and Florida area to complete the troop movements as scheduled.⁴⁰⁵

✓ The final equipment train of the 1st Armored Division departed Fort Stewart, Georgia, at 1700 hours, 15 December, while the final air movement of 1st Armored Division troops (a rear detachment of forty-five officers and enlisted men) departed the Savannah area at 2000 hours, 17 December. By 18 December, Operation ROLL UP went into its final phase as small rear detachments of Peninsula Base Command units which had remained behind to assist in ROLL UP operations moved to their home stations. The entire 1st Armored Division closed at Fort Hood by 19 December with the exception of one train which was delayed for some time at Memphis, Tennessee, due to a hot box and faulty brakes; that train did arrive at Fort Hood by 1900 hours, 20 December, to keep within the established deadline. The 159th Transportation Battalion

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Msg (USCOMARMC In M-485603), CG Third Army to CG, USCOMARMC, DTG 022100Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCSMIR P&O Div files.

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(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-485724), CG Third Army to Dir/DTMS, DTG 031600Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCSMIR P&O Div files. (2) DF, DCSLOG to CGCS, 5 Dec 62, subj: Daily Status of Movements -- Roll Up (U), ATLOG-NOV-25542. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) DF, same to same, 14 Dec 62, subj: as above, ATLOG-NOV-25552. (UNCLASSIFIED). Both in DCSLOG Admin Br files.

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STATUS OF DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS

20 December 1962

A. Deployed into Third Army Area	-	<u>23,473</u>	
(1) 1st Armored Division			(15,428)
(2) Other Operation Plan 316 Units			(2,366)
(3) Peninsula Base Command Units			(7,684)
B. Reported Closed at Home Station	-	23,724	
(1) 1st Armored Division Units			(14,359)
(2) Other Operation Plan 316 Units			(2,366)
(3) Peninsula Base Command Units			(7,000)
C. Remaining in Third Army Area	-	223	
(All from Peninsula Base Command Units)			
D. Returning to Home Stations on Individual Travel Basis (ETS, Leave, Hospital, etc.)	-	1,530	
(1) 1st Armored Division			(1,170)
(2) Peninsula Base Command Units			(360)

SOURCE: Final Rpt., DCSLOG Mov Br., 20 Dec 62, subj: Status of Movements -- Roll Up (U). p. 1. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Admin Br files.

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(Boat) did not remain in the Florida area for the completion of the 1st Armored Division amphibious exercises as earlier directed but departed for their home station at Fort Eustis, Virginia, after the completion of the second exercise on 4 December. The entire battalion closed at Fort Eustis by 18 December with the exception of one Q-boat which was left at the Charleston Transportation Depot for repairs and the LCU-1573 which was still under U. S. Navy control on a special mission project at Key West, Florida. The LCU was finally released by the Navy at 1500 hours, 19 December, and departed some three hours later for Fort Eustis, where it was expected to arrive some time on 27 December.⁴⁰⁶

Final Status of Operation Plan 116 Units and Support Forces⁴⁰⁷

✓ With Operation ROLL UP completed in the Florida - Georgia area by 20 December, only 225 troops remained, all of whom belonged to units of the Peninsula Base Command. An additional 24 of these were scheduled to depart for their home stations from Opa Locka and Eglin Air Force Bases by 22 December. In the 30 day period allocated for Operation ROLL UP, 25,254 troops had been moved from pre-positioned locations in Florida and Georgia to their home stations. (See Chart 4.) Of the 25,254 troops moved by official travel orders in unit packets, etc., 12,317 traveled to home stations by air, 3,334 moved via highway convoys (both commercial bus and organic vehicles); 4,136 moved in rail passenger accommodations; and an additional 1,917 moved via water. The last category included personnel of the 159th Transportation Battalion (Boat) and troops of the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, who traveled from Fort Lauderdale to Beaumont, Texas, via LST.⁴⁰⁸ Movement of this vast number of troops required a total of 187 water lifts, 33 rail movements, 112 commercial air movements, and 101 convoys (11 bus convoys and 90 convoys composed of organic vehicles). The 33 trains required to move not only the 1st Armored Division but other Operation Plan 116 units and support forces, required a total of 2,489 rail cars, of which 2,152 were flat cars.

406.

(1) DF, DCSLOG to CGS, 17 Dec 62, subj: Daily Status of Movements -- ROLL UP (U), ATLOG-NOV-2554. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) DF, Same to same, 19 Dec 62, subj: as above, ATLOG-NOV-2554. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) DF, Same to same, 20 Dec 62, subj: as above, DCSLOG-NOV. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCSLOG Admin & Files.

407.

Entire para is based on: Final Rept, USCOMARC DCSLOG Nov 62, 20 Dec 62, subj: Status of Movements -- Roll Up (U). (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Admin & Files.

408.

See below, pp. 209-41.

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Subsequent to 22 December 1962 a total of 281 support force personnel were stationed in Florida as follows:

<u>ASAC</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOT</u>
Ops Looka AFB	3d Logistical Command		36
	Det. 525th Signal Co.		39
Patrick AFB	Det. 188th Signal Co.		10
McCoy AFB	Det. 188th Signal Co.		13
Eglin AFB	Det. 325th Signal Co.		18
Tyndall AFB	Det. 525th Signal Co.		11
Key West Inter- national Airport	Det. 593d Signal Co.		11
Sanford HSB	Det. 168th Signal Co.		10
Homestead AFB	Det. 593d Signal Co.		47
	Det. 2d Ordnance Co.		58
	Det. 16th Finance Bn		6

In addition to the Operation Plan 316 support forces a total of 1,925 troops remained in the Florida area with the air defense missile units and their organic support under the operational control of the Commanding General, USARADCOM, as well as support units specifically placed in the area by Third Army to support the USARADCOM units. At the completion of Operation ROLL UP, there was no known departure date established for these troops.

Use of LST's to Transport the 1st Armored Division

✓ In developing his recommendations for the final phases of amphibious training for elements of the 1st Armored Division, the Commander, U. S. Navy Amphibious Group 2, with the concurrence of the Commander, U. S. Navy Atlantic Amphibious Forces, stated on 27 November that, upon completion of the training exercises, the four U. S. Navy LST's involved would be available to transport the remaining 1st Armored Division elements from Fort Lauderdale to Savannah. On the basis of this recommendation, General Powell went further and directed the Third Army commander to use available amphibious shipping where feasible to return elements of the 1st Armored Division to Gulf ports as close to their home station as possible.⁴⁰⁹

✓ In commenting on this directive, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, pointed out that the LST's then assigned to Operation Plan 316 would have to be returned to the control of the Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, and,

⁴⁰⁹.

(1) Msg (UNCOMSARC In M-121205), COMBIBRON 3 to COMSIBARANT, SPO 171242Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg 303640, CG UNCOMSARC to CG Third Army, SPO 191804Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (SECRET). Both in DCSTAF PAC Dev Files.

~~SECRET~~

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consequently, the four U. S. Navy LST's allocated to Task Force CHARLIE would have to be released from assignment to the 1st Armored Division immediately upon completion of the amphibious training exercises on 12 December. In the meantime, however, all four commercial LST's which had been leased by the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) for use by U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, were moved to Fort Lauderdale to participate in the amphibious exercises, making a total of eight amphibious vessels available for that purpose. General Powell directed a request to Admiral Dennison for all eight vessels to be used to transport elements of the 1st Armored Division from Florida to Beaumont. In addition, he requested the use of a Landing Ship Dock (LSD) for the same purpose, in order to give elements of the 1st Armored Division practice in the use of such a vessel. In reply to these requests, Admiral Dennison pointed out that a minimum of eighteen days transit time would be required by the LST's for such a mission and that two of the vessels required time for maintenance and preparation prior to being returned to the operational control of the Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, in mid-January. Because of this reason, and the fact that he desired to have his units in port during the holiday season, he could not approve General Powell's request, nor could he provide an LSD for that purpose since all such type vessels would be used to transport U. S. Marine forces to their home bases. ⁴¹⁰

Since the four commercial LST's had been leased for the specific use of the U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, they were available to transport selected elements of the 1st Armored Division from Fort Lauderdale to Beaumont. In addition, as earlier recommended, the four U. S. Navy LST's had to return to Charleston, South Carolina, and thus were available to transport the remaining portion of the 1st Armored Division from Fort Lauderdale to Savannah where the equipment could be loaded on rail cars for shipment along with other elements of the division. The eight LST's were sufficient to transport all personnel and equipment of the divisional units which completed their training exercises at Fort Lauderdale on 10 December, thus obviating the need for rail equipment for this purpose in the Florida area. The four U. S. Navy LST's departed Fort Lauderdale at 1630 hours, 11 December, for Savannah carrying 243 troops and a total of 130 vehicles -- the residue remaining after the commercial LST's had been loaded. The four commercial LST's departed at 1730 hours, 11 December, bound for Beaumont, Texas, carrying 708 troops and a total of 259 vehicles, 177 trucks and

410.

(1) Msg (ESCOMARC In N-221534), CINCLANT to CINCSARLANT, DTG 102130Z Nov 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Msg (ESCOMARC In N-221843), CINCLANT to CINCSARLANT, DTG 031030Z Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in SCUTE P&O Div files.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

trailers were carried on the upper decks while M2 tracked vehicles were carried on the lower or tank decks.⁴¹¹

☞ All four vessels arrived at Beaumont between the hours of 1630 and 2200 on 16 December with discharge operations beginning on the morning of 17 December. Personnel and equipment were moved mainly by convoy, using both commercial barges and organic vehicles but cog trains were required to move tracked vehicles from Beaumont to Fort Hood.⁴¹²

Evaluation of Beaumont, Texas, as a Port of Embarkation

☞ Although the move of 1st Armored Division troops through the Port of Beaumont via LST was strictly a commercial movement, General Powell desired an evaluation of Beaumont as a port of embarkation. His transportation staff pointed out that the unloading exercise had provided an excellent medium to test the discharge of LST's at that port, an important point since Beaumont would be used as an encroaching port for both the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions. The U. S. Army Transportation Gulf Terminal Command was both surprised and pleased at the rapidity with which the four LST's were discharged by contract labor gangs, as well as by the exceptional assistance rendered by the port authorities. While the Terminal Command had estimated some forty-eight hours for the discharge operations, only twenty-eight hours were actually required. The Terminal Command felt that U. S. Navy LST's could be discharged just as rapidly as commercial LST's. Port authorities at Beaumont extended "preferential rights" to military cargo, which meant that they were willing to expedite all military cargo as much as possible. At the time of the unloading exercise, Beaumont port facilities provided a capability to simultaneously unload eight conventional vessels and two LST's. A joint Terminal Command - Port Authority study was undertaken with a view to expanding the LST berthing facilities to four vessels, the expansion could easily be accomplished with a minimum amount of grading to the beach then in use. The Gulf Terminal Command had already established a permanent outpost at Beaumont and informed Headquarters, USCOMBAC, that the outpost staff would be expanded to meet any additional traffic demands placed upon it. General Powell's transportation

⁴¹¹.

(1) WF, DCSLOG to CoGS, 11 Dec 62, subj: Daily Status of Movements -- Roll Up (U), ATLOG-MFW-25348. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) WF, same as same, 12 Dec 62, subj as above, ATLOG-MFW-25350 (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) WF, same as same, 13 Dec 62, subj as above, ATLOG-MFW-25351. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCSLOG Admin Br files.

⁴¹².

WF, DCSLOG to CoGS, 17 Dec 62, subj: Daily Summary of Movements -- Roll Up (U), ATLOG-MFW-25354. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DCSLOG Admin Br files.

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advisers recommended that these facts be taken into consideration when the surface movement schedules for Operation Plan 316 were revised.⁴¹³

Release of Roll-on, Roll-off Vessels

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the Chief of Naval Operations on 10 November to resume to normal operations the MSTS nuclear transports and the two roll-on, roll-off vessels then supporting Operation Plan 316. Since the possibility still existed that the operation plan might be implemented in the near future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Chief of Naval Operations that, if and when they made a decision to implement Operation Plan 316, he was automatically authorized to recall both the nuclear transports and the roll-on, roll-off vessels from the Atlantic area without completion of the voyage in progress. As a result of this directive, the Commander of the Atlantic Area, Military Sea Transport Service, announced that unloading operations were completed for the two roll-on, roll-off vessels on 1 December and that he had directed the MSTS representative at Savannah to immediately issue appropriate orders for these vessels. Consequently, the two vessels in question would not be available to the U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, after 1 December unless the Cuban Crisis worsened and the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the implementation of Operation Plan 316.⁴¹⁴

Discontinuance of Special Unit

(U) The special unit which had been organized in anticipation that Operation Plan 316 would be implemented had become superfluous by the end of November. The 1st Press Camp (Provisional) (CA), which had been designed to provide complete press coverage for the assault and combat operations in the Cuban area, was discontinued at Fort Rustle as of 10 November 1962. The supplies and equipment of this unit, with the exception of vehicles, reverted to the control of the Commanding General, Fort Rustle, for storage and maintenance pending further instructions. The unit's vehicles were to be immediately absorbed in logistical channels at Fort Rustle for final disposition under appropriate regulations and directives.⁴¹⁵

413.

DF, DESLOG to CofS, 13 Dec 62, subj: Daily Summary of Movements -- Roll-up (S), ATLOG-NOV-23334; w/Comment 3, DESLOG to CofS, 3 Jan 63. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DESLOG Admin Rc files.

414.

(1) Msg 7630 (UNCLASSIFIED In 8-1739), JCS to CNO, DTG 190215Z Nov 62, Op. 4. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Msg (UNCLASSIFIED In 8-485468), COMUSMACV to MSTS Rep, SW Area, DTG 011631Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DESUTE P&O Rcv files.

415.

UNCLASSIFIED GO 135, 1 Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED).

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(U) The 188th Aviation Company (Army) (Provisional) was organized to provide aviation support for both USARLANT Forward Headquarters and the Peninsula Base Command. With the phase-out of USARLANT Forward and the anticipated gradual phase out of Peninsula Base Command, such aviation support was no longer required and the unit was discontinued on 12 December 1962.⁴¹⁶

(U) The Peninsula Base Command had been organized in late October 1962 to carry out the mission of the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, as Department of the Army Coordinating Authority. Even though this command had been given a target date of 10 December to complete movement of all units which had been pre-positioned in the Florida - Georgia area, the close-out actions were completed so expeditiously that most of its own personnel had already returned to their home stations by 15 December 1962. Between 26 and 31 December phase elements of the command's subordinate units which remained behind in Florida maintained minimum essential operational readiness requirements and prepared to dispose of the remaining supplies and equipment in accordance with verbal instructions of the Third Army and USCOMSAC commanders. A small nucleus headquarters was maintained at the Peninsula Base Command (Forward) after 31 December 1962, and the command proper was finally discontinued 7 March 1963.⁴¹⁷

Close Out of Headquarters, USARLANT Forward

(U) The stand-down in readiness conditions and return of all units to their home stations beginning on 10 December violated the requirement for a Forward Headquarters of U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command. General Powell informed his forward headquarters on 30 November of the actions which they would take to effect a close out. Actions were to be begun immediately to close out all operations as soon as possible and to return all troops to their home stations by 10 December 1962. Provisions would have to be made to retain sufficient personnel for security measures and for periodic testing of the communications network which had been devised for the forward headquarters. Arrangements also had to be made with Third Army for that headquarters to assume responsibility for funding, supplies, equipment, and facilities, to handle accounting and field maintenance. While these instructions envisioned a complete close out of the forward headquarters by 10 December, the Commander

⁴¹⁶.

USCOMSAC CG, 137, 18 Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED).

⁴¹⁷.

(1) HQ, 3d Log Gd, The Role of the Peninsula Base Command (Logistical Command), in The Cuban Crisis, 1962, pp. 29 - 31. (SECRET).

(2) USCOMSAC CG 12, 18 Mar 63. (UNCLASSIFIED).

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In Chief, Atlantic Command, informed General Powell on 1 December that his Forward Headquarters would close operations effective 1900 hours, 1 December.418

Cancellation of Port Call Alerts

418. As Third Army issued its final directive for the immediate movement of all pre-positioned units to their base stations, it became apparent that the crisis had subsided even though the possibility still existed that the plan might be implemented in the near future. The Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Transportation Atlantic Terminal Command, reminded General Powell on 1 December that his command had issued port call alerts to selected units as a result of directives issued in compliance with provisions of Operation Plan 306. The Atlantic Terminal commander requested information at that time as to whether those port call alerts were to remain in effect or were to be rescinded. Since all units had reverted to DEFCON 3 status, the port call alerts were no longer applicable and were consequently cancelled.419

Release of Antilles Command Forces

419. As was indicated earlier, operational control of the forces of the Antilles Command, U. S. Army Caribbean, was transferred to the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command, in order to carry out his responsibilities as senior Army commander in the Cuban area. By agreement with the Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, those forces carried out their normal missions for the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Caribbean, until such time as the conditions of the emergency would preclude their accomplishment. Conditions during the Cuban Crisis never deteriorated to that point, however, with the result that operational control of the forces of the Antilles Command was only nominal at best. With the passing of the critical stages of the emergency and the stand down in readiness conditions, it was only logical that operational control should return to normal channels. Consequently, Admiral Friedman informed General Powell on 1 December that the forces of the Antilles Command, U. S. Army Caribbean, should be permitted to immediately revert to the operational control of the Commander in Chief, Caribbean Command, in accordance with previously issued instructions.420

420.

(1) Msg 303877, OO USCOMAR to C-in-C USARLANT Fed, DTG 300440Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMAR to W-221450), CINCLANT to CINCSARLANT, DTG 030000Z Dec 62. (SECRET). Both in DESUTE P&O Div files.

419.

Msg (USCOMAR to W-221749), OO USATTA to OO USCOMAR, DTG 031400Z Dec 62. (CONFIDENTIAL). In DESUTE P&O Div files.

420.

Msg (USCOMAR to E-1748), CINCLANT to CINCSARLANT, DTG 032310Z Dec 62. (TOP SECRET). In AD 75 con.

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Withdrawal of Pre-Positioned Material

When the question of a stand down in readiness conditions was first broached to USCOMAR, the general feeling of that headquarters' planning staff was that all pre-positioned material and equipment should remain in place as long as any possibility remained that Operation Plan 116 might be implemented. As late as 11 November 1962, General Powell notified Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, that he had not developed any plans which called for the withdrawal of pre-positioned material.⁴²¹ It was not until 13 November that Headquarters, USCOMAR, confirmed the cancellation of equipment sail-forward and, as planning for a stand down in readiness conditions began in earnest, General Powell appointed an Ad Hoc committee to develop recommendations as to what should be accomplished in this regard. The USCOMAR Chief of Staff issued additional instructions to this committee on 17 November which directed them to consider a number of new points in the logistics field including the retention of Ops Lanka Air Force Base on a permanent status. He also questioned whether the cargo gathered for this operation should be retained in the Florida area or returned to the depot. He suggested three alternate actions with regard to these Classes I, III, and V supplies which had been pre-positioned at the Florida bases: they could be retained at bases in Florida, but this might entail relocation; they could be returned to the depot system, or they could be reduced by consumption.⁴²²

The USCOMAR Logistics Planning Staff completed its recommendations by 18 November for the disposition of all pre-positioned material and equipment. It was decided that, since Class I supplies were expendable and had already been purchased, they would be expended by Third Army at Forts Jackson and Benning. Class III supplies would have to be returned to the depot system for the simple reasons that USCOMAR's subordinate commands did not have a means capability to reconstitute packaged POL stocks and the Army depot system was much better able to provide for their turnover. All Class V supplies were to be returned to the depot system as directed by U. S. Army Materiel Command, but USCOMAR recommended that they be located at either the Anniston or Blue Grass Depots so that it would be in the general area and easily available to Operation Plan 116 forces. Class II and IV supplies represented the area which involved the greater share of handling all air

⁴²¹.

Msg 103488, CG USCOMAR to CG XVIII Abn Corps, DTG 112127Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCBUIR P&O Div files.

⁴²².

(1) Msg 41008-P-103376, CG USCOMAR to CG USAFPOG, DTG 232244Z Nov 62. Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) DF, Gads to All SdCds' and Chiefs, Sept Cdr, 23 Nov 62, subj: Stand Down of 116 Forces, Secy 62-2626. (CONFIDENTIAL). (3) DF, Same to same, 27 Nov 62, subj: as above, Secy 62-2628. (CONFIDENTIAL). All in DCBLOG Admin Br files.

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Items were to be referred to the depots which normally handled that category of supply while material which belonged to Third Army would remain in that Army area. Third Army, however, objected to purchasing all of the tents, cots and like material since they had no funds for such purposes at that time.⁴²³ Peninsula Base Command requested immediate disposition instructions on 29 November for the 300 SS-11 missiles which were stored in bunkers at Homestead Air Force Base and were intended for helicopter armament sub-systems for the HH-1 aircraft. Both Peninsula Base Command and the 1st Armored Division assumed that part of the missile supply was earmarked for use by that division and, on that basis, a request was made that a stockpile of such missiles be established for the division at Fort Hood. All SS-11 missiles, however, were eventually shipped to Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania.⁴²⁴

423. At the time that USCOMARMC gave the orders for withdrawal of pre-positioned supplies and equipment, some 8,600 tons of such material were located in the Peninsula Base Command area. Not included in this over-all tonnage figure were such mission-support items as forklifts, cranes, light sets, generators, and roller conveyors. Of the over-all total, some 3,100 tons represented pre-positioned supplies which had been moved into the Army Staging Area Commands during a three day period, 19 - 21 November 1962, while some 5,000 tons represented pre-positioned air items. USCOMARMC alerted the Peninsula Base Command on 29 November and gave the actual order for movement to definite locations on 3 December. All Class I Operational Retraints stored at Ops Locks Air Force Base were shipped to Fort Benning while those stored at Langford Naval Air Station were shipped to Fort Jackson. All oils and lubricants in Classes III and III A were shipped to Atlanta Army Depot while all fuels were shipped to Charleston Army Depot with the exception of 165 tons of water gasoline (approximately 72,000 gallons) which was consumed locally at Ops Locks Air Force Base during Operation BOLT-UP at the direct request of the Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Petroleum Center. All Class V supplies were shipped to the Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, except the SS-11 missiles which were shipped to Letterkenny Army Depot. All baggage and cots were retained by Third Army and shipped to Fort Benning. Approximately 350 tons of TOE air items were shipped to Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell for the two airborne divisions, while 70 percent of the remainder was returned to Richmond Army Depot and the remaining 22 percent to Memphis Army Depot. All of the shipments were completed between 5 and 10 December 1962 and were accomplished with promptness and the generation of a minimum number of problems. The

423.

USARLANT DOC Bly Briefing, 30 Nov 62, pp. 13 - 14. (TOP SECRET). In AG 75 Com.

424.

(1) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-221375), CG, PSC, to CG, USCOMARMC, DTG 191740Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Msg (USCOMARMC In M-221433), CG, PSC, to CG, USCOMARMC, DTG 292235Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSUR PSC Dav Files.

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Commanding General, Peninsula Base Command, concluded that the roll up operation conclusively demonstrated that his support units had the capability and know-how to move large quantities of supplies in a minimum period of time.⁴²⁵

⁴²⁵.

(1) Hq 100873, CG USCOMMAC to CG's Third Army and FBC, DTG 300020Z Nov 62. (SECRET). (2) Hq 000000, CG USCOMMAC to CG's Third Army and FBC, DTG 001111Z Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). Both in DCSLOG Admin Br files. (3) Hq, Peninsula Base Command, Air Tasking Order, undated, Tab B, Incl 4, pp. 1-3. (SECRET - Info used is UNCLASSIFIED). In DCSLOG Hist Br files.

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STAND-BY STATUS -- CONTINUED READINESS

✓ Even though tensions in the Caribbean area had relaxed to the point that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were able to authorize a stand down in readiness conditions and direct the return of all pre-positioned units to their home stations, the possibility still remained after 1 December that Operation Plans 313 and 316 might have to be implemented. The fulfillment of Soviet promises to remove all Mi-28 aircraft from the island of Cuba could not be confirmed until after 20 December, the terminal date of the Soviet agreement. But even if this latter promise were kept -- as had been the Soviet promise to remove all Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) from Cuba -- several factors still remained which necessitated continued vigilance on the part of the United States. The very fact that the Castro Government in Cuba was an avowed Communist State operating some ninety miles off our southern shores required constant surveillance to keep Castroism confined to the island of Cuba. Overt actions on the part of Castro which could be construed as aggressive acts would require immediate retaliation by the United States acting for the Organization of American States. The undesirable presence of Soviet troops and alleged Soviet technicians in Cuba was a constant source of irritation to the United States, and any attempt to reinforce them in sizeable numbers would have to be met with a further ultimatum. It is a fact of life in international relations that ultimatums to be effective, must be backed with a show of force. Consequently, USCOMSAC and its subordinate commands went into a stand-by status after 1 December which required continued readiness, but not the short-range type of readiness which prevailed during the period from 19 October until approximately 1 December.

Retention of Air Defense Units in Florida

✓ Of prime importance in the southeastern area of the United States was the maintenance of a proper defense against sneak attacks from Cuba either with aircraft or with missiles. Consequently, in planning for a stand down in readiness conditions began, the Department of the Army, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, determined that all forces of the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) should retain their present posture but that the Automatic Weapons Battery, which USCOMSAC had provided, could be returned to its home station because of its limited capability. At the same time, the USCOMSAC commander attached the units in question to Third Army for administrative and logistical support but left them assigned to V. S. Army Air Defense Command (USARADCOM) for operational control. Command and control functions over the air defense units and their supporting detachments became rather complicated at this point since they were assigned to Second, Fourth, or Sixth Armies, as appropriate, further assigned for operational control only to USARADCOM, and attached to Third Army for administrative and logistical support. Third Army had placed some additional Ordnance units in Florida to support the USARADCOM

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air defense units and those, too, were required to remain as long as the current posture of air defense readiness was retained, even though the latter units were not under the operational control of USMACVCOM.⁴²⁶

✓ At the time that all USCOMSARMC units were being returned to their home stations, the U. S. Army Air Defense Command developed a study for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on air defense requirements in the southeastern area of the United States. It was determined at that time that only Battery B, 39th Artillery (Automatic Weapons), could be released as had already been recommended by the Department of the Army. As of the end of January 1963, there remained in the Florida area one air defense artillery group headquarters, two Nike missile battalions, and one SAGE-MERCURIES missile battalion which was minus one firing battery. In addition to the actual air defense units, supporting Ordnance units were required to remain to render the proper support. These included not only those units normally attached to such missile battalions but also Ordnance units assigned to the area by Third Army for the support of the U. S. Army Air Defense Command. At the end of January these units included an Ordnance Battalion, one Ordnance company, and six specialized Ordnance detachments.⁴²⁷

Authority to Obtain Bulk Supplies and Equipment

✓ The material readiness of the units assigned to Operation Plan 318 when the Cuban Crisis occurred in October was one of the major obstacles which had to be overcome in order to prepare these units for actual combat operations in the objective area. Headquarters, USCOMSARMC, had initiated Logistical Plan ROUTINGMARK which was merely a transfer of the required supplies and equipment from non-committed units to those assigned to the Operation Plan.⁴²⁸ In addition, Department of the Army authorized higher supply priorities for all Operation Plan 318 units so that they might obtain any required supplies and equipment from the depot systems. The maintenance of an eighteen-day reaction time for an extended period as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant that the material readiness of the assigned units could not be allowed to deteriorate.

426.

(1) Hag (USCOMSARMC In M-320439), DA Was Rem to CG USCOMSARMC, DTG 211942Z Nov 62. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Hag 303848, CG USCOMSARMC, to CG's Record, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Armies, DTG 282300Z Nov 62. (SECRET). In DCSTUR P60 Div files.

427.

(1) USARLANT DOC Div Briefing, 30 Nov 62, pp. 9-10. (TOP SECRET). In AG TS Com. (2) Hag 303843, CG USCOMSARMC to CG USMACVCOM, DTG 011901Z Dec 62. (SECRET). (3) Ltr, Maj, Third Army, to CG USCOMSARMC, 30 Jan 63, subj: After Action Report for Cuban Emergency (U), AJAGT-P, w/Encl, "Third Army After Action Report, Cuban Emergency (U)," pp. 4-5. (SECRET). Both in DCSTUR P60 Div files.

428.

See above, p. 34.

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While the implementation of Logistical Plan DENTONMARK had undoubtedly caused material shortages among the non-committed units in USCOMSAC, the return of this material to the original owners would seriously affect the readiness of Operation Plan 316 units. Consequently, on 10 November the Department of the Army directed that U. S. Army Operation Plan 316 units would retain all COM and EM equipment, as well as unit loads then on hand. Unit loads authorized for retention included basic loads, prescribed loads, mission loads, and universal mission loads. This authorization to retain unit material currently on hand applied both to equipment obtained under Logistical Plan DENTONMARK and that equipment requisitioned from the depot systems under increased priorities for Operation Plan 316.⁴²⁹

Continued Maintenance of a Communications Net

✓ As had been mentioned several times previously, the establishment of an eighteen-day reaction period for all Operation Plan 316 units by the Joint Chiefs of Staff meant that this readiness posture would have to be maintained for an indefinite period. Because of this fact, the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, informed General Powell on 29 November that he required the maintenance of the communications net which had been established for both Operation Plans 316 and 318. In addition, he felt that both USARLANT and USARLANT Forward headquarters should be maintained in a reduced status and held ready for immediate expansion. Since this directive was in agreement with a decision already made by General Powell, USCOMSAC quickly developed plans for a rapid reactivation of the communication net which supported the various Operation Plan 316 Army Staging Area Commands. USCOMSAC intended to expand the existing facilities at five of the seven airbases used as staging areas in order to meet the established communications requirements. It was also determined that USCOMSAC could provide the necessary augmentation in personnel and equipment.⁴³⁰

✓ On 14 December the communications net established in the forward area for the support of Operation Plan 316 reverted to the operational control of Third Army, the command which had previously been responsible for the maintenance of the communications equipment. In this regard, Third Army pointed out to USCOMSAC that it would have a continuing requirement for two aircraft to carry out its responsibilities for the communications net and that such a requirement would remain valid so long as the net was continued in its

⁴²⁹.

Mag (USCOMSAC Ia M-211348), DCSOPS BA, to CG USCOMSAC, DTD 160300Z Nov 62 (SECRET). In DCSTAF P&O Div files.

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Nov 62. (1) Mag (USCOMSAC Ia M-211348), CINCLANT to CG USCOMSAC, DDC 291850Z (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Mag 160874, CG USCOMSAC to CINCLANT, DDC 282124Z Nov 62. (SECRET). Both in DCSTAF P&O Div files.

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present status. This network was still maintained on a standby operational status subsequent to 31 December 1962, although certain items of signal equipment were phased out of the net. All excess signal equipment was stored and maintained at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida.⁴³¹

Continued Aviation Support Requirements

☞ Despite the stand down in readiness conditions, the requirement to maintain an eighteen-day reaction time and to maintain an operational readiness capability created certain problems in the field of continued aviation support until such time as the support requirements were assessed by Third Army. The provisional aviation company which had been organized to support USARLANT Forward and the Peninsula Base Command was discontinued on 2 December, just one day after USARLANT Forward indicated to General Powell that it would require the services of a small aviation detachment for an extended period of time. USARLANT Forward reduced their support requirements to a detachment consisting of two L23 aircraft, three L20's, one HU1A and two HH1B's and moved the detachment from Miami International Airport to Homestead Air Force Base. Aviation support requirements were assessed by Third Army on 14 December 1962 and that command had to satisfy all such requirements from its own available resources from that point onward.⁴³²

Lack of Air Items in Storage

☞ So long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff required all Operation Plan 316 units to maintain an eighteen-day reaction time, even though located at their home stations, the equipment prepared for aerial delivery to the airborne units in the objective area could not be fully released as were other supplies. By late December all air items had been returned to either division control at home stations or to the depot systems. Both USCOMARC and the V. S. Army Materiel Command intended to maintain these items in a maximum readiness condition for subsequent use. A continuous logistical effort was required on the part of both division supply personnel and the pertinent depots since periodic surveillance inspections had to be made and parachutes had to be repacked on an annual basis. Even before the items were returned from pre-positioned locations, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander requested permission

431.

Mag (USCOMARC In M-221863), CG Third Army to CG USCOMARC, DTG 032122Z Dec 62, (CONFIDENTIAL). In DOSTER P&O Div files, (2) Hq Third Army, Historical Narrative, Cuban Crisis of 1962 (P), Annex C, "Logistics," pp. 16-17, (SECRET), Cp. 3. Copy in DOSTER Hqg Rr,

432.

(1) USCOMARC GG 137, 18 Dec 62. (UNCLASSIFIED). (2) Mag (USCOMARC In M-445471), USARLANT Fwd to CINCPACFLT, DTG 011830Z Dec 62, (CPLUSE), (3) Mag (USCOMARC In M-331893), CG FSC to CG USCOMARC, DTG 032023Z Dec 62, (CONFIDENTIAL). Both in DOSTER P&O Div files.

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for a team of two officers from his headquarters to periodically visit the locations where such equipment was stored. On each visit the team would determine the shortages which related in the various project codes, the completeness of stockage at each location, and the suitability of any substitute equipment for operations in the objective area. In addition, the officers would inspect the conditions of packs and containers, as well as the conditions under which the equipment was stored, and determine the next replenish interval for the parachutes. The first visits for the team were scheduled to commence shortly after 1 January 1963.⁴³³

Filler Personnel Policy In the Event of a New Alert

434 One of the major problems facing all levels of command during the partial implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316 during October and November 1962 was the provision of sufficient filler personnel to bring the alerted units up to maximum deployable strength. As a result of various personnel actions, this question was again significant by the end of December 1962, particularly so in view of the eight-day reaction time imposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a partial solution to the problem, USCOMARMC, on 18 December, issued new guidance pertaining to criteria and procedures to be followed in furnishing personnel to both troop list and supporting units in the event that they were again alerted for possible implementation of Operation Plan 316. While the criteria pertaining to expiration of term of service (ETS) had been lowered to twenty days at the time of the Cuban Crisis, USCOMARMC now directed that individuals assigned to the units in question would be considered deployable at the time of the alert only if they had thirty days or more remaining until ETS. Individuals attached or assigned from local installation resources would also have a minimum of thirty days remaining until ETS. On the other hand, individuals from other than local installation resources who were placed on temporary duty with these units would have to have a minimum of sixty days remaining until ETS. As a departure from procedures in use during the height of the Cuban Crisis, USCOMARMC placed certain limitations on persons who could be counted as part of the deployable strength of the appropriate units. Individuals normally assigned to a particular unit and on temporary duty with a mobile training team could neither be recalled nor considered a part of the deployable strength of that unit, nor could unit officers attending an Army Service School nor enlisted men attending an MOS-proficiency course. Certain limits were also imposed on the categories of troops which could be used as filler personnel for Operation Plan 316 units. First of all, individuals assigned

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(1) Hag (USCOMARMC to M-401432), CC XVIII Air Corps to CG USCOMARMC, OTC 0100284 Dec 42. (OFLUSE). In DCMJTR PAC Piv files. (2) Hag XVIII Air Corps, The Role of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U), pp. 5-2-1 to 5-2-7. (TOP SECRET - Info used is CONFIDENTIAL). Copy in DCMJTR Hist Br.

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to the permanent party contingents of Army Service Schools or Army Training Centers could not be used if such use adversely affected the training output required by either the Department of the Army or USCOMARC. Likewise prohibited was the use of personnel on temporary duty with mobile training teams, officers attending Army Service Schools, or enlisted men attending MOS-producing courses. Finally, no individuals could be used who had been notified of their selection for overseas movement unless specifically exempted by the Department of the Army. Individuals who were actually assigned to Operation Plan 316 units at the time of a new alert would be removed from overseas and COMUS reassignment orders, except if they were earmarked for any of the following commands and activities: U. S. Army, Pacific; U. S. Army, Hawaii; Eighth U. S. Army; Ryukyu Islands; U. S. Army, Japan; activities in Vietnam; and all Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Military Attaches. These specific areas of exemption, however, could be changed, depending upon the situation at the time of the new alert. Of course, an exemption was always made for those individuals whose removal from such orders would create a serious personal or financial hardship. USCOMARC emphasized that commanders at all echelons who furnished enlisted personnel in response to temporary duty or permanent change of station orders or directives were to insure that the persons so selected were qualified for immediate and effective use by the gaining commander. Specifically prohibited was the use of these directed transfers to obtain relief from the responsibilities of appropriate personnel actions such as proper physical reprofiling, reclassification under pertinent Army regulations, discharges, or other disqualifying conditions.

✓ USCOMARC established a new set of procedures for filling Operation Plan 316 units to the minimum deployable strengths and for providing other temporary duty personnel needed to supplement units or activities supporting the operation plan. In the case of officer personnel, the Army or station commander concerned would obtain branch clearance direct from Department of the Army prior to placing the officer or warrant officers on temporary duty. This was to be accomplished by the most expeditious means; initially by telephone and then further confirmation by message if communications facilities and time permitted. Requests for officers which could not be provided from within an Army area were to be transmitted to USCOMARC only after the appropriate Army commanders had exhausted all available resources by applying maximum grade, branch, and MOS qualifications. In addition, a determination would have to be made that the requested officers were necessary and essential to the accomplishment of the unit's mission or to bring a particular unit to minimum deployable strength as stated in Operation Plan 316. Insofar as enlisted personnel were concerned, commanders of those installations where Operation Plan 316 units were located were directed to fill these units to prescribed strength using on-base personnel. Filler personnel were to be provided to the gaining unit on a permanent change of assignment basis with the exception of E1's through E9's; the latter personnel would be furnished on an attached basis only. All filler requirements remaining after this initial action would be referred to the appropriate COMUS Army commander who would effect main filler action using personnel assets available within his own Army area and under his control. All personnel selected by the COMUS Army

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commanders would be provided on a temporary duty basis only. All remaining requirements would be forwarded to the Commanding General, USCOMSAR, who would thereafter effect a maximum fill from all available resources on either a temporary duty or permanent change of station basis.

✓ All COMUS Army commanders were directed to establish a time table for the accomplishment of these personnel actions so as to insure the arrival of reinforcements within the required eighteen-day reaction time. As a matter of information, USCOMSAR pointed out to the Army commanders that, after initial requirements were received and acted upon, Department of the Army was prepared to respond to requests for clearances and exceptions from either USCOMSAR or the COMUS Army on the very day that they were received. As a final measure, USCOMSAR directed the COMUS Army commanders to take whatever actions necessary to insure fill of Operation Plan 316 units on a permanent change of assignment or permanent change of station basis in order to reduce temporary duty requirements on a continuing basis to the absolute minimum.⁴³⁴

Coordination of Command and Planning Arrangements

✓ Planning responsibilities and command arrangements for the development and implementation of Operation Plans 312 and 316 have been described in detail earlier in this study. On 11 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, that the Cuban contingency planning and command arrangements for Operation Plans 312 and 316 as used during the Cuban Crisis would remain in effect unless otherwise directed. This decision insured the existence of workable command arrangements in the event that the plans would have to be implemented and continued acceptable planning arrangements for the development of further recommendations for acceptance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴³⁵

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Reg 304133, CG USCOMSAR to CG's First Ohio Sixth Armies and HQM, DTG 291734Z Dec 62, (SECRET). In DCSUTR P&G Dev files.

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Reg 5176 (USCOMSAR In R-300493), JCS to CINCLANT, DTG 112104Z Jan 63. Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSUTR P&G Dev files.

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LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE CRISIS⁴³⁶

✍ The occurrence of the Cuban Crisis and the resultant partial implementation of the pertinent contingency and support plans provided U. S. military leaders with an excellent opportunity to test their plans under realistic conditions short of actual combat. This dress rehearsal for Operation Plan 316, moreover, developed a mass of ideas which could be thoroughly screened for ways to improve the execution of that plan. The numerous extensive and constructive comments made by both USCOMSARAC staff officers and agencies and appropriate subordinate commands indicated the manner in which all participants performed during the crisis. That many problem areas existed is attested to by earlier presentations in this study, but remedial actions proposed for each of these areas were intended to insure the successful execution of Operation Plan 316 under actual combat conditions. What is more, the lessons learned from an intensive study of the major problem areas during the period of partial implementation were applicable to other operation plans as well. General Powell was enthusiastic about the ways which were found to improve both the plan and its execution and felt that the lessons learned had definitely improved the day-to-day administrative, operational, and logistical procedures of the entire U. S. Continental Army Command.

Study of Lessons Learned

✍ While Operation Plan 316 was being partially implemented as a result of the Cuban Crisis, the USCOMSARAC Chief of Staff held a series of informal discussions with his Deputy Chiefs of Staff to outline guidance for improving the plan based on experience gained in deploying both troops and supporting activities. He felt that Headquarters, USCOMSARAC/USARLANT, as the senior U. S. Army headquarters involved in developing the plans, as well as conducting actual operations, should insure that effective action was taken by all concerned to apply improvements to plans, standard operating procedures, and other pertinent guidance. The Chief of Staff formalized and consolidated this previously developed guidance on 4 September 1962, at which time he established a USCOMSARAC Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Unit Training and Readiness to review the conclusions and recommendations which the USCOMSARAC staff officers had derived from a close study of their respective operations. The committee was responsible for developing a list of USCOMSARAC "Lessons Learned" and for preparing resultant changes to USCOMSARAC's plans, procedures, and policy directives, as well as for recommending such

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Unless otherwise stipulated, the entire chapter is based on: Mr. USCOMSARAC Ad Hoc Committee to ESOITE, 13 May 63, subj: Summary Report of Ad Hoc Committee, Lessons Learned (OPLAN 316) (U), ATTER-P&O (S). Op. 4, (SECRET). In DCSTAF P&O Div Files.

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changes to all levels of command involved in the operation. While the study of "Lessons Learned" as a first priority was to be aimed at improving Operation Plan 316, the conclusions and recommendations developed as a result of the study might well be applicable to other plans.⁴³⁷

(U) In order to fully satisfy the requirements placed upon them and to insure that all sources had been exploited as directed, the Ad Hoc Committee directed the COMUS Army and corps commanders to submit any lessons learned during the operation. Approximately 130 various lessons learned were submitted by the contributing sources, and while many of these referred to the same general problem areas, differing viewpoints resulted in diverse over-all treatments. The Committee made an attempt to cite any of these lessons prior to assigning them to the USCOMARAC staff office having primary interest. The final summary report of the Ad Hoc Committee was not completed, coordinated, and approved for dissemination until 13 May 1963.⁴³⁸

General Impressions of the USCOMARAC Ad Hoc Committee

✓ As a result of a preliminary survey of the lessons learned at all levels of command, the USCOMARAC Ad Hoc Committee gained the impression that the major problem areas resulted mainly from rapid changes in USCOMARAC's missions and from the many changes in the reaction times for Operation Plan 316. In general, many of the problems involved and lessons learned seemed to stem from three major areas: the reorganization of the Army, the limited number of people who were actually acquainted with Operation Plan 316, and both the shortcomings of the operation plan itself and the improvisations which had to be adopted during its partial implementation.

✓ As far as the reorganization of the Army was concerned, many of the difficulties stemmed from the fact that familiarity with the new organizational structure was extremely limited, particularly since both Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Headquarters, USCOMARAC, had only been functioning under the new organizational structure since 1 July 1962. The fact that USCOMARAC's subordinate commands retained the old organizational structure provided a further complicating factor. One of the major sources of difficulty in this regard was the Technical Service areas where such services no longer existed as readily identifiable entities and, consequently, many of USCOMARAC's subordinate agencies lacked a knowledge of how to progress certain actions or from whom to obtain required guidance.

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OP, CofS to DCS's, Chiefs of Staff Offs and CO., Ft. Monroe, 6 Dec 62, subj: Lessons Learned, OPLAN 316 (U), SECY-62-1696. Op. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL) In RGTS files.

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OP, CofS to DCS's and Chiefs of Staff Offs, 13 May 63, subj: Summary Report of Ad Hoc Committee, Lessons Learned (OPLAN 316)(U). Op. 4. (UNCLASSIFIED). In DCS/STN P&O file.

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✓ In the second general problem area, Operation Plan 316 was confined to a strict need-to-know basis by its very classification but, when the Cuban Crisis occurred, it became necessary to acquaint a vastly increased number with the plan not only at USCOMSAC headquarters but within the COMUS Army as well. Reading the plan and executing pertinent portions thereof were thus concurrent actions for many of these new people. The problem was compounded at USCOMSAC headquarters with the arrival of temporary duty personnel who were not only not familiar with Operation Plan 316 but lacked even a working knowledge of USCOMSAC's organizational structure and command relationships.

✓ While comments regarding shortcomings in the plan were many, they fell into approximately eight categories. Chief among these was the development of requirements which had not been considered in prior planning, but resulted mainly from the rapidly changing enemy situation. Many requirements, particularly those which concerned reports, lacked sufficient detail or proper clarity, and many of those who commented on Operation Plan 316 felt that it did not clearly delineate responsibilities assigned to various agencies. The Department of the Army's decision to designate USCOMSAC as the departmental coordinating authority caused temporary difficulties since it altered the responsibility for preparing movement schedules. Partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 pointed up the fact that planning coordination between that plan and counterpart plans developed by either headquarters or services was not adequate. The establishment of a USARLST Forward Headquarters created a number of additional difficulties particularly with regard to personnel, equipment, finances, and command relationships. Many of the comments within USCOMSAC headquarters concerned the lack of a headquarters-wide standard operating procedure for implementing contingency plans and the fact that no pre-touted procedures existed for establishing an emergency operations center. Finally, many outside comments concerned the disruption caused to other vital Army activities as a result of the "crash basis" personnel augmentation of USCOMSAC headquarters.

General Conclusions of Headquarters, USCOMSAC

✓ Two different sets of general conclusions with regard to the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 were developed by Headquarters, USCOMSAC, one in December 1962, immediately after the completion of the exercise, the other in May 1963, as a result of the intensive review and study of the situation by the USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee to develop "Lessons Learned." The December conclusions centered about what was considered a very successful partial implementation of Operation Plan 316. It was pointed out at that time that the overall operational readiness of USCOMSAC's STRAC forces had been improved as a result of the Operation Plan 316 Troop List units being given the highest equipment priority in addition to a redistribution of equipment from lower priority units. It seemed at that time that the USCOMSAC commander was the logical and proper choice to carry out the additional command responsibilities of Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command, Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, and the Department of the Army Coordinating Authority, and that Headquarters, USCOMSAC, as Headquarters, USARLST, was completely capable of supporting and controlling operations in

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support of CINCLANT Operation Plan 316. At the same time, actions taken by Headquarters, USCOMSAR, concerning Operation Plans 329 and 321 insured that a general reserve of forces would be capable of reinforcing Europe. Finally, it was concluded that the use of forces and resources of USCOMSAR was in accordance with directions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of the Army, and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, and that all forces committed in support of plans other than Operation Plan 316 were earmarked against valid requirements.⁴³⁹

After studying the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that resources to maintain all units at full strength in personnel and equipment were just not available to USCOMSAR, even though a priority system for assignment of resources was in existence. However, unless this priority system supported the current primary mission of the USCOMSAR commander, the existing resources could not be made available to the units having the greatest need at that time. USCOMSAR was required to maintain all USNAF forces in a state of readiness commensurate with that necessary to implement a contingency plan within its envisioned time frame. If such a proper state of readiness could be maintained, it certainly would lessen the impact of mass transfers of personnel and equipment at a critical time. In this regard, the required readiness categories for each unit on the Operation Plan 316 Troop List were reviewed and answered to both Department of the Army and the CINCEC Army commanders so that all agencies concerned could work toward bringing and maintaining each unit to the required state of readiness. But, while Operation Plan 316 was the current primary mission of the USCOMSAR commander, this mission was subject to change according to shifts in the international political situation, and the problem of bringing the units required to support the mission of the moment to the proper state of readiness as prescribed in the pertinent contingency plan still remained.

It was evident to the committee which studied this situation that many emergency tools were available to USCOMSAR, the use of which would have assisted in providing a more efficient partial implementation of Operation Plan 316. For example, many actions were taken which should have occurred under DEPCON 1 status, yet only a DEPCON 3 status was actually put into effect. In like manner, an extension of the Expiration of Term of Service of individual enlisted troops would have reduced personnel turn-over and the implementation of emergency financial procedures would have reduced confusion and lessened the present funding impact on the command. Since authority to use these emergency tools was not forthcoming from higher command levels, USCOMSAR recommended to Department of the Army that they be taken into consideration in any future similar situations.

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DP, DOSTER to DODAF and GOFB, 8 Dec 62, subj: General Adams' Letter to General Powell, dtd 20 Nov 62, w/incl, Ref Study, p. 8. (TOP SECRET). In AG TR Con.

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✓ It was also very apparent to all concerned at Headquarters, USCOMMAC, though not to the subordinate commands, that deviations from any contingency plan could and must be expected. It was, however, incumbent upon each echelon of command to limit changes in the plan to those required by the situation and to view with caution any divergent actions proposed by those not having intimate knowledge of the plans. Staffs at all levels of command had to be alert and prepared to make changes that would be caused by the differences between planning provisions and actual execution of the plans.

✓ When the question arose as to a reduction in the currently prescribed reaction time of eighteen days for Operation Plan 106, the ad Hoc Committee pointed out that the only possible method of reduction was to pre-position many of the required units since some of them were normally stationed as far away as Fort Lewis, Washington. The 1st Armored Division, which was the backbone of the ground assault force, would definitely have to be moved from Fort Hood, Texas, to a more advantageous location in either the Second or Third Army area. Pre-positioning was a vital necessity if Operation Plan 106 was to be implemented under the concept visualized at the beginning of 1960 and the measure of necessity would increase to a marked degree if the reaction time had to be further reduced.

✓ A conclusion of major importance was the fact that all concerned should immediately examine both plans and capabilities for maintaining a general war posture in the event that Operation Plan 106 was implemented. It was pointed out in this regard that the partial implementation of Operation Plan 106 proved that an early decision to call up reserve components would not only enable USCOMMAC to more easily move into a general war posture, but would also facilitate the actual implementation of the plan, release school support units for their primary mission, and assist in providing additional security forces and replacements in the event that nuclear warfare was introduced on the battlefield.440

Personnel Problems

✓ Personnel problems were created by the very decision to prepare for implementation of Operation Plan 106 since this brought about an immediate requirement to provide filler personnel for the permanent units in order to bring them to the prescribed deployable strength. Planning guidance generated by the Department of the Army for the activation of filler personnel

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In addition to the over-all source as indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the above is based on: TRG-C, "Comments on General Macell's Letter, subj: Review of Cuban Plans," to LTR, CINCLANT to CM/JCS, 25 Jan 61. (TOP SECRET). In AG TR Cor.

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required modification on several occasions. At the outset of the exercise, the personnel deployability criteria was drastically changed in order to increase the number of troops available. Based on experience gained during the partial implementation of the plan, both USCORARC and the Department of the Army revised their instructions for filler personnel in the event that these units were alerted in the future. 441

✓ The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel felt that valuable experience had been gained regarding procedures for reporting personnel strengths, which under normal conditions called for the manual posting of such reports. Since the timeliness of such reports was a major problem during partial implementation of the plan, it was necessary to obtain daily reports by individual echelon reflecting the temporary change of status location. The time consumed in manually posting these reports emphasized the need for a machine strength accounting capability at headquarters, USCORARC. A separate Ad Hoc Committee was established to study the means of obtaining such a capability in as short a time as possible.

✓ Although the entire operation plan was never executed and no loss of troops was actually experienced in combat, the USCORARC personnel planning staff felt that some clarification was required with regard to the procedures governing troop replacements for combat losses. Coordination between USCORARC and the Department of the Army was established in this field at the beginning of the exercise with the result that a workable solution was finally achieved, revised instructions have consequently been included in STRAC Operation Plan 314. A major problem area of some importance was the urgent need for increased civilian personnel authorizations by the CONUS Armies. Only a small number of additional temporary spaces were immediately allocated at the time that USCORARC passed these requirements to Department of the Army while action on the remainder was appreciably slowed by demands for detailed justifications. USCORARC did satisfy many of the urgent requirements through the use of such expedients as adjustments of space resources, overstrengths against unattached hire lag, and the use of overtime. As a result of these rather unsatisfactory arrangements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, USCORARC, contacted action shortly after the beginning of 1963 to obtain authority from the Department of the Army to exceed space authorization on a temporary basis during an emergency and to submit justification after the fact.

✓ One of the most perplexing problems which occurred was that of frequent changes and additions to the Operation Plan 314 Troop List. Units not committed to the operation plan were levied to provide filler personnel for committed units but, in some instances, the former units were subsequently added to the Troop List in a depleted condition, thereby compounding

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See above, pp. 321 - 323.

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the personnel fill problem. The obvious solution to this predicament was the restriction of all units in their minimum acceptable readiness category. Because of the personnel problems inherent in the entire military structure, any rapid changes or expansion of contingency plans would undoubtedly create problems which would have to be solved as they occurred.

Intelligence Aspects

✓ Intelligence operations did not play a large part in the partial implementation of the operation plan but most of the intelligence effort at Headquarters, USCOMSAC, was engaged in planning for the eventual execution of the plan. In this regard, the appointment of the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, as Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Airborne Command, on 16 October changed the role of the USCOMSAC intelligence staff from that of close monitoring of planning by XVIII Airborne Corps to one of active participation in such planning. In this transfer of roles, four major problem areas were uncovered: aerial reconnaissance and aerial photography; code words; availability of linguists to support the operation plan; and the availability of trained language interpreters and air reconnaissance liaison officers.

✓ Planning developed at the CINCLANT level called for the implementation of Operation Plan 312 immediately prior to the execution of Operation Plan 313.⁴⁴¹ At Headquarters, USCOMSAC, had not been put on distribution for photos which could be taken during the implementation of Operation Plan 312. This omission was rectified at a Targeting Conference held at CINCLANT headquarters on 8 November when it was agreed that the U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) would furnish USCOMSAC with one positive print of each photo for interpretation and reproduction. All USCOMSAC requirements in this field would be made known to the Tactical Air Command through a USCOMSAC Air Reconnaissance Liaison Officer stationed at TAC's Air Reconnaissance Center, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

✓ Intelligence planners spent many long hours over the matter of code words, alphanumeric codes, and other types of codes which were intended to represent units, locations, or actions. The unrestricted use of these codes and their multiplicity could create security hazards and hinder efficient operations. USCOMSAC intelligence planners felt, therefore, that all future operation plans should make provisions for all code words as needed and that each code list should include alternate codes to be assigned by proper authorities whenever and whenever required by the operational situation. A procedure for insuring that adequate code words were included in any operation plan was developed as part of a USCOMSAC check list for measuring the adequacy of such plans.

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See above, pp. 7 - 8.

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✓ The matter of linguists had come to the attention of Headquarters, USCOMSAC, long before the Cuban Crisis occurred. In actual practice, linguists were trained in appropriate intelligence specialties and assigned to major Military Intelligence units in the Second, Third, and Fourth Army areas where they served as a linguist pool to satisfy Department of the Army requirements on a world-wide basis. Certain plans, however, required linguists not included in the pool, while the demand for Spanish linguists far exceeded the availability of those trained as Military Intelligence specialties. Issues placed against the COMUS Armas for Spanish linguists on November 1962, were only a partial solution since linguists were required who possessed a military utility. To achieve this end, "White" interpretation courses were established at Forts George G. Meade, Scapa, and Reid on November 1962 as an accelerated training program. At the time that the Lessons Learned study was compiled by USCOMSAC, the Headquarters Intelligence staff admitted that much remained to be done in this particular area, but that several staff offices were working on the problem in order to achieve an acceptable solution.

✓ With regard to the final problem area, the Cuban Crisis created heavy demands for trained photo interpreters which, for extended operations, were beyond the capability of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) (Field Army). This battalion would have to be brought closer to full authorized strength in order to perform all the missions required of it in USCOMSAC's contingency plans since, although it was a STRA unit, it fluctuated between 25 to 40 percent of authorized unit strength. One suggested solution concerned a survey of the COMUS Armas to locate trained personnel who would then be detached for duty with the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion as necessary. A joint study was conducted by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Intelligence, USCOMSAC, in order to develop the most effective way of reinforcing the battalion.

Operations Difficulties

✓ The partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 required Headquarters USCOMSAC, to become an actual operational headquarters controlling and directing all U. S. Army activities and operations. A number of problems involving both the headquarters, itself, and the subordinate commands became apparent during this period and enabled the headquarters to realize its shortcomings and make recommendations to rectify the mistakes or to justify its course of action because of the over-all situation. A significant problem reversed the establishment of USARLANT Forward which drained USCOMSAC headquarters of a great number of personnel at a time when the latter was already over-taxed by its multimission responsibilities. It was apparent that the previously envisioned mission for USARLANT Forward would have to be carried out with much less of an expenditure of manpower and other resources in any future operations. As a result of this drain, USCOMSAC Headquarters personnel were replaced by temporary duty personnel from other headquarters on such a lavish scale that many other vital USCOMSAC operations were disrupted. The Ad Hoc Committee, in conjunction with operations specialists, recommended the establishment of a small "Battle Staff" of approximately twelve officers which

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would operate at Henshawfield Air Force Base to assist in furnishing quick solutions to XVIII Airborne Corps problems, but which would not serve as a major command element directing combat or support operations. The Chief of Staff solved the major portions of this problem when he approved a number of separate recommendations on future command relationships. 443

Another problem of some importance at Headquarters, USCOMSAC, was the fact that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the main headquarters at Fort Monmouth became operational from the outset and, in effect, became the command post for General Powell in his triple command responsibility as Commanding General, U. S. Desegregated Army Command, Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command, and Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Gen. Atlantic Command. Administrative procedures consequently had to be established for the EOC, as well as methods for handling classified documents and for processing actions on an extended basis. These requirements, were further complicated by the presence of temporary duty personnel unversed in either the operation plan itself or the USCOMSAC organizational structure. In order to insure a continuity of operations until these requirements became consistent with their new duties, the staff of the EOC War Room was made up largely of officers and enlisted men from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Training and Readiness. It was the opinion of the USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee that the EOC would have operated more efficiently if its responsibilities had been limited to merely operating the War Room, handling only DIFCOM, situation, and other recurring reports, and acting as the focal point for information with which to develop briefings. Sufficient officers should have been permanently assigned to the EOC at the earliest practicable date in order to maintain essential data and to provide a nucleus for any required expansion. Permanent expansion of the EOC was absolutely essential to avoid confusion in the initial, critical stages of any emergency and to preclude the requirement for a single staff office to allocate the bulk of its assigned personnel to EOC operations with a resultant loss of effect in other vitally necessary military operations. A new SOP was developed for future EOC operations which provided that the full potential of the EOC would only be realized at some time in the future when sufficient officers were available for permanent assignment.

In the area of COMUS-USA training, for which USCOMSAC became responsible subsequent to 1 July 1963, interference with the Army training mission resulted from the use of school groups and individual members of school facilities to support the JUP-FLAK Plan and the Army Staging Area Commands. The USCOMSAC planning staff recommended that units of the On-call Echelon of Operation Flak 316 be used for these purposes until such time as Army Reserve units were available. The revised COMUSAC Operation Plan 316 was designed to include this provision.

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✓ USCOMSARC staff agencies also pointed up the fact that several problems developed in the field of unconventional warfare occasioned by the responsibility for providing logistical support to indigenous United Nations Forces and for providing intelligence services to the Atlantic Command's Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUNTF). Two major deficiencies were responsible for these problems: the absence of a permanent Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command, at CINCLANT's headquarters; and the lack of an adequate and approved unconventional warfare plan supporting Operation Plan 316. It is an axiom in unconventional warfare that such forces must be capable of reacting rapidly for almost immediate use after the initial alert. The very absence of an approved unconventional warfare plan, as well as an unconventional warfare staff, meant that an Ad Hoc JUNTF had to be organized simultaneously with the development of detailed operational plans by the provisional staff on a "crash" basis. The USCOMSARC planning staff felt strongly that a permanent and active nucleus Joint Unconventional Warfare staff should be established to serve as a base for expansion to full staff size whenever the implementation of any contingency plan was imminent. In addition, the supporters for this staff should be designated by name so as to insure the selection of properly trained individuals. It was also considered essential that unconventional warfare plans be kept current and that all responsibilities in this field be clearly defined. By the time that the Summary of Lessons Learned was prepared in February and March 1963, CINCLANT had studied various recommendations and obtained approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a JUNTF nucleus staff as a permanent part of his headquarters.

✓ The distribution and availability of the various contingency plans was a major problem which almost defied solution and seemed to be a point of contention for most of the COMUS Army and corps headquarters. Distribution of such plans necessarily had to be kept to a minimum and made only a strict "need-to-know" basis since they contained Top Secret information concerning U. S. military intentions toward a foreign nation, the unauthorized disclosure of which would gravely endanger our national security. The Ad Hoc Committee recommended that a supporting USCOMSARC/USARLANT Operation Plan 316 be published since it would be possible to assign a lower security classification to those portions dealing only with troop deployment and other matters of a non-tactical nature, thus allowing distribution on a much larger scale. This matter was still receiving the continued attention of Headquarters, USCOMSARC, at the time that the Summary report of Lessons Learned was developed.

✓ Comments received from the USCOMSARC subordinate commands regarding operational matters for the most part were comprehensive, constructive, and contained criticisms which were generally well-founded and justified. Discernible through the majority of these comments, however, was a tendency of the subordinate headquarters staff to be inflexible when it came to executing plans. It was apparent to the Ad Hoc Committee that the majority of comments contained a "between-the-lines" criticism of any USCOMSARC actions requiring the subordinate commands to deviate from an existing plan. What was actually manifested, according to the views of the committee, was a reluctance or an inability of these staffs to initiate any new, required course of action even though it had been obviously coordinated to avoid the magnification of "flaps."

✓ As a final lesson in this area, the Ad Hoc Committee found that many of the problem areas applicable to Operation Plan 316 were equally valid not only for other current contingency plans but for future planning requirements as well. In order to preserve the lessons that were learned in this operation and to prevent their recurrence in any similar future operations, the Committee included these points in an operations section of the check list prepared for staff usage. (See Appendix A).

Logistical Support of Contingency Operations

✓ It is evident from the earlier treatment in this study that logistical problems assumed major importance during the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 and have provided fertile ground for numerous lessons to the participants. A significant problem area was that of movements, both troop and supply movements via all available means and methods. In this regard, it was very evident to USCOMSARC logistical planners that a critical requirement existed for the establishment of a movements control capability not only at the USCOMSARC level but also at the level of the COMUS Army. Since the consensus among the logistical staff was that this function was as vital to the Army's readiness posture as were training, supply maintenance, and communications, a movement control nucleus was established in the Plans Division of the USCOMSARC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. During the Cuban Crisis it was necessary for USCOMSARC to improve management tools, devices, and procedures rather than execute a planned system in this area.

✓ Perhaps a problem of even more importance was the absence of a unit designator system which was compatible with the needs of both supply procedures and movement reporting and which would serve to identify each unit, active or reserve, regardless of size. Early in 1961, USCOMSARC forwarded to the Department of the Army a series of recommendations concerning the need for a revised, simplified, and standardized procedure for unit movement reporting. In order to meet such a need, however, a transceiver capability was needed by the logistical command operating in the objective area. At the time of the partial implementation of the Operation plan, the 3rd Logistical Command of the XVIII Airborne Corps did not possess the necessary data processing equipment nor personnel to process line item requisitions through the transceiver systems which would not the objective area, the Base Command, and the Successor Supply Agencies, but USCOMSARC did subsequently assign a transceiver capability and the required supporting Signal unit.

✓ The problem of providing sufficient amphibious shipping to support an amphibious assault over the beaches in a foreign area has been presented adequately earlier in this study. As a result of this problem the USCOMSARC logistical and movement planners concluded that the availability of military or naval craft within the existing military establishment was wholly inadequate for even the initial requirements of Operation Plan 316. As a possible solution, additional sources of shipping of both the LST- and LSD-types would have to be identified by appropriate Naval authorities and plans would have

to be developed to insure the procurement of whatever additional shipping was required to lift the assault elements of the landing force to the objective area. In this regard, CINCLANT did receive authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to place all eleven LST's in the U. S. Navy Reserve Fleet in a Category I condition; i.e., under normal conditions they would be only 25 percent crewed but could be operationally ready within 48 to 72 hours after alert notification. Information available to the Military Sea Transport Service indicated that commercial sources could provide additional amphibious-type shipping and CINCLANT requested the commander of the Military Sea Transport Service to survey and maintain a record of all available vessels. It was the consensus at Headquarters, USCOMARAC, that follow-up action would have to be continuous with regard to the eleven LST's in the U. S. Navy Reserve Fleet and pertinent plans would have to be revised when they were actually made available.

✓ The two roll-on, roll-off vessels had also created numerous problems for the USCOMARAC movements planners and it was felt that plans for their use should be thoroughly reviewed because of the need for special piers at both origin and destination terminals in order to take full advantage of their unique capabilities. Since this limitation rendered the vessels unsuitable for assault operations, their proper use would have to be considered at future surface movements planning conferences. These same movements planning conferences would have to consider the question of water terminals to be used during the execution of the operation plan, both for embarkation of troops and shipment of supplies, as well as receiving terminals in the objective area. USCOMARAC movements planners recommended the development of pertinent plans based on the best over-all estimates of port capabilities, accessibility to the objective area and to the units' home stations or staging areas, and consideration of the estimates of the Defense Traffic Management Service concerning transportation capabilities, and time, distance, and cost factors. The proposed port operations and capability plans would facilitate the development of shipping annexes to the contingency plans and help eliminate guess work in this phase of the planning. National Intelligence Summaries contained considerable suitable information concerning transport capacities of foreign port areas. USCOMARAC recommended to the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army, that terminal representatives have port capabilities studies available during all future surface movements scheduling conferences. It was pointed out at the same time that the tactical concept of any operational plan must take into consideration a requirement to rapidly develop port or other terminal capacities and to exploit existing facilities, elements which were lacking in Operation Plan 318.

✓ One problem of some importance encountered by the logistical planners was that of loading and unloading aircraft under field conditions in the forward area. While work had been underway for some time to develop a satisfactory system for this purpose, a difference of opinion existed between Army and Air Force planners, the Air Force preferred to follow procedures which would allow the best use and handling within its aircraft while the Army preferred to have the equipment fit into its trucks and trailers and to

be able to handle it under field conditions. The major decision facing USCOMSAC in this regard was whether or not the Air Force would perform its assigned mission of loading and unloading the aircraft. If the Air Force was to continue to accept this responsibility, then USCOMSAC would have to decide where the Army would accept control of its personnel and supplies. This problem had been passed to the Department of the Army for consideration at that level.

Of paramount importance to USCOMSAC and particularly to its logistical planning staff was the use of the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) system in connection with contingency plans. It was apparent to the logisticians that the creation of combat forces ready for deployment in support of contingency plans was controlled by a number of factors and, in particular, by the time available for USCOMSAC to complete certain required actions including the tailoring of service support units, reallocation of personnel and critical items of equipment, and arrangements for commercial and military transport for their movement. The USCOMSAC logistical planners were firmly convinced that DEFCON system could and should be the catalyst for these actions since the warning time it was designed to provide created the environment in which improved force readiness could be achieved and, in the field of logistics, its use started a chain of interrelated actions both at USCOMSAC headquarters and within the subordinate commands which was intended to bring the required forces to peak readiness condition. The same DEFCON system initiated actions by other agencies, such as the Military Sea Transport Service, the Military Air Transport Service, and the Defense Traffic Management Service, as well as commercial carriers who controlled the movement resources upon which the Army uniquely depended. It was consequently a valid conclusion that USCOMSAC's readiness depended to a great extent on the margin of warning that it received through the DEFCON system and this matter was presented to both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army for their consideration.

In this same regard, it was pointed out that the lack of implementation of the Department of the Army Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions⁴⁴⁴ had a very serious effect on the logistical readiness of the Command. Long lead times are required in the logistics area to obtain certain supplies, equipment, transportation, and other services and obligation authority must be available as early as possible to reduce this time frame to the absolute minimum. The rapid reaction time desired in readying troops in an emergency could not be slowed merely because the command did not possess authority to expend funds in a timely manner. It appeared only logical that the designation of an appropriate DEFCON status should automatically authorize the expenditure of funds commensurate with the state of emergency and a proper recommendation in this regard was forwarded to Department of the Army.

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See below, pp. 238-39.

✓ One of the most important lessons learned, which was as much concerned with unit training and readiness as it was with logistics, was that of providing support units for the contingency plans. Some units -- such as round-out forces for mechanized divisions -- were not available from active Army reserves and hence could not be made available within the required reaction times. What is more, balanced forces to support night divisions just did not exist in the active Army while certain other units, such as Ground Transportation, did not exist within the CONUS active Army structure. Still other units, such as Transportation Corps detachments and truck companies were not available in sufficient numbers to support the expanded concept of Operation Plan 316. It was apparent to the USCOMARMC Ad Hoc Committee that if rapid reaction times were required for contingency plans, balanced forces would have to be available from the active Army structure to support any particular plan, or a possible combination of plans which might be implemented simultaneously. A possible alternate solution would be to maintain selected U. S. Army Reserve units in a state of readiness comparable to that of active Army units and thus available for an immediate call to active duty. The Ad Hoc Committee recommended a coordinated study of the force structure by USCOMARMC and the Department of the Army and further indicated that there would have to be a national resolve to call up reserves if the active Army was unable to provide the troop units required for the implementation of a particular contingency plan.

Fiscal and Funding Aspects

✓ One of the thorniest problems during the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 -- and one which was to continue to plague USCOMARMC in very areas for some time to come -- was the question of funding the emergency actions required to implement the plan. From a Comptroller standpoint, the Command was fortunate in that the crisis requiring such emergency actions occurred early in the fiscal year. Although USCOMARMC was given authority to exceed its established budget programs, the only possible way of funding the Cuban requirements was by using funds reserved for the latter portion of the fiscal year, thus merely postponing the effects of the problem since ultimate relief would have to be provided in the form of an increased Annual Funding Program (AFP). Once Headquarters, USCOMARMC, embarked on a program for securing essential operations during a fiscal year -- as outlined in its operating program -- the over-all plan was disrupted if this same operating program was used to finance emergency actions. Such a procedure would not possibly work if an emergency occurred during the latter part of the fiscal year. In addition, when the Command was directed to use the available Annual Funding Program to accomplish such actions, limitations such as budget program controls should be automatically lifted and authority granted to USCOMARMC to effect interprogram transfers. At the Comptroller level it was felt that a supplemental Annual Funding Program -- or some other appropriate financing means -- should be immediately provided upon the announcement of an emergency and that these funding actions should be identified separately from the normal, previously programmed operations so as to permit the latter costs to remain as USCOMARMC's budget base for subsequent years.

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✍ A related problem concerned the fact that under normal conditions USCOMSARC was required to furnish a fund citation action to elements of the U. S. Army Materiel Command and the Defense Supply Agency when obtaining various supplies from the depot systems. On the other hand, guidance published by Department of the Army permitted the use of advice codes in lieu of fund citations under emergency conditions which required the procurement of large quantities of supplies and equipment from Stock Funds, Management Funds, and Industrial Funds. Such authority was not given to USCOMSARC during the Cuban Crisis despite the absence of proper departmental guidance and the Command was required to provide funds to the Army Materiel Command and to the Defense Supply Agency for all supplies and equipment drawn to support emergency operations. In addition to being a further drain on already limited resources, this procedure resulted in administrative delays in the execution of emergency actions. Since both of these problem areas were related to the question of a Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions -- as were many others encountered -- USCOMSARC prepared a special set of recommendations for action by the Comptroller of the Army.

Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions

✍ The Ad Hoc Committee received approximately forty lessons learned fact sheets bearing on problems which would never have occurred if they had been considered in the preparation of the current Department of the Army Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions (FMFEC), and if this plan were closely tied in with the various DEPCON's so that at a given period of time, certain steps would automatically be taken in the financial management area. The major criticism of the Department of the Army was that the current plan was never implemented during the Cuban Crisis despite the fact that on numerous occasions USCOMSARC pointed out the resultant financial hardships. As a separate action, USCOMSARC recommended that Department of the Army publish a revised FMFEC which would automatically authorize specific emergency actions whenever a change in the DEPCON status was announced. USCOMSARC specifically requested that standing authority be given to develop an emergency coding supplement to the Army Management Structure with "stand-by" functional cost accounts to be used at the time that the existence of emergency conditions was recognized. Also requested was automatic authority to lift budget program limitations and to exercise financial control at the Army Operations and Maintenance (O&M A) level whenever an emergency operation with a significant dollar impact was initially ordered into effect. Finally, automatic authority was requested to provide for receipt of stock fund supplies in support of emergency operations under appropriate coding without the use of fund citations. In this respect, accounts receivable applicable to such issues should be suspended pending receipt of funds for liquidation. In the same manner, accounts payable applicable to purchases made by Branch Offices from either Army or Defense Supply Agency stock funds should also be suspended pending receipt of funds for liquidation.

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✍ In a similar vein, USCOMARCOM recommended that a policy be established that costs incurred by each service -- whether for itself or for other activities -- be accumulated by the activity furnishing the supplies or services and transferred to the Department of Defense level for appropriate billing. As an alternative, a Standard Inter-service Support Agreement which met the funding and accounting requirements of all services including specific reimbursement procedures should be developed and agreed upon at the Department of Defense level. Such an agreement would preclude inter-service billing at the organization or activity level; support would be rendered on a common service basis, but identity of service costs would not be eliminated. 443

Other Comptroller Area Problems

✍ In the data systems area, it was determined early in the operation that an expanded data processing capability was needed in order to supply General Powell and the subordinate commanders with more timely and accurate information. Needless to say, the manual processing of the voluminous data required for such an operation was very slow and required an excessive amount of overtime work, while simple manual errors were compounded into errors of major proportion. The USCOMARCOM Comptroller therefore recommended that a data processing capability consisting of both man-mounted computers and peripheral equipment be included in any future operations of this type. Since the chain of command for such responsibilities was not clearly defined during the Cuban Crisis, USCOMARCOM would have to determine and assign responsibility for ordering, procuring, and installing the data processing machines, as well as determining the type and quantity required. During the Cuban Crisis operations, various staff offices at Headquarters, USCOMARCOM, were involved in procuring equipment. Third Army also became involved, and some of the equipment was ordered by units on site directly from the manufacturer. Recent alignment of command lines for contingency action resolved some of these problems and USCOMARCOM continued to take action to make an acceptable system available for use.

✍ The omission of disbursing and accounting support from the Army Staging Area Commands was another problem of some importance. Disbursing services was provided on a limited basis by the 16th Finance Disbursing Section by the expedient of dispatching cells from the parent unit to these Army Staging Area Commands since scheduled for the heaviest troop population and centrally located in relation to other Army Staging Area Commands. The same unit, however, could not handle the accounting burden and this was partially solved by the staffs of the Army Staging Area Commands themselves and with such qualified personnel as could be spared by the Peninsula Base Command on a loan basis. The USCOMARCOM Comptroller recommended that the Tables

(1) HQ, USCOMARCOM to G-2, 13 Mar 63, subj: Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions (U). Sp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). (2) Ltr, USCOMARCOM to G-2, 22 Mar 63, subj: as above (U), ADDON (C). Sp. 4. (CONFIDENTIAL). In USCOMARCOM Rpt DLR Files.

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of Distribution for Staging Area Commands include sufficient personnel to handle both disbursing and accounting workloads and that the attempts for this purpose be related to the size of the troop population being served. In addition, Class B agents should be appointed to Finance Disbursing Sections servicing the entire area in which the Army Staging Area Commands were located, and detailed instructions for these purposes were to be written into the Comptroller Annex for USCOMARCOM Operation Plan 316.

✓ But perhaps a problem of more importance to the morale of all troops involved was the fact that many units and individuals arrived at the Army Staging Area Commands without Financial Data Records folders and without a Unit Personnel Officer capability for preparing vouchers and providing reimbursement of pay, allowances, and per diem. In the absence of a unit capability to prepare the proper vouchers, the Peninsula Base Command directed the return of financial data records to base stations for payment either by check, Class A agent, or submission of a completed payroll to the Finance Officer, Peninsula Base Command, for direct payment. The USCOMARCOM Comptroller pointed out in this regard that a need existed for coordinated instructions, issued in advance of the movement of either units or individuals, to insure that current and effective payments were made.

✓ The manner in which the support units were dispatched into the forward area, plus the fact that such units had to be filled with temporary duty personnel, caused certain repercussions in the fiscal area even though the established policy of both the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense should have eliminated such difficulties. For example, per diem allowances were paid to persons on temporary duty with units also on a temporary duty status despite the fact that this procedure was prohibited by the Joint Travel Regulations. Although original orders placing an individual on temporary duty were amended to show that he was attached to a unit in that same category in order to preclude payment of per diem, this procedure was not uniformly applied. Reports reached Headquarters, USCOMARCOM, that individuals from Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, had been paid per diem for their period of temporary duty at Homestead Air Force Base. The entire difficulty could have been avoided by including in the pertinent travel orders the statement, "Per diem not authorized when government quarters are available without charge and government mess is available," which was prescribed by Department of the Army message in June 1962 but never incorporated into Army Regulations. The USCOMARCOM Comptroller reminded the Department of the Army of this discrepancy in the hopes that it would be remedied within the near future.

✓ The final problem in the fiscal area concerned the use of money in the objective area and would have caused some difficulties only if the plan had actually been executed. In the early planning stages, the Department of the Army stipulated that United States dollars would be used for local procurement in the objective area unless the Army Component Commander felt that the use of local currency would facilitate the accomplishment of his mission, but if local currency was used, it was to be obtained at the most favorable rate possible. After the XVIII Airborne Commander decided that he would use local currency for these purposes, he was advised by the USARLANT

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commander that any required local currency would be requisitioned from local banks on a hand receipt basis. Such requisitioning of local currency, in lieu of exchange for dollars, created a situation wherein appropriated funds would not have been used even though they were available for obligation and expenditure. In the event that the plan was executed, disbursing officers using this procedure would have had to resort to the use of informal records to account for all requisitioned indigenous currencies. The USCOMSAC Comptroller concluded that, for the sake of control and uniform reporting, a need existed for standardized procedures for acquiring, controlling, using, and reporting such currencies.

Shortcomings of Airborne Control

At the time that contingency planning for the Cuban area was initiated, the concept of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) was that it should be an airborne combat force capable of air movement to any trouble spot in the world. These forces were under the direct command of XVIII Airborne Corps which acted as USCOMSAC's planning agent for all contingency plans in which they might become involved. But by mid-1962 this concept had changed to include conventional Infantry and Armored forces, and a second Corps headquarters -- III Corps -- was activated as the ground counterpart of the airborne corps. The expansion of Operation Plan 316 added two Infantry divisions and an Armored division to the assault troops which remained under the command of the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps. At the end of the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, developed several major criticisms of this strictly airborne command situation. He pointed out that the existing Field SOP of the XVIII Airborne Corps provided inadequate guidance for an Armored division since it was directed toward the command, control, and reporting procedures of airborne units which, in most cases, did not apply to an Armored division. He consequently recommended that the Field SOP be revised so as to include standard operating procedures which would be applicable to Infantry and Armored divisions as well as to Airborne divisions. The 1st Armored Division commander also pointed out that STRAC logistical instructions were intended to outline the general readiness posture to be maintained by all STRAC units but that the only existing STRAC logistical instructions applicable to Operation Plan 316 were those published by XVIII Airborne Corps and oriented toward airborne and airdropped-type units. As a final recommendation in this regard, he requested that new STRAC logistical instructions applicable to all STRAC units be developed and published at the USCOMSAC level.⁴⁴⁴

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Eq. 1st Armd Div The Role of the 1st Armored Division in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U), Part II, pp. 4 and 7. Gp. 4. (SECRET). In DOSTA Hist Br Files.

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Command and Control Functions⁴⁴⁷

✓ Numerous difficulties in the area of command and control functions were attributable to the very magnitude of the plan itself, the many and rapid changes to the plan, the shift in command responsibility for execution of the plan, and the addition of missions by the Department of the Army. It was apparent to the USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee that a majority of the lessons learned comments submitted by both USCOMSAC staff offices and agencies and the subordinate commands dealt with the various aspects of command relationships and responsibilities. What is more, the USCOMSAC command picture appeared confused even to the committee itself.

✓ The major change in command relationships for CINCLANT Operation Plan 316 occurred on 16 October 1962 when a theater-type command structure was established and service commanders in chief were superimposed over the original component task force commanders. As the command structure for the operation of U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, evolved, two new headquarters were established in the Florida area, the Peninsula Base Command, which assumed command of the Army Staging Area Commands from Third Army, and USARLANT Forward, the principal mission of which was to provide a forward base for operations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command, in the event that it became necessary for him to control his forces from the forward area. The relationships between these three headquarters -- USARLANT Forward, Third Army, and Peninsula Base Command -- were never clearly or formally delineated. The USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee logically concluded that USARLANT command relationships were ill-defined and did not make efficient use of the existing command structures; a more formal delineation of the command relationships between the three headquarters indicated above should have been forthcoming. What is more, the command primacy of the Commanding General, Third Army, in the southeastern area of the United States was not respected. Many recommendations indicated that the control of the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 should have been decentralized from Headquarters, USCOMSAC, to the Commanding General, Third Army, with the 1d logistical Command (Peninsula Base Command) placed under his operational control.

✓ One of the serious difficulties encountered in this area was the fact that competing demands for support personnel at USARLANT Forward, the various Army Staging Area Commands and for the execution of the Joint Defense Plan for the Florida Keys area (JDF-FLAK) resulted in the use of

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Entire paragraph based on: DP, DCSAIR to CofS, 3 Mar 63, subj: Lessons Learned, OPLAN 316 (U), ATUTE M160; w/Inv, 841 Study, subj: Command Relationships, OPLAN 316 Op. 4. (SECRET). In DCSAIR 960 Div files.

school troops for certain of these roles. The use of school troops, as well as individual members of school faculties jeopardized the continued operation of the schools from which they were withdrawn. But perhaps an even more serious problem concerning these factors was that they prevented the accomplishment of many of the actions pertaining to the day-to-day operations of Headquarters, USCOMARAC. In the event that Operation Plan 316 had been executed, USCOMARAC would have been required to implement its mobilization mission for units and individuals of the reserve component; to continue to be responsive to the requirements of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command, for other operations plans; to suspend its training center and school functions; and to accomplish its normal responsibilities to the Department of the Army to include the ground defense of the United States. A reasonable doubt consequently existed in the minds of many concerned with this problem that Headquarters, USCOMARAC, could have effectively and efficiently discharged its multiple missions and simultaneously executed Operation Plan 316. It is a safe conclusion that the multiple missions would have suffered in an emergency situation.

With regard to USARLANT Forward, the Ad Hoc Committee announced that a thorough study of the matter had failed to justify the establishment of that headquarters, particularly on such a lavish scale, on the basis of military necessity. Since the major argument put forward for the creation of this headquarters was that USARLANT would also be operating from a forward base, that headquarters was contacted for information concerning its forward operations under Operation Plan 316. Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, pointed out that General Sweeney's presence would be required in the forward area for Operation Plan 312 but that for that purpose he intended to use a "Battle Staff" consisting of only twelve to fifteen officers at the forward location where they would be furnished operational support by Headquarters, Nineteenth Air Force. General Sweeney and this "Battle Staff" intended to remain at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, only for the duration of Operation Plan 312 and planned return to Langley Air Force Base immediately upon its completion. The phasing of Operation Plan 312 into Operation Plan 316 would be decentralized to the Nineteenth Air Force which would continue operating from Homestead Air Force Base. The Nineteenth Air Force was the Air Force Task Force under the Commander in Chief, USARLANT, and was the operating counterpart of the XVIII Airborne Corps on the Army side of the picture. It was stated by Air Force spokesmen that concern for General Sweeney's other command responsibilities as Commanding General, U. S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, precluded the full-time location of his headquarters at Homestead Air Force Base during the period that Operation Plan 316 was implemented. If, as originally stated, the main reason for USARLANT Forward was the presence of General Sweeney's headquarters in the forward area, the fact that General Sweeney would return to Langley Air Force Base for Operation Plan 316 required General Powell's presence at Fort Monroe rather than in Florida. Thus, no justification existed for the establishment of USARLANT Forward on the basis of military necessity. What is more, the establishment of USARLANT Forward at Homestead Air Force Base on an elaborate scale would deprive XVIII Airborne Corps of required operational space and communications facilities.

✓ On the positive side of the picture, the success of Operation ROLL UP at the end of November 1963 gave an indication as to how the concept of USARLANT command relationships should have worked. The USCOMSAC/USARLANT staff developed the basic concept for withdrawal of Army forces, coordinated it with Third Army in a planning conference, and assigned the resultant mission to the Commanding General, Third Army. Peninsular Base Command (2d Logistical Command) was placed under the operational control of the Third Army Commander for the execution of Operation ROLL UP, a command arrangement which proved to be both workable and effective. Pre-positioned Army forces, the presence of which was no longer required, were withdrawn and returned to their home stations with only a minimum of participation by Headquarters, USCOMSAC.

✓ As a result of thorough review and consideration, the USCOMSAC Ad Hoc Committee made a separate report on the question of command and control relationships in which they recommended that the Commanding General, USCOMSAC, make use of the principle of decentralization within the existing command structure. As a first move in this direction, General Powell should assign to the Commanding General, Third Army, the mission of organizing, operating, and controlling the Army Staging Area Commands, with USCOMSAC furnishing concept guidance only and requiring a study to determine how the Third Army commander would accomplish his mission and at which point in time the mission would cease. The 2d Logistical Command would have to be attached to Third Army as required for the execution of Operation Plan 316 but this was visualized as being only during the deployment phase of the plan. The Commanding General, Third Army, should also be assigned responsibility for movement of tactical units into the Army Staging Area Commands as required by the approved movements schedule, and should be permitted, after proper coordination with USCOMSAC and XVIII Airborne Corps, to use the units of the Go-call Echelon of the Operation Plan 316 Troop List for the initial operation of the Army Staging Area Commands. Coordination and direction of the unloading phase of Operation Plan 316 should be decentralized to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, with the 2d Logistical Command most probably assigned to a direct support mission until after Joint Task Force, Cuba, was activated. As a final recommendation, the Committee suggested that the composition and location of USARLANT headquarters be resolved by separate action. (This latter recommendation was the subject of a separate study by the USCOMSAC Comptroller with the final report to be completed at a later date.)

Recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee

✓ Since the review of lessons learned during the partial implementation of Operation Plan 316 was intended mainly as an exercise to determine ways to improve that plan, as well as any other contingency plans to which the same lessons might apply, the staff agencies took immediate steps to correct the problem areas that were so delineated. By the time that the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee had been prepared, coordinated and approved in May 1964, many of the lessons learned areas had been reported separately as having been acted upon in such a way that they were no longer considered a problem of

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major importance for extensive and intensive consideration by the entire command. Consequently, the first of three final recommendations by the Ad Hoc Committee stated that those lessons learned items which had been reported separately should be considered as having been completed or that action had been initiated which obviated the necessity for further active command consideration.

✍ Many problems, however, remained which could not be settled by staff action at the USCOMMAC level or which required continued surveillance at that level to insure that actions were instituted by the proper command echelon, or that proper equipment, personnel, and the like were provided in order to correct the problem areas indicated in the lessons learned items. This category of items was reported in detail and included in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee, which recommended that action be continued on such lessons learned items by the USCOMMAC staff section having primary interest until such time as the problem areas which engendered them were successfully resolved.

✍ As was indicated earlier in this chapter, it was evident to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee that many of the problem areas commented upon in the lessons learned reports both of the USCOMMAC staff agencies and the subordinate commands were common to the implementation of contingency plans and not isolated instances resulting from Operation Plan 316. In order to preserve the efficacy of the lessons lessons learned in this exercise and to prevent their repetition in any future operations, the Committee developed a check list for use in the various headquarters staff areas -- personnel, intelligence, operations and training, logistics, and comptroller activities -- to determine the completeness of any particular contingency plan. (See Appendix A). As its final recommendation, the USCOMMAC Ad Hoc Committee recommended that the proposed check list be approved and included as an integral part of its final report for use in all future operations involving contingency plans.

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GLOSSARY

AATCC	-	Army Air Traffic Control Center
Abn	-	Airborne
ACC	-	Army Component Command(er)
ACL	-	Allowable Cargo Loads
ADWOM	-	Advanced Operations (USAF)
AFB	-	Air Force Base
AFHS	-	Armed Forces Recruiting and Induction Station
AFP	-	Annual Filing Program
AIT	-	Advanced Individual Training
AMC	-	Army USAMC
ANGUSO	-	Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ANTCOM	-	Artillery Command
APC	-	Army Petroleum Command
APGE	-	Aerial Port of Embarkation
APT	-	Army Postal Unit
ARE	-	Armored Rifle Battalion
Armd	-	Armored
ASA	-	Army Security Agency
ASAC	-	Army Sizing Area Command
ASCP	-	U. S. Army Strategic Capabilities Plan
ASL	-	Authorized Stockage List
ATD	-	Air Traffic Director
ATF	-	Army Task Force
ATGM	-	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AW	-	Automatic Weapons
BAC	-	Barge, Amphibious, Resupply, Cargo
BAC	-	Battle Airborne School
BCT	-	Basic Combat Training
Bde	-	Brigade
BOL	-	Beach Blotchart Lighter
BO	-	Battle Group
BL	-	Block Lines
BFO	-	Base Post Office
BUT	-	Basic Unit Training
CA	-	Civil Affairs; <u>also</u> Combat Area
CAISU	-	Combined Airdocking Support Unit
CAN	-	Commercial Air Movement
CARIBOON	-	U. S. Caribbean Command (Joint Command)
CC	-	Combat Command
CCT	-	Combat Control Team
CHOP	-	Change of Operational Control
CINCPACFLT	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic Command
CINCPACSTRIKE	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Forces, Strike Command

CINCARIB	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Caribbean Command (SagP CINCSOUTH)
CINCLANT	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command
CINCLANTSTRIKE	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command
CINCLANT	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Command
CINCLANTFLT	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (U. S. Navy)
CINCOMNAV	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Navy Forces, Atlantic Command
CINCOMAS	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Continental Air Defense Command
CINCOMSTRIDE	-	Commander in Chief, U. S. Strike Command
CJTF	-	Commander, Joint Task Force
CNO	-	Chief of Naval Operations
COA	-	Current Operating Allowances; <u>Alig</u> Comptroller of the Army
COMANTDEFCON	-	Commander, Antiair Defense Command
COMCEN	-	Communications Center
COMJUNTA	-	Commander, Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command
COMFROGRU	-	Commander, Amphibious Group (U. S. Navy)
COMFLEMLANT	-	Commander, Atlantic Amphibious Forces (U. S. Navy)
COMSECNOFLEET	-	Commander, U. S. Second Fleet (U. S. Navy)
COMSES	-	Commander, Military Sea Transport Service
COMSTANTAREA	-	Commander, Military Sea Transport Service, Atlantic Area
COMTAC	-	Commander, Tactical Air Command (USAF)
COMAD	-	U. S. Continental Air Defense Command
COP	-	Command Outpost
CPX	-	Command Post Exercise
CoS A	-	Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
CTF	-	Commander, Task Force
CTU	-	Commander, Task Unit
DCGRF	-	Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces (UNCOMARC)
DCSUTR	-	Deputy Chief of Staff for Unit Training and Readiness
DEFCON	-	Defense Readiness Condition
DRFC	-	Division Ready Force
DS	-	Direct Support
DSA	-	Defense Supply Agency
DTC	-	Date Time Group
DTMS	-	Defense Traffic Management Service
DS	-	Drop Zone
EOC	-	Emergency Operations Center
ETS	-	Expiration of Term of Service
EUSA	-	Eighth U. S. Army
FPA	-	Forward Floating Depot
FMPEC	-	Financial Management Plan for Emergency Conditions
FTX	-	Field Training Exercise
GOP	-	Group Observer Post
GS	-	General Support

EAAT	-	Hampton Roads Army Terminal
IACC	-	Interim Army Component Command(er)
IFC	-	Integrated Fire Control
IRF	-	Immediate Ready Force
ISA	-	Intermediate Staging Base
JAAT	-	Joint Airborne Advance Party
JCRMILANT	-	Joint Central Graves Registration Office, Atlantic Command
JCS	-	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS-FLAK	-	Joint Defense Plan, Florida Keys
JOSEP	-	Joint Operations Report
JSCP	-	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTF	-	Joint Task Force
JUNTPA	-	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic Command
LAFFET	-	U. S. Atlantic Fleet (U. S. Navy)
LCH	-	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCH	-	Landing Craft, Utility
LCC	-	Logistical Operations Center
LDB	-	Landing Ship, Dock
LST	-	Landing Ship, Tank
LS	-	Landing Zone
MAAG	-	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAID	-	Military Authorization Identification Number
MATS	-	Military Air Transport Service
MDM	-	Military District of Washington
MEB	-	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	-	Marine Expeditionary Force
METS	-	Minimum Equipment for Training Requirements
MSE	-	Materials Handling Equipment
ML	-	Missile Loads
MOS	-	Military Occupational Specialty
MSTS	-	Military Sea Transport Service
NAS	-	Naval Air Station
NICP	-	National Inventory Control Point
OAS	-	Organization of American States
OCaT	-	Office of the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army
OUT	-	On-the-job training
OAM A	-	Organization and Maintenance, Army
OPLAN	-	Operation Plan
OPG	-	Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army
OSA	-	Overseas Supply Agency; <u>Also</u> Office of the Secretary of the Army

ODD	-	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTS	-	Over-the-hatch
POC	-	Peninsula Base Command
PCS	-	Permanent Change of Station
PLL	-	Prescribed Loads List
POE	-	Port of Embarkation
POL	-	Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (Class III)
PMH	-	Preparation for Overseas Movement
PMR	-	Preparation for Overseas Replacement
PLANG	-	Peoples Liberation Army National Guard
RFA	-	Rear Area Force Act
RLT	-	Rolling Liquid Transporter
ROAD	-	Reorganization of Army Divisions
ROCAD	-	Reorganization of Current Armored Divisions
ROOLD	-	Reorganization of Current Infantry Divisions
ROSO	-	Roll-on, Roll-off (RoRo)
SAC	-	Strategic Area Command, <u>Also</u> Strategic Air Command (USAF)
SAM	-	Special Air Mission; <u>Also</u> Surface-to-air missiles
SARE	-	Special Airfield Requirement Document
SASF	-	Special Ammunition Supply Point
Secp	-	Security
SEUS	-	Southwestern United States
SFG	-	Special Forces Group
SITREP	-	Situation Report
SIC	-	Reg: <u>SHADOC</u>
SOA	-	Secretary of the Army
SOB	-	Secretary of Defense
SPAWARCS	-	U. S. Army Special Warfare Center
SSB	-	Single Side Band
STRAC	-	Strategic Army Command (<u>Formerly</u> Corps)
STRAF	-	Strategic Army Forces
TAC	-	Tactical Air Command (USAF)
TACLOG	-	Tactical Logistical Command
TARE	-	Tactical Aircraft Support Element
TCS	-	Temporary Change of Station
TDS	-	Temporary Duty
TF	-	Task Force
TFP	-	Task Force <u>CHARLIE</u>
TOC	-	Tactical Operations Center
TP	-	Timing Points
TU	-	Task Unit
USAA	-	Third U. S. Army
UNL	-	Universal Mission Load
USAFANT	-	U. S. Air Force; Atlantic Command

USAFS TRKE	-	U. S. Air Forces, Strike Command
USAMC	-	U. S. Army Materiel Command
USARMCDCM	-	U. S. Army Air Defense Command
USARCAKIE	-	U. S. Army, Caribbean Command (<u>Reg:</u> USARCSOUTH)
USARCOMC	-	U. S. Army Communications Zone
USAREUR	-	U. S. Army, Europe
USARPAN	-	U. S. Army, Hawaii
USARLANT	-	U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic Command
USARPAC	-	U. S. Army, Pacific
USARCSOUTH	-	U. S. Army, Southern Command (<u>formerly</u> USARCAKIE)
USASSTRIKE	-	U. S. Army Forces, Strike Command
USARTIS	-	U. S. Army, Ryukyu Islands
USASMC	-	U. S. Army Supply and Maintenance Command
USATC	-	U. S. Army Training Center; <u>also</u> U. S. Army Transportation Center
USATTC-SEA	-	U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Command - Southeastern Activity
USATTCGA	-	U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Atlantic
USATTCG	-	U. S. Army Transportation Terminal Command, Gulf
USAE	-	U. S. Army-owned rail cars
USNS	-	U. S. Navy Ship
USSTRICOM	-	U. S. Strike Command
USC	-	Unconventional Warfare Base
WE	-	War Room

APPENDIX A

OPERATION PLAN CHECK LIST

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LESSONS LEARNED

OPLAN CHECK LIST

DCS-PER 40000

Does this plan include or make provision for:

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Division Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Maintenance of unit strength		
	a. Loss estimates and reports		
	b. Disposition of records		
	c. Reports required, submission		
	d. Replacement of combat losses		
	e. Fill of units		
2	Personnel Management		
	a. Promotion, transfer		
	b. POW-Collection, processing, safe-guarding		
	c. Civilian personnel-sources, use, procurement, administration		
3	Manpower management		
4	Morale		
	a. Love, Rest, Recreation, PX, Legal, Welfare		
	b. Awards and decorations		
	c. Graves registration		
	d. Postal services		
5	Maintenance of Discipline, Law, and Order		

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Division</u> <u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
5	a. Conduct, appearance, off limits b. Military justice, stragglers c. Civilian relations		
6	Headquarters Management		
7	Miscellaneous a. Safety b. Education c. Dependents d. Marriage e. Administrative matters f. Courier service-aircraft, officers		

OSCAR CHECK LIST

DOCTRINE ASPECT

Does this plan include or make provisions for:

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subitem</u>	<u>Division</u> <u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Map Supply		
	a. Are sufficient maps available?		
	b. Are maps for air vehicles stocked on post?		
	c. Are instructions adequate for initial release and distribution of operational maps to units?		
2	Military intelligence linguists		
	a. Does plan include specific linguist requirements by grade, MOS and language authorized each MI unit?		
	b. If requirements exceed capabilities of MI linguist pools, are pre-set and prepared messages available or procedure qualified personnel from other COMUS sources.		
3	Security		
	Are instructions included for downgrading security classification of the plan at specific stages of implementation?		
4	Is aerial photographic and interpretation support adequate?		
	a. Has liaison been established with AF reconnaissance elements?		

Item No.

Subject

Responsibilities Remarks

b. Are the Army and AF air recon.
processing elements co-located?

3 Is authorization included for the use of
intelligence contingency funds?

8 Are the essential elements of information
(EEI) current?

OPPLAN CHECK LIST

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ASPECT

Does this plan include or make provisions for:

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>DIVISION</u> <u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Reserve Component Units required for the execution <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Have specific units been selected?b. Has DA been asked to approve this list?c. Has DA agreed to mobilize these forces if the plan is executed?		
2	Deployment Instructions prepared for (transmission letters) all units not receiving OPPLAN: Do employment instructions contain specific special training requirements?		
3	Minimum acceptable readiness categories proposed by the employment commander <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. Are units assigned to the plan assigned appropriate REDCAT?b. Do all units meet this REDCAT?c. If no, have these limitations been brought to CINCPACFLT or DA attention as applicable to this plan?		
4	Downgrading security classification at some specific stage of execution		
5	Units that will require reorganization before the plan can be executed		

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
3	a. Medical personnel b. Census registration units c. Linguists d. Other TOE changes e. Are army commanders aware of these actions? f. Will they require additional personnel and logistical support? g. COMIN Operating Units		
4	The pre-positioning of units prior to execution a. Is this necessary for the successful execution in the time envisioned by the plan? b. Has DA been asked to release authority to direct movement to this headquarters? c. Has DA been asked to release any funds required to execute pre-positioning actions at the time required?		
5	Changing priorities of post support, school support, and training centers, if required		
6	Command and control lines that are in accordance with the USCOM&C basic plan If not, is this fact specifically covered with clear delineation?		
7	Operational terms such as "attachment" fully supportable by administrative and logistical procedures in being.		

Item 82

Subject

Responsibilities

Remarks

- 10 Instructions or items in the plan not in accordance with the USMC/MC Basic Plan, regulation, or other document and are these items clearly identified as being an exception?
- 11 Instructions for the exchange of liaison officers.
- 12 Pre-cut and prepared messages that will facilitate the execution of this plan.

Have they been included in an annex to the plan?

- 13 TD units with an established strength and priority.
- 14 Those elements of units not required for the plan.

What is the disposition of these fragmented elements remaining behind?

- 15 Units that are not available but are required for this plan.
- a. Has the non-availability of units been evaluated by the employment commander?
- b. Has DA and CINCPAC been informed of this evaluation?

- 16 Code words

Will the use of code words facilitate the execution of the plan?

- 17 Clearly stating who will be responsible for directing movement in the deployment phase.

In the employment phase.

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Division</u> <u>Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
18	Distribution of sufficient copies to satisfy the needs of commanders in the event of execution. Should additional copies be made available in sealed containers at additional headquarters?		
19	The use of Toxic chemicals. Their logistical support requirements.		
20	The use of atomic weapons. Their logistical support requirements.		
21	The use of other classified ammunition. Their logistical support requirements.		
22	Possible joint usage of communications centers and facilities by more than one agency.		
23	Will existing DEFOUR message support this plan?		

OPLAN CHECK LIST

LOGISTICS ASSEX

Does this plan include or make provisions for:

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Division Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Does Troop List contain adequate Combat Service Support units?		
	a. Are these units available within STRAF?		
	b. Does implementation contemplate call up and use of Reserve Component units? If so, has necessary DA approval been obtained.		
	c. Will non-available (OPVAL) units seriously affect implementation of plan?		
2	are types and quantities of unit accompanying supplies properly identified and in accordance with existing directives?		
	a. Is method of automatic resupply, to include transition to normal resupply clearly stated?		
	b. Are authorized levels stated?		
	c. Are any peculiar cross service agreements for resupply clearly stated?		
3	Will prepositioning of supplies or equipment be required?		
	a. If prepositioning is required are requirements clearly identified, to include location of such prepositioning?		
	b. Will prepositioning require coordination with other services?		

- 4 Is there a requirement for intermediate staging of forces?
- a. If staging is required is the responsible headquarters designated to operate staging bases?
 - b. Has responsible headquarters prepared an adequate supporting plan, to include requirements which are beyond his capabilities?
 - c. Have identified requirements of responsible headquarters been satisfied, to include nonaction of specific units not available within his command?
- 5 Are maintenance policies clearly stated?
- 6 Are instructions for establishing transportation requirements adequate - For air - For sea?
- a. Are responsibilities of various headquarters and agencies clearly stated?
 - b. Is there a requirement for port operation and if so is responsibility clearly fixed?
- 7 Will the plan require the establishment of any Class IV operational projects, to include execution of projects for base development?
- Have such projects been initiated?
- 8 Has an overall review of the complete logistical annex been made, to include necessary participation by all concerned?

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LESSONS LEARNED

OPPLAN CHECK LIST

CONTROLLER ANNER

Does this plan include or make provisions for:

<u>Item No</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Division Responsibilities</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Have adequate Finance Unit(s) been assigned for the mission? Has paying jurisdiction of each been established by organization and/or physical boundaries?		
2	Have provisions been made for payment of troops. a. At home station b. In staging area c. In objective area?		
3	Have provisions been made delineating travel entitlement and travel payment responsibility?		
4	Have provisions been made as to responsibilities for payment of commercial accounts at various levels/areas?		
5	Have provisions for the payment of indigenous personnel been made?		
6	Have provisions been made for emergency payments to dependents utilizing allowances and/or direct emergency payments?		
7	Have provisions been made for Staff Finance and Public Finance Services?		
8	Have currency controls been provided to include types of currency to be used within the various areas included in the plan for? a. Commercial transactions		

Item No

Subject

- b. Troop payments
- c. Exchange facilities?
- 9 Has the utilization of the following been considered?
 - a. Class A agents.
 - b. Class B agents.
 - c. Inquest Fund Cashiers.
- 10 Has the possibility of utilization of "General Allotments" and/or "Bulk Commitments" been considered?
- 11 Have provisions been made as to the level at which, and the degree to which, accounting, under the Financial Management Plan, will be performed?
- 12 Have provisions been made establishing levels thru/to which funds will be distributed and from/thru which Status of Funds Reports will be prepared/forwarded?
- 13 Have reporting requirements and reporting channels been established to include condition of accounts?
- 14 Have functions to be mechanized and degree of mechanization of such functions been established?
- 15 Are reporting installations and/or activities directed to be prepared to substantiate reported costs?
- 16 Are instructions concerning the format pertaining to reporting costs included?
- 17 Is the CPAS conducive to mechanization?

APPENDIX B


TABLE

JOINT MILITARY HEALTH PLAN



Figure 1-1

- a. JOINT MILITARY HEALTH PLAN (JMP) IS A PLAN COVERING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AND IS A PLAN COVERING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.
- b. INTERMEDIATE JOINT MILITARY HEALTH PLAN (IJMP) IS A PLAN COVERING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AND IS A PLAN COVERING THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.



1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

LOCATION OF BATTLE SHIPS (1914)




1914

Map of Battle at the same as the previous map, with the addition of the location of the battle ships in 1914.


1. 1914 2. 1915 3. 1916 4. 1917

1998 WATSON LIGHTSHEET -- OPERATING YEAR 2011 (REPS)



PRE-POSITIONED FORCES

PARACHUTE DROPPING



~~SECRET~~

Sources:

MAPs No. 1, 2, and 3: By 81st Aeron Div, The Role of the 81st Airborne Division in the Cuban Crisis, 1962 (U). Cp. 3. (TOP SECRET - Maps are SECRET).

MAPs No. 4, 5, 6, and 7: Briefing for Def Sub-Com, House Com on Approp, by Gen. M. B. Powell, CG USCOMSAC, 21 Jan 63, mbp; Review of the Cuban Situation. Cp. 3. (TOP SECRET - Classifications of the maps are as indicated.)

~~SECRET~~